

Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture

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Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture

Brandenburg-Swedish Relations
in the Seventeenth Century

By

Daniel Riches



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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>ABr</i>	<i>Acta Brandenburgica. Brandenburgische Regierungsakten seit der Begründung des Geheimen Rates.</i> Four volumes, ed. Melle Klinkenberg. Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für die Provinz Brandenburg und die Reichshauptstadt Berlin III. Berlin: Kommissionsverlag von Gsellius, 1927–1930.
<i>ADB</i>	<i>Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie.</i> Fifty-six volumes. Leipzig and München: Duncker & Humblot, 1875–1912.
<i>BBL</i>	<i>Brandenburgisches Biographisches Lexikon.</i> Edited by Friedrich Beck and Eckart Henning. Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2002.
GStA PK	Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin
HHStA	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna
KA	Svenska Krigsarkivet, Stockholm
KB	Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm
<i>NDB</i>	<i>Neue Deutsche Biographie.</i> Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1971–.
<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Protokolle und Relationen des Brandenburgischen Geheimen Rathes aus der Zeit des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm.</i> Seven volumes, ed. Otto Meinardus. Publicationen aus den K. Preußischen Staatsarchiven, volumes 41, 54, 55, 66, 80, 89, 91. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1889–1919.
RA	Svenska Riksarkivet, Stockholm
<i>RAOSoB</i>	<i>Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling.</i> Multi-volumes. Utgifna af Kongl. Vitterhets- Historie- och Antiquitets-Akademien. Stockholm, 1888–.
SBB PK	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin
<i>SBL</i>	<i>Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon.</i> Stockholm, 1918–.
<i>UA</i>	<i>Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg.</i> Twenty-three volumes. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1864–1930.
UUB	Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek, Uppsala

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INTRODUCTION

PROTESTANT COSMOPOLITANISM AND DIPLOMATIC CULTURE

This book proposes a new understanding of early modern European diplomacy through the study of Brandenburg's relations with Sweden in the seventeenth century. It builds upon the rich foundations laid down by the 'new diplomatic history' while at the same time taking the movement in unexplored directions. The foremost intention of the book is to speak to those interested in understanding the nature of relations between early modern polities in general while remaining engaged throughout with the respective Prusso-German and Swedish national historiographies.

My analysis rests on the claim that the historiographical separation of early modern diplomacy from the intellectual, cultural, and religious contexts in which it was embedded is insupportable, and suggests a focus on the diverse range of individuals involved in crafting a diplomatic relationship 'on the ground' to recapture these elements. Centering a study on the level of diplomatic actors rather than on high politics alone reveals that the actual functioning of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy cannot be understood as the collision of states' interests and the institutional apparatus constructed to carry them forward, but rather as an aggregate of personal interactions carried out via mobile and transnational networks of figures whose activities were informed by their educational backgrounds, intellectual and cultural interests, religious convictions, and webs of personal connections. This claim requires defining 'diplomat' broadly to include not only formally-credentialed representatives of governments, but also the numbers of officers, bureaucrats, clergymen, merchants and scholars involved in creating and servicing the relationship over time and giving it its particular flavor.¹ The core of the book examines the formation of this northern European diplomatic class and the particular diplomatic culture shared by many of its members that was based in a cosmopolitan (yet

¹ A similar call for an expanded definition of those involved in early modern diplomatic activity is made in Heidrun Kugeler, Christian Sepp, and Georg Wolf, "Einführung: Internationale Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ansätze und Perspektiven," in Kugeler, Sepp, and Wolf (eds.), *Internationale Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit: Ansätze und Perspektiven* (Hamburg: Lit, 2006), 9–35, here 23–24.

decidedly Protestant) worldview that transcended the narrow boundaries of state, dynasty and confession.

It has become almost clichéd for diplomatic historians to begin their works with a reflection on the recent past of the field. The trajectory they trace is almost always the same: precipitous decline, starting with the 1960s social history turn and accelerated by the 1970s linguistic turn, from the lofty (if admittedly undeserved and flawed) heights traditional diplomatic history had once commanded; marginalization in the following decades to the edges of the discipline as a recalcitrant dinosaur representing all that is wrong with history innocent of sophistication and focused narrowly on great men and their grand actions; and then finally the twinklings of rebirth from the 1990s of a diplomatic history in new theoretical and methodological garb that atones for the field's past sins and demonstrates the enduring value of diplomatic material to the broader concerns of the historical profession at large.² The fact that the new diplomatic history is often introduced in the form of a ritualized denunciation of how diplomatic history used to be written says much about the lingering need to justify our interests that many diplomatic historians continue to feel.

Nonetheless, scholars of early modern Europe—and not only diplomatic historians by training—have shown undeniable optimism in recent years about the potential of rehabilitated diplomatic history to pose

² For a few examples, see Arno Strohmeyer, "Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzenerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert: Forschungsstand—Erträge—Perspektiven," in Strohmeyer and Michael Rohrschneider (eds.), *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzenerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007), 1–50, esp. 1–5; Kugeler, Sepp, and Wolf, "Einführung," esp. 9–14; Sven Externbrink, "Internationale Politik in der Frühen Neuzeit: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung zu Diplomatie und Staatensystem," in Hans-Christoph Kraus and Thomas Nicklas (eds.), *Geschichte der Politik: alte und neue Wege*, Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 44 (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 15–39; Heiko Droste, "Diplomacy as a Means of Cultural Transfer in Early Modern Times: the Swedish evidence," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, nr. 2 (June 2006), 144–50; Lucien Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 7–12; Karl W. Schweizer and Matt J. Schumann, "The Revitalization of Diplomatic History: renewed reflections," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 19 (2008), 149–86. For a more detailed account that situates the rise and fall of the history of foreign relations within long-term characteristics of German historiography, see Eckart Conze, "Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der internationalen Politik," in Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper, and Guido Müller (eds.), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 15–43. As early as 1982 Gordon A. Craig spoke in his presidential address to the American Historical Association of the need for diplomatic history to add analytical sophistication and engage with theory in order to fend off creeping irrelevance. Craig, "The Historian and the Study of International Relations," *American Historical Review* 88, nr. 1 (February 1983), 1–11.

new and creative questions that speak to a wide array of issues beyond the traditional purview of the field. The historian Mary Lindemann has written of the “discreet charm” of diplomatic sources to yield insights of value to social, cultural, and economic historians.³ Literary scholars have gravitated towards the study of diplomatic texts as semiotically-rich objects that offer a privileged view of the intersections between literary form and political culture, and of the dynamics of interaction between cultures.⁴ Political scientists and international relations theorists have looked to early modern Europe to construct innovative studies that forward ambitious, wide-ranging claims in their fields.⁵ One historian has gone so far as to suggest that the once-despised theory of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ may be making a comeback, while another has written of diplomatic history that “Clio’s anemic patient is alive and kicking.”⁶ Indeed, the distinguished German historian Winfried Schulze has declared with some satisfaction that the history of foreign relations “is in high demand.”⁷ The aspirations of the current study vis-à-vis the reformed diplomatic history to which it is indebted and which has produced such enthusiasm therefore merit discussion.

³ Mary Lindemann, “The Discreet Charm of the Diplomatic Archive,” *German History* 29, nr. 2 (June 2011), 283–304. Gordon Craig, in reference to modern diplomacy, had earlier written of the “pleasure” of research in diplomatic documents. Craig, “On the Pleasure of Reading Diplomatic Correspondence,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, nr. 3/4 (September 1991), 369–84.

⁴ Timothy Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy: literature and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009); Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani (eds.), *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: mediation, transmission, traffic, 1550–1700* (Farnham, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). See also Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). For historians’ use of diplomatic sources to investigate perceptions of the ‘other’, see Strohmeier and Rohrschneider (eds.), *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden*; Ernst Schütz, *Die Gesandtschaft Großbritanniens am Immerwährenden Reichstag zu Regensburg und am kur(pfalz-)bayerischen Hof zu München 1683–1806* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007), esp. part D.

⁵ Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: religious conflict, dynastic empires, and international change* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009); Mai’a K. Davis Cross, *The European Diplomatic Corps: diplomats and international cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁶ Brendan Simms, “The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy,” *German History* 21, nr. 3 (2003), 275–91; Karina Urbach, “Diplomatic History Since the Cultural Turn,” *The Historical Journal* 46, nr. 4 (2003), 991–97, here 991.

⁷ “Außenpolitik—so können wir ohne großes Risiko feststellen—hat Konjunktur.” Winfried Schulze, “Dimensionen der europäischen Außenpolitik zur Zeit der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert,” in Friedrich Beiderbeck, Gregor Horstkemper, and Winfried Schulze (eds.), *Dimensionen der europäischen Außenpolitik zur Zeit der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003), 23–33, here 26.

The New Diplomatic History

The new diplomatic history is grounded in the investigation of foreign relations and diplomatic practice via the insights of social, intellectual, and cultural history, as well as engagement with social scientific and literary theory. Rather than focusing exclusively on the great deeds of monarchs and ministers or the impersonal interactions of faceless state institutions as traditional diplomatic history has done, the new diplomatic history views diplomacy as a culturally-inflected activity carried out by multifaceted individuals whose own biographies, priorities, and personal relationships shape their understandings of the world and how its various parts should fit together, affecting in turn their diplomatic activities in fundamental ways. This emphasis on the “socio-cultural dimension of diplomacy” situates the history of diplomacy within a broader cultural history of politics.⁸ The theoretical sensitivity and methodological innovation with which the movement approaches diplomatic material are posited in self-conscious reaction to the traditional approach to studying diplomacy, “with the intention,” as Daniela Frigo has put it, “of freeing such research from its too close, sometimes suffocating, embrace with diplomatic history in the strict sense.”⁹ Frigo’s work, as well as that of Toby Osborne, have been the greatest impetus in establishing the new diplomatic history within the Anglophone scholarship on early modern diplomacy.¹⁰

An emphasis on the creative potential of individual actors to influence diplomatic outcomes is a hallmark of the new diplomatic history.¹¹ While acknowledging the power of structural forces, the new diplomatic history reminds us that early modern diplomacy retained a vital personal element

⁸ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 47. On actor-centered diplomatic history as part of the cultural history of politics, see Markus Mösslang and Torsten Rlotte (eds.), *The Diplomats’ World: a cultural history of diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁹ Daniela Frigo, “Introduction,” in Frigo (ed.), *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: the structure of diplomatic practice, 1450–1800.*, tr. Adrian Belton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–24, here 5.

¹⁰ Toby Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: political culture and the Thirty Years’ War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹¹ See *ibid.*, 2–3. ‘Actor-centered’ diplomatic history has found its greatest reception in the German-speaking lands. See especially Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau, 2010); and Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage: die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurzentrierter Perspektive* (Epfendorf: biblioteca academica, 2010).

as well, without which it cannot fully be understood.¹² Practitioners therefore turn to personal as well as official, state-level sources in constructing their studies, paying special attention to the private papers and personal correspondence of the individuals involved in diplomatic activity.¹³ The picture that emerges from such sources is of a diplomatic world of immense complexity, of overlapping levels of activity and a multiplicity of actors with varied, sometimes competing, motivations and loyalties. Lindemann has compared early modern diplomacy to a “tapestry woven from fibers of varying colors, thicknesses, types, and strengths, resulting in a textured cloth that was lumpy, uneven, and often unattractive, threadbare in places and overly bulky in others.”¹⁴ The new diplomatic history revels in the details that are flattened out of diplomatic history narratives as traditionally written, holding them to be vital bearers of meaning that unlock the potential of diplomatic history to teach us larger lessons about the early modern world.¹⁵

Although a small but growing core of new diplomatic history monographs have made their way into print, the bulk of work to date has been carried out in articles and essays, many of which take the form of manifestoes calling for further development in the field.¹⁶ As these manifestoes

¹² See Mary Lindemann, *Liaisons dangereuses: sex, law, and diplomacy in the age of Frederick the Great* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 279–80. See also Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*, 10.

¹³ On the centrality of such sources, as well as the interpretive challenges posed by them, see Heiko Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone. Schwedische Diplomaten im 17. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Lit, 2006), esp. ch. 3; Jennifer Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe, c. 1750–1830* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 1–3; Jeremy Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688–1800* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2001), 177–98.

¹⁴ Lindemann, *Liaisons dangereuses*, 78.

¹⁵ On the tendency of the most interesting material in diplomatic sources to fall out of standard diplomatic history accounts, see Andreas Gestrich, “Forward,” in Mösslang and Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World*, v–vi, here v.

¹⁶ See John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, nr. 1 (Winter 2008), 1–14; Lindemann, “Discreet Charm”; Droste, “Diplomacy as a Means of Cultural Transfer”; Kugeler, Sepp, and Wolf, “Einführung”; Schweizer and Schumann; Ursula Lehmkuhl, “Diplomatiegeschichte als internationale Kulturgeschichte: Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Forschung zwischen Historischer Kulturwissenschaft und Soziologischem Institutionalismus,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27, nr. 3 (July–September 2001), 394–423; Michael Hochedlinger, “Die Frühneuzeitforschung und die ‘Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen’: Oder: Was ist aus dem ‘Primat der Außenpolitik’ geworden?” *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 106 (1998), 167–79; Melvyn P. Leffler, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations,” *Diplomatic History* 19, nr. 2 (Spring 1995), 172–96.

attest, the new diplomatic history is still very much a work in progress, in need both of an expansion of scope and a refinement of method.

The current study contributes to the ongoing development of the new diplomatic history in three important ways. First, the movement, especially in its Anglophone form, has thus far directed most of its attention towards Italy, Britain, and to a lesser extent France and Spain.¹⁷ This book takes the new approach into the largely unexplored territory of central and northern Europe by examining the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden, and in so doing aims to improve the new diplomatic history's understanding of early modern European diplomacy in general through the inclusion of previously under-addressed regions.

In addition to expanding the geographic coverage of the new diplomatic history, this book serves as a corrective to one of the new approach's weaknesses by remaining firmly pegged into the story of foreign policy action that is often eschewed by the new diplomatic history's practitioners. In a manner resonant with the swing of the Hegelian pendulum, traditional diplomatic history's near exclusive emphasis on the grand events of interstate interaction (wars, alliances, treaties, etc.) provoked its antithesis in the new diplomatic history's focus on the individual actor as the subject of attention and culture as the field of activity—in other words, on negotiation and embassy themselves as autonomous objects of study—with little incentive to link them back into the baseline of relations between polities. One recent commentator, for instance, wrote admiringly of an author who, “[t]rue to the spirit of the new diplomatic history, ... focuses more on questions of gender and genre than on the narrative of political events.”¹⁸ This book, in contrast, stresses the connections between the insights of the new diplomatic history and the more traditional issues of how and why countries related with one another as they did, and in so doing seeks to nudge the trajectory of the new diplomatic history back towards a creative engagement with time-honored questions where its true promise lies.

Most importantly of all, however, the current study represents the first work of the new diplomatic history to look carefully at *both* sides of an early modern diplomatic relationship over time, and to apply the tools of the new approach to investigate the nature of an early modern diplomatic

¹⁷ For a study of Spanish diplomacy in the vein of the new diplomatic history, see Michael J. Levin, *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).

¹⁸ Watkins, 11.

relationship *per se*. Works to date have centered on a single figure or small handful of individuals, or a relatively limited timeframe or set of events.¹⁹ Even the widest-ranging works have confined their focus to the structure, personnel, and culture of a single state's service.²⁰ None have given equal attention to all parties involved in a long-term diplomatic relationship, or to the relationship itself as the centerpoint of study. This book, in contrast, investigates the full range of individuals (numbering in the hundreds) active in creating the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden over the course of a 'long' century, with the aim of proposing a different framework for thinking about what an early modern diplomatic relationship consisted of.

The approach in this book, therefore, takes the state and its role seriously, while at the same time decentering it as the self-evident unit of analysis in early modern diplomatic history. Rather, the focus here is on a diverse set of diplomatic actors who retained (to varying degrees) a sense of state affiliation while at the same time finding themselves suspended in tissues of culture and personal connections that paid scant heed to state borders and that lent these actors a particular worldview and diplomatic culture that allowed them—and through them their states—to relate to one another in particular ways. The intersections of state, worldview, and diplomatic culture were never simple, nor easy to predict, but it was there that the real play of early modern diplomacy took place.

Through these contributions to the new diplomatic history, the current study suggests a different geometry for our understanding early modern European diplomacy. Lines of cooperation and identification, as well as of diplomatic cleavage, did not necessarily fall along the borders between polities, but rather ran amongst and between clusters of individuals spread across states and possessing similar or differing worldviews and a greater or lesser ability to converse in the symbolic language of a common diplomatic culture.²¹ The image of diplomatic interaction that emerges is

¹⁹ Osborne's excellent *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy*, for instance, focuses squarely on the single figure of Abate Alessandro Cesare Scaglia and his circle.

²⁰ See, for example, Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy*; and Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*.

²¹ An analogous point, though with an emphasis on high political elites and factional politics rather than on diplomatic culture, is raised (but not pursued at length) by Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, 144. For how the inclusion of cultural factors in the study of international relations challenges the automatic re-inscription of us versus them binaries, see Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Introduction: On the Diversity of Knowledge and the Community of Thought: Culture and International History," in Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 3–26, here 3.

less one of smooth (if often contentious) bilateral contact and exchange between clearly-defined poles, and more one of zigging and zagging along the lines of multiple intersecting networks and ever-shifting constellations of religion, politics and culture.²²

The two main terms of the title—Protestant cosmopolitanism and diplomatic culture—encapsulate the chief claims of the book. The following sections take them up in turn before showing how they converge around a core element of the early modern.

Protestant Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is a notoriously slippery term, inclined by its nature to elude being fettered to a concrete definition.²³ Nevertheless, the specter of the nation-state looms large in nearly all current discussions of cosmopolitanism, with the ability to transcend the narrowly national serving as a minimum common denominator between competing understandings of the term.²⁴ In light of these theoretical trends that hinge (if negatively) upon the nation state, there are significant challenges in conceptualizing cosmopolitanism in the pre-nation-state world of early modern Europe where the ability to move beyond the national was a less-pregnant accomplishment. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ itself, in fact, only emerged into more general usage in central Europe as the period covered by this book was drawing to an end.²⁵ In her investigation of early modern cosmopolitanism Margaret Jacob builds upon Diderot’s famous declaration that cosmopolitans are “strangers nowhere in the world” to identify as cosmopolitan the set of early modern Europeans sharing in some curiosity about the broader world, access to knowledge about that world, first-hand experience of its diversity, and a measure of openness to cordial interaction with

²² On historians’ use of network theory, see Håkan Gunneriusson (ed.), *Sociala nätverk och fält*, Opuscula historica Upsaliensia, nr. 28 (Uppsala: Historiska institutionen, 2002).

²³ See Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, Carol A. Breckenridge, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Cosmopolitanisms,” *Public Culture* 12, nr. 3 (2000), 577–89.

²⁴ Note, for instance, titles such as Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds.), *Cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

²⁵ See Sigrid Thielking, *Weltbürgertum: kosmopolitische Ideen in Literatur und politischer Publizistik seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2000), 24. For an argument against the analytical utility of cosmopolitanism in an early modern context as a term both too elusive and frequently viewed in negative terms by contemporaries, see Martin Krieger, “‘Transnationalität’ in vernationaler Zeit? Ein Plädoyer für eine erweiterte Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30, nr. 1 (2004), 125–36, here 133–34.

people notably different from themselves.²⁶ Early modern cosmopolitanism was above all a worldview, simultaneously political, intellectual, and religious.²⁷ While the ability to think beyond one's own polity was a necessary part of this worldview, early modern cosmopolitanism and patriotism were often mutually supportive forces.²⁸ Friedrich Meinecke's influential (if contested) *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, in fact, points to a complicated but partially complementary relationship between cosmopolitan thinking and the emergence of German national feeling.²⁹

In the early modern world, a sense of foreignness and especially religious difference posed far more serious challenges to cosmopolitan openness than did attachment to the nation. Scholars frequently point to exclusionary religious dogmatism as one of the great enemies of the cosmopolitan, itself marked by a conscious opposition to orthodox religiosity.³⁰ Craig Calhoun locates the origins of modern cosmopolitanism in the early modern rejection of the sorts of passions that fed the wars of religion:

²⁶ Margaret C. Jacob, *Strangers Nowhere in the World: the rise of cosmopolitanism in early modern Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Jacob (1) notes that the development of cosmopolitanism depends on favorable circumstances of "situations, times, and places." Though diplomats would appear to have had such opportunity in abundance, they do not play a role in her account.

²⁷ On these points in relation to Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, see Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: its form and function in the ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), xi–xii.

²⁸ Thielking, 24. Vibrant debate over the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and patriotism in the contemporary world was sparked by the publication of Martha Nussbaum's "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," along with replies by twenty-nine scholars, in the *Boston Review* 19, nr. 5 (1994), 3–34. A number of these essays, with several new contributions, were published as Martha C. Nussbaum et al., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).

²⁹ Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, tr. Robert B. Kimber (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

³⁰ Amanda Anderson has written that religion was one of the "constricting allegiances" against which cosmopolitanism was defined. Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity," in Cheah and Robbins (eds.), *Cosmopolitics*, 265–89, here 267. Craig Calhoun adds that elite Enlightenment cosmopolitanism "was hostile to religion, and in opposing reason to prejudice often imagined a collective life free of traditional loyalties." Calhoun, "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," in Daniele Archibugi (ed.), *Debating Cosmopolitics* (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 86–116, here 89. While more open to nuance, including the prospect of confessionally-committed groups such as millenarian Protestants pursuing a form of cosmopolitanism, Jacob (*Strangers*, 40) concludes that "a deep commitment to religious orthodoxy seemed to discourage" cosmopolitanism's "live and let live" attitude toward border crossing."

Contemporary cosmopolitan theory... is also rooted in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism with its ethical universalism. Modern cosmopolitanism took shape largely in opposition to traditional religion and more generally to deeply rooted political identities... These were at best particularistic, local understandings that grasped universal truths only inaccurately and partially. At worst, they were outright errors, the darkness which the Enlightenment challenged. Certainly, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars of faith seemed to cry out for universalistic reason and a cosmopolitan outlook.³¹

Even commentators focused on the nation-state as the staunchest foe of modern cosmopolitanism remain hesitant to confer cosmopolitan status on transnational religious movements that they concede “massively subvert... state structures by going around and beyond them” since these “[f]aith communities... can be narrowing, rather than broadening, despite working in a transborder fashion.”³² Others state quite plainly that cosmopolitanism is incompatible with giving “moral preference” to co-religionists.³³

The figures marked in this book as inhabiting “Protestant cosmopolitanism” transgress many of these aspects of cosmopolitanism in fundamental ways. Most would not have felt at home anywhere in the world. Many were decidedly not aiming their actions at perpetual and universal peace amongst a human race conceived as having equal moral worth across all lines of difference. Several in fact hoped to fan the flames of religiously-tinged conflict of a particular sort rather than to form their worldview around the rejection of such conflict. What does make them cosmopolitan is that they simultaneously inhabited multiple, intersecting layers of identity and allegiance, sensing no inherent tension between rendering honest service to a particular dynasty or state while at the same time working earnestly on behalf of a broader worldview of Protestant cooperation across lines of political and denominational difference.³⁴ Following Jeremy Waldron, Stuart Hall has written that the ability to draw upon multiple sources of identity and to see them as mutually supportive planks

³¹ Calhoun, “Class Consciousness,” 101. See also Schlereth, xxiv.

³² Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, “Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism,” in Vertovec and Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: theory, context, and practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1–22, here 20.

³³ Stan van Hooft, *Cosmopolitanism: a philosophy for global ethics* (Montreal/Kingston/Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 4.

³⁴ On the multiple roles and allegiances of early modern diplomatic actors in which loyalty to their prince was but one of several principles guiding action, see Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, 151–52.

of a singular worldview “is precisely what cosmopolitanism means.”³⁵ Protestant cosmopolitans possessed the “layered geopolitical understanding” characteristic of cosmopolitanism.³⁶ They were intensely interested in the bigger picture in which their own state and own (Protestant) confession, no matter how significant, were but parts, and defined their worldview as serving the interests of both the parts and the whole.³⁷ Protestant cosmopolitans could understand each other in a particular way, and could interact with each other through their shared culture to mold the relationship between their states in a particular way. The common culture allowed these individuals to travel across territorial and intra-Protestant confessional boundaries with minimal disruption and resistance. To use a biological metaphor, if the boundaries that divided parts of the early modern world can be conceived as membranes, then those between Brandenburg and Sweden were at least semi-permeable, and Protestant cosmopolitanism served as a vector that could facilitate the relatively free movement of people, ideas and practices across the dividing membranes. This particular strand of cosmopolitanism could in turn be exclusionary and intolerant towards those falling outside of its broadened geopolitical and confessional purview.

Diplomatic Culture

Those sharing in Protestant cosmopolitanism developed modes of interaction and exchange based in their shared convictions and experiences—a diplomatic culture particular to Protestant northern Europe that connected abstract worldview with concrete political action and impacted the interactions between the governments to which these figures were connected. The concept of diplomatic culture is most closely associated

³⁵ Stuart Hall, “Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities,” in Vertovec and Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*, 25–31, here 26. Vertovec and Cohen themselves (“Introduction,” 4) add that cosmopolitanism “is capable of representing variously complex repertoires of allegiance, identity and interest.”

³⁶ Anderson, “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity,” 271.

³⁷ Schweizer and Schumann, drawing upon Benedict Anderson, write that “[m]uch can be made of the communities that diplomats and ministers imagined that they represented, and indeed of the constructions and discourses that they employed in representing those imagined communities.” “The Revitalization of Diplomatic History,” 172. Protestant cosmopolitans saw no conflict in representing multiple communities simultaneously, and deployed discourses accordingly.

with the international relations theorist Hedley Bull, who described it as the body of ideas, values, languages and techniques shared amongst diplomats that condition their interaction.³⁸ While the immediate possession of the diplomats themselves, diplomatic culture functions as a means of eliding the distance between different peoples to bring them together in an international society of sovereign states. It is a “bridge between states” that overcomes the alienation of difference to facilitate various forms of border crossing.³⁹

My account departs from the standard definition of diplomatic culture in two important respects. First, Bull and those following him focus squarely on professional, credentialed diplomats serving as official representatives of sovereign state governments. This restricted scope makes little sense in an early modern world where a more extensive range of individuals participated in diplomatic activity, and where the sovereign state was merely one emerging option amongst several possible ways of structuring diplomatic interaction. Diplomatic culture in this study embraces the expanse of those involved in a more varied diplomatic scene, and therefore assumes a different shade of meaning.

More substantially, almost all scholars writing on diplomatic culture—including those who focus on the early modern period—tend to describe it as essentially uniform across Europe. They pitch their studies at the level of the high-aristocratic, universal courtly culture that pervaded the continent and transcended regional variation and (frequently) divisions between Catholics and Protestants, arguing that diplomats from across the spectrum of European polities operated in this elite world and drew their codes of conduct from it.⁴⁰ Both Osborne’s *Dynasty and*

³⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics*, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 304–5. For a more recent call to conceptualize diplomatic culture along the lines of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, see Iver B. Neumann, “The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled,” *International Relations* 17, nr. 3 (2003), 341–69, here 364.

³⁹ The emphasis on diplomatic culture as the mediation of alienation is made most clearly by Bull’s student James Der Derian. See his *On Diplomacy: a genealogy of Western estrangement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), esp. ch. 3; and “Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture,” in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), *International Society after the Cold War: anarchy and order reconsidered* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 84–100. The cited passage is from Der Derian, “Hedley Bull,” 97.

⁴⁰ See Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*; Hamish Scott, “Diplomatic culture in old regime Europe,” in Scott and Brendan Simms (eds.), *Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58–85; Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, esp. 322–50, 373–410; Daniela Frigo, “Prudence and Experience: Ambassadors and Political Culture in Early Modern Italy,” *Journal of Medieval and Early*

Diplomacy at the Court of Savoy and Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox's *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, for instance, open with discussions of celebrated portraits of their diplomatic protagonists, painted by eminent artists and housed with fanfare in the National Gallery in London.⁴¹ The diplomatic world of these studies is embedded in the European social and cultural stratosphere.

Scholars looking at Brandenburg-Prussian and Swedish diplomats and diplomatic practice have noted similar connections to a pan-European elite cultural code.⁴² This book, in contrast, aims at a much broader group of actors, most of whom were of lower social station than Osborne's Abate Scaglia and Adams and Cox's Constantijn Huygens. Few merited the attention of leading artists, and many operated on a more modest social register with activities of an importantly different and less universal sort. These individuals were primarily middle elites who were united by a bond that had both regional and confessional specificity—a form of semi-elite culture that falls in the interstices between an ecumenical European-wide courtliness and erudition and a particularly northern brand of Protestant solidarity. These Brandenburgers and Swedes partook in varying degrees in the common cultural possession of Protestant cosmopolitanism, often cultivated through foreign travel or study, especially in the Netherlands, that led them to want to cooperate with each other, and gave them the conceptual tools to do so. Participation in this culture united these diplomatic figures in a common framework of understanding that conceived of Brandenburg and Sweden as complementary pieces of a larger whole

Modern Studies 38, nr. 1 (Winter 2008), 15–34, esp. 22–24, 29; Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, esp. 151–54, 225–26; idem, "Diplomatie vom *type ancien*. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens," in Thiessen and Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen*, 471–503, esp. 485–97; Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 212–13. Frigo ("Prudence and Experience," 29) wrote that "diplomacy reflected European aristocratic society... Sovereigns, ambassadors, courtiers, and nobles spoke the same language, used the same 'grammar of life.'" For a similar argument about nineteenth-century Europe, see M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 119–28.

⁴¹ Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*, 1; Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, "Introduction," in Cox and Adams (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, 1–12. Osborne writes of a portrait of Scaglia painted by Anthony van Dyck, Cox and Adams of a portrait of Constantijn Huygens painted by Thomas de Keyser.

⁴² See Jeannette Falcke, *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen am brandenburgisch-preußischen Hof im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006), esp. 255–61; Gerrit Walther, "Adel und Antike: zur politischen Bedeutung gelehrter Kultur für die Führungselite der Frühen Neuzeit," *Historische Zeitschrift* 266, nr. 2 (April 1998), 359–85, esp. 381–83; Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 15.

to which they owed common allegiance, and equally importantly gave them a shared set of experiences, values and goals that connected them to one another in networks of personal relations. This particular diplomatic culture differentiated these Brandenburgers and Swedes from the world of universal diplomatic courtliness (although the most skillful and high-powered of them could partake of both,) but also set them apart from the majority of those living in their own polities who thought in traditional terms with more limited horizons. Defining the specific content of the Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture and tracing its development and subsequent impact on Brandenburg-Swedish relations over time is a central mission of the book.

Hillard von Thiessen's study of Spanish-Roman diplomacy in the early seventeenth century develops the concept of the diplomat of the '*type ancien*,' an ideal-typical model of European diplomats active from 1500 into the eighteenth century, the period between the establishment of permanent embassies and the rise of the modern, trained professional diplomat. This model holds much in common with the understanding of diplomacy advanced in the current book, including an emphasis on culture and the personal relationships of individual diplomatic actors as the keys to understanding early modern diplomatic conduct; a recognition of the overlapping layers of official, semi-official and informal diplomatic activity that characterized early modern diplomacy; and an understanding of early modern diplomats as occupying a variety of roles and acting according to a variety of interests, only some of which were connected to governments and the imperatives of statecraft.⁴³ Thiessen, however, firmly embraces the view of early modern diplomacy as a high-noble activity dominated by the (universal) values of European courtliness which set the tone and style of diplomatic activity. His study also remains, at root, more interested in exploring the norms, values, and patterns of early modern diplomatic conduct than in connecting those things to specific diplomatic events. Thiessen's concept of the *type ancien* diplomat is therefore a thought-provoking but imperfect vehicle for understanding Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic interaction of the sort presented here.

Political science scholarship provides two useful models to begin to think through how diplomatic culture grounded in Protestant cosmopolitanism functioned in practice to influence the course of Brandenburg-

⁴³ Thiessen provides a succinct summary of his model in *Diplomatie und Patronage*, 224–28. For a more extended discussion, see Thiessen, "Diplomatie vom *type ancien*."

Swedish diplomacy. The first is the move to consider a body of diplomats as forming an 'epistemic community.' Epistemic communities are transnational networks of experts united by a "shared set of normative and principled beliefs" and "a common policy enterprise" which they strive through coordinated action to insinuate onto the policy agendas of decision makers, in particular governments.⁴⁴ These communities often encompass individuals with formal state appointments as well as those without, working in conjunction with one another across political borders to encourage the policies of multiple states to develop in resonance with their common worldview.⁴⁵ The concept of epistemic communities was originally applied exclusively to groups of modern professionals with technical, usually scientific, expertise, though Mai'a K. Davis Cross has since used the term to encompass diplomats, including those functioning in the early modern period.⁴⁶ Though tied to a narrow, statist, and extremely modern definition of diplomat, and the highly questionable assumption that diplomats necessarily work for the purposes of peace and international cooperation, Cross' application of the concept of epistemic communities to the world of early modern diplomacy offers intriguing theoretical tools to investigate the impact of ideas on diplomatic interaction, and in particular the ability of interpersonal networks held together by a common worldview to work to see that worldview actualized in policy.⁴⁷

Similar to the concept of epistemic communities but departing from the emphasis on technical expertise is the idea of transnational advocacy networks. These webs of activists driven by ideological commitment to a set of issues work, like epistemic communities, to encourage more directly powerful actors to adjust their policies, although their actions rest less on the provision of expert advice and more on their ability to shift the terms of discourse through the manipulation of information flows and

⁴⁴ Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, nr. 1 (Winter 1992), 1–35, here 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 27–32.

⁴⁶ Cross, *European Diplomatic Corps*. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph has advocated expanding the term to include transnational religious movements as well. See her "Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society," in Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 1–24, here 2.

⁴⁷ On the concept of epistemic communities as "a research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of ideas in international relations," see Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program," *International Organization* 46, nr. 1 (Winter 1992), 367–90. The cited passage is on p. 367.

the application of moral pressure.⁴⁸ Political scientists are coming to identify such networks as influential players in international politics, and to investigate how the inclusion of non-governmental entities such as advocacy networks in international relations theory calls for an expansion of Bull's definition of an international society composed solely of sovereign states.⁴⁹

The diplomatic figures discussed in this book straddled the line between the knowledgeable experts of an epistemic community and the ideological activists of an advocacy network, with some tilting more towards one direction or the other. They shared with epistemic communities and advocacy networks a political vision of how the world should be, and a commitment to work through specific modes of personal interaction to further that vision. Their sense of identity and allegiance, however, was too complicated to fit neatly into either model, and their actions were rarely as coordinated or as confidently directional as theories of epistemic communities or advocacy networks would suggest. In short, Protestant cosmopolitans were members of more than one community, and the code of their diplomatic culture was multi-lingual.⁵⁰ The multiplicity and simultaneity of this group's modes and attachments points to a larger claim about diplomacy in early modern Europe.

The 'both/and' of Early Modernity

In his celebrated study of Rabelais, Lucien Febvre characterized the pre-modern as a world of multiplicity, fluidity, and ambiguity; a time anterior to modernity's forced choice between hardening orthodoxies and absolutes when questions of identity and belief could still be answered with a 'both/and' rather than an 'either/or.'⁵¹ People living then felt at ease in

⁴⁸ See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: advocacy networks in international politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 34, 209–17. For an approach to this issue from a legal point of view, see Markus Heintzen, *Private Außenpolitik: eine Typologie der grenzüberschreitenden Aktivitäten gesellschaftlicher Kräfte und ihres Verhältnisses zur staatlichen Außenpolitik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989).

⁵⁰ For a thought-provoking study that speaks of diplomatic culture in light of Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock's concept of political languages, see Erik Thomson, "For a Comparative History of Early Modern Diplomacy: commerce and French and Swedish emissarial cultures during the early 17th century," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, nr. 2 (June 2006), 151–72. See also Scott, "Diplomatic culture," 59–60.

⁵¹ Lucien Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: the religion of Rabelais*, tr. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1982).

conditions of imprecision that would strike the modern mind as “logically unbearable.”⁵² The concepts of cosmopolitanism and diplomatic culture offer prospects for liberation from the inflexible modern categories through which modern scholarship, itself disquieted by the ambiguous and imprecise, has approached early modern diplomatic history.⁵³ Both Protestant cosmopolitanism and northern European diplomatic culture facilitated movement across many of the borders (state, dynastic, confessional, ‘national’/linguistic) that divided early modern people from each other, and recognizing this calls for a reconsideration of the role of such categories in understanding the story of early modern diplomacy. To draw from Febvre, Protestant cosmopolitanism and northern European diplomatic culture, with their multiple complementary allegiances, were part of the ‘both/and’ world of an early modern diplomacy that had yet to be coerced into adopting the ‘either/or’ of modernity, either by developing states (and later nationalisms) increasingly jealous of extracting exclusive allegiance on the one hand, or by the universalizing urges of Enlightenment and continental-wide aristocratic diplomatic culture that granted little space for regionally- and confessionally-specific modes of interaction on the other. Early modern European diplomacy eluded the imposed precision of exclusionary choice.

The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century and the Shape of Diplomatic History

Diplomatic history that incorporates ‘both/and’ elements falls into a structural blind spot in the language of traditional Western social science that grew up in close connection to the developing nation-state and continues to apply models based on the nineteenth-century nation-state to

⁵² Ibid., 439.

⁵³ On cosmopolitanism’s resistance to “the certainties of a world of the either/or,” see Pollock et al., “Cosmopolitanisms,” 580. On diplomatic culture and the either/or, Der Derian has written: “in contrast to the monologues of unipolar regimes of truth and power, as embodied by the technoscientific power of a universalising ‘West’, there can be found in the linking of multiple queries and responses from opposing cultures a potential power to transform international relations, from a discourse of *either* order or justice, *either* war or peace, *either* one power or many powers, to *both/and* all of these things: in Bull’s apt oxymoron for this condition of tragic hope, an anarchical society. Yet, through the idea of a diplomatic culture, Bull dismantled many of the fixed oppositions and supposedly eternal enmities of world politics, and renovated an historical mediation of strangers that had fallen into neglect.” “Hedley Bull,” 97.

early modern phenomena.⁵⁴ The sociologist Ulrich Beck has written at length on what he refers to as the ‘methodological nationalism’ dominant in the social sciences in which the “grammar” of scholarship is so firmly rooted in the national paradigm that even scholars who may themselves be anti-nationalist and investigating non-national phenomena carry out their research in a framework in which the nation is the taken-for-granted unit of analysis.⁵⁵ Breaking free from these deep moorings requires an act of audacity, an ontological shift in the field. Beck refers to his own proposed alternative as ‘methodological cosmopolitanism,’ the shift towards which he notably describes as a transition from either/or to both/and categories.⁵⁶ In this view, states may lose their monopoly as the necessary containers within which all social and political phenomena must occur, but they continue to be recognized as vital factors in a more varied and pluralistic world. Scholars approaching international relations from this perspective can “analyse the multiple forms of interdependence not only between states but also between other players at various levels of aggregation,” including transnational networks of cosmopolitan individuals whose actions suggest a new understanding of culture and spatiality no longer anchored in the nation-state.⁵⁷

The current study is a first step towards studying early modern diplomacy from such a cosmopolitan perspective. It is marked less by its success in this endeavor than by an awareness of how much further there is to go. This book is also by no means fully emancipated from the ‘national’ perspectives of Brandenburg-Prussian and Swedish history, nor would that be desirable. It remains instead firmly anchored in the respective historiographies of Brandenburg-Prussia and Sweden and strives to offer something

⁵⁴ On the dominance of the ideal-typical nineteenth-century nation-state as the model for writing diplomatic history, and how this model squeezes out the role of the interpersonal interaction that was such an important part of early modern diplomacy, see Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler, “Einleitung,” in Thiesen and Windler (eds.), *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 36 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 9–13, here 9–10. See also Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper, and Guido Müller, “Einführung,” in Conze, Lappenküper, and Müller (eds.), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen*, 1–14, here 10.

⁵⁵ See Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, tr. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Beck, “Cosmopolitical realism: on the distinction between cosmopolitanism in philosophy and the social sciences,” *Global Networks* 4, nr. 2 (2004), 131–56.

⁵⁶ Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, 4–5, 26, 31, 33, 92; Beck, “Cosmopolitical realism,” 143. Beck also refers to the move as one from exclusive to inclusive differentiation.

⁵⁷ Beck, “Cosmopolitical realism,” 132; Magdalena Nowicka, *Transnational Professionals and their Cosmopolitan Universes* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2006).

of interest to those vested in those historiographies while at the same time telling a broader story about early modern Europe at large.

*National Historiographies and the History
of Brandenburg-Swedish Diplomacy*

The nineteenth century has cast an especially long shadow over those writing Prusso-German history.⁵⁸ Although many aspects of their writings have been discredited for some time, the ways in which we think about German history today continue to be influenced by the paradigmatic classics of the nineteenth-century Prusso-German nationalist historians (Ranke, Droysen, Treitschke, etc.) in certain important ways. These authors viewed the history of early modern Brandenburg-Prussia in teleological terms as the rise of Prussia to the eventual Great Power status that allowed it to fulfill the dreams of these same historians by unifying Germany under its leadership. Although this paradigm entailed recognition of early modern Brandenburg's relative insignificance (a tale of heroic and meteoric rise must after all start from modest beginnings,) it nevertheless established a flawed comparative framework where Austria, France or England were put forth as the natural peers to which Prussia was destined to aspire, and by extension as the yardstick against which early modern Brandenburg could be measured. This had consequences in two directions. First, an emphasis on Brandenburg-Prussia's historical position vis-à-vis the Great Powers—as defined from a nineteenth-century presentist point of view—led to a reluctance to recognize the long-term importance of Brandenburg-Prussia's relations to places like Sweden that looked relatively insignificant through nineteenth-century presentist glasses. Sweden's role in Brandenburg's foreign policy was universally acknowledged (these same historians tended to fixate on the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, for example, as an epochal event in Brandenburg's history,) but often in a way that reduced Sweden to the status of a mere addendum to the larger stories of German or European history. Ranke, for example, treated Gustav Adolf as a "world-historical man" who "created a new combination of universal importance"—a channel through which the great currents of history functioned.⁵⁹ Droysen's

⁵⁸ See the discussion in Conze, "Abschied von Staat und Politik?"

⁵⁹ Leopold von Ranke, *Preußische Geschichte* (Hamburg and Berlin: Hoffmann und Campe, 1934), 148–49.

treatment of the king in his seminal *Geschichte der preußischen Politik* as the savior of German Protestantism whose plans for a German Protestant union are made to sound like a proto-*kleindeutsch* solution to German unification is even more telling.⁶⁰ In either case the fact that Gustav Adolf was actually King of Sweden becomes an insignificant detail.⁶¹

The second consequence of the Great Power comparative framework established in the nineteenth century relates to the ongoing debate over a German *Sonderweg*. Implicitly adopting this framework (as many have done) feeds nicely into the image of early modern Brandenburg-Prussia as aberrant, militant, and perhaps already on the overdetermined path to illiberal development. To take one example, the military historian Hans Delbrück compared Brandenburg-Prussian to French military development and found stark differences that are suggestive of an authoritarian militarism (in comparison to the French, the Brandenburg-Prussians had a disproportionately large army led by a monolithic officer corps that was obsessive in drill and draconian in discipline.)⁶² If one substitutes Swedish military development for French, however, the Brandenburg-Prussians seem much less unusual (the Swedes were every bit as committed to drill and discipline and Swedish forces during the Thirty Years' War were proportionally larger than any army raised by Prussia before 1814.) Indeed, when compared with its northern neighbors Prussia fits rather nicely with Sweden (and Denmark) in what Fabian Persson has referred to as the "martial courts of the Baltic."⁶³ By highlighting the rich and varied diplomatic connection Brandenburg and Sweden shared, this book advocates

⁶⁰ "...der evangelische Bund müsse von den Katholischen sich trennen und sich mit einem erforderlichen Haupt versehen, besonders für den Krieg; dieser Bund, dieß *corpus formatum* der Evangelischen müsse innerhalb des Reichs für sich bestehen und ein eigenes *parlamentum* haben... das Bild eines neuen föderativen, auf Religionsfreiheit und reichsfürstliche Territorialität gegründeten Deutschlands trat bereits in seinen Umrissen hervor; es war Zug für Zug das Gegentheil dessen, was die österreichische Politik gewollt hatte." Johan Gustav Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1 (Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1870), 64–86, here 77–78.

⁶¹ In reacting against this, Michael Roberts, the leading English-language historian of Sweden, defiantly set out in the preface to his great biography of Gustav Adolf that his book "differs, perhaps, from many books on the subject in treating the reign as a portion of the history of Sweden, rather than as an episode in the history of Germany; but it has no other claim to originality." Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: a history of Sweden 1611–1632*, 2 vol. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953–58), I:vii.

⁶² Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War: within the framework of political history. Volume IV: The Modern Era*, tr. Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 259–62.

⁶³ Fabian Persson, *Servants of Fortune: the Swedish court between 1598 and 1721* (Lund: Wallin & Dalholm, 1999).

a reorientation of early modern Brandenburg-Prussian historiography towards the Baltic as an avenue leading to a more balanced understanding of the state and cultural worlds of which Brandenburg-Prussia was part, and away from the tendency to extol Prusso-German exceptionalism that is still present in the German historiography. In this respect the book stands in implicit dialogue with the works of scholars such as F.L. Carsten and Hans Rosenberg in what can be called a pre-*Sonderweg* tradition that locates the origins of the comparative pathologies of Prusso-German history in the seventeenth century.⁶⁴

Swedish historiography, for its part, has been both primarily inward-looking and overwhelmingly structural.⁶⁵ Those studies that consider aspects of Sweden's foreign relations do so mainly to shed light on the internal structure and functioning of the Swedish state, its relations to Swedish society, and its ability to mobilize resources. Connections between Sweden and other parts of Europe are seen as yielding domestic lessons about Sweden itself rather than about something larger. Early modern Europeanists, in turn, have paid relatively little attention to Scandinavia when crafting arguments about broad European themes. The argument of this book that Brandenburg and Sweden shared in a particularly important relationship in the early modern period that was conditioned by a fundamental cultural bond between them speaks to each of these historiographies. For students of early modern Europe, the interpenetration of German/continental 'core' and Swedish 'periphery' serves as a reminder that Scandinavia was an integral part of Europe—culturally as well as politically—rather than an insignificant appendage floating on the frozen northern fringe. Efforts to understand the history of early modern Europe without considering Scandinavia as part of the story are impoverished. This in turn can serve as an incitement for historians of Sweden to transcend the self-definition of their field as a comfortable (if peripheral) niche and to realize that their material took place within a larger European context and that their studies have something of value to contribute to larger European debates.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ See F.L. Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: the Prussian experience 1660–1815* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

⁶⁵ See Erik Thomson, "Beyond the Military State: Sweden's Great Power Period in Recent Historiography," *History Compass* 9/4 (2011), 269–83.

⁶⁶ See Susan Lewis Hammond, Daniel Riches, and Erik Thomson, "Emulation and Competition. Introduction: Early Modern Scandinavian Transformations of European Examples," *Scandinavian Studies* 77 (2005), nr. 3, 327–30, and the literature cited therein.

For the reasons discussed, neither the Prusso-German nor the Swedish national historiographic traditions have been positioned to deal well with the story of Brandenburg-Swedish relations. A number of works have examined aspects of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy, though all have dealt with time frames significantly shorter than that covered by this book, and have done so in the vein of traditional diplomatic history.⁶⁷ A small handful of other works have brought the methods of the new diplomatic history to bear on other aspects of Brandenburg's and Sweden's diplomatic practice. The most significant of these studies is Heiko Droste's *Im Dienst der Krone*, a careful study of Swedish diplomats in the "Great Power period" (1611–1718) that places patronage networks, private interests, and the personal actions of individual diplomats at the very heart of early modern diplomatic practice.⁶⁸ Droste, however, does not study Swedish diplomats to understand how Sweden related with other polities, but rather approaches these diplomats as a functional elite within Swedish royal service that offers a convenient case study to investigate the relationship between Swedish courtly culture, state structures, and service to the Crown. Droste's history of Swedish diplomatic service is very much one written 'from the inside', with little interest in exploring the role of Swedish diplomats in relating to those outside of Swedish service. There is, in other words, little discussion of actual diplomatic interaction in Droste's book, and the historiographical battles he wages are more about domestic Swedish development, state formation, and the culture of early modern functional elites than they are about the history of diplomacy. Peter Bahl has provided us with a similarly detailed social history of the Brandenburg court under Elector Friedrich Wilhelm (reigned 1640–1688) that does not focus on foreign affairs *per se* but does offer an important window into the social world of Brandenburg's governmental elites that is of much use to the student of Brandenburg's diplomats.⁶⁹ Both of these works investigate institutions and practices that developed under transnational influences, but they retain an essentially domestic orientation towards explaining the structure and function of these institutions and

⁶⁷ The most recent book-length study, dealing with a period of two years, is Jouko Vahtola, *Brandenburgs Annäherung an Schweden zu Beginn der Regierungszeit Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelms 1640–1641* (Rovaniemi: Societas Historica Finlandiae Septentrionalibus, 1984).

⁶⁸ Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*.

⁶⁹ Peter Bahl, *Der Hof des Großen Kurfürsten: Studien zur höheren Amtsträgerschaft Brandenburg-Preußens* (Köln: Böhlau, 2001).

practices within the Swedish and Brandenburg states. The current book's investigation of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture builds upon the exciting impulses set out in such works and ties the close study of individuals and their contexts and personal connections into the broader story of inter-state relations.

The Plan of the Book

The rise of substantial and meaningful bilateral relations between Brandenburg and Sweden in the seventeenth century tacks closely with the development of Protestant cosmopolitanism and Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. The book is structured to detail the tight connections between these intertwined and mutually reinforcing processes. It places stronger emphasis throughout on mapping the interconnections between diplomatic activity and the complex world of personal networks and intellectual, cultural, and religious currents than it does on providing a narrative of diplomatic relations for its own sake. This allows us to investigate the mechanisms through which much of early modern diplomacy actually functioned, and to examine the contours of what an early modern diplomatic relationship consisted of.

Chapters One, Two, and Four trace the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship through stages of development from very modest beginnings in the late-sixteenth century through a period of intense and intimate connection that lasted through much of the seventeenth century before being reconfigured in a new register as the century came to a close. These chapters focus on the periods of formation and eventual decline of the common diplomatic culture and its values and forms of interaction. As the book advances and the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden becomes more established there is a progressive decoupling of the diplomatic narrative elements provided in some detail at the beginning of the book from the thematic focus that emerges with greater force later on. By Chapter Four the diplomatic narrative is kept to a bare minimum and the emphasis is almost exclusively thematic, with the message that the story of interstate relations is far more than one of dramatic political or military events, no matter how important these may be.

Chapters Three and Five are extended case-studies of diplomatic culture in action. In Chapter Three we see the diplomatic culture at its height, with relatively small groups of likeminded, interconnected individuals—some quite removed from the levers of state power—working

to bring about developments with broad international ramifications: the marriage of Swedish King Gustav II Adolf to Princess Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, and a second proposed match between Queen Christina of Sweden and Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg that never came to fruition. Chapter Five, in contrast, shows a diplomatic culture in the process of dissolution in the face of rising Lutheran-Calvinist confessional tension and growing cultural distance between Brandenburgers and Swedes in the 1680s and early-1690s. The increasingly confessionalized northern European diplomatic landscape in the age of Louis XIV placed Protestant cosmopolitanism under duress. Whereas the personal actions and religious convictions of diplomatic actors had once brought certain Brandenburgers and Swedes together, they now created unintended fissures between their states that neither side knew how to heal.

The Epilogue depicts one last-gasp attempt to bring Brandenburg and Sweden together through the old style of interaction in the mid-1690s. These efforts were led by Eberhard von Danckelman on the Brandenburg side, and Nils Bielke on the Swedish. The disastrous personal outcomes of the two main protagonists (both of whom ended up being tried for treason, though admittedly for reasons that had little direct connection to Brandenburg-Swedish relations) show that they, and their way of doing business, were now out of step with the times. The Epilogue and book conclude on this note of changing times as the eighteenth century approached, with Protestant cosmopolitanism and the diplomatic culture described throughout the book being squeezed from both ends between the exclusive demands of the developing modern state on one side, and the broadly universal pull of Enlightenment values and European aristocratic-courtly culture on the other. The space for informal networks based in regionally-specific and confessionally-circumscribed modes of conduct to affect the story of European diplomacy had been sharply curtailed.

CHAPTER ONE

FOUNDATIONS, 1575–1615

One of the earliest examples of direct correspondence between the Swedish and Brandenburg ruling houses is a short letter written in August 1542 by King Gustav Vasa to Elector Joachim II requesting toll-free passage of a shipment of wine purchased by Gustav's agent in Germany.¹ The king wrote in the polite, friendly, and utterly anonymous tone characteristic of early modern princely correspondence between rulers who had little contact with one another and scant reason to expect this to change in the future. This type of exchange was typical of what slight interaction there was between the Brandenburg and Swedish governments throughout much of the sixteenth century.

In his history of Brandenburg politics from the middle ages through the Thirty Years' War, Reinhold Koser wrote that until the 1610s Sweden "hardly entered into the horizon of Brandenburg politics." The relationship that grew from this point, however, "would quickly become the political eye of the storm for Brandenburg for an entire century," and was from the beginning fraught with "advantages and dangers lying close one beside the other."² Koser was correct that Brandenburg and Sweden did not play important roles in each other's history until the seventeenth century was well underway, and that the significant relationship that developed afterwards was filled from the start with tensions that foretold a future of conflict as much as of harmony. The foundations of the future Brandenburg-Swedish relationship were laid in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when formal diplomatic contacts between their governments were scarce. Broad geopolitical forces began

¹ Gustav Vasa to Joachim II, Stockholm, 30 August 1542. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 2, 1–2.

² "...wurde dem Kurfürsten eine neue politische Verbindung angetragen, von einer Seite her, die nun sehr bald, und zwar auf ein ganzes Jahrhundert, der politische Wetterwinkel für Brandenburg werden sollte... Das schwedische Reich war bisher kaum in den Gesichtskreis der brandenburgischen Politik getreten. Gleich die erste Berührung führte auf die Wahrnehmung, daß in einer Verbindung mit dieser Macht Vorteile und Gefahren hart neben einander lagen." Reinhold Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik bis zum Westfälischen Frieden von 1648* (Stuttgart and Berlin: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1913), 380–81.

to draw Brandenburg and Sweden together while simultaneously creating the fundamental tensions that complicated their emergent relationship. Diplomatic and political developments, however, were only some of the factors that set the conditions for a deep and sustained relationship between the two lands. An understanding of how Brandenburg and Sweden came into close contact, and of the nature of the relationship that ensued, cannot be grasped in terms of formal diplomatic relations alone, but rather lies in the combination of classical high-politics with factors that reach beyond the scope of what is normally encompassed under the rubric of diplomatic history. This chapter explores the array of factors that set the framework for the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden that emerged in later years.

Political and Diplomatic Overview

Sweden re-emerged as an independent kingdom when the Danish-led Union of Kalmar dissolved in the 1520s. For the next several decades under Gustav I (reigned 1523–1560) and Erik XIV (reigned 1560–1568) Swedish foreign policy remained for the most part focused within its traditional boundaries of the Baltic Sea and lands immediately adjacent.³ The scope of diplomatic interests expanded under Johan III (reigned 1568–1592) due to the king's dynastic and religious agendas.⁴ Johan's first wife Katarina Jagiellonka was the daughter of King Sigismund I of Poland and Bona Sforza. Bona's parents were Duke Giangaleazzo Sforza of Milan and Isabella of Aragon, the daughter of Alfonso II of Naples and heiress to the Duchy of Bari and the principalities of Rossano and Manfredonia in the Kingdom of Naples, itself under Spanish control. Johan's efforts to gain from his wife's Italian inheritance brought him into contact with Philip II of Spain, and his similar efforts to pursue her Polish claims increased the already frequent contact with Baltic power Poland. This interaction with leading Catholic powers meshed well with Johan's

³ The best overview of Swedish foreign policy under Gustav Vasa is Nils Ahnlund, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia: I: Tiden före 1560* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners, 1956); see also Michael Roberts, *The Early Vasas: a history of Sweden, 1523–1611* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 45–53, 91–107, 124–31, 144–67. For Erik XIV, see Wilhelm Tham, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia: I:2 1560–1648* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners, 1960), 18–46.

⁴ On Johan and his reign, see Lars Ericson, *Johan III: en biografi* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2004).

ecumenical efforts aimed at the reunification of the Christian faiths under a reformed Catholic Church. He sought support for his religious plans from his German relatives, including Count Edzard of East Frisia, Duke Magnus of Lauenburg, Margrave Christoff of Baden, and *Pfalzgraf* Georg Hans of Veldenz, but otherwise showed little interest in cultivating relations with other German Protestants, the Dutch, or the English.⁵ Brandenburg continued to occupy a peripheral position in Sweden's diplomacy little different than what it had enjoyed under Gustav or Erik.

Sweden was no more central in Brandenburg's foreign policy during this period.⁶ Brandenburg had shown interest in the Baltic dating back to the middle ages, particularly along the southern Baltic coast from Pomerania to Prussia. Some of this interest was rekindled in the 1560s when the electoral Hohenzollern line secured the *Mitbelehnung* (simultaneous enfeoffment) and right to eventual succession in Ducal Prussia, where a junior branch of the Hohenzollern family ruled as Polish vassals, but this interest did not yet entail an active Baltic policy or significant interaction with Sweden.⁷ Brandenburg was also amongst the members of the Empire to attempt to mediate a settlement between Sweden and Denmark when the Seven Years' War of the North (1563–1570) threatened political and economic stability in Germany.⁸ Although these efforts marked Brandenburg's most substantial engagement to date with Swedish affairs, they entailed little direct contact between Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats and brought no lasting change to Brandenburg-Swedish relations. The state of Brandenburg-Swedish relations in this period can fairly be described as mutual and benign neglect.

⁵ See Emil Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, Sveriges Historia till våra Dagar, pt. 5 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1921), 136–58, 183–89; Tham, 51–78; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 277–89; Jason Edward Lavery, “Die Rolle der Konfession in der Außenpolitik Dänemarks und Schwedens 1570–1618,” in Beiderbeck, Horstkemper, and Schulze (eds.), *Dimensionen der europäischen Außenpolitik*, 247–63, here 250–54.

⁶ The best overviews of Brandenburg foreign policy in the sixteenth century are still Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, and the classic account of Johan Gustav Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, II:2.

⁷ See Heinz Immekeppel, *Das Herzogtum Preussen von 1603–1618* (Köln and Berlin: G. Grote, 1975), 19; Jason Edward Lavery, *Germany's Northern Challenge: the Holy Roman Empire and the Scandinavian struggle for the Baltic, 1563–1576* (Boston: Brill Academic, 2002), 31–32. Lavery wrote that the right to eventual succession “heightened [Elector] Joachim's attention to Baltic affairs.”

⁸ For an excellent treatment of the Empire's complicated reaction to this conflict, see Lavery, *Germany's Northern Challenge*.

Prussia Enters the Scene

A series of developments in the 1570s and '80s began to open the door to a more lively relationship. From the middle of the 1580s, electoral prince Joachim Friedrich assumed increasing foreign policy responsibilities from his aging father, the profoundly conservative Elector Johann Georg (reigned 1571–1598) whose diplomatic passivity earned him lasting ignominy in the eyes of the late-nineteenth century Prusso-German nationalist historians.⁹ Joachim Friedrich had gathered valuable political experience as the administrator of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg since 1566, and he was far more willing than his father to pursue active foreign policies. He cultivated relations with foreign Protestants and explored Protestant unionist schemes, especially after his son Johann Georg was elected bishop by the Strassburg cathedral chapter in 1592. The Catholic minority resisted this move, and instead chose Prince Karl of Lorraine as their claimant to the see. The contest over the election dragged on until 1604, and during the intervening years Joachim Friedrich sought to rally international Protestant support for his son's claim.¹⁰ Joachim Friedrich's interest in building relations with other Protestants, it would appear, carried with it the potential for closer ties with Sweden.

Another important development had taken place in 1577, when Margrave Georg Friedrich of the Ansbach (Franconian) line of the House of Hohenzollern took over the administration of the Duchy of Prussia as regent for his mentally-ill cousin, Duke Albrecht Friedrich (reigned 1568–1618).¹¹ Although both Georg Friedrich and Albrecht Friedrich were from cadet branches of the Hohenzollern family, the margrave's assumption of power in Prussia strengthened the involvement of the electoral Hohenzollern line in Prussian affairs. Albrecht Friedrich was the only surviving male of the Prussian Hohenzollern line, and his mental illness raised the prospect that Brandenburg's dynastic claims to eventual succession in Prussia could soon be realized. Georg Friedrich, who himself was childless, worked to pave the way for Brandenburg succession in the Duchy. He was a kindred spirit to Joachim Friedrich, supporting a policy that linked Hohenzollern dynastic interests with a more actively Protestant policy,

⁹ See Droysen's blistering critique, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, II:2, 321, 330.

¹⁰ See Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 296ff.; Bodo Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession: the Second Reformation in Brandenburg* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 56ff.

¹¹ Immekeppel, 20.

and the two worked together very well. Joachim Friedrich sent his eldest son, the future Elector Johann Sigismund, to the Ansbach court for the completion of his studies in 1590, and Georg Friedrich was instrumental in bringing about the marriage of Johann Sigismund to Princess Anna of Prussia, the eldest daughter of Duke Albrecht Friedrich, in 1594. By that time it was apparent that the mad duke would indeed fail to produce a male heir, and the marriage between Johann Sigismund and Anna was designed to cement the claims of the Brandenburg Hohenzollern to succession in the Duchy. This match was the key to the dramatic dynastic expansion enjoyed by the House of Hohenzollern in the seventeenth century, not only in Prussia, but also along the Rhine, for Anna's mother Maria Leonora was the eldest daughter of Duke Wilhelm IV of Jülich-Kleve-Berg and the sister of the final duke of his line, the childless Johann Wilhelm. Anna was therefore a potential double-heiress to both the Prussian and Jülich-Kleve inheritances, all of which would transfer through her husband to the Brandenburg Hohenzollern if they could make good on Anna's claims.

Prussia, with its long Baltic coastline and active participation in the lucrative Baltic grain trade, had a longer tradition of relations with Sweden that Brandenburg stood to inherit as well. Albrecht von Hohenzollern, the first Duke of Prussia (reigned 1525–1568), enjoyed a much closer relationship with Sweden than did his cousins in Brandenburg. He was the first Protestant prince to enter into diplomatic relations with the newly independent Swedish monarchy in 1526–1527, and as early as August 1525 Sweden and Königsberg had come to an agreement on trade issues which was later expanded into a general peace- and commercial treaty between Sweden and the entire Duchy in 1526. The Prussian court at Königsberg even came to be a kind of diplomatic connection point between the young Swedish monarchy and the continent, particularly Danzig and Poland. A non-aggression pact between Prussia and Sweden was ratified in 1542, and this was later renewed as a friendship-, trade- and shipping treaty after extensive diplomatic dealings in July 1561. The future Johan III traveled to Königsberg to meet with Duke Albrecht in 1562, and Albrecht later made efforts to have Johan and his wife set free when they were imprisoned by Erik XIV on suspicion of treason in 1563.¹²

¹² See Ahnlund, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, 90–91; and especially Walther Hubatsch, *Albrecht von Brandenburg-Ansbach: Deutschordens-Hochmeister und Herzog in Preußen 1490–1568* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960), 258–60.

Under Georg Friedrich's administration, Prussia continued to have some contact with Sweden based on a tradition of relations and recognized common interests not yet shared between Sweden and Brandenburg. Some elements of this interaction foretold the themes of the relationship that would develop between Sweden and Brandenburg in the following century. In 1578 Johan sent Johannes Kosskull and Martinus Hirschfeld on a mission to Georg Friedrich to request military assistance and a 30000 *Thaler* loan for the defense of Livonia against Muscovite aggression.¹³ The Swedes stressed the necessity to both Sweden and Prussia of saving neighboring Livonia "from Muscovite tyranny," and confidence that this could be accomplished if they stood together. They appealed not only to the geopolitical imperative of keeping a dangerous and expansionist power out of the neighborhood, but also to a common Christianity that would make Swedish-Prussian cooperation in the defense of Livonia against the (schismatic) Russians pleasing in the eyes of God. All of this was tied together by the existing tradition of Swedish-Prussian relations: "Since Our predecessors and We ourselves have for many years maintained constant good friendship and correspondence with this princely house, We do not doubt that said prince will stand with Us . . ." ¹⁴ Johan was therefore advocating Swedish-Prussian military cooperation based in common geopolitical and religious interests and a history of positive relations between their ruling houses. There existed as of yet no basis to make a similar appeal to Brandenburg, although the increasing likelihood of the eventual succession of the electoral line in Prussia was a step towards changing this situation.

¹³ Johan's letter of credential and instructions for Kosskull and Hirschfeld are dated Stockholm, 10 June 1578. They appear to have arrived in Prussia in early September 1578. See the documents in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 248 Schweden, fasc. 1.

¹⁴ "Welches . . . Christliches bedencken unnd fürhaben, wie es der selben bey Wenigehlich billich, Rhumblich unnd loblich, also gereicht es gemeinen Christenheit, den Benachbarten, und Insonderheit den beengstigten Lannden, zu trost unnd gedreyen. Derohalben Wir auch Sr. H.[?] dazu vom Gott dem Allmechtigen, vil glückhs, heyl und segenn, wollten gewünschet haben. Neben deme dieweiln Unnsern Vorfahren, unnd Wir, vonn vilen Jarn her, mit diesem Fürstlichen Hause bestennndige gute fruendtschafft unnd Correspondenz gehalten, das Wir nicht zweifelten, hochgedachter Fürst, darinn mit Unns zuuerharen gemeinet sein würde." Johan III's instructions for Kosskull and Hirschfeld, Stockholm, 10 June 1578. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 248 Schweden, fasc. 1.

Swedish-Polish Dynastic Union and a Brandenburg Marriage Plan

The Prussian factor, however, took on an entirely new level of importance under drastically different circumstances when Sigismund Vasa was elected king of Poland in 1587. Sigismund's election was the most significant political development of the later sixteenth century for Brandenburg-Swedish relations. He was the son of Johan III and Katarina Jagiellonka and had been raised Catholic (and Polish-speaking) with the prospect of a future Polish election in mind. As Polish king he became the feudal overlord of Ducal Prussia. Sigismund stood to eventually inherit his father's Swedish crown as well, and as the Brandenburg Hohenzollern moved to secure their right to succession in the duchy it became a realistic scenario that within a generation an Elector of Brandenburg (in his office as Duke of Prussia) could be the vassal of a reigning King of Sweden. In these circumstances, the benign neglect with which earlier Brandenburg and Swedish rulers had regarded one another was no longer possible.

It was less clear, though, if the change in Brandenburg-Swedish relations would be for the better or the worse. Georg Friedrich had supported a rival candidacy in the Polish election, and this created friction during the first few years of Sigismund's reign.¹⁵ These tensions, however, were only temporary, and it soon began to appear as if the new relationship between the Vasas and the Hohenzollern would lead to a more serious consideration of each other as potential partners. Sigismund succeeded to the Swedish throne when his father died in 1592, inaugurating the short-lived personal union of the Polish and Swedish crowns. Shortly thereafter talks began of a dynastic marriage between his sister, Princess Anna of Sweden, and Margrave Johann Georg, the Protestant candidate in the Strassburg struggle. These were junior members of their respective dynasties who did not stand to inherit the most important of their families' lands and titles, but the consideration of a marriage between them was a significant step nonetheless.

Dynastic linkages can be counted amongst the organizing principles of early modern foreign relations.¹⁶ Successful dynastic marriage negotiations required each side to believe it had something to gain from

¹⁵ Immekeppel, 21–22.

¹⁶ Heinz Schilling lists dynastic concerns amongst the “driving forces” in his influential schema of the early modern international system. Schilling, “Formung und Gestalt des internationalen Systems in der werdenden Neuzeit—Phasen und bewegende Kräfte,” in Peter Krüger (ed.), *Kontinuität und Wandel in der Staatenordnung der Neuzeit: Beiträge zur Geschichte des internationalen Systems* (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1991), 19–46.

the match, and, on one level or another, to recognize that it shared something in common with its partner. The idea for the match between Anna and Johann Georg originated in the early 1590s and was moved forward on the Brandenburg side by Wilhelm Rudolf von Meckbach, Joachim Friedrich's chancellor in Magdeburg who later followed the prince to Berlin when he became elector.¹⁷ Meckbach traveled to Krakow in 1596 to deal with Sigismund on the marriage issue.¹⁸ They worked on the details of the *pacta dotalia*, and the finalization of the match seemed so imminent that Sigismund gave his sister a gift of 6000 *daler* and a number of horses in preparation for her wedding.¹⁹ The ceremony was preliminarily set for November 1596, with the date later postponed to April 1597. But the plan soon became bogged down, apparently over Brandenburg insistence that Johann Georg receive assurances of succeeding as Duke in Prussia, or even of being named Sigismund's *statthalter* in Sweden, both of which the king did not wish to commit himself to.²⁰ Brandenburg Chancellor Johann von Löben was sent to Poland in 1597 to continue to negotiate on the matter, and Sigismund sent his secretary Johan Skretusky to deal with the Brandenburgers.²¹ Despite some progress in the negotiations a number of events in 1598 placed the marriage plan permanently on the back-burner. The death of Elector Johann Georg and succession of his son Joachim Friedrich (reigned 1598–1608) in January 1598 was followed the next month by that of Queen Anna of Sweden and Poland (Sigismund's wife), shifting the focus away from the marriage negotiations for the time being. More significantly, Sigismund departed on his fateful mission to Sweden in July 1598 to deal with the uprising led by his uncle, Duke Karl,

¹⁷ The marriage negotiations have received little attention in the secondary literature. A good summary of the entire affair is provided by the *Gutachten* of Chancellor Johann von Löben and the Geheimen Räte to Joachim Friedrich, Cölln an der Spree, 1 [11] September 1607. Document Nr. 1775 in *Acta Brandenburgica. Brandenburgische Regierungsakten seit der Begründung des Geheimen Rates* [hereafter *ABr*], vol. 3, ed. Melle Klinkenberg (Berlin: Kommissionsverlag von Gsellius, 1930), 185–95. This document states that Meckbach got the issue moving in 1594, although complications arose that prevented more progress until 1596. H. Almquist states that negotiations for the marriage began in 1592. See his entry for Princess Anna in the *SBL*, II, 22–27, here 24. Other documents in *ABr*, vol. 3 dealing with the marriage issue include: Nr. 1742, Nr. 1743, Nr. 1789, Nr. 1816, Nr. 1910, Nr. 1911.

¹⁸ *ABr*, v. 3, Nr. 1775, 185.

¹⁹ Almquist, 25.

²⁰ Roberts writes that by summer 1595 news of the plan to name Johann Georg *statthalter* in Sweden had reached Sigismund's uncle Duke Karl, who saw his own (considerable) prerogatives threatened. *Early Vasas*, 356.

²¹ See Skretusky's instructions dated Warsaw, 11 December 1597. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 86, 22v–23r.

that had blossomed into a full-blown civil war. This was a major political crisis, and Sigismund was not to be bothered with talk of his sister's marriage at a time when his grip on the Swedish crown was becoming ever more tenuous. The king's interest in the marriage plan never recovered.

Despite continued overtures from Brandenburg over the next several years, the marriage plan withered away in the face of Sigismund's distractions and Anna's own active resistance.²² The failure of the plan does not erase the fact that the Vasa and Hohenzollern had come to consider themselves as possible dynastic partners, and that the idea of a Hohenzollern *statthalter* in Sweden had been floated. However, an assessment of the significance of the proposed match for the broader story of Brandenburg-Swedish relations must be tempered by a recognition that the negotiations were really more a Brandenburg-Polish than a Brandenburg-Swedish affair. Sigismund conducted the negotiations primarily through Polish officials and in discussions at the Polish court and Diet.²³ The Brandenburgers viewed the marriage issue as a chapter in their relations with Sigismund as King of Poland, and thoughts of the Prussian feudal relationship were always on their mind. With this said, the prospect of a Hohenzollern-Vasa marriage foretold an important strand of Brandenburg-Swedish relations that would develop in the first half of the seventeenth century. The failed plan for a match between Johann Georg and Anna may have planted a seed that bore fruit in the future.

The Swedish Revolution of 1597–1600

Sigismund's early support of the marriage plan, including his willingness to talk of naming Johann Georg *statthalter* in Sweden, shows that the king's new, feudal relationship with the Hohenzollern in Prussia raised the level of awareness between the dynasties and carried with it the possibility of strengthening Brandenburg's ties to Sweden. Prussia's potential to be a unifying force between the two lands, however, was turned entirely on its head by the Swedish Revolution of 1597–1600.²⁴ Sigismund's Catholicism

²² On Anna's stance, see *ABr*, vol. 3, Nr. 1775, 186–87. The matter wasn't finally laid to rest until 1608, when Johann Georg informed Sigismund of his intention to marry Eva Christine of Württemberg, and the king gave his congratulations without making any mention of the earlier marriage plans. *ABr*, vol. 3, 287. Almquist (25) claims that the marriage plan wasn't entirely abandoned until 1609.

²³ Polish officials who played important roles in the talks included Samuel Lasky, Nikolaus Wolski, and the aforementioned Johan Skretusky.

²⁴ The literature on the Swedish revolution is large, detailed, and filled with conflicting interpretations. The primary divisions are between those who place the responsibility for

and obligations as King of Poland placed some distance between him and his Swedish subjects. But the legitimacy of his claim to the throne was unquestioned, and if not for the actions of his uncle it is unlikely that these concerns alone would have given rise to civil war. Karl was the last surviving son of Gustav Vasa, and per the settlement set out in his father's testament enjoyed virtual independence as the Duke of Södermanland. He jealously guarded all prerogatives of power in his duchy while at the same time believing it his right to take an active role in the government of the kingdom as a whole. Karl also had a long history of tension with the aristocratic members of the Swedish Council, and when Johan died the power sharing agreements set up between the duke and the Council to administer the kingdom in Sigismund's absence were fraught with troubles. Karl, like his father, was a skillful orator not averse to demagoguery, and he used a combination of his own considerable power base and an ability to whip up popular support from the lower-classes to bully the Council into conceding ever more authority to him and into acquiescing to decisions that contradicted Sigismund's orders. The Duke was most hostile to the *statthalter* appointed by Sigismund in various parts of the kingdom, and used military force against them when he deemed it necessary. Several members of the Council fled the country, traveling to Sigismund's court in Poland and regaling him with stories of Karl's aggressions. By summer 1597 it was apparent to Sigismund that if he were to have any hope of preserving his power in Sweden he would need to travel there to deal with his unruly uncle in person. After long and sluggish preparations the king's fleet arrived off the coast of Kalmar with 4000–5000 Polish and German troops at the end of July 1598.²⁵

The showdown that was brewing in Sweden was of immediate concern to the Brandenburg authorities. They received intelligence reports out of Sweden of Karl's seizure of Stockholm from Sigismund's appointed *statthalter* in early spring 1597, followed Sigismund's military and financial preparations for his Swedish campaign with interest, and corresponded with the Palatinate and Prussian governments regarding the looming

the revolution on Sigismund's missteps and popular discontent with his Catholicism, and those who blame Karl's ambition and skillful manipulation of the lower classes for stirring up a conflict that did not arise from a broad base of violent unrest. The former is the most common view in the traditional Swedish historiography; the latter is championed by Roberts (*Early Vasas*, 327–93) and others.

²⁵ Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 279–91; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 369–79.

conflict and what could be done about it.²⁶ One of Elector Joachim Friedrich's first policy priorities after he came to power in January 1598 was to have his family's right to eventual succession in Prussia confirmed. That would require maintaining the good graces of Sigismund, whose attention was now dominated by the troubles in Sweden. A major conflict involving Sweden and Poland threatened to disrupt the Baltic trade as the Seven Years' War of the North had done, and it was a plausible concern that hostilities could spill over into the Duchy of Prussia itself. The Prussians, as Polish vassals, also feared the economic burden that contributing to Sigismund's Swedish expedition could place on the duchy.²⁷ Promoting a peaceful settlement in Sweden would therefore serve both Brandenburg's and Prussia's economic and security interests, and would saddle Sigismund with a debt of gratitude to Brandenburg that could be repaid by confirming their rights in Prussia.

Sigismund was also aware that it would be in the elector's interest to further a settlement in Sweden, and upon his request a joint mediation delegation from Brandenburg, Prussia and Mecklenburg was dispatched from Germany in July 1598, arriving in Sweden shortly before the king himself.²⁸ Brandenburg's representative on the mediation team was Joachim von Winterfeld, and he and his colleagues worked earnestly in negotiating with both sides and carrying proposals and counter-proposals back and forth between the two belligerents until the middle of September.²⁹ After much work the mediators sadly concluded that their efforts had no

²⁶ "Schwedische Zeitung vom 7. Aprilis Ao. 97." GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 3, 15r–16; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5a1–5a2.

²⁷ See the documents from the Prussian Ober- and Kammerräte in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5a1–5a2. Erik Sparre, one of the members of the Swedish Council who fled from Karl, made a request for a loan to Sigismund in 1597 that was politely refused the following year. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 248 Schweden, fasc. 1.

²⁸ Hildebrand (*Gustav Vasas söner*, 291) and Tham (82) argue that the mediators were acting on Sigismund's request, while Roberts (*Early Vasas*, 379) claims they became involved on their own initiative. A letter from Joachim Friedrich lends credence to the former position: "... inmaßen unns anno 98, da wir beneben andern unsern Herrn Verwandten die schwedische Pacification uf ihrer Maj. eigen Begehren vorgenommen, schriftlich und mundlich..." Joachim Friedrich to Reichard Beyer, Cöln an der Spree, 14 [24] November 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, ed. Melle Klinkenberg (Berlin: Kommissionsverlag von Gsellius, 1927), Nr. 25, 62–74, here 69–70.

²⁹ See documents in: RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199; RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 176; *Svenska riksdagsakter jämte andra handlingar som höra till statsförfattningens historia under tidehvarvet 1521–1718*, Series I, pt. 4, ed. Torvald Höjer and Lars Sjödin (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1909–38), Nr. 263, 755–58.

prospect of success, and they began their return journey home shortly before Karl's dramatic victory at Stångebro forced Sigismund to accept peace on humiliating terms.³⁰ Not long thereafter Sigismund fled the country and returned to Poland, never again to set foot in Sweden. In July 1599 the Swedish Estates declared Sigismund deposed, and in 1600 offered Karl the crown (an offer he did not accept until 1604, from which point he was known as King Karl IX). Brandenburg's efforts at mediation had been unable to help Sigismund save his crown.

Sigismund never surrendered his claim to the Swedish throne, and the revolution marked the beginning of a bitter dynastic struggle between the Polish and Swedish Vasas that would stretch on for decades. It also had profound effects on Brandenburg and its potential for relations with Sweden. Sweden was now ruled by the sworn enemy of the Hohenzollerns' feudal lord in Prussia, and Sigismund had more desire than ever to enlist Brandenburg's aid against his uncle. The Brandenburgers knew that they could earn points with Sigismund by supporting him in his efforts to regain Sweden, and it was equally clear that any friendly contacts with Karl were sure to incur Sigismund's wrath. This is not to mention the disdain that almost all European princes felt for Karl as a usurper who had deprived a legitimate king of his kingdom. A close relationship with Sweden seemed like an impossibility as long as Karl was in charge.

By the time that Karl died in 1611, however, Brandenburg stood at the doorstep of a more substantial relationship with Sweden than it had ever enjoyed before. Under Karl's son Gustav II Adolf (reigned 1611–1632), the unrelenting animosity between Sigismund and his Swedish cousin would not prevent Brandenburg, still very much in a delicate relationship with Sigismund in Prussia, from forming both marriage and military alliances with Sweden. The foundations of this relationship were present by the mid-1610s. Some were closely tied to the geopolitical situation, while others bore a less obvious connection to traditional foreign relations. Both sets of factors were fundamental in creating and defining the relationship that would follow.

³⁰ The Treaty of Linköping was signed on 28 September 1598.

*The Factors**Poland and Prussia*

The Polish and Prussian factors changed the dynamic of Brandenburg-Swedish relations entirely by placing the two countries firmly into each other's diplomatic orbits for the first time. Brandenburg's substantial involvement in the 1598 mediation—its most significant diplomatic activity on Swedish soil to that point—was undertaken with Prussian concerns squarely in mind. The Vasa dynastic struggle made Sweden highly relevant for Brandenburg's foreign policy, and became the lens through which Brandenburg and Sweden viewed one another.

Brandenburg's involvement in the Swedish-Polish conflict accelerated in the first years of the seventeenth century. Karl invaded Polish-controlled Livonia in August 1600, beginning a conflict that stretched on until 1611.³¹ In 1603 Margrave Georg Friedrich of Ansbach died, which meant that the time had come for Brandenburg to stake its claim to the administration of Ducal Prussia. Sigismund's approval of the latter came at the insistence of Brandenburg support in the war.³²

A conversation between Polish and Brandenburg officials in Krakow in 1603 resulted in a fifteen-point document that served as a basis for subsequent debate within the Brandenburg government on how to proceed with the effort to gain the Prussian administration.³³ Several of these points dealt directly with Sweden and Sigismund's requirements for action. Point X asked the elector to deal with the King of Denmark, the Dukes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, the Hansa cities, "and other Lords living along the [Baltic] coast" to keep the Baltic trade "free and secure" from Karl's efforts to disrupt it.³⁴ Point XII was more direct in insisting

³¹ On the Livonian war, see Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 398–404. An excellent discussion of this and other conflicts in early modern northeastern Europe is Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars: war, state and society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow: Longman, 2000).

³² For extensive coverage of these issues, see Immekeppel, and the documents in *ABr*.

³³ "Extractum ex actis et responso comitorum Cracoviensium anno 1603 celebratorum," undated (but before 1 [11] August 1604.) Heavily abridged version printed in *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 2, 5–14.

³⁴ "Daß I. Ch. G. mit dem Könige in Dennemarck, Herzogen in Pommern und Mechelburg, den Hansestedten und andern an der Sehekandten wonenden Herrn dahin verdacht sein und trachten wolten, damit die Schiffart in mari Balthico kunftig dergestalt nichtt, wie ein Zeitlangk mit der Kauffleutt großem Schaden zugangen, daruber sich Dantzick, Elbingen, Riga und Königspergk gar hartt beschwereten, von Herzogk Carln in

that when the electoral line came to power in Prussia it would be obliged to maintain four warships for the defense of the Prussian coast, and that if necessary these ships were to join with Polish ships at sea against the enemies of the Polish crown. Point XI addressed negotiations with Karl himself. The elector was to urge other German princes to join him in sending an embassy to Karl aimed at reaching an agreement to return the Swedish crown to Sigismund.

The Polish demands set off a lively debate within the Brandenburg and Prussian governments, with the Prussian councilors in particular stressing that Joachim Friedrich needed to take tangible action regarding Karl if he were to maintain hope of Sigismund granting his requests in Prussia.³⁵ Help with the Swedish issue, they wrote, had been "urged with particular seriousness by the king and estates" and included "very emphatically" in the extract of the Krakow discussions of 1603. "It will therefore be necessary that the elector's delegates [to the Polish Diet] bring something definite and comforting regarding this point, since it is clear that this matter is the greatest of all concerns for His Royal Majesty." The elector must be explicit that if Sigismund shows himself well-disposed towards Brandenburg's requests for administration and eventual succession in Prussia, the elector will have his related German princes and the King of Denmark "move Duke Karl to obedience and return his hereditary kingdom to His Royal Majesty."³⁶ Duchess Maria Leonora of Prussia agreed

Schweden gehindert und gefehret worden, sondern frey und sicher pleyben möchte. Dann dieses die Herren allesamt angienge, wolte dann Herzogk Carl je mit den Polen Kriegk führen, weren sie endtlich deßhalb ohnerschrocken, ohn allein, das er die Commercias in der Sehe derentwegen nicht aufhielte noch hemmete." *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁵ For the reaction of the Brandenburg councilors, see Löben, Waldenfels, Prückmann, Benckendorff and Hübner to Joachim Friedrich, Cölln an der Spree, 1 [11] August 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 3, 14–22.

³⁶ "Den 11. Punct anlangende tragen die Herren Regenten und Anwesenden die Sorge, es werde derselbe mit besonderm Ernst von I.K.M. und den Ständen urgiret werden in Anmerckung, das derselbe gar empfatice ins Crakauische responsum gesetzt worden, und will zwar von nöten sein, das I.Ch.G. Abgesandten dieses Puncts halber was Gewisses und Tröstliches mitt sich bringen, dan wie menniglich kundt und offenbahr, diese motiva bei I.K.M. die allgröste ist, dergestalt daß sie sich von allem, so es mit I.Ch.G. gerne gut sehen, einbilden lassen, das, wan sich I.K.M. nurt gegen I.Ch.G. in der Curatel- und Successionsache wilfehrit erzeigten: es wurden I.Ch.G. nicht allein für sich und ihren andern Blutsverwandten sich der Sachen mit allem Ernst annehmen, sondern auch die K.M. aus Dennemarck p. dahin beleiten, das durch dero würckliches Zuthun und Handtbitten Hertzog Carolus zum Gehorsamb und I.K.M. zu dero Erbkönigreich wurden gebracht werden." Response of Ludwig Rautter, H. Rautter, Christoph Rappe, and Wolff von Wernsdorff, Königsberg, 19 [29] October 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 14, 41–48, here 46–47.

that Joachim Friedrich needed to put forth specific suggestions either at or before the Diet of steps to be taken against Sweden.³⁷

Joachim Friedrich felt as if he were caught between a rock and a hard place. The dangers of inaction were clear, but the possibilities for action seemed limited at best. If he undertook mediation efforts that were ultimately unsuccessful (the most likely outcome), he ran the risk of being accused by the Jesuits and others in Poland of having put forth a half-hearted effort, or even of having purposely undermined the talks due to religious grounds. Similar accusations had been floated after the failed mediation of 1598, and rumors were already circulating in Poland in 1604 that Brandenburg (and Denmark) would rather hinder than help Sigismund's recovery of Sweden.³⁸ The Prussian councilors in particular were insistent that Joachim Friedrich needed to make a concrete demonstration of his loyalty to Sigismund in the Swedish issue to counter the widespread Polish suspicions of Brandenburg *Schadenfreude* over the king's loss of his kingdom.³⁹ As for Karl, he was well aware of the Hohenzollerns' relationship with Sigismund in Prussia, and was therefore unlikely to trust that Joachim Friedrich was negotiating in good faith. The duke had been skeptical of the 1598 mediation effort, and he viewed that and other plans launched by northern German princes as little more than extensions of Sigismund's diplomatic intrigues.⁴⁰ So Joachim Friedrich was faced with the daunting task of trying to bring about a settlement between two bitter enemies, both of whom were prepared to be profoundly suspicious of his own motives. As the elector once wrote, Sigismund "would not stand for us to carry on correspondence with Karl," while Karl himself would suspect that "in the negotiations We would only favor [Sigismund's] side."⁴¹

³⁷ Reichard Beyer to Joachim Friedrich, Königsberg, 11 [21] November 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 24, 61–62.

³⁸ Joachim Friedrich to Reichard Beyer, Cölln an der Spree, 14 [24] November 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 25, 62–74, here 69; Undated [late 1604] news report out of Poland received by Reichard Beyer at the Prussian *Landtag* 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 65, 142–44, here 143.

³⁹ Reichard Beyer to [Joachim Friedrich], undated [after 7 {17} January 1605]. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 77, 165–71, here 165–66.

⁴⁰ Tham, 82.

⁴¹ "Derentwegen, nachdem wir die hendels langst *pro et contra* erwogen, kein ander mittelh sehen, den das wir uns bemuhen, wie dem Unheilm durch gutliche *Composition* vorzubawen. Vermerckten aber so vielh, do wir es schon vor Uns, sol woll beÿ den Konningk W. als beÿ Herzog Carls L. versuchen wolten, das doch den *effect*, dahero gering sein mochte, in dem die Koning. W. konte Verwenden, des es Uns nicht wolte gebuhren, mit Hertzogk Carls L. *Correspondentz* zumachen. Nuhn ist aber ohne Vorhergehende Vertheuligkeit nichts zu *expectiren*, Herzog Carls L. mochte Unser ohnmuthen dahin Verstehen, das entweder der Konningk guttliche hendlung begerte, geschehe von Uns

Furthermore, the elector feared that either Karl's or Sigismund's actions could soon expand the Polish-Swedish theater of war into the Duchy of Prussia itself.⁴² All three of the pieces involved in Brandenburg's proposed mediation between Sweden and Poland therefore distrusted each other in advance, and this was surely no recipe for success.

When the Diet convened in January 1605 Joachim Friedrich instructed his delegates to proceed with caution. If it became clear that the only sticking point preventing Poland from granting the elector's requests was the issue of assistance against Sweden, then the delegates were to ask for written assurances that Joachim Friedrich would receive Prussia in return for his promise to go to all lengths to assist Sigismund against Sweden in several specific ways, including making efforts to urge Kristian IV and princes in the Empire to deny Karl's troops free passage through their lands, and to strictly forbid Karl from recruiting troops in his own lands.⁴³

After long negotiations at the Diet Sigismund finally awarded Joachim Friedrich the guardianship of Duke Albrecht Friedrich and the administration of Ducal Prussia on 11 March 1605. The terms were extensive and harsh, and included a series of demands for diplomatic and military assistance against Karl.⁴⁴ Joachim Friedrich had now publicly committed himself to an active, essentially partisan position in Poland's struggle with Sweden. He had promised Sigismund to take steps that could reasonably be considered anti-Swedish. This precluded any chance for open,

nicht *proprio motu*. Wir wurden in der *tractation* bloß den Konnigl. W. *partes fouirn*." Joachim Friedrich to [Hieronymus von Dieskau], Cöln an der Spree, 26 July 1605. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5d IV, 18r–27r, here 23v–24r.

⁴² Joachim Friedrich to Reichard Beyer, Cölln an der Spree, 14 [24] November 1604. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 25, 62–74, here 71.

⁴³ Joachim Friedrich to Wedigo Reimar von Putlitz, Isaac Kracht, Christoph Benckendorff, and Joachim Hübner, Cöln an der Spree, 30 December 1604 [9 January 1605]. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 62, 126–40.

⁴⁴ "Verpflichtung des Kurfürsten Joachim Friedrich zur Übernahme der Bedingungen für die Belehnung mit Preußen." Cölln an der Spree, 19 [29] March 1605. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 179, 275–78. The agreement demanded that if Sigismund chose to seek a negotiated settlement with Karl, the elector would try to enlist the aid of the Landgrave of Hessen-Kassel and the Elector of the Palatinate in this effort; if Sigismund instead settled upon a military path, Joachim Friedrich would support him at land and at sea; the elector would provide four warships for the defense of the Prussian coast; his subjects would be banned from serving in Karl's army or assisting him in any way, and those already in Swedish service would be recalled; that he would work to have Saxony, Pomerania, and other German territories adopt similar policies; and that he would encourage Denmark towards friendship with Sigismund and cooperation in the Baltic Sea against incursions by Karl. On the agreement in general, see Immekeppel, 34–35.

normal diplomatic ties to develop between Brandenburg and Sweden. In fact, some scholars have said that the entirety of Brandenburg's relationship with Sweden during Karl's reign consisted solely of the mediation efforts that were governed by Polish interests and which alienated the two Protestant lands from one another when they otherwise would have had reason to cooperate.⁴⁵ There was, in effect, no diplomatic relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden independent of Prussian/Polish concerns.⁴⁶

In the years following the transfer of the Prussian administration in 1605 Joachim Friedrich followed through on a number of the promises he had made. Lacking a navy of his own, the elector obtained use of four Danish warships to patrol the Prussian coast.⁴⁷ He wrote to the Dukes of Pomerania, Braunschweig-Lüneburg, and Mecklenburg and urged them to prevent Karl from recruiting troops in their lands.⁴⁸ The Brandenburgers also undertook efforts to enlist Elector Friedrich IV of the Palatinate and Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, both of whom were connected to Karl by marriage, in mediating an end to the Swedish-Polish conflict.⁴⁹ Joachim Friedrich kept the Poles abreast of his efforts, and Sigismund continued to apply pressure to ensure a good-faith effort leading to real results.⁵⁰

In 1611 the warring Vasa cousins concluded an armistice that, while not resolving any of the outstanding points of contention, did at least give them some breathing space and free up resources for use in other areas.⁵¹

⁴⁵ This is the position adopted by Bertil Thyresson, *Sverige och det protestantiska Europa från Knäredfreden till Rigas erövring* (Uppsala: Wretmans, 1928), 14–15.

⁴⁶ On Brandenburg's paranoia of even an indirect glimmer of contact with Sweden coming to Sigismund's attention, see Prussian Obererräte [to Joachim Friedrich], Königsberg, 1 [11] August 1607. *ABr*, vol. 3, Nr. 1725, 152–53; "Relation der geheimen Räte," Cölln an der Spree, 15 [25] August 1607. *ABr*, vol. 3, Nr. 1750, 165–66. On concerns that the elector's positions could lead to a Swedish military attack, see Joachim Friedrich to Simon Ulrich Pistoris, Schönbeck, 4 [14] August 1605. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 416, 444–45.

⁴⁷ For documents relating to the use of these ships, see *ABr*, vol. 1, Nrs. 405, 416, 426, 530, 533.

⁴⁸ See the correspondence from July 1605 in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5d IV, 56r–62v.

⁴⁹ GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5d IV; *ABr*, vol. 1, Nrs. 401, 433–34, 607; *ABr*, vol. 2, Nrs. 712, 1282.

⁵⁰ Joachim Friedrich to Sigismund, Cölln an der Spree, 8 November 1605. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5d IV, 74r–79v; Nikolaus Wolski to Joachim Friedrich, Cracow, 16 November 1606. *ABr*, vol. 2, Nr. 1282, 437–38; Nikolaus Wolski to Joachim Friedrich, Cracow, 15 April 1608. *ABr*, vol. 3, Nr. 2145.

⁵¹ Sweden faced war with Denmark as well as its deep involvement in the Russian "time of troubles." See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 1:43–44, 72–91; idem, *Early Vasas*, 451–58; Tham, 103–11.

In November of this same year, after long efforts, Sigismund agreed to grant Elector Johann Sigismund (reigned 1608–1619) the enfeoffment in Ducal Prussia to go along with the right to administer the Duchy that Brandenburg had enjoyed since 1605.⁵² This important step moved the Brandenburg Hohenzollern one step closer to securing their succession in Prussia, but under renewed requirement to continue to assist Sigismund against Sweden.

Brandenburg's efforts to mediate a lasting solution between the Swedish and Polish Vasa increased during the armistice. Johann Sigismund dispatched Hans Keiler to Sweden in May 1612, sending with him letters to Queen-Mother Christina and the Swedish representatives in Reval that offered mediation with Sigismund.⁵³ When Sweden came to terms with Denmark in January 1613, thus freeing up military resources that could have gone into renewed hostilities with Poland, Johann Sigismund redoubled his efforts to involve foreign powers in mediating a settlement.⁵⁴ The Brandenburg privy councilors wrote to the Swedish council in May 1613 that the elector was moved by the feudal obligation he owed Sigismund as well as his concern for the common wellbeing of the region to work to bring Sweden and Poland "into better understanding, peace and quiet." They added that the elector had communicated with James VI/I and the Dutch States General to this end, and these powers had now agreed to offer their services to help end the conflict.⁵⁵ Along with their own document, the Brandenburgers forwarded letters they had secured from James and the Dutch to this effect.⁵⁶

⁵² See Immekeppel, 85–100.

⁵³ Keiler's mission is dealt with below, 44–46.

⁵⁴ Thyresson, 63.

⁵⁵ Brandenburg privy council [Friedrich Pruckmann] to Swedish council, Cöln an der Spree, 15 May 1613. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199; Swedish council [Axel Oxenstierna] to Brandenburg privy council, Stockholm, 19 July 1613. *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling* [hereafter *RAOSoB*], series I, vol. 2 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1896), Nr. 76, 141–45.

⁵⁶ Axel Oxenstierna reported to the queen-mother on the arrival of these documents: "Så ähr och, allernädigste Drottning, för någre fhå dagher sedhen, een Brandeburgsk post ahnkommen medh breff ifrån de Chur-furstlige Brandenburgiske rådth till Rijkzens Rådth här i Sverige, aff hvilckett E. M:tt jagh een copie ödmiukeligen tillskickar, och voro där innelychte tu latiniske breff, K. M:tt tillskriffne, dedh eene aff Konungen i Britanien dedh andre aff de herrar General Staterne i Nederland, som kortteligen och allenast gå där opå att förmane H. K. M:tt till saksens vänlige bijlägning, emillan H. K. M:tt och Konungen i Pälend, effter som de sigh och tilbiude att vele lathe däruttinnen bruke sigh för underhandlere." Axel Oxenstierna to Queen-Mother Christina, Stockholm, 1 July 1613. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 74, 138–40, here 138–39.

Although Gustav Adolf was, as his father had been, skeptical that much would come from foreign mediation, he did not reject the overture, and Axel Oxenstierna (writing in the name of the Swedish council) responded to the Brandenburgers in pleasant language that stressed the king's approval of the measures taken and asked the elector to carry on with his efforts.⁵⁷ In February 1614 the elector sent a delegation to the Dutch Republic to encourage the States General to send a delegation to take part in future Swedish-Polish peace talks.⁵⁸ Another push for peace was made in 1615, when, at Sigismund's urging, Johann Sigismund organized a peace conference to take place at Stettin in September under French and English mediation. In April they wrote to the Swedish council with an invitation to Gustav Adolf to take part in the talks.⁵⁹ The Swedish reply, although friendly, insisted upon impossible conditions that in effect doomed the talks before they ever started.⁶⁰ The King of France withdrew his offer of mediation when he learned of Gustav Adolf's conditions, and England later cancelled its participation as well. In the end, only Poland and Brandenburg bothered to send delegates to Stettin, and the only results of the meeting were to further embitter Sigismund against Gustav Adolf and to strengthen the belief in Europe that a negotiated settlement between Sweden and Poland was unlikely.⁶¹

Dynastic concerns in Prussia had thrust Brandenburg into the middle of the Swedish-Polish struggle and had involved it in years of effort on behalf of mediation schemes that appeared to have accomplished little.

⁵⁷ *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 76, 144. For Gustav Adolf's skeptical attitude towards the mediation, see Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:144.

⁵⁸ William Colwall to Sir Ralph Winwood, The Hague, 23 February 1614. *Report on the Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry, K.G., K.T., preserved at Montagu House, Whitehall*, vol. 1 (London: for Her Majesty's Stationery Office by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1899), 151.

⁵⁹ Brandenburg chancellor and council [Friedrich Pruckmann, Adam Hans zu Putlitz, Abraham Burggraff zu Dohna, Simon Ulrich Pistoris, Sigismund von Götze] to Swedish chancellor and council, Cöln an der Spree, 26 April 1615. *RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

⁶⁰ The Swedes expressed willingness to take part in the talks, but only if issues regarding possession of the Swedish crown and kingdom were off the table. What is more, they requested that Brandenburg intercede with Sigismund to get him to agree to these terms. Axel Oxenstierna [in name of the council] to Brandenburg council, Stockholm, 4 [6] June 1615. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 141, 221–23. See also *RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

⁶¹ Thyresson, 76–77; Sven Fromhold Hammarstrand, *Försök till en Historisk Framställning af Förhandlingarne om Sveriges deltagande i Trettioåriga Kriget, till fördraget i Beerwalde, d. 13 Januari 1631* (Uppsala: C.A. Leffler, 1855), 24–25. Hammarstrand incorrectly states that the French and English delegations did indeed attend the talks.

The Baltic trade, and even Prussia itself, remained vulnerable to direct damage from a flare up of the Vasa family conflict that was far from resolved. Sigismund had driven a hard bargain in granting the administration and enfeoffment in Prussia, and by acting as his surrogate in trying to resolve the Swedish issue Brandenburg came to be viewed by Sweden as little more than a Polish lackey. Avenues for an open, official relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden independent of Polish concerns were barred, and even the slightest whiff of friendship between the two needed to be suppressed lest Sigismund react with fury. Poland and Prussia, it would appear, were purely divisive forces that kept Brandenburg and Sweden apart.

There was, however, another side to these developments that was by no means destructive to preparing the way for a direct and intense relationship to develop between the two lands in the future. On the most fundamental level, Brandenburg and Sweden were now for the first time anchored on each other's diplomatic horizon, and each was forced to think deeply about the other as they had never had to before. The Brandenburg electors were no longer second-line followers in Swedish affairs as they had been in the mediation efforts during the Seven Years' War of the North, but rather were themselves the point men of continental plans to end the Swedish-Polish conflict since the mediation embassy of 1598. The international peace conference intended for Stettin had been organized by Brandenburg, and Joachim Friedrich and Johann Sigismund had reached out to the Palatinate, Hessen, Denmark, England, the Dutch Republic and France in an effort to pull these powers into mediation schemes. Indeed, the English and Dutch expressions of interest in working to solve the Swedish-Polish conflict in 1613 were not sent directly to Gustav Adolf, but rather were communicated to the Swedish king via Brandenburg. Bertil Thyresson has noted that Berlin, alongside Paris, became the focal point of mediation activity with Sweden in all of Europe.⁶² This intense involvement in affairs relating to Sweden was a new development in Brandenburg history, and it set the stage for the relatively quick establishment of substantial relations with Sweden once Brandenburg's Swedish policy could gain some autonomy from Polish dominance.

There were already muted signs that this shift was occurring by the 1610s. Sigismund's demands for assistance against Sweden in the 1612 enfeoffment agreement led to the mission of Hans Keiler to Stockholm

⁶² Thyresson, 14–15.

later that year. On the surface, this mission appears to be a prime example of the Polish-dictated policy that poisoned relations between Sweden and Brandenburg in the early seventeenth century. Keiler's own report on his mission begins with the statement that he had been sent to carry letters from the elector to Queen-Mother Christina and the Swedish representatives in Reval concerning "His Royal Majesty of Poland's, as well as His Electoral Highness' affairs regarding Sweden..."⁶³ These letters were written in inflammatory, fully partisan language that was sharply critical of the Swedish revolt against Sigismund. "It is now known virtually around the world," wrote Johann Sigismund, that for several years the hereditary kingdom of "the illustrious prince, Lord Sigismund, King in Poland and Sweden (etc.), our highly honored and friendly beloved uncle, brother-in-law, lord father and feudal lord," has been plagued by a "great shedding of blood, misery and suffering."⁶⁴ The elector was now moved to seek an end to this dire situation, which could best happen "if all unlawful crimes are done away with, and that which in the first place has gotten [Sweden] into the misfortune in which [it] still finds [itself] is corrected," adding that "this is a means by which you can be returned to peace, quiet and unity, [n]amely if you obediently consent to His Royal Majesty as your hereditary lord."⁶⁵ Johann Sigismund was placing the blame for the

⁶³ "Nachdem es dem Durchleuchtigsten Hochgebornen Fursten unndt Herrn, Herrn *Johanni Sigismundo* Margraffen zu Brandenburgk...etzliche schreiben in Ihrer Koniglichen Maytt Zu Pohlen, so woll auch Ihrer Churfurst. Durchl. angelegener Sachen halber in Schweden an die durchlauchtigste hochgeborne Furstin unnd Frawen, Frawen Christinen... wie auch an die zur... *tractation* abgeordneter Herrn *Commissarion* abzuferigen gnedigst gefallen, als hab ich mich den 8 *Juny Anno 1612* uff die reise nach Schweden gemacht..." Hans Keiler's report on his mission to Sweden, undated [probably shortly after 26 October 1612]. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 3a, 1r–5v, here 1r.

⁶⁴ "Es ist numehr fast weltdkundig geworden, was es mit der Cron Schweden etzliche Jahr hero fur eine gelegenheit und selzames ansehen gewonnen, zu dem der *Durchlauchtigster* Furst, Herr *Sigismundt* Könige in Pohlen und Schweden [etc.] unser hochgeehrter freundlicher lieber Oheimb, Schwager, Herr Vater und Lehns herr, solches Ihres Erbkönigreichs gleichsamb *de facto* endt wurden, und daßelbe bißhero von außen ansehen mueßten, und zwar mit was großen bluetvergißen, Jammer und nodt..." Johann Sigismund to Swedish representatives in Reval, Königsberg, 18 May 1612. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

⁶⁵ "Alß wehren wir nicht allein nicht ungeneigt sondern erkenneneten uns zum hohesten schuldigh, da von unß etwas vorgenommen werden könnte, das zu beförderung des gemeinen friedens zugereichen (:welches dan nicht fueglicher zugeschehen, als wan einem Ieden das werde, worzu er von Gottes und Rechts wegen befurgt, alle unrechmeßige *atentata* abgeschaffet und man das wiederumb *Corrigire*, wordurch man anfenglich in dieses ungluck, welches noch auf diese stunde wehret, gerathen:); "Und weill dan dieses ein mittel, dadurch Ihr zur ruhe, friedt und einigkeit wiederumb gelangen könnet. Nemblich wan Ihr Euch Ihrer Kon: Wrd: alß Ewren Erbherrn gehorsamblichen bequehmet." Ibid.

Swedish-Polish struggle squarely on Sweden's shoulders, and was advocating nothing less than the reversal of the revolution that had driven Sigismund from his Swedish throne more than a decade earlier.

As could be expected, the Swedish reaction to this approach was entirely negative. Gustav Adolf wrote to his mother that he viewed the elector's letter to her as part of Sigismund's aggressive policy following Karl IX's death that aimed to sew disunity amongst the Swedish estates, which in turn would help him recover the kingdom and return it to the papal yoke. The letter was part and parcel of a growing threat to Sweden.⁶⁶

Alongside the public discourse of these letters that continued to toe the line of harsh Polish partisanship, however, there began to develop a private discourse that was not nearly so confrontational. In a personal audience with the queen-mother at Gripsholm, Keiler had in fact informed Christina that Johann Sigismund had instructed him orally (and therefore not in the written instructions for his mission which could, potentially, be read by Poland) to tell her that the elector had been required to write his letter as part of the negotiations for the Prussian enfeoffment.⁶⁷ The implication was that there was nothing to fear from the elector's harsh tone, since it was written more for a Polish than a Swedish audience.⁶⁸ The letter from the Brandenburg to the Swedish council of May 1613, when a renewal of hostilities between Sweden and Poland seemed far more likely than in the previous year, contained none of the stridently pro-Polish tone of the letters carried by Keiler. The Swedes noticed this with pleasure, and their response explicitly compared this letter to those of 1612. The positive tone of the latter letter, they wrote, made it clear that the damaging language of the earlier ones, which left no room for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship, must have been written "for other ends" and "out of other

⁶⁶ Gustav Adolf to Queen-Mother Christina and Duke Johan, Stockholm, 6 November 1612. *Svenska riksdagsakter jämte andra handlingar som höra till statsförfattningens historia under tidehvarvet 1521–1718*, series I, part II, vols. 1–2, ed. Nils Ahnlund (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1931–1932), Nr. 86, 180–82, here 181.

⁶⁷ "Dy ändoch att breefwet lydde annorleedes, så hafwer doch likwäll hans uttschickade post, Hans Keiler, som war till Hennes M:t widh Gripsholm, låtet seija Hennes M:t igenom den, som Hennes M:t till honom förschickade, att hans herre hade munteligen befält honom, der han fingo tala medh Hennes M:t, att han schulle seija Hennes M:t, att Churfursten hafwer så mått schrifwa Konnungen i Pålandh till willie, alldenstundh att han hafwer taget länhet Pryssen af honom på bättre conditioner än som hans Herrfadher det hadhe." "Änkedrottning Kristinas förklaring med anledning av konungens proposition den 6 november." *Ibid.*, Nr. 87, 183–88, here 185–86.

⁶⁸ Queen-Mother Christina's response seems to have allayed Gustav Adolf's concerns. See "Konungens svar på änkedrottningens förklaring till proposition," Stockholm, 11 November 1612. *Ibid.*, Nr. 91, 193–96.

causes not known to us at the time,” and that their meaning was perhaps “not indeed what the words say.”⁶⁹ Brandenburg’s correspondence of 1615 in preparation for the Stettin peace conference even extended some form of recognition to Gustav Adolf’s royal status, if not his rightful claim to the Swedish throne, referring to him as “His Royal Majesty” and “the current Royal Majesty in Sweden.”⁷⁰ All of these changes signaled a slow shift in the tone of Brandenburg-Swedish relations.

There was yet another level, even further below the surface, on which the Polish and Prussian issues held the potential to bring Brandenburg and Sweden together rather than to divide them. The Hohenzollern and Vasa—both Swedish and Polish—were all aware of this, and it was in the back of their minds throughout the period. Stated most plainly, the potential existed for the electors to violate their feudal obligation to Sigismund and ally with Sweden in order to make good their claims to Prussia by force. It was clear that Karl and Gustav Adolf would have been every bit as eager for Brandenburg’s aid against Poland as Sigismund was insistent on its help against Sweden, and that the Swedes had military resources that far exceeded any that Brandenburg could muster in the event that a decision to fight Sigismund was made. Brandenburg’s relations with Poland were far from idyllic for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that Sigismund knew that he had the Hohenzollern in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Prussia and was willing to use this to drive a hard bargain. As early as 1601 there were discussions within the Brandenburg government of the possibility of forming a military alliance with Karl to break out of Prussia’s feudal relationship with Poland, and Karl reportedly made offers in this direction.⁷¹ Joachim Friedrich gave more serious consideration to the possibility of offensive military action in Prussia in 1604, and his counselors raised the prospect of approaching Karl through a third party (such as Count Johan of Nassau, Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, or Kristian IV of Denmark) for military and financial support.⁷² There was real fear in

⁶⁹ “...als haben wir uns die gedanken machen wollen, das solches, so hiebevorn geschehen, und vorgedacht, zue andern ende, und vielleicht nicht allerdings wie die worte lauten, mochten gemeinet sein, sondern auss andern uhrsachen, die uns noch zur zeit unbewust, geschrieben worden.” *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 76, 142–43.

⁷⁰ Brandenburg chancellor and council to Swedish chancellor and council, Cöln an der Spree, 26 April 1615. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199.

⁷¹ Immekeppel, 24; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, II.2, 396–97.

⁷² *Gutachten* of Johann von Löben, Christoph von Waldenfels, Christoph Benckendorff, Friedrich Pruckmann, and Joachim Hübner, Cöln an der Spree, 1 [11] August 1614. *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 3, 14–22, here 22. The elector also approached Kristian IV and asked for 3000

Poland during the delicate negotiations at the Diet of 1605 that Joachim Friedrich would declare war if he did not get what he wanted, and these fears were made worse by the threatened resumption of hostilities with Sweden.⁷³ Michael Roberts has even argued that the elector was awarded with the administration at this time as a bribe to keep him neutral in the struggle with Karl.⁷⁴ If this was Sigismund's strategy it appears to have paid dividends, for Brandenburg did not pursue the idea of an alliance with Karl in earnest. The overtures from Karl that Joachim Friedrich realized must be turned away after receiving the administration in Prussia may well have been military in nature. Sigismund may have had similar motivations in granting Johann Sigismund the enfeoffment in 1611.⁷⁵ So while the Prussian issue tied Brandenburg policy so closely to that of Sigismund, within this same context the possibility of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation to their mutual benefit was also raised.

Prussia was an intensely complicating factor in Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the early seventeenth century. It negated the possibility for normal, public, positive relations between the two lands, while at the same time compelling them to consider each other in a new light. It was now clear to them both that they could have profound effects on each other's interests, and therefore deserved to occupy important positions in each other's foreign policies, and not unavoidably in an adversarial mode. Herein lay an important pillar of the relationship to come.

Denmark

If Poland was Sweden's chief enemy of the moment, Denmark was its primal rival from time immemorial. And as Brandenburg stood in a relationship with Poland that conditioned its relations with Sweden, it also enjoyed close ties with Denmark that placed additional obstacles on the path to a substantial relationship with Sweden. The Hohenzollern and Denmark's Oldenburg ruling house were tied together by a myriad of dynastic connections that contributed to pro-Danish sentiment in the Brandenburg

Danish troops and Danish assistance in getting English and Dutch military help in the event of hostilities between the elector and Sigismund. See Thyresson, 13–14.

⁷³ Immekeppel, 32.

⁷⁴ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:148–49.

⁷⁵ Thyresson, 59–60; Ranke, 136.

government.⁷⁶ Hohenzollern-Oldenburg dynastic ties were reinforced on the eve of Brandenburg's first major foray into active involvement in Swedish affairs (the mediation embassy of 1598) when King Kristian IV of Denmark married Elector Joachim Friedrich's daughter Anna Katarina in November 1597.

Brandenburg capitalized on its good relations with the Danish crown by working in concert with Denmark regarding Ducal Prussia and other issues of importance.⁷⁷ The Danes provided the warships that the elector was obliged to employ for defense of the Prussian coast against Karl. Sigismund was aware of Brandenburg's close relationship with Kristian IV, and Joachim Friedrich knew this. The elector dangled the prospect of Danish assistance in the Swedish issue as an enticing carrot before Sigismund's eyes: if his Prussian requests were granted, the elector would work to enlist Kristian's aid in recovering Sweden for Sigismund.⁷⁸ Brandenburg's relationship with Denmark became even more of an asset vis-à-vis Poland when the War of Kalmar broke out in 1611. It might have been expected that Sigismund would have been delighted when Kristian declared war on Karl IX, but the opposite was true. Sigismund still considered himself to be King of Sweden, and he claimed the subjects and resources of the kingdom as his own. Damage to them was damage to his own interests. Furthermore, Kristian was not fighting to return Sigismund to his rightful throne, but rather under the stated banner of conquering Sweden for himself in order to restore the Union of the Scandinavian kingdoms.⁷⁹ Brandenburg, because of its Danish ties, was in position to intercede with Kristian IV to try to bring the war to an end, and as was the case in the Swedish-Polish conflict, Brandenburg took an active role in furthering a negotiated settlement between the Swedes and Danes.⁸⁰ Upon Sigismund's request, Johann Sigismund wrote to Kristian in March 1611 with an appeal against military hostilities and an offer to mediate in

⁷⁶ King Kristian I of Denmark (reigned 1448–1481) had married Dorothy of Brandenburg in 1449; their granddaughter Elizabeth, daughter of their first son Hans (king from 1481–1513), became the wife of Elector Joachim I of Brandenburg (reigned 1499–1535) in 1502; Kristian and Dorothy's second son, King Frederik I (reigned 1523–1533), married Anna, the daughter of Elector Johann Cicero of Brandenburg (reigned 1486–1499); Frederik and Anna's daughter Dorothy wed Duke Albrecht of Prussia in 1526.

⁷⁷ See, for example, *ABr*, vol. 1, Nrs. 3, 35, 56, 292; vol. 2, Nr. 710; vol. 3, Nrs. 1662, 2161; vol. 4, pt. 1, Nrs. 2398, 2404.

⁷⁸ See *ABr*, vol. 1, Nrs. 14, 25, 262.

⁷⁹ Brief summaries of the war and its causes can be found in Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 445–58; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:60–72; Tham, 89–100; Hildebrand, 347–53.

⁸⁰ On Johan Sigismund intercession, see Thyresson, 59–62; Tham, 98–99.

the Danish-Swedish conflict. During 1612 Johann Sigismund made various appeals to his fellow electors, Emperor Matthias, France, England, and the Dutch to take up mediation efforts between Kristian and Gustav Adolf.

Despite his opposition to the war, Sigismund recognized that Kristian's military success could offer him some opportunities to advance his cause in Sweden. The elector was key to these plans. In December 1611 Sigismund wrote to Johann Sigismund with the request to encourage Kristian to turn over Kalmar and the other parts of Sweden conquered by Danish arms to him. The elector sent Martin von Wallenrodt to Denmark in summer 1612, and in language reminiscent of the letters carried by Keiler to Sweden at about this same time asked Kristian to hand over his conquests to Sigismund "as the right natural hereditary lord and King of Sweden."⁸¹ Such requests made no headway with Kristian, and they, like Keiler's mission, would do little to endear Brandenburg to Sweden.

The situation up to the early 1610s, then, was one in which Brandenburg was in close contact with Sweden's two great rivals, Poland and Denmark, much closer contact than it enjoyed with Sweden itself. This was a serious roadblock to the development of an independent and substantial relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden. But it also raised the level of mutual awareness between Brandenburg and Sweden, and forced them to realize that there was a set of issues in which they were mutually invested. Once the roadblock was shifted to the side, it would become clear that the forms of contact between Brandenburg and Sweden that Polish/Prussian and Danish concerns had brought about, although not always friendly, had nevertheless paved the way for a closer relationship in the future.

Geopolitical Shifts

The first decades of the seventeenth century witnessed a number of important geopolitical developments that had lasting implications for Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Sweden suffered from diplomatic isolation during most of Karl IX's reign as nearly all of the courts of Europe viewed Karl as a usurper and consequently treated him as a pariah. Heavy-handed Danish actions in northern Germany and rising fears of Danish dominance of the Baltic trade helped turn the tide of international opinion more in Sweden's favor during the early years of Gustav Adolf's reign as the Dutch, English, and Hansa cities began to see Sweden as a potential

⁸¹ Thyresson, 60–61.

partner who could help protect their Baltic interests. Brandenburg itself saw its relations with Denmark cool over Kristian's refusal to provide support for the elector in his struggle for the Kleve-Jülich inheritance, which in turn opened the door to closer relations with Gustav Adolf.⁸²

The Dutch Republic had been the main foreign supporter of Brandenburg's claims to Kleve-Jülich since the 1590s, and Brandenburg's ties to the Dutch were deep.⁸³ The Dutch were also the first European power to enter into a formal alliance with Sweden after the revolution, concluding a defensive pact in 1614 that marked Gustav Adolf's first major foreign policy victory and Sweden's emergence from diplomatic isolation.⁸⁴ Brandenburg and Sweden now shared an important friend in common, and whereas Poland and Denmark had kept Brandenburg and Sweden apart, in coming years the Dutch would work to promote friendship between their Brandenburg and Swedish allies.

At the same time that Brandenburg was turning away from Denmark and Sweden was forging ties with the Dutch, the elector was beginning to adopt a policy more independent from Poland as well.⁸⁵ The feudal relationship in Ducal Prussia was still very important, but after receiving the enfeoffment in 1611 Johann Sigismund could reasonably expect a pause before the next great struggle over a major transfer in Prussia took place—that regarding Brandenburg's actual succession in the Duchy when Duke Albrecht Friedrich died, which did not happen until 1618. Sigismund was preoccupied with events in Russia and domestic problems, and this gave Brandenburg further space in which to develop its own policy. The new spirit of independence was apparent in July 1613, when Johann Sigismund's aunt Elisabeth Sophie married Prince Janus Radziwiłł, a leader of the Lithuanian noble party that frequently stood in opposition to Sigismund, in a ceremony celebrated in Berlin with the elector's support. It should be no surprise that this shift in policy coincided with the improvement in tone in the Brandenburg-Swedish correspondence of 1613.

There was one additional factor contributing to the growing distance between Brandenburg and Poland, perhaps the most important one—religion. Johann Sigismund's conversion to Calvinism in 1613 and

⁸² Thyresson, 64–66; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:147–54.

⁸³ For Brandenburg-Dutch cooperation over Jülich-Kleve in 1594, see Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 320.

⁸⁴ Thyresson, 35–56; Tham, 119–20; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:149–52.

⁸⁵ Thyresson, 64; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:148–50.

Brandenburg's membership in the Evangelical Union in Germany created real tension between the elector and the Polish king. Religion, and a more assertive Protestant policy, were also central elements in Brandenburg's emergent relationship with Sweden. Before discussing the religious factor itself, though, something needs to be said about the approach to describing diplomatic relations adopted by this chapter thus far.

Diplomacy has been portrayed to this point, and not wholly without reason, as the purview of states described as essentially coherent structures with clearly defined interests and unified policies: 'Brandenburg' was working towards a specific set of goals and under a specific set of constraints; 'Sweden' was dealing with the following issues that determined its policy; and thus the two interacted with one another as they did. This kind of language is a convenient shorthand in approaching the immensely complex story of foreign relations, and of introducing the broad international contours within which countries such as Brandenburg and Sweden come into contact and begin to establish relationships with one another. But this language can also be severely misleading if not viewed in the proper light, especially in an early modern context. The emerging states of early modern Europe were not monolithic entities with highly developed, impersonal institutions designed to formulate and carry out discrete policy objectives. Rather, they were made up of groups of individuals, often with widely divergent ideas of what the state should be, how it should be organized, which interests it should serve, and how and why they in turn should serve it. These individuals, like other members of society, were influenced by their religious beliefs, intellectual and cultural interests, financial circumstances, educational backgrounds, and sets of personal relationships. All of these things affected the ways in which early modern people conceived of, and functioned within, the developing states that populated their world. Furthermore, a significant portion of early modern political and diplomatic activity was carried out by people who were only loosely connected to, or even entirely outside of, the formal state institutions and structures that did exist. The lines between official diplomatic activity and private action were blurry, and motives of public interest could be indistinguishable from private agendas. The concept of 'public interest' itself bears interrogation, as many early modern diplomatic actors remained committed to an expansive definition of the multiple 'publics' to which they belonged and towards which their diplomatic work rendered service, including many 'publics' that could not be lodged within the borders of a singular polity nor governed by a singular

government.⁸⁶ In order to understand how diplomatic activity in early modern Europe was actually conducted, and why relationships between countries followed the course that they did, the central role of individuals (both within and outside of state institutions) and the multitude of factors influencing their behavior must be recognized as standing alongside the important (but not hegemonic) role played by governments and the state institutions they were developing.

In the case of Brandenburg and Sweden, the shifts in geopolitical circumstance that drew the two together coincided with the development of a highly personal diplomatic culture that provided the codes and tools through which individuals connected to each country could engage with one another to influence their developing relationship. This diplomatic culture drew upon the final three factors to be discussed in this chapter—religion and Protestant politics, education and culture, and interpersonal networks—and hovered around the point where diplomatic activity shades into personal action and vice versa. Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture was by no means *sui generis*, as similar factors played roles in any number of early modern diplomatic relationships, although it did enjoy a particular mixture and weighting of elements that encouraged its practitioners (and through them the countries themselves) to interact in certain ways. The geopolitical forces discussed in this chapter so far would have laid the foundations for *a* relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden under almost any circumstances, but it wouldn't have been the same relationship that actually did take place had it not been for the role of diplomatic culture. Thinking in terms of diplomatic culture allows us to rescue the story of early modern diplomacy from the straightjacket to which it has often been confined by the assumption that states as unitary agents were the dominant sources of diplomatic initiative and activity. Approaching an early modern diplomatic relationship through the lens of diplomatic culture provides a picture that is more nuanced, and more interesting.

⁸⁶ Garrett Mattingly's classic argument that the shift from medieval to modern diplomacy entailed a redefinition of the public interest diplomats served from that of the universal *respublica christiana* to that of the individual secular state may hold true for some diplomatic actors, but others (including many of those investigated in this book) eluded the modern imposition of singular diplomatic allegiances and preserved loyalties that resonated on multiple levels. See Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Dover, 1988).

Religion and "Protestant" Politics

Sweden was an almost uniformly Lutheran country in the early seventeenth century. The population of Brandenburg was also overwhelmingly Lutheran, and the specific paths followed by the Lutheran reformations in the two countries bore many similarities. Ironically, it wasn't until a significant confessional difference developed with the Hohenzollern conversion of 1613 that religion and religious politics became an element that drew them together into a relationship.

Both Brandenburg and Sweden had conservative reformations and relatively late-developing Lutheran orthodoxies. Elector Joachim II took Brandenburg into the Reformation in 1539 and pursued a moderate, middle-path course that wasn't replaced with a more confessional stance until the reign of his son Johann Georg, under whom rigid Gnesio-Lutheran orthodoxy set in.⁸⁷ Two of Johann Georg's theologians, Andreas Musculus and Christoph Corner, played leading roles in drafting the chief document of the Gnesio-Lutheran movement, the Formula of Concord, which Johann Georg enthusiastically embraced upon its completion in 1577. The suffocating orthodoxy of Johann Georg's reign went hand in hand with his unrelenting political conservatism.

The development of a clearly-defined Lutheran confessional identity within the Swedish Church occurred at the same time that Johann Georg ruled in Brandenburg.⁸⁸ The reformation instituted by Gustav Vasa was slow-paced and moderate, with no sustained effort to assert doctrinal or ceremonial uniformity. When Erik XIV came to the throne many fundamental issues were still unsettled, and they remained so throughout his brief and mercurial reign. Johan III was deeply versed in theology and had a clearly developed religious agenda aimed at settling the issues left open by Sweden's reformation. The king's desired solution, however, lay in the

⁸⁷ The best modern study of sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Brandenburg religious history is Nischan, *Prince, People and Confession*. For the period from Joachim I through Johann Georg, see 5–55. See also Wolfgang Gericke, *Glaubenszeugnisse und Konfessionspolitik der Brandenburgischen Herrscher bis zur Preußischen Union 1540 bis 1815* (Bielefeld: Luther-Verlag, 1977), 13–21.

⁸⁸ For sixteenth-century Swedish religious history, see Hjalmar Holmquist, *Reformationstidevarvet, 1521–1611*, vol. 3 of *Svenska Kyrkans Historia*, ed. Hjalmar Holmquist och Hilding Pleijel (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1933); Lars Anton Anjou, *Svenska kyrkoreformationens historia* (Uppsala: Leffler och Sebell, 1850); Anjou, *Svenska Kyrkans Historia ifrån Upsala Môte år 1593 till Slutet af Sjuttonde Århundradet* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1866); Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 59–75, 107–24, 273–96, 327–38.

reunification of the Swedish Church (and the other Protestant churches of Europe, he hoped) with a reformed, universal Catholic Church. Johan's activities towards this end, including an extended, clandestine correspondence with the Papal Curia (culminating in his submission to Gregory XIII of a written proposal for the reunification of the Swedish Church with Rome in March 1578), the cultivation of relations with leading Catholic powers, the scandalous discovery that a man permitted by the king to operate an academy in Stockholm (the infamous "Klosterlasse") was actually a Norwegian Jesuit sent to Sweden by the pope, and especially his efforts to impose a new liturgy, the 'Red Book' of 1576, upon the Swedish Church, produced a backlash that ultimately led to the confessional consolidation of the Church around orthodox Lutheran principles.

Duke Karl's duchy of Södermanland became a center of clerical resistance to the Red Book. Shortly after Johan died Karl had the interim government summon a church council to meet at Uppsala which condemned the Red Book as a "monstrum horrendum" and adopted the Augustana invariata, along with the Apostolic, Nicean, and Athanasian creeds, as the pillars of the Swedish Lutheran Church.⁸⁹ Papists and Liturgists (those supporting Johan's liturgy) were condemned, and the government was called upon to suppress them in the Swedish Lutheran Church's first official statement in favor of intolerance and persecution. Copies of the Uppsala Resolution were printed and circulated throughout the country. Michael Roberts has written that "[t]he Uppsala Resolution became a great national act of faith, a declaration of religious rights, the cornerstone of Swedish Lutheranism."⁹⁰

Both Brandenburg and Sweden therefore had moderate Lutheran reformations that became more stridently confessional in the later years of the sixteenth century. With the Uppsala Resolution of 1593, the Swedish Church pledged itself to a specific confessional position not all that different than the Lutheran orthodoxy that predominated in Brandenburg at the same time. Indeed, the University of Frankfurt an der Oder in Brandenburg was one of four German Lutheran universities from which the assembly at Uppsala requested formal advice in its debates over the

⁸⁹ See Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 238–44; Anjou, *Svenska kyrkans historia*, 3–9; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 331–38. The text of the Uppsala Resolution, as well as a facsimile of the original document, are printed in Hildebrand, between 240 and 241. The text is also printed in Holmquist, pt. 2, 311–15.

⁹⁰ Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 336.

liturgy.⁹¹ It does not appear, however, that religious similarities opened up important avenues of exchange between the countries at this time.⁹² That step waited until each land began to shift towards more activist Protestant politics.

For the Hohenzollern, the adoption of an activist Protestant policy accompanied a move away from Lutheran orthodoxy and the eventual conversion of the ruling house to Calvinism. Johann Georg despised Calvinists as both heretics and social and political revolutionaries.⁹³ He forced his son Joachim Friedrich and grandson Johann Sigismund to sign a pledge in 1593 to remain true to the Formula of Concord, and in his "Fatherly Disposition" of 1596 insisted that Brandenburg maintain "the true pure Evangelical teachings of the Augsburg Confession, as We have preserved with God's help during the years of Our reign up to now, with out Calvinistic or other sectarian error."⁹⁴ Despite Johann Georg's best efforts, Joachim Friedrich proved far less antagonistic towards Calvinists than his father. Joachim Friedrich was a convinced and pious Lutheran, but of a much milder mold.⁹⁵ He was influenced by the irenic teachings of Martin Moller, who advocated harmony between Lutherans and Calvinists.⁹⁶ He was also deeply affected by events such as the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre and Spanish actions in the Netherlands, and he became convinced that the Catholic Counter-Reformation was a serious threat to the Hohenzollern lands that demanded an active response. This would require working closely with Calvinists, and Joachim Friedrich showed himself very willing to do so. Already during his days as the Administrator of Magdeburg he had welcomed Calvinist councilors into his service, and his leading advisor was the Calvinist Wilhelm Rudolf von Meckbach, who had earlier been in Hessian service and who advo-

⁹¹ See documents 12–14 in *Svenska riksdagsakter jämte andra handlingar som höra till statsförfattnings historia under tidevarvet 1521–1718*, Series I, pt. 3, ed. Emil Hildebrand (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1894), 31–78.

⁹² Prussia, on the other hand, enjoyed many contacts with the early Lutheran church in Sweden and exerted real influence over its development. See Hubatsch, 259.

⁹³ On Johann Georg's hatred and fear of Calvinism, see especially Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 47–55.

⁹⁴ "...die wahre reine evangelische lehr Augspurgischer confession, wie wir die zeit unserer regierung bishero durch gottes hülfe bewaret, ohne calvinische und andere sectierische irthumb." Cited in Gericke, 21.

⁹⁵ On Joachim Friedrich's personal piety and prayer habits, including a good deal of information on the specific theologians whom the elector read, see the "Fragment betr. das Gebet des Kurfürsten Joachim Friedrich," document #5 in Gericke, 118–20.

⁹⁶ Gericke, 21; Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 71.

cated cooperation between German and foreign Protestants (particularly the Dutch) against Catholic aggression.⁹⁷ From the 1580s Joachim Friedrich came ever more under the influence of his cousin Georg Friedrich of Ansbach, who admired the Dutch and the Huguenots and was an advocate of Protestant political union. Joachim Friedrich himself became involved in plans for a broad Protestant alliance in the late 1580s and early 1590s, and from 1592 these plans blended into his efforts to champion his son's cause in the Strassburg election. He also worked actively with the Dutch from the earliest stages of the Kleve-Jülich negotiations in the mid-1590s, establishing a pattern of Brandenburg-Dutch cooperation along the Rhine that would last well into the next century.⁹⁸

Others in Brandenburg shared a desire for harmony between the Protestant confessions. Urban Pierius, the superintendent of Küstrin, wrote a pamphlet in 1590 in favor of Protestant cooperation against aggressive Catholicism: "Take pity on us as our enemies are oppressing us . . . Do not permit them to exterminate your true faith; do not allow them to bring back the papal blasphemy. . . . Help, give courage and sustenance to our brothers and sisters in the Palatinate, Hessen, Württemberg, France, the Netherlands, and wherever else they may need it!"⁹⁹ Such appeals made no headway with Johann Georg, who refused requests for assistance from the Huguenots and Dutch Calvinists and prevented them from raising troops in his lands. But when Joachim Friedrich succeeded his father in 1598 he brought with him not only his more open, less dogmatic Lutheranism, but also a keen desire to strengthen ties with the Dutch, the Huguenots, and other Protestant powers.

One of Joachim Friedrich's most important acts of government was the establishment of the *Geheimer Rat* (privy council) in 1604, a body that became the center of the Brandenburg government and wielded substantial influence over Brandenburg policy through much of the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁰ Several of the original councilors Joachim Friedrich appointed

⁹⁷ Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 296; Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 56–73. For Joachim Friedrich's shift towards 'Calvinist politics' during his Magdeburg time, see Christof Römer, "Der Beginn der calvinischen Politik des Hauses Brandenburg. Joachim Friedrich als Administrator," in *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* 23 (1974), 99–112.

⁹⁸ Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 320f.

⁹⁹ Cited in Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 61.

¹⁰⁰ Documents relating to the foundation of the *Geheimer Rat* are printed in *ABr*, vol. 1. For a discussion of the atmosphere in which the *Gehemier Rat* was founded, see the provocative (but not always balanced) discussion of Otto Hintze, "Kalvinismus und Staatsräson in Brandenburg zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts," in *Regierung und Verwaltung. Gesammelte*

were either Calvinists themselves or friendly towards Calvinism, and these men advocated an internationalist and activist Protestant policy that guided Brandenburg ever closer to the German Protestant “action party” led by the Palatinate and Hessen.¹⁰¹ Some would also play important roles in the public conversion of Johann Sigismund to Calvinism in 1613. The *Geheimer Rat* gave an influential institutional home to the pro-Calvinist and politically activist elements in Brandenburg.

The religious and political policies adopted under Joachim Friedrich gave rise to unfounded suspicions that the elector was a crypto-Calvinist.¹⁰² Similar accusations were leveled at Karl IX in Sweden, who assumed power at roughly the same time that Joachim Friedrich succeeded in Brandenburg. Like Joachim Friedrich, Karl IX thought of himself as a believing Lutheran, although of a non-dogmatic, eclectic type.¹⁰³ He was no fan of the Formula of Concord, and was personally willing to tolerate differences of religious opinion as long as they did not directly contradict Scripture. There can be little doubt that Karl was open to certain aspects of Calvinist thought. His first wife was a Palatinate princess, his second a descendant of Philip of Hessen. Karl was therefore connected by marriage to the two leading houses of German Calvinism, and he spent considerable time at Heidelberg and elsewhere in Germany in 1578 and 1579, where he became personally familiar with Calvinist practice. The Heidelberg Catechism in particular

Abhandlungen zur Staats-, Rechts- und Sozialgeschichte Preussens, 2nd edition, ed. Gerhard Oestreich, 255–312. For a general history of the *Geheimer Rat*, see Gerhard Oestreich, *Der brandenburg-preußische Geheime Rat vom Regierungsantritt des Großen Kurfürsten bis zu der Neuordnung im Jahre 1651. Eine behördengeschichtliche Studie* (Würzburg-Aumühle: Konrad Triltsch, 1937).

¹⁰¹ The nine original *Geheime Räte* were: Christoff Benckendorf; Ott-Heinrich von Bylandt, Freiherr von Rheydt; Hieronymus von Dieskau; Joachim Hübner; Johann von Löben; Simon Ulrich Pistoris; Dr. Friedrich Pruckmann; Hieronymus von Schlick; and Christoph von Waldenfels. Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 334ff. Waldenfels and Rheydt had been in Georg Friedrich of Ansbach's service. Schlick and Dieskau had served Joachim Friedrich since the Magdeburg days, and Schlick maintained close ties with the Bohemian Calvinists. See Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 62. Dieskau, Pistoris, and Pruckmann were all part of the group of advisors around Johann Sigismund involved in his conversion. *Ibid.*, 92. This same group advocated closer ties with the Dutch, the Palatinate, and the Evangelical Union, and a harder-line against the Habsburgs and other Catholics.

¹⁰² Droysen describes the elector as a Calvinist in spirit, held back from a full embrace of the faith by his cautious personality. *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, II.2, 383–84. It would be more accurate to state, as Hintze does, that crypto-Calvinism slowly and quietly flourished at Joachim Friedrich's court. “Kalvinismus,” 267.

¹⁰³ For Karl's religious policies and relations with the Swedish Church, see Holmquist, pt. 2, especially 243–301; Anjou, *Svenska Kyrkans Historia*, especially pt. 1, chapter 2; Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 322–26; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 412–26.

exerted a strong influence on Karl's religious thought, and his own efforts to produce a catechism for the Swedish Church drew upon the Heidelberg Catechism as well as the writings of John a Lasco. Theodore Micronius, a Livonian theologian whom Karl called to Sweden as his court preacher and who was undoubtedly Calvinist, instituted a liturgy for Karl's royal chapel based on the Heidelberg Handbook. It would be inaccurate, though, to say that Karl was a Calvinist, for he rejected predestination and embraced a theology that was more akin to Philippism than Calvinism. This still left him at odds with the increasingly orthodox Swedish Lutheran Church, and these tensions were made worse by the fact that Karl was a firm royal supremacist who rejected all notions of separation of church and state and believed it his right to intervene in matters of church governance. This situation produced bitter recriminations from the clergy that Karl was a crypto-Calvinist who wished to Calvinize the Swedish Church. Karl's relationship with the Church would be strained throughout his reign, and it wasn't until the last few years before his death that the king and the church realized that neither would be able to change the other's positions and entered into what Roberts has described as "a sort of armed truce."¹⁰⁴

There were other reasons in addition to religious belief that led Karl to pursue policies that were open towards Calvinists. He hoped to cultivate trade with western European Calvinists and to attract skilled Calvinist settlers to Sweden to improve the domestic economy. A prosecutorial Lutheran orthodoxy favored by the clergy would not further these ends. Even though he had been integral in bringing the Uppsala meeting of 1593 to life and in securing the acceptance of its results throughout the kingdom, Karl was not entirely pleased with the Uppsala Resolution since it was directed against Calvinists as well as Catholics.¹⁰⁵ In a meeting of the Estates in 1606, Karl responded to the Estates' insistence that not only Catholics but Calvinists, Anabaptists, and all other sects must be resisted by stating that "Calvinists and Anabaptists are not my enemies."¹⁰⁶ Against clerical resistance, Karl granted religious freedoms to the Dutch Calvinists who settled in the newly founded city of Göteborg.¹⁰⁷

Cooperation with foreign Protestants, including Calvinists, was also a central goal of Karl's foreign policy. He was desperate to connect his

¹⁰⁴ Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 425.

¹⁰⁵ Anjou, *Svenska Kyrkans Historia*, 5.

¹⁰⁶ "Kalvinister och vederdöpare äro icke mina fiender." Cited in Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 324.

¹⁰⁷ Holmquist, 285–86; Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 325–26.

rebellion against Sigismund to the larger Protestant struggle against Catholicism, for a domestic audience to justify the rebellion and consolidate popular support, and for an international audience as an avenue to build connections with other Protestant states to break out of Sweden's diplomatic isolation and win recognition and support for his rule. Getting continental Protestants interested in his cause was an uphill battle for Karl against the relatively distant location of his kingdom and his own status as a usurper, and it wasn't until the end of his reign—and really not even until the rule of his son Gustav Adolf—that much of European Protestantism began to accept that Swedish affairs were firmly tied to their own confessional struggles. The establishment of this connection would mark a fundamental turning point in Sweden's foreign relations and a major advance in the ongoing integration of early modern Sweden into Europe.¹⁰⁸

Karl's attempts to form the connection began in the earliest stages of his rebellion, when he was still claiming to be loyal to Sigismund. Brandenburg was one of the states to which he reached out in an effort to paint his actions in Sweden as religiously driven. In a letter to Elector Johann Georg from July 1597, Karl excused his rebellion on the grounds that he had assumed power "so that the Pope's intended plan regarding the introduction of his idolatrous doctrine in this Kingdom will not be brought to fruition, and the true religion grounded in God's Word will not be put in danger," and called for a league of all Protestant powers to face this pernicious threat.¹⁰⁹ The arrival of a Catholic king at the head of a foreign army of invasion in 1598 certainly provided grist for Karl's potent domestic propaganda mill, and it did help turn his rebellion into a more broadly popular revolt. But it produced little reaction from Protestants

¹⁰⁸ See Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 395–96.

¹⁰⁹ "Alß bitten Wir freundlich, E.L. wolle nicht alleine, so dieselbige dieses falschen aus Preuzens und Verleumbdens berichtet wurde, keinen glauben zustellen, sondern Uns im besten freundlich entschuldigt nemen. Auch so in Uns künfftig gewaltsamer weise gesetzt pleiben solte, wie Wir gleichwohl nicht verhoffen wollen, Uns ihren guten rath mittheilen, und so viel an ihr ist, befördern helffen, damit des Pabsts vorlengst furgehabtes vornehmen, wegen einfuerung seiner Abgöttischen lehre, alhie im Reich, nicht zu werck gerichtet, und die wahre auch in Gottes wort gegründte religion in gefahr gesetzt pleiben möge. Dahin den beruerter unruigen leute alles ihr tuchten und trachten gehet, damit angeregter Päbstischer irthumb, alhie, zu ihrem vorthell, wiederum auff die bahne gebracht werden möge. Welches den do eß geschehen...eine *Liga* erfolgen solte, die benachtbarte Königreich, Fürstenthumb und Landschafften, so woll auch alle Euangelische *Stende* ins gemein hernacher mitbetreffen wurde." Karl to Johann Georg, Stockholm, 31 July 1597. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5a1–5a2, 466v–470r. An essentially identical letter was sent on the same day to Electoral Prince Joachim Friedrich.

internationally, and as we have seen Brandenburg's position in the early years of the Swedish-Polish conflict was not at all in favor of Karl.

While Karl suggested that Protestant cooperation could lead to closer ties between Sweden and Brandenburg, the ironic truth was that the combination of Brandenburg and Protestant politics actually contributed to Sweden's ongoing diplomatic isolation by placing a roadblock between Karl and his 'natural' basis of support within the German Protestant action party. Karl's German relatives in the Palatinate and Hessen were the recognized leaders of the action party, and their religious-political viewpoints and familial ties made them Karl's most logical German allies. Although they had sympathy for Karl's cause and were more prepared than most to accept Karl's insistence that his struggle with Sigismund was part of their own struggle against Catholicism, they shied away from giving Karl active support because they had a bigger goal in mind: attracting Brandenburg to membership in the action party. While they were actively courting Joachim Friedrich, including lending him support in his negotiations with Poland for the administration and eventual succession in Prussia, they realized that if their party publicly adopted the cause of Sigismund's arch-enemy it would make it impossible for Brandenburg to join.¹¹⁰ Elector Friedrich and Landgrave Moritz therefore felt able to render Karl little more than quiet moral support.

Both Joachim Friedrich and Karl IX were Lutheran sovereigns with similar attitudes towards Calvinism. They each ruled over Lutheran populations and pursued policies that favored trans-confessional cooperation between Protestants. On the state level, however, religion and Protestant politics contributed little if anything towards establishing a relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden during the first decade of the seventeenth century, and even served to reinforce Sweden's diplomatic isolation. The situation was different on the level of individual action that underlay official state policy. Several of those figures who moved into positions of influence under Joachim Friedrich as the ossified Gnesio-Lutheran orthodoxy of Johann Georg's reign was cracking held opinions that foretold a future where religion would indeed draw the two countries towards one another.

Ott-Heinrich von Bylandt, Freiherr von Rheydt, was an ardent pan-Protestant whose influence over Brandenburg policy has been overstated

¹¹⁰ Thyresson, 15–16; Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 396–97; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:154; Tham, 87.

by Otto Hintze but who nevertheless held a position of real importance during Joachim Friedrich's reign.¹¹¹ He was a native of Kleve and one of the leaders of the "*Patriotenpartei*" that worked in collaboration with the Protestant claimants to the duchy against the Spanish. He was also a fiery Calvinist and vocal advocate of Protestant unionist politics. He had been in the service of Georg Friedrich of Ansbach, where he had worked with the margrave in support of his policy of Protestant unity.¹¹² He entered Brandenburg service in 1603 and became an important advisor to Joachim Friedrich and especially electoral prince Johann Sigismund. In 1607 he wrote to Joachim Friedrich in language that could have been penned by Karl himself. "Your Electoral Grace knows," Rheydt wrote, "that the Jesuits have moved this king [Sigismund] so that he has forsaken his hereditary kingdom of Sweden, contrary to established pacts and agreements, under the hope that he will master the heretics with violence and reintroduce the Papacy into Sweden by the sword."¹¹³ The blame for the Swedish Revolution was thus placed squarely at Sigismund's feet, and its causes rooted in a broader Papal and Jesuitical conspiracy. Rheydt quickly slipped in a reference to his own arch-enemy, the Habsburgs, by adding that the Jesuits had even been able to move the king of Spain to murder his only son. The mention of Spain was by no means coincidental, as it placed the troubles in Sweden within the context of the European-wide Protestant-Catholic struggle that Rheydt, every bit as much as Karl, believed demanded Protestant cooperation.¹¹⁴

Like Rheydt, Adam Gans zu Putlitz was a Calvinist official in Joachim Friedrich's government who became part of the group of advisors surrounding Johann Sigismund who advocated a more militant, activist Protestant foreign policy and increased ties to foreign Calvinists, especially in

¹¹¹ See Hintze, "Kalvinismus," 283–310.

¹¹² Ibid., 285ff.; Immekeppel, 22.

¹¹³ "Über das ist E.Ch.G. bekandt, das die Jesuiter eben diesen König dahin gebracht haben, das ehr wider aufgerichte pacts und Vergleichungh sein Erbkonigreich Sweden verlassen, unter dieser gemachten Hoffnungh, ehr wurde die Ketzer mit Gewalt zwingen und das Papstumb mit dem Schwert in Sweden wider einfuren kunnen. Den König von Hispanien haben die Jesuiter zu seines der Zeitt einzigen Shones Mordt bewogen." Rheydt to Joachim Friedrich, Königsberg, 17 [27] February 1607. *ABr*, vol. 2, Nr. 1449, 526–29, here 527–28.

¹¹⁴ For a good example of Rheydt's advocacy of Protestant unionism and his fiery anti-Catholic rhetoric, see "Gegenberichte Rheydts gegen das Bedenken der geheimen Räte wegen seiner niederländischen Verrichtung," Berlin, 14–16 [24–26] July 1606. *ABr*, vol. 2, Nr. 1028, 265–93.

France and the Netherlands.¹¹⁵ When Joachim Friedrich died, Johann Sigismund appointed Putlitz as his *statthalter* in Brandenburg. At about that same time, Putlitz wrote to Reichard Beyer regarding the Polish-Swedish peace negotiations. His suggestion that it would be beneficial for Brandenburg's Prussian concerns if it involved itself in the negotiations is not surprising, as this had been Brandenburg's position since 1598. What is noteworthy is the idea that it would be good if Karl, whom Putlitz was willing to refer to as the "Royal Majesty in Sweden," chose Johann Sigismund to serve alongside the Elector of the Palatinate as his chosen mediators at the talks.¹¹⁶ Putlitz even added that if the elector had misgivings about contacting Karl to broach this possibility, he would be willing to do so himself, "since I'm known to His Majesty, and He has recently thought me commendable."¹¹⁷ Putlitz was not suggesting that Brandenburg abandon its loyalty to Sigismund and throw its support behind Sweden in the ongoing struggle, but he was certainly proposing a course of action more open to friendship and cooperation with Karl than previous mediation ventures had been, and he was advancing this proposal on his own initiative. His suggestion that Karl knew of him and liked him, and that his personal actions could therefore be of special use in establishing a friendly connection between Brandenburg and Sweden, is particularly relevant to the style of diplomacy that would develop between the countries in the future. Putlitz was a governmental official serving within the institutions of the Brandenburg state, but he was also an individual with a particular political-religious worldview and with webs of personal ties (that in this case touched Karl IX himself) that conditioned how he assessed the diplomatic world and how he desired to act within it. His actions straddle the line between the official and the private, or rather suggest that thinking in terms of such lines may not always be useful. Putlitz was later involved in

¹¹⁵ Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 340; Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 77.

¹¹⁶ It was customary in negotiations that each of the principals be able to appoint mediators of their choosing.

¹¹⁷ "Weil die tractatio pacis zwischen Schweden und Pollen soll vorsein, wie mhan alhie stark davon redet, wer mein Erachtens zu unsern preußischen Sachen nicht undinstlichen, das noster illustrissimus von Schweden als ein Unterhändler benebst Pfaltz wurde vorgeschlagen. Wan I.Ch.G. etwas deswegen ahn K.M. in Schweden zu gelangen Bedenken, wolte ichs für mein Person thun, weil ich I.M. bekant, dieselbige auch meiner unlangst rhumligen gedacht; erwarte Erklerunge." Adam zu Putlitz to Reichard Beyer, Cöln an der Spree, 9 [19] August 1608. *ABr*, vol. 4, pt. 1, Nr. 2373, 95–96.

the Brandenburg-Swedish correspondence of 1615, and in the negotiations leading up to the marriage of Gustav Adolf to Maria Eleonora in 1620.¹¹⁸

Joachim Friedrich's Chancellor, Wilhelm Rudolf von Meckbach, was also a Calvinist and a proponent of Protestant political cooperation. Meckbach was one of those who worked on the planned marriage between Margrave Johann Georg and Princess Anna of Sweden, and in his desire to bring about the match may have overstepped his instructions and come to conclusions on certain negotiating points that he had only been authorized to discuss.¹¹⁹ It is not clear if Meckbach approached the marriage talks as part of a religiously-infused vision of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation (Anna, though Sigismund's sister, was a firmly Lutheran Swedish princess), nor if that would have played any role in his over-eager negotiating. The suggested marriage was, however, fiercely resisted by the papal nuncio in Poland, the Jesuit Germanico Malaspina, who was one of Sigismund's closest confidants.¹²⁰

The proposed groom, Margrave Johann Georg, became an adherent of militant Protestant activism. He converted to Calvinism and served as a high-ranking officer with Friedrich of the Palatinate's forces in Silesia during the Thirty Years' War, for which he was stripped of his Duchy of Jägerndorf by the emperor.¹²¹ In 1612 Johann Georg exerted significant influence on Brandenburg policy as his brother Johann Sigismund adopted more independence vis-à-vis Poland that opened the door to closer relations with Sweden.¹²² He was clearly open to the prospect of friendship with Sweden, and although plans for his own Swedish marriage had failed, the margrave was one of the earliest voices in the Brandenburg government to speak out in favor of the future match between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora when it was proposed in the 1610s.¹²³ The marriage of Princess Elisabeth Sophie with Prince Janus Radziwiłł in July 1613 that further marked Brandenburg's growing independence from Sigismund was

¹¹⁸ On these negotiations, see Chapter Three.

¹¹⁹ The theory that Meckbach exceeded his instructions in rushing the marriage negotiations forward is abundant in the report of Chancellor von Löben and the *Geheimer Rat* from September 1607. *ABr*, vol. 3, Nr. 1775, 185–95, esp. 185, 189–90.

¹²⁰ Almquist, 24.

¹²¹ On his conversion, see Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 85–86.

¹²² Thyresson, 64.

¹²³ Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 383–84.

also favored by Protestant unionist elements, and unionist leader Moritz of Hessen-Kassel was instrumental in bringing the marriage about.¹²⁴

Certain individuals who favored intra-Protestant confessional harmony and activist Protestant politics were therefore more open to building a relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden in the last years of the sixteenth and first years of the seventeenth centuries than official, pro-Polish Brandenburg policy would allow. They took a number of steps that raised the prospect of cooperation between the states, and contributed, directly or indirectly, to the improvement of the diplomatic environment between the two lands. The positive potential that religion and Protestant politics could have in Brandenburg-Swedish relations wasn't felt on a more official, state level, however, until the early 1610s, when the actions of this same activist Protestant group facilitated Brandenburg's membership in the Evangelical Union (in 1611) and Johann Sigismund's conversion to Calvinism (in 1613).¹²⁵ These moves created real problems for the Hohenzollern in Prussia, for both Sigismund and Prussia's Lutheran estates were violently anti-Calvinist. The two cooperated in their resistance to the conversion, and they made things difficult for Johann Sigismund in the duchy.¹²⁶ These religious-political changes added to the growing distance between the king and the elector that had a direct, positive effect on Brandenburg's relations with Sweden.¹²⁷ The changes also strengthened Brandenburg's ties with the Palatinate and Hessen, and lessened the hesitancy that each had earlier felt to embrace Sweden. Now that Brandenburg was officially in the fold, the wall between Sweden and its activist German relatives began to come down. Already in 1613 a Hessen-Kassel embassy arrived in Sweden to raise the issue of Swedish cooperation with the Protestant action party. In February 1614—only two months

¹²⁴ Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 102–03. There had been contacts with Radziwiłł at least since 1608. See *ABr*, vol. 4, pt. 1. The Swedes received news of this marriage with interest, and noted that it would displease Sigismund: “I sundagz som var, stodh Johan Ratzewildz Voivodens aff Littoven brylllop medh Churfurstens syster i Berlijn, och meenar man att samme brylllop icke skall synnerligen behaghe Konungen i Polen.” Axel Oxenstierna to Queen-Mother Christina, Stockholm, 1 July 1613. *RAOSoB*, I, 2, Nr. 74, 138–40, here 139.

¹²⁵ The literature surrounding the Hohenzollern conversion, and in particular its motivations, is substantial. See Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 81–110. On the fundamentally international nature of the Reformed world of which Brandenburg was now part, see Graeme Murdock, *Beyond Calvin: the intellectual, political and cultural world of Europe's Reformed Churches, c. 1540–1620* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

¹²⁶ Immekeppel, 101–17; Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 95–96.

¹²⁷ Hammarstrand, 29; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:148–49.

after Johann Sigismund's conversion—another mission arrived from Friedrich of the Palatinate and the other members of the Union.¹²⁸ Moritz of Hessen-Kassel sent Johan Zobel on a mission to Sweden a few months later to directly encourage Gustav Adolf to join the Evangelical Union and to pledge the landgrave's support in gaining Swedish entrance.¹²⁹ The issue of Swedish membership was also raised at the Heilbronn *Unionstag* of 1614, and in September 1614 a letter signed by Friedrich of the Palatinate, Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, Duke Johann Friedrich of Württemberg, Margrave Georg Friedrich of Baden, Prince Christian of Anhalt, a representative of Margrave Joachim Ernst of Brandenburg-Ansbach, and others was sent to Gustav Adolf that stressed the dangers facing Protestantism and the desire that the king join with them in its defense.¹³⁰ In June 1615 the ties between Sweden and the Palatinate were further strengthened by the marriage of Gustav Adolf's half-sister Katarina to Johann Kasimir of Pfalz-Zweibrücken-Kleeburg. Johann Kasimir "made it his business to champion Gustav Adolf's cause in Germany and to promote good relations between Sweden and the Palatinate party."¹³¹ He would play an important role in deepening the connections between Sweden and the German Protestant states, including Brandenburg. Brandenburg's membership in the Union and conversion to Calvinism strengthened its connections to the Netherlands as well, at much the same time that the Dutch were forming their alliance with Sweden in 1614 that announced the end of Sweden's diplomatic isolation. The Brandenburg conversion and public entry into the world of activist Protestant politics were parallel and related developments to Sweden's integration into the European Protestant cause, and they opened the door for a new kind of relationship to develop between the two countries.

In these changed circumstances, suspicions of Karl's crypto-Calvinism, such a liability domestically, could become an asset in forging a relationship with Brandenburg, which seems to have paid some heed to the rumors. When Joachim Friedrich worked to involve Friedrich of the Palatinate and Moritz of Hessen-Kassel in the Swedish-Polish mediation in 1605, the elector suggested that these Calvinist rulers would be ideally suited to deal with Karl as his relatives and co-religionists.¹³² When ten

¹²⁸ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:154.

¹²⁹ Swedish Council to Gustav Adolf, 30 May 1614. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 117, 194–95; Thyreson, 66.

¹³⁰ Hammarstrand, 12–13.

¹³¹ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:154.

¹³² "Vermuegen kondten, das Ihr LL sich zur gutlichen handlung zwischen den Koningl. W. und Hertzogk Carls L. durch Ihren LL, so woll den *Religion* halben, als den Verwandtnus,

years later Johann Sigismund sought to learn more about Gustav Adolf with an eye towards forming a closer relationship with him, he inquired as to whether the young king was “rigidly Lutheran,” or if he was more inclined towards Calvinism as his father had been.¹³³ In the eyes of the Hohenzollern, the religious basis for a close relationship between the Brandenburg and Swedish ruling houses had clearly not been damaged by their conversion to Calvinism, and may in fact have been improved. And to the Swedes, a Calvinist Brandenburg aligned with the Protestant action party was a far more attractive partner than a Lutheran Brandenburg cowed by Sigismund.

But the picture was not all that rosy. A potential Brandenburg-Swedish friendship now had to contend with a new obstacle: the virulent clerical and popular anti-Calvinism that was deeply ingrained in Sweden. The Swedish clergy had in fact been spurred to their first concerted efforts for doctrinal clarification since the Swedish Reformation when confronted with the ‘threat’ of small-scale Calvinist immigration in the early 1560s, and the result was a violent condemnation of Calvinist teachings that predated by decades any positive consensus on what the Swedish Church itself actually stood for.¹³⁴ As Michael Roberts wrote, “[a]fter 1562, whatever the precise doctrinal position of the Swedish church might be, at least it was not Calvinist; Calvinism henceforward is heresy; Calvinists are enemies of the faith.”¹³⁵ The prosecutorial Lutheran orthodoxy that developed in the 1580s and 1590s only strengthened this sentiment. There were political ramifications of this position as well, as clerical rejections of the possibility for Lutheran-Calvinist theological understanding were often accompanied by aversion to alliance with Calvinist powers.¹³⁶ Swedish anti-Calvinism would remain a strong force well into the

wegen seiner in Gott ruhenden freundtlichen geliebter Gemahlin, zu desselben einen sonderbahren willen. So ist Uns bewust, das Ihr LL. mitt demselben, offft und vielhmals *correspondet* . . .” Joachim Friedrich’s instructions for Hieronymus von Dieskau, Cöln an der Spree, 26 July 1605. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5d IV, 18r–27r, here 18v–19v. See also the abbreviated version in *ABr*, vol. 1, Nr. 401, 433–34.

¹³³ Johann Sigismund posed this question to the Swedish agent Hieronymus von Birckholtz. Hammarstrand, 30; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 382.

¹³⁴ See Holmquist, 404–14.

¹³⁵ Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 274.

¹³⁶ See, for instance, Archbishop Petrus Kenicius’ rejection of David Pareus’ irenical program on grounds that were both theological and political. Kenicius to Axel Oxenstierna, Uppsala, 12 May 1615. *RAOSoB*, series II, vol. 12, Nr. 11, 17–18. See also Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:371.

eighteenth century, and a path around it would need to develop if Brandenburg and Sweden were to form a significant relationship.

Just such a path was provided by the nascent diplomatic culture and the Protestant cosmopolitan worldview of its practitioners. Many of those involved in building the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship on the ground shared an openness to Lutheran-Calvinist partnership, or at least peaceful coexistence, within a context that granted that loyalty to state or dynasty or indeed to specific confession, no matter how intensely felt, need not monopolize an individual's sense of allegiance, nor make exclusive claims on the interests one was serving in carrying out diplomatic activity. This cosmopolitan ability to be 'both/and' rather than 'either/or' allowed Brandenburg and Swedish diplomatic actors to think around the hurdle posed by confessional difference, and in many cases to embrace a vision of a Brandenburg-Swedish relationship in which the good of their own states and the health of their mutual relationship redounded to the larger good of Protestantism as a whole.

These ideals found expression in practice through the modes of personal interaction that characterized the diplomatic culture. 'Official' resistance, be it from state or church, could pose a daunting obstacle to diplomatic initiatives, but it need not be fatal when those initiatives themselves are proposed and pursued through individual interactions with a measure of separation from official control. The future of Brandenburg-Swedish relations would depend on a mixture of official governmental activity and the private actions of a diverse array of individuals.

Education and Culture

Similar educational backgrounds and exposure to common intellectual and cultural currents gave many diplomatically-active Brandenburgers and Swedes a shared possession and helped cultivate their Protestant cosmopolitan outlook. The *stormaktstiden* ("great power era") of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has been described as the most cosmopolitan, travel-prone period in Swedish history.¹³⁷ Sweden's imperial endeavors exposed the Swedish homeland to a wide range of continental influences, which in turn contributed to the ongoing process

¹³⁷ Carl Vilhelm Jacobowsky, *Svenskar i främmande land under gånga tider* (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1930), 26.

of integrating Sweden (and the rest of Scandinavia) into Europe.¹³⁸ The circulation of ideas, texts, objects, and especially people was central to these developments. Swedes traveled abroad as soldiers, diplomats, imperial administrators, merchants, and students in unprecedented numbers, returning home with new experiences and innovative ideas that shaped domestic developments.

Higher education played a particularly important role in this process of integration, as well as in creating the diplomatic culture that affected Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Swedish youth had traveled to the intellectual centers of the continent for centuries in search of an educational experience not available at home.¹³⁹ During the sixteenth century the acquisition of practical skills and experiences as preparation for state service became one of the motivations for undertaking such travels.¹⁴⁰ Karl IX in particular was keenly aware of the value of foreign study in providing Sweden with highly-trained civil servants, and he provided stipends for Swedish students to study abroad.¹⁴¹ The Uppsala meeting of 1593 had insisted that Swedish students be prevented from studying

¹³⁸ This phenomenon has attracted increasing scholarly interest since the 1980s. See Göran Rystad (ed.), *Europe and Scandinavia: aspects of the process of integration in the 17th century* (Lund: Wallin & Dalholm, 1983); Robert Bohn (ed.), *Europa in Scandinavia: kulturelle und soziale Dialoge in der frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Bern/New York/Paris/Vienna: Peter Lang, 1994); J.C.A. Schokkenbroek (ed.), *Plying between Mars and Mercury: political, economic and cultural links between the Netherlands and Sweden during the Golden Age* (The Hague: The Swedish Embassy & Nederlands Scheepvaartsmuseum Amsterdam, 1994); J.Ph.S. Lemmink and J.S.A.M. van Koningsbrugge (eds.), *Baltic Affairs: Relations between the Netherlands and North-Eastern Europe 1500–1800* (Nijmegen: Instituut voor Noord- en Oosteuropese Studies, 1990); Badeloch Noldus, *Trade in Good Taste: relations in architecture and culture between the Dutch Republic and the Baltic World in the seventeenth century*, tr. Titus Verheijen (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2004); *Scandinavian Journal of History* 28 (2003), Nr. 3–4 (special double-issue on cultural traffic in the early modern Baltic).

¹³⁹ Our understanding of early modern Swedish study abroad has been aided immeasurably by the publication of Simone Giese's *Studenten aus Mitternacht: Bildungsideal und peregrinato academica des schwedischen Adels im Zeichen von Humanismus und Konfessionalisierung* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009). For the medieval period, see Kjell Kumlein, "Svenskarna vid Utländska Universitet under Medeltiden," in Adolf Schück and Åke Stille (eds.), *Historiska Studier tillägnade Sven Tunberg* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1942), 143–69; Sten Lindroth, *Svensk Lärdomshistoria*, vol. 1 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners, 1975).

¹⁴⁰ See Lars Nilén, *Peregrinatio Academica: det svenska samhället och de utrikes studieresorna under 1600-talet* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1983).

¹⁴¹ Roberts, *Early Vasas*, 298; Nils Runeby, *Monarchia Mixta. Maktfördelningsdebatt i Sverige under den tidigare Stormaktstiden* (Uppsala: Appelbergs, 1962), 46.

at either Catholic or Calvinist academies, but these demands were routinely ignored.¹⁴²

The bulk of Swedish students studying abroad in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries attended the Protestant universities of northern Germany.¹⁴³ A moderate number enrolled at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder in Brandenburg and the University of Königsberg in Ducal Prussia.¹⁴⁴ Specific cultural connections between Sweden and Brandenburg, however, were thin at this time. Frankfurt an der Oder became a mid-size printing center in the middle of the sixteenth century, and Frankfurt prints made their way to Sweden and other Baltic lands.¹⁴⁵ Benedict de Drusina, a musical instructor based in Frankfurt an der Oder, dedicated a 1556 edition of lute music printed in the same city to the Swedish Crown Prince Erik.¹⁴⁶ The writings of the mystical Brandenburg theologian Martin Moller, the favorite author of Elector Joachim Friedrich, had some influence in Sweden as well.¹⁴⁷ But Sweden's educational and cultural connections with Germany were centered much more around Rostock and Wittenberg than Brandenburg.¹⁴⁸ As was true with diplomatic relations themselves during this period, a simple and direct connection between Brandenburg and Sweden on the level of education and culture proved difficult to establish. A cultural intermediary was needed, and this role was filled well by the Netherlands.

The Swedish-Dutch alliance of 1614 increased the flow of Dutch cultural influence into Sweden.¹⁴⁹ The Dutch Republic had become the intellectual and cultural center of Protestant Europe by the later sixteenth century, and the University of Leiden, founded in 1575, rose to a position of pre-eminence in Protestant education and culture. The first Swedish student

¹⁴² Sven Göransson, *De Svenska studieresorna och den religiösa kontrollen från Reformationstiden till Frihetstiden*, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1951:8 (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistiska Bokhandeln, 1951), 7ff.

¹⁴³ Matriculation statistics provided in Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*. See also Göransson, *Svenska studieresorna*, chapter 1; Niléhn, *Peregrinatio Academica*, 152.

¹⁴⁴ Giese, 365–70, 433–36. According to Giese, from the sixteenth century through 1637 forty Swedes studied at Frankfurt/Oder, and thirty-five at Königsberg. See also Niléhn, *Peregrinatio Academica*, 120–21.

¹⁴⁵ Heinrich Grimm, *Meister der Renaissancemusik an der Viadrina: Quellenbeiträge zur Geisteskultur des Nordosten Deutschlands vor dem Dreißigjährigen Kriege* (Frankfurt an der Oder and Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1942), 43.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 92–97.

¹⁴⁷ Holmquist, vol. 2, 260–62.

¹⁴⁸ By comparison, in the time period studied by Giese 472 Swedish students enrolled at Rostock, 446 at Wittenberg. Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*, 328, 394.

¹⁴⁹ Hildebrand, *Gustav Vasas söner*, 346.

to study at Leiden enrolled in 1613, and significant Swedish attendance began in the years immediately following the alliance of 1614. By 1637 over 200 Swedish students had studied at the Dutch university, and it became the single most frequently attended foreign university for Sweden's noble elite.¹⁵⁰ Smaller numbers of Swedes studied in Franeker, Groningen, and elsewhere in the Dutch Republic.¹⁵¹ A disproportionally high percentage of Swedes to enter into governmental, military, economic, social and cultural leadership positions in the coming decades had studied in the Netherlands.

Dutch cultural influence and student travel to the Netherlands were experiences Sweden shared with Brandenburg.¹⁵² As was the case with Sweden, many of the future leaders of Brandenburg society and state studied in the Dutch Republic from the early seventeenth century. Of the 11,000 Germans who enrolled at Leiden from 1575–1750, 1371 came from the region "Old Prussia, Livonia and Kurland," and an additional 346 from Brandenburg.¹⁵³ These students shared something important in common with their Swedish comrades who had similar educational experiences.

Foreign study was especially important for those who wished to be active in foreign policy and diplomacy.¹⁵⁴ An important cadre of young Swedes who studied abroad and returned home to enter into diplomatic service in the early years of Gustav Adolf's reign went on to play a crucial role in the king's diplomacy in Germany.¹⁵⁵ Brandenburg's foreign relations were also largely in the hands of men who had gained valuable skills and experiences while studying and traveling abroad, especially in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the early seventeenth century saw the stirrings of what would become significant Dutch influence over Brandenburg's

¹⁵⁰ Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*, 457–75; Göransson, *Svenska studieresorna*, 17, 22.

¹⁵¹ Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*, 453–93.

¹⁵² The most vocal proponent of Dutch influence on early modern Brandenburg-Prussia has been Gerhard Oestreich. See, for example, his *Neostoicism and the early modern State*, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, tr. David McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 118–31; and "Die Bedeutung des niederländischen Späthumanismus für Brandenburg-Preußen," in *Humanismus und Naturrecht in Berlin-Brandenburg-Preussen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), 16–27.

¹⁵³ Heinz Schneppen, *Niederländische Universitäten und Deutsches Geistesleben: von der Gründung der Universität Leiden bis ins späte 18. Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1960), 10, 13–15.

¹⁵⁴ Göransson, *Svenska studieresorna*, 30–31.

¹⁵⁵ Emil Hildebrand, "Den svenska diplomatiens organisation i Tyskland under 1600-talet," *Historisk Tidskrift* 4 (1884), 155–74.

and Sweden's native universities later in the century.¹⁵⁶ The men who studied at these universities, and especially those who traveled abroad, were exposed to similar intellectual and cultural influences that they could draw upon when interacting with each other to form a relationship between Sweden and Brandenburg.

In terms of the Brandenburg-Sweden relationship, the most important aspect of the expanded horizons these educational and cultural forces provided was an openness to Protestant cooperation. In describing the influence of Johannes Althusius in Sweden, Hans Cnattingius long ago noted the permeability of intra-Protestant confessional borders when it came to issues of scholarship and ideas.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, through their educational experiences the main strains of Dutch thought, such as the neostoicism of Justus Lipsius and natural law theory of Hugo Grotius, became common possessions of Brandenburgers and Swedes alike that transcended the Lutheran/Calvinist confessional boundary and provided a shared intellectual medium through which they could interact.¹⁵⁸ For Brandenburg's first generation of Calvinist court preachers, study in the Netherlands played a fundamental role in the development of toleration and Protestant irenicism.¹⁵⁹ Close connections to Leiden encouraged the University of Frankfurt an der Oder to develop into a center of Protestant irenicism.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, Swedes educated in the Netherlands were more likely to hold irenic pan-Protestant ideals than the polemical confession-

¹⁵⁶ For example, over one-half of the professors to teach at the University of Uppsala from 1640 to 1660 had studied at Leiden, and when the University of Åbo opened in 1640 six of the original eleven professors had studied in the Netherlands and Johan Stålhandske delivered his inaugural address in Dutch. Eight of the first nineteen professors at the University of Lund had also studied at Leiden. F.S. de Vrieze, "Academic Relations between Sweden and Holland," in Th. H. Lunsingh Scheurleer and G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), *Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century: an exchange of learning* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden/E.J. Brill, 1975), 344–65, here 345; Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the early modern State*, 112.

¹⁵⁷ Hans Cnattingius, *Johannes Rudbeckius och Hans Europeiska Bakgrund. En Kyrkorättshistorisk Studie* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri/A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1946), 88–89.

¹⁵⁸ On Swedish students' exposure to Lipsius and Dutch political thought in general at Leiden, see Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*, 463–65.

¹⁵⁹ Rudolf von Thadden, *Die Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Hofprediger im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der absolutistischen Staatsgesellschaft in Brandenburg-Preussen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959), 102–04.

¹⁶⁰ Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession*, 70–71, 128, 236. See also Othmar Feyl, "Die Viadrina und das östliche Europa. Eine bildungsgeschichtliche Studie," in Günther Haase and Joachim Winkler (eds.), *Die Oder-Universität Frankfurt: Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte* (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1983), 105–39, here 116ff.

alized Lutheranism favored by the Swedish clergy, a fact that the clergy recognized as well, hence their repeated efforts throughout the early modern period to restrict and control the foreign study-travel of Swedish students.¹⁶¹ In short, study abroad could encourage the development of Protestant cosmopolitan attitudes in which Brandenburg and Swedish travelers would return to their homelands with increased awareness of the wider world and feelings of membership in a community that extended beyond the borders of their polity, as well as with a common stock of ideas and experiences that could connect them to each other. This helped lay the foundation for Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture.

Interpersonal Networks and 'Personal' Diplomacy

One final pair of related factors—interpersonal networks and ‘personal’ diplomacy—brought the diplomatic culture to action and established its patterns of operation. A significant number of diplomatic actors involved in the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship were connected to each other through personal and familial ties. Some achieved positions of power within their governments, while others were only tangentially connected to state institutions. A number moved between Brandenburg and Swedish service, perhaps more than once. In each case they were able to draw upon personal connections in performing the actions that helped draw the countries into a relationship. These individuals and their networks had their own values and agendas which may or may not have coincided with the policies of their governments, and they worked in conjunction with each another to nudge policy in the direction that they favored.

A Protestant cosmopolitan worldview allowed individuals to travel freely across territorial and intra-Protestant confessional boundaries while still feeling at home. Personal connections could serve the same function of facilitating the movement of people and ideas across lines that could otherwise divide them. Many Brandenburgers had come to Sweden as part of the larger migration of German, Dutch and Scottish immigrants who flowed into the developing Scandinavian monarchies in the sixteenth century. A number were nobles who served in important administrative positions before the Thirty Years’ War and as military officers during and after the war. Most Brandenburg noble families had at least one member serve in the Swedish army in the seventeenth century, and hundreds of

¹⁶¹ Göransson, *Svenska studieresorna*, 34–35; Giese, *Studenten aus Mitternacht*, 459–60.

marriages between Brandenburg and Swedish noble families took place.¹⁶² The Brandenburg immigrants often maintained contacts to their German relatives and friends as well, building up interpersonal networks that spanned both sides of the Baltic Sea.¹⁶³

The Hohenzollern also drew upon an international group of individuals to serve their own developing state, especially in the seventeenth century. This included Swedes or others who had been in Swedish service.¹⁶⁴ By the 1610s a number of individuals had established links to both countries based upon immigration, personal service, or family connections.¹⁶⁵ The utility of such connections in carrying out the diplomacy between the countries had already begun to show in the sixteenth century. Margrave Hans of Brandenburg-Küstrin sent Albrecht von Selstrang, who had earlier been a marshal in Gustav Vasa's service, on a mission to Sweden in 1551. Hans made explicit reference to this personal tie as the reason why Selstrang was selected for the mission, writing that the king would be sure to give a good hearing to Selstrang "as Your old and constant servant."¹⁶⁶ Similarly, Hieronymus von Birckholtz, a native Brandenburger who had stood in Swedish service since the early 1590s, was one of the few Swedish (as opposed to Polish) officials involved in the negotiations for the proposed marriage between Princess Anna and Margrave Johann Georg.¹⁶⁷ Others in Brandenburg and Sweden, lacking such obvious service or family connections to the opposite state, nevertheless became known for being

¹⁶² Christopher von Warnstedt, *Brandenburgisk Adel med Svensk Anknytning. I.: Ätterna von Königsmarck, Mörner, von Warnstedt*, Föreningens för släktforskning skrifter 11 (Lund: Carl Bloms Boktryckeri, 1947), 23; idem, *Brandenburgisk Adel med Svenska Ättlingar*, I–II, Särtryck ur R.S.T:s Tidskrift (Lund: Carl Bloms Boktryckeri, 1944), 6–8.

¹⁶³ For an in-depth study of one such family, see Herbert J. Langer and Jens E. Olesen (eds.), *Eine deutsch-schwedische Adelsfamilie im Ostseeraum. Das "Geschlechtregister" der Mörner (1468–1653)* (Greifswald: Panzig, 2001).

¹⁶⁴ Ernst Opgenoorth, *Ausländer in Brandenburg-Preussen: als leitende Beamte und Offiziere 1604–1871* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1967), 8.

¹⁶⁵ This included members of the von Arnim, von Beerfeld, von Bennewitz, von Birckholtz, von Brunkow, von Falkenberg, von Kannenberg, von Königsmarck, von Mörner, von Pinnow, von Rohr, von Stöhr, von Warnstedt, and von der Wedel families. For the von Rohr family, see Monica B. Carlberg, *von Rohr. Från Brandenburg till Sverige. En släktgrens historia* (Stockholm, 1968).

¹⁶⁶ "... unnd wir auch wissen, das obgedachter Sielstrannck E: Kn: M: ettwan marschalck unnd Diener gewesen, haben wir umb des willen nicht umbgehen ungen, Ime diese unnser vorbitt an E: Kn: M: mittgeben zuelassen. . . . Es werden sich E: Kon: M: gegen obgemeltem Sielstranncke, Als Irem Alten unnd stetten dienner, In deme alem gnedigst erzeigen, unnd dies unnser furschrift bei Ir freundlich stadt finden lassen." Margrave Hans of Küstrin to Gustav Vasa, Küstrin, Sunday after John the Baptist 1551. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 14, Nr. 1, fasc. 3, 94r–v, here 94r.

¹⁶⁷ See the entry for Birckholtz in *SBL*, IV, 406–08 (by Nils Ahnlund,) here 407.

friendly towards the other, and they too could be of special use in conducting diplomatic activity. Adam von Putlitz was alluding to this when he mentioned that he could be a particularly effective conduit to communicate with Karl IX since the king thought well of him personally.¹⁶⁸

These figures also played a role in deepening the cultural connections between the states. To take one high-profile example, Gustav Adolf's main instructor when he was crown prince was Johan Skytte, who had studied at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder in 1592. Another of the prince's tutors was Otto Helmer von Mörner, a Brandenburg nobleman who had immigrated to Sweden and entered Duke Karl's service in 1596. The king's education was therefore in the hands of individuals with personal ties to Brandenburg. Like Birckholtz, Skytte and von Mörner also played a direct role in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy.¹⁶⁹ Von Mörner, Birckholtz and Skytte had each studied at leading Protestant universities: von Mörner at Strassburg, Birckholtz at Heidelberg, and Skytte at Wittenberg, Leipzig and Marburg in addition to Frankfurt an der Oder. Skytte also traveled in the Netherlands during his student years, and he became a convinced Ramist and an admirer of Justus Lipsius. These influences are apparent in the study program he wrote for Gustav Adolf in 1604, *Een kort Onderwijsning*.¹⁷⁰ He later sent his own sons to study at Leiden, and he created the Skytte Professorship of eloquence and politics at Uppsala that was held by a series of foreign scholars with connections to Matthias Bernegger and the Strassburg school of Lipsius scholarship.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ See above, 63.

¹⁶⁹ See RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 206. On Otto Helmer von Mörner, see Langer and Olesen (eds.), *Eine deutsch-schwedische Adelsfamilie*, especially 70–80; *SBL*, XXVI, 300–01 (by Sven Malmberg); and Martin Gerhardt and Walther Hubatsch, *Deutschland und Skandinavien im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1977), 174.

¹⁷⁰ Johan Skytte, *Een kort Onderwijsning/ Uthi hwad Konster och Dygder een Fursteligh Person skal sigh öfwa och bruka then ther täncker med tijden lycksaligen regera Land och Rijke. Stält til then Höghborne Furst och Herre/ Herr Gustaff Adolff/ Sweriges-Rijkes Arf-Furste/ Hertigh til Sudermanneland/ Närke och Wärmeland/ etc. Uff Hans Furstl. M. Præceptore Johann Skytte/ Åhr 1604. Men nu å nyo effter någre Förmähme Personers Begäran* (Stockholm: Niclas Wankijff, 1678). On this work, including its mention of Lipsius, see Runeby, *Monarchia Mixta*, 48–49; Lars Gustafsson, *Virtus Politica: Politisk Etik och Nationellt Svärmeri i den Tidigare Stormaktstidens Litteratur* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1956), 27–28.

¹⁷¹ On Skytte's early years, see Tor Berg, *Johan Skytte. Hans Ungdom och Verksamhet under Karl IX:s Regering* (Stockholm: Alb. Bonniers, 1920). On Skytte's sons at Leiden, see de Vrieze, 347. On the Skytte professorship, see Barbro Lewin, *Johan Skytte och de skytteanska professorerna* (Uppsala, 1985). On connections between the Strassburg scholars and Sweden, see Michael Stolleis, "Lipsius-Rezeption in der politisch-juristischen Literatur des 17. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland," *Der Staat* 26 (1987), 1–30, here 23. These scholars included Johannes Loccenius, Johann Freinsheim, and Johannes Scheffer.

Concluding Word

Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture was based in the combination of these religious/political, educational/cultural, and interpersonal factors. Not everyone who participated in the diplomatic culture partook in all three traits, and for each individual the various elements carried different relative weights. Nor was all, or even at times most, of the official diplomatic interaction between Brandenburg and Sweden carried out by those sharing in the common culture, and the goals and values of the culture were no means always adopted as official policy by the two governments. The diplomatic culture straddled both sides of the official/unofficial, public/personal divides, and its influence on developments at the state level was often subtle, and only rarely decisive on its own merits. But it was real, and the larger story of Brandenburg-Swedish relations cannot be understood without taking it into account. As the 1610s progressed the door swung open for Brandenburg and Sweden to enter into a more substantial relationship than they had ever enjoyed before, and there now existed a growing body of individuals on both sides of the Baltic with the tools and desire to work with one another to bring this relationship about.

CHAPTER TWO

CONVERGENCE, 1615–1653

When Hieronymus von Birckholtz embarked upon his covert mission from Sweden to Germany in 1615, he carried with him instructions from the Swedish government to establish a system of paid correspondents across northern Germany who would supply Sweden with the latest political information, particularly regarding the machinations of King Sigismund of Poland and his agents. Birckholtz, the native Brandenburger in Swedish service who had been involved in the marriage discussions between Margrave Johann Georg and Princess Anna, was well-suited for his mission.¹ He drew upon the extensive set of familial and personal connections he maintained throughout northern Germany and his knowledge of postal and information networks in the region to identify potential correspondents and recruit them onto the Swedish payroll.² Aided by his actions, Sweden developed an effective intelligence system that kept a close eye on Sigismund and his agents in Germany. Birckholtz' mission marked a deepening of Swedish involvement in Germany under the changing international circumstances in which Sweden broke out of its years of diplomatic isolation.

The mission was also a watershed in Brandenburg-Swedish relations, for it was during this mission that Birckholtz entered into direct discussions with Elector Johann Sigismund and members of the Brandenburg court regarding the establishment of closer relations between his adopted country and that of his birth, discussions that would lead eventually to the suggestion of a marriage between Gustav Adolf and the Brandenburg princess Maria Eleonora. Whether Birckholtz had been instructed to discuss the issue of marriage or if he had done so on his own initiative is unclear. What is clear is that in subsequent years he became one of the main figures moving the marriage negotiations forward in the spirit of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. Birckholtz pursued closer Brandenburg-Swedish relations and dynastic marriage using the same tool that had proved effective

¹ See above, 74.

² The best source on Birckholtz' information network is Heiko Droste, "Hieronymus von Birckholtz—Sveriges förste underrättelseman," *Personhistorisk tidskrift* 94 (1998), 76–98.

in establishing the intelligence system—personal connections to a network of individuals spread throughout northern Germany.

Birckholtz' activities will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. For now it will suffice to note that from the beginning of the period covered by the present chapter individuals with connections to both Brandenburg and Sweden began to work through their private contacts and personal actions—which may or may not have had the official sanction of their governments—to draw the two countries into a closer relationship. This came at the same time that broader political and military events were bringing Brandenburg and Sweden into contact like never before. Indeed, the seeds of the potentially substantial relationship that were sown in the preceding period began to bear tangible fruit from the middle of the 1610s.

Over the next few decades, Brandenburg and Sweden developed the complete formal infrastructure of a full diplomatic relationship, including long-term representation at each other's courts, the conclusion of treaties and alliances, the contraction of dynastic marriage (and discussion of a further match), combat as friend and as foe on the battlefield, and the possession of substantial bilateral issues of mutual concern. Others across Europe began to notice that Brandenburg and Sweden were now involved in a relationship of substance.

The construction of this traditional infrastructure was surely important, but the infrastructure was only a skeleton around which the whole complex of factors that constituted the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden coalesced. Less official forms of contact filled out the formal framework and were the sinews that allowed the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship to function as it did and gave it its particular flavor. Rather than becoming more institutional and centralized during this period of increased contact, Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy became ever more personal as the diplomatic actors involved got to know each other better and establish firmer connections with one another, and as the diplomatic culture between them developed. If one looks beneath the surface story of fundamental change in the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship, the personal activities of those in this group can often be found to have affected the form that these changes assumed.

The undeniable and growing imbalance of power between Sweden and Brandenburg from the 1620s to the early 1650s has often led observers to a one-sided assessment of their relationship during this period. Sweden was a rising Baltic empire and one of Europe's leading military powers, approaching the historical zenith of its influence, the *stormaktstiden*.

Brandenburg, on the other hand, was a middleweight German territory of the sort despised by nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century students of the *Machtstaat*: hamstrung by the entrenched power of its recalcitrant and locally-minded Estates, ravaged by the Thirty Years' War, and powerless to prevent foreign troops from marching to and fro across its territory with impunity. Sweden possessed the military means to impose its will on Brandenburg if it chose to do so, and during the war years of the 1620s–1640s it sometimes availed itself of this option. In this light, it may appear simple to place Sweden and Brandenburg in a clear hierarchy of rank and power that discounts the possibility of their having viewed each other as having anything meaningful in common. Diplomatic culture, however, lessened the asymmetry between them. Forms of contact based in the personal actions and interpersonal connections of a group of men who shared important characteristics and goals tended to accentuate the common ground between their countries and minimize the imbalance of power. These individuals, even when delegated by their governments and negotiating in the names of their princes, operated on a level somewhat separate from that of state to state or dynasty to dynasty, and felt a sense of common purpose that was not focused on the inequality of power between their lands. Their diplomatic culture created a space for Brandenburg-Swedish interaction in a tone not always identical to the hierarchical competitiveness expected of early modern 'power states.'

Brandenburg-Swedish Relations Enter a New Phase

Polish Concerns

The Swedish-Polish conflict continued to be a fundamental factor in Brandenburg's relations with Sweden as the reign of Gustav Adolf progressed. The Hohenzollerns' precarious geographic and feudal position gave them a strong vested interest to work to prevent Swedish-Polish hostilities that could wreak havoc on Ducal Prussia and force it to provide financial or military assistance to its Polish overlord. This necessity became even more acute when Duke Albrecht Friedrich died in 1618 and the Duchy was set to pass to the Electoral line, contingent upon Polish confirmation that friendly dealings with Gustav Adolf would surely jeopardize. When Prussia did become a battlefield between Sweden and Poland in the 1620s, Sir Thomas Roe, the English champion of Protestant unity who would have loved to see Brandenburg and Sweden live in harmony, compared the elector's position to that of "a grayne of corne betweene

two millstones, brused to make bread for others.”³ This situation, like that in the earlier period, appeared conducive neither to positive nor to independent relations between Brandenburg and Sweden.

The Swedish-Polish conflict was, however, no longer the nearly impenetrable barrier to Brandenburg-Swedish relations that it had been earlier. As in the preceding years, the Vasa family struggle kept Sweden and Brandenburg firmly in each other's sights. With each of their futures so clearly tied to Poland, the two began to consider more explicitly whether their fates could be linked as well. This gave rise not only to unspoken, but increasingly to voiced desires that the two could cooperate to their mutual benefit. Added to this was the greater confidence of Swedish foreign policy as Gustav Adolf stepped out from under the usurping shadow of his father and began to flex his military muscles, and the rising calls for Protestant unity from various quarters as the Empire moved closer to religious war. In Brandenburg and Sweden and elsewhere across Protestant Europe, some began to consider the two as logical or even natural partners. The plan for a marriage between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora, which will be considered separately in Chapter Three, was the most dramatic early expression of this sentiment.

Other contacts show more explicitly how the Polish connection in particular could bring Brandenburg and Sweden together. The Swedish government reached out directly to Johann Sigismund in 1616 by sending Johan Forthelius, a chancery official, to speak with the elector's councilors in Prussia regarding what had transpired at the failed Stettin peace conference the previous year.⁴ Aside from Birckholtz, Forthelius was the first Swedish official to be sent on a mission to the Brandenburgers in several decades, showing that the Polish concerns that had so often kept Brandenburg and Sweden at arms' length could also provide occasion to deal with each other directly and in person.⁵ Forthelius' mission was introduced in a letter from the Swedish Council that recognized Johann Sigismund as “the prince who above all others has taken up these negotiations” in a matter in which his government naturally had interest “due to

³ Cited in Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:397.

⁴ Swedish Council to Brandenburg councilors in Prussia, Stockholm, 4 August 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 177, 286–88.

⁵ Johann III had sent Herman Breuser to Johann Georg in 1578. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, *Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 249a1 Schweden, fasc. 1.

proximity and being neighbors,” implying the common ground that relations with Poland gave to both king and elector.⁶

Forthelius’ mission came at a time when relations between Brandenburg and Poland regarding Prussia were particularly strained. In July 1616 Sigismund issued his response to a series of complaints against Johann Sigismund from the Ducal Prussian Estates. The Estates had accused the elector of violating their religious privileges by furthering Calvinism and disabusing the Duchy’s established church practice, as well as their political privileges by appointing foreigners to important posts traditionally reserved for natives. Sigismund came down decidedly on the side of the Estates, and his pronouncement overturned several of the elector’s edicts, policies, and appointments. Johann Sigismund refused to concede the legal force of the king’s pronouncement.⁷ A highly-charged meeting of the Prussian Estates, where a central issue would be Sigismund’s autocratic removal of the Calvinist Fabian zu Dohna the elder, the Hohenzollerns’ staunchest champion in the Duchy, from his office as a Prussian *Hauptmann*, loomed right around the corner.⁸ Under such circumstances, the Swedes believed it could be possible to dislodge the elector from his loyalty to Sigismund. Forthelius was expected to observe the state of affairs between the elector and Poland and report upon it when he returned home.⁹

Gustav Adolf, with an eye cast towards the unfolding marriage plans, shared the hope that now could be the time to bring Brandenburg to his side. In a letter to Moritz of Hessen-Kassel in October 1616, the king described potential Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation as logical and mutually-beneficial due to the common Polish threat they both faced. The Poles, he wrote, “now show themselves on the Baltic as well as in Kurland. The next blow will strike the Duchy of Prussia. The King of Poland has never given up his plan to subjugate it. What he has granted in favor of Brandenburg has not been done out of good will, but rather from necessity. A connection between Brandenburg and Sweden would be equally

⁶ “all die weil I. Churf. G. als der herr gnediger Landesfürst sich vor allen andern dieser tractation unternommen, undt gedachte tagefahrt beramett, wie dan die herrn selbstn wegen der nähe undt nachbarschafft hierinnen ettlicher massen interessieret.” Swedish Council to Brandenburg councilors in Prussia, Stockholm, 4 August 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 177, 286–88, here 288.

⁷ Immekeppel, 110–24.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 124–29.

⁹ Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav Adolf, Tidön, 17 October 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 183, 293–94.

fruitful for both.”¹⁰ With the marriage talks progressing, Gustav Adolf raised the prospect of a formal alliance with Brandenburg, including military and financial support in the event of a Polish attack on Prussia, in a proposal to the Swedish Council in July 1620.¹¹ The threat of a Brandenburg-Swedish alliance was not unknown to Sigismund. Several historians have concluded that he made important concessions to the Hohenzollern in Prussia in order to stave off Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation that was made more likely by Swedish military activity in Livonia.¹²

Talk of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation against Poland continued into the 1620s. In 1624 Gustav Adolf sent Clas Horn on a mission to Berlin, and amongst Horn’s charges was to investigate whether one of Brandenburg’s legates in Poland would be willing to provide information to Sweden in return for a healthy salary.¹³ The Brandenburg councilor Christian von Bellin traveled to Sweden to meet with Gustav Adolf that same year, and in the course of their discussions the king stated plainly that he was Elector Georg Wilhelm’s (reigned 1619–1640) “best friend in the world” and spoke openly of the potential for Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation against Poland. Gustav Adolf pointed to a commonality of interests that united Sweden with Brandenburg, and made clear that no one was more willing or better positioned to come to Brandenburg’s aid versus Poland than Sweden. Bellin’s report describes the king’s words:

Your Electoral Highness and he are joined not only as brothers in law, but especially by your current and future clear mutual interests. The same enemy who is in open animosity with him is scheming in secret after Your Electoral Highness’ state. . . . There is certainly no one who could [support]

¹⁰ “Sie zeigte sich nun auch an der Ostsee und in Curland; der nächste Schlag werde das Herzogthum Preußen treffen; den Plan, es zu unterwerfen, habe der König von Polen nie aufgegeben; was er bisher zu Gunsten Brandenburgs nachgegeben, sei nicht aus gutem Willen, sondern aus Noth geschehen; eine Verbindung zwischen Kurbrandenburg und Schweden werde für Beide gleich ersprießlich sein.” Gustav Adolf to Landgrave Moritz von Hessen-Kassel, 22 October 1616. Cited in J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, II:2, 451.

¹¹ See Thyresson, 228–29; Nils Ahnlund, “Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget 1620–25. Den preussiska diversionsplanen och den nordtyska fronten,” *Historisk Tidskrift* 37 (1917), 245–92, here 250.

¹² Otto Hintze, Reinhold Koser, and Heinz Immekeppel all state that the Swedish military presence in Livonia was an important factor that prevented Sigismund from creating any difficulties for the succession of the Electoral line in Prussia in 1618. Hintze, *Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk: fünfhundert Jahre vaterländischer Geschichte* (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1915), 163–64; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 385; Immekeppel, 147.

¹³ Gustav Adolf’s instructions for Clas Horn, Rotholmen, 24 July 1624. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 146, 340r–343v.

Your Electoral Highness more quickly with a powerful armada than he. He also would have cause to do this without any recompense, if only not to allow his enemy to become more powerful.¹⁴

Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna was instructed to stop in Berlin during his trip across northern Germany in 1625 and offer Georg Wilhelm further assurances that he could rely upon Swedish assistance to ensure that he (and not Poland or other claimants) obtained Pomeranian succession when it became open so that Gustav Adolf didn't "receive a different neighbor along the Baltic."¹⁵

Due to its delicate feudal position, any move by Brandenburg to reciprocate Sweden's advances for friendship and cooperation against Poland had to be made in highest secrecy. The diplomatic culture provided modes of interaction conducive to such clandestine contact by shifting the locus of diplomatic activity to personal rather than institutional or governmental channels, even if those individuals involved were themselves highly-placed members of dynastic or governmental structures who may have been operating with the tacit or stated approval of their superiors. Such was the case in the spring of 1621 when Margrave Johann Georg of Jägerndorf, the onetime suitor to Princess Anna, made overtures to Gustav Adolf regarding joint military action against Poland. Johann Georg shared many of the traits common to those who partook in the culture of diplomacy. He had studied at the University of Strassburg, a major center of Protestant intellectual life, as a youth; became enmeshed in international Protestant politics as an episcopal candidate in that same city as a teenager; and

¹⁴ "Eß wehre aber sehr unrecht . . . dardurch e Churf durchl. deß besten freundeß, den sie in d Welt hetten, von lustig werden können. Ihn und ewer Churf. durchl. *conjugirte* nicht allein die Schwägerschaft, sondern ihren beederseits jetzigen undt kunftigen laude *interesse*. Eben der feindt der ihn öffentlich anfeindete, Trachtete in geheym nach e Churf. durchl. *Staat*. Solten sie von demselben wird gebuhr bedrangt werden. So wehre gewiß keinen nicht, der baldt mit einen machtigen armada bey e Churf. durch. sein könnte alß er. Er hette eß auch ohne einige *recompens* zu thun ursache. Nuhr alleyn darumb, daß er seinen feindt nicht ließe mechtiger werden." Christian von Bellin to Georg Wilhelm, Riga, 13 October 1624. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 4, 4r–33r, here 9v–10r. See also Nils Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg och den europeiska krisen 1626," *Historisk Tidskrift* 38 (1918), 75–115, here 77–78.

¹⁵ "Och förlåtandes sigh näst Gudh på K.M.tt att där H. Churf. N. någon nödh på störde, då will H.K.M.tt till att *maintinera* honom dermedh, opsättia allet hwadh H.K.M.tt äger att dedh Huuß Brandenburg må bliffua därwedh, och H.K.M.tt icke få någon annan granne här wedh Österson." Instructions for Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna's mission to Germany, Stockholm, April 1625. RA, Diplomatica, Germanica, vol. 254. The reference here was not only to a potential Polish threat to Brandenburg's succession in Pomerania, but also to claims that could be made by Denmark, Bavaria, and the emperor.

later was driven from his duchy of Jägerndorf after joining Friedrich of the Palatinate's armed struggle against the Habsburgs in Bohemia. Johann Georg's alignment with the militant branch of international Protestantism appears to have informed the ways in which he approached Hohenzollern dynastic politics and the Swedish-Polish conflict, including the quick support he had shown for the idea of a marriage between Maria Eleonora and Gustav Adolf. In early 1621 the margrave was one of the small number of Protestant princes to support the very harsh terms issued by Gustav Adolf as conditions for extending his armistice with Sigismund.¹⁶ A few months later Johann Georg came forward with his plan for military cooperation with the Swedish king. He proposed bringing a force of 1500 cavalry and 5000 infantry into the field, to be used against Poland at a time and place of Gustav Adolf's choosing. The margrave believed that this action would not only secure Brandenburg's claims in Prussia, but would also further the broader Protestant cause that he had been attempting to serve by fighting on in Silesia even after being stripped of Jägerndorf and placed under the Imperial ban following White Mountain. Georg Wilhelm, upset with the continuing difficulties and delays made by Sigismund in granting the Prussian investiture, was initially willing to lend this scheme his tacit support.¹⁷ Although the plan eventually came to nothing, the means through which it was communicated to Sweden illustrate the forms of conduct encouraged by the diplomatic culture.

With Georg Wilhelm momentarily on-board, plans were made to pass along Johann Georg's overtures to the Swedish legate Christoph Ludwig Rasch at a pre-arranged secret meeting with one of Georg Wilhelm's counselors. Rasch, as we shall see in Chapter Three, was himself a prime exemplar of the diplomatic culture. He had been a secretary to Elector Johann Sigismund before entering Swedish service and maintained personal connections to many in both Brandenburg and Sweden that he drew upon in his diplomatic activity. He was also an active Protestant political pamphleteer in the campaign to drum up anti-Habsburg sentiment in northern Germany in the late-1620s.¹⁸ The secret meeting with Rasch, however, was hastily cancelled, perhaps because a shift in the atmosphere in Prussia led Georg Wilhelm to believe that he could receive the investiture without needing to take recourse to drastic measures. The plan was nevertheless

¹⁶ The others were Bethlen Gabor and Mansfeld. See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:203.

¹⁷ For this and the following, see Thyresson, 244–46.

¹⁸ See below, 159–60.

salvaged when the Dutch representative Sticke, in Königsberg to support Georg Wilhelm in his negotiations with the Poles at the meeting of the Prussian Estates, intervened and persuaded the elector to allow him to communicate Johann Georg's plan (along with some other matters) to Rasch in a meeting that took place in late-July 1621. Johann Georg's plan fizzled out from this point, but this should not obscure the fact that his scheme suggested cooperation with Sweden based in a combination of Hohenzollern dynastic interests and broader Pan-Protestant motivations, and that the diplomatic actions on behalf of the plan consisted of the secret activity of an individual with personal connections to each state (Rasch) and the involvement of a representative of a third Protestant power (the United Provinces) with eyes cast towards a broader Protestant interest as well as George Wilhelm's own concerns in Prussia.

Polish concerns therefore encouraged a range of contact between Brandenburg and Sweden that suggested a more thoroughgoing congruence of interests between the two than in the preceding period. The diplomatic culture provided avenues through which the prospect of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation could be probed without requiring a dramatic or 'official' public display that the Brandenburgers still shied away from. Despite this, the Prussian feudal relationship with Sigismund continued to be a source of real problems that threatened to choke off any advances in Brandenburg-Swedish relations before they could grow firm roots. In 1616—the same year that Gustav Adolf wrote enthusiastically on the prospects of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation—Johann Sigismund agreed under Polish pressure to discuss with the Prussian Estates the raising of an army in the Duchy to support Poland against Sweden.¹⁹ Shortly thereafter Sigismund used the Berlin court as the site of his efforts to entice the United Provinces into an offensive and defensive alliance laced with trade incentives that was clearly aimed against Sweden.²⁰ Any overt dealing with Swedish representatives continued to be hindered by the palpable fear of Polish reaction. A full and open relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden, although closer to realization than it had been, was still not reality.

¹⁹ Immekeppel, 129.

²⁰ Thyresson, 123–24.

Alliance Negotiations and the Prussian Invasion

Both the positive and negative implications of the Polish issue for Brandenburg-Swedish relations were magnified dramatically when Gustav Adolf decided to shift the theater of his war with Sigismund from Livonia to Royal, or Polish, Prussia in 1626. This would require a Swedish army to land on the coast of Ducal Prussia and march across Hohenzollern territory en route to Polish-controlled areas, with a Polish army most likely rushing from the other direction to meet it. At least some, and possibly considerable, disruption and destruction would thus be brought to Ducal Prussia. Sigismund would most certainly use all means at his disposal to urge the elector to defend his territory vigorously against the invaders and to fulfill his feudal obligations in contributing to Poland's defense. The Swedes, in turn, could be expected to intensify their own efforts to transform the Hohenzollern-Vasa marriage alliance into a functioning military alliance directed against Poland, with their urgings backed up by the persuasive force of an army on Hohenzollern territory. In short, Ducal Prussia would become, at least in the interim, the *sedes belli* of the Swedish-Polish war, and intense pressure would be brought to bear on Georg Wilhelm from both directions to become an active participant in that war. This seemed to be the perfect example of Roe's grain between two millstones metaphor, and the elector would clearly wish to avoid being ground at all costs. Georg Wilhelm therefore initiated increased diplomatic contact with Sweden with the aim of staving off or at least redirecting the Swedish Prussian campaign.

What was for the elector a plague to be avoided presented itself to others in Brandenburg and Sweden as an opportunity to further their long-term goals of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. There were many in the Swedish government who desired Brandenburg's cooperation or at least neutrality during the planned Prussian campaign for immediate and self-evident pragmatic reasons. Alongside these were other Swedes whose political and religious outlooks committed them to a more substantial image of Brandenburg and Sweden as natural and desirable partners. The sentiments of this second group were mirrored by a faction in Brandenburg and Prussia who, unlike their prince, believed that Sweden's military plans could be advantageous as the necessary catalyst to take the relationship that had slowly begun to emerge in preceding years to a new level. Like the elector, this group encouraged direct dealings with the Swedes at this juncture, although with different aims in mind. Some of them, and their likeminded Swedish counterparts, were called upon by their respective

governments to take part in this new wave of diplomatic activity. Others took up less-official forms of contact typical of the developing diplomatic culture. Although the issues at stake were difficult and the atmosphere often tense, both sides made sincere efforts to open up a dialogue. The immediate result of Gustav Adolf's decision to shift the war to Prussia was therefore an intense phase of formal and informal diplomatic activity in the period preceding and immediately following the Swedish landing in which direct contact between the two governments was accelerated and the advocates of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship were forced to articulate the principles of their position in concrete language.

All of this took place in conjunction with another event of great importance to Brandenburg-Swedish relations, the early years of the Thirty Years' War. Despite their myriad political, religious and dynastic connections to the Palatinate, the Hohenzollern held themselves neutral in the first years of the war that saw 'Winter King' Friedrich deprived of his lands and driven into exile and the emperor and his allies gain a hegemonic position in the *Reich*.²¹ From the beginning of Georg Wilhelm's reign Brandenburg's foreign policy was influenced by Count Adam von Schwarzenberg, the dominant figure on his privy council. Schwarzenberg was a Catholic nobleman from the Hohenzollerns' Rhineland territories whose family had an illustrious history of Imperial service and who himself hoped to keep Brandenburg on good terms with the emperor.²² Schwarzenberg's influence (and he was by no means alone amongst Brandenburg's counselors in arguing against a break with the emperor) combined with Georg Wilhelm's own cautious nature and the Estates' aversion to raising funds for an army to set the course of Brandenburg's policy away from active participation in the early years of the war.

A variety of factors contributed to a temporary yet noteworthy shift in this policy in 1624. Georg Wilhelm had never approved of Emperor Ferdinand II's seizure of Friedrich of the Palatinate's lands and transfer of the Palatinate electoral dignity to Friedrich's Wittelsbach cousin Maximilian of Bavaria. Both Brandenburg and Saxony—the two remaining Protestant electors—protested these moves at the *Kurfürstentag* in

²¹ On Brandenburg's policy in the early years of the Thirty Years' War, see Ulrich Kober, *Eine Karriere im Krieg: Graf Adam von Schwarzenberg und die kurbrandenburgische Politik von 1619 bis 1641* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), especially 82–131.

²² An overview of the polarized historiography on Schwarzenberg is provided in the largely sympathetic political biography by Kober. *Ibid.*

Regensburg in 1623.²³ By 1624, however, Johann Georg of Saxony had dropped his resistance and had come to recognize the transfer as a *fait accompli*. This left Brandenburg isolated, and fearful of the consequences of continuing to hold out on its own against the transfer. Beneath this lay an undercurrent of unease about the electorate's ability to hold to its neutral course in the long-term. As these events were unfolding, Schwarzenberg traveled away from Brandenburg to the Rhineland, ostensibly to see to family business, unofficially to conduct important diplomatic work regarding the Hohenzollern claims to the Kleve-Jülich lands.²⁴ At this same time important changes were taking place in France and England that turned each of them towards a more decidedly anti-Habsburg policy. In England this was brought about by the break with Spain following the humiliating failure of the plan to marry Crown Prince Charles to a Spanish princess; in France, by the rise of Richelieu and a revival of the traditional French desire to engage German Protestants as a check on Imperial power. Each opened up diplomatic initiatives that targeted Brandenburg as one of the candidates to be recruited into an envisioned anti-Habsburg grand coalition. The French representative Marescot visited the Electoral court in July 1624, with the English agent Robert Anstruther following in August.²⁵ Such overtures from exalted quarters had an impact on the impressionable Georg Wilhelm, especially with Schwarzenberg absent and unable to filter their effect. Taken together, this combination of factors created an opening for the consideration of a change in policy into which Brandenburg's domestic advocates of international, activist Protestantism stepped.

This group included several of those who would go on to form the 'Sweden party' in the Brandenburg government: Christian von Bellin, Samuel von Winterfeld, and Sigismund von Götze. Indeed, the French and English initiatives each contained either implied or direct calls for cooperation between the German Protestants and the Scandinavian kingdoms. This fit perfectly with Bellin and his colleagues' preference that Brandenburg assume a more forceful policy stance in combination with German and foreign Protestants to support a Palatinate restitution and a settlement of the conflict in the Empire that would secure Brandenburg's

²³ Kober, 104–14; Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 167; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 27–32.

²⁴ See Kober, 132–41.

²⁵ Kober, 142–45; M.G. Schybergson, *Underhandlingarna om en Evangelisk Allians åren 1624–1625; ett bidrag till trettioåriga krigets historia* (Helsingfors: J.C. Frenckell & Son, 1880); Tham, 137–38; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:234–37; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 269–70.

long-term security. With Georg Wilhelm's approval, Bellin was dispatched on a mission to Denmark and Sweden in August 1624 with proposals to involve the northern powers in the German war.²⁶ Following a mixed but generally reserved reception in Copenhagen, Bellin held significant personal discussions with Gustav Adolf at Vadstena in September, where he offered a plan that agreed in principle with that proposed by the British agent James Spens in Sweden a few months earlier (a general Protestant league) but differed in some important particulars, most notably the request that the Swedes intervene in western Germany (along the Weser River) rather than along the Vistula and through Silesia. Gustav Adolf showed decidedly more interest in Bellin's proposals than Kristian IV had, and Bellin returned to Brandenburg with a list of concrete terms offered by the king as conditions for his acceptance of the plan.²⁷

This led to careful debate amongst the elector and his councilors, since the formal acceptance of Gustav Adolf's terms would not only commit Brandenburg to active participation in the German war against the Catholic League and perhaps against the emperor himself, but would also set up potential friction with Poland, as several of the Gustav Adolf's conditions insisted that his future allies provide him with various security guarantees vis-à-vis Poland and Denmark.²⁸ There was therefore a real risk, and in regards to the emperor the near certainty, that the elector would be set at odds with both of his overlords if he pursued the alliance plan to its conclusion. The more cautious of his advisors hesitated to endorse such a course of action, but the activist group of Bellin, Götze and Winterfeld pushed forward, and with Schwarzenberg still away their opinion prevailed. Bellin traveled to London and Paris to push for the acceptance of Gustav Adolf's terms, while Götze and Winterfeld moved across Germany with the aim of establishing a German Protestant league that

²⁶ The documents from Bellin's mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4. A draft of his instructions, dated Cöln an der Spree, 30 July/9 August 1624, is in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24a., Nr. 1, fasc. 21. Secondary treatments include: Kober, 145–47; Schybergson, 37ff.; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 33; Tham, 138–39; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:237–41; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 269ff.; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 398.

²⁷ Gustav Adolf's sixteen conditions are enumerated in a document entitled "Conditiones Wie sie vom Konige mit aygner hand aufgesetzte gewesen" in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4, 31v–33r. This document was attached as enclosure #1 to Bellin's report on his mission, dated Riga, 13 October 1624.

²⁸ GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4, 31v–32r.

would pave the way for the larger international alliance.²⁹ At the same time direct contact between Brandenburg and Sweden itself increased.³⁰ In November 1624 Georg Wilhelm sent a handwritten note to Gustav Adolf with thanks for the reception given to Bellin and statements of his desire to continue to work together for the “common good.”³¹ The Brandenburg councilors, especially Bellin and Götze, began to correspond regularly with Axel Oxenstierna as well.³²

The abject failure of these efforts is well known. Bellin was able to generate scant interest in the plan internationally, and the reception within the Empire itself was lukewarm at best. Kristian IV's decision in early 1625 to involve himself in the war as the purported savior of German Protestantism put an effective end to serious international consideration of the terms Gustav Adolf had given Bellin at Vadstena. Vain efforts were made under Brandenburg and Dutch leadership to convince Sweden and Denmark to cooperate in a joint intervention in Germany, including a mission by Sigismund von Götze to Copenhagen and Stockholm in April–May 1625, but to no avail.³³ Danish forces moved south into Germany in June 1625, while Gustav Adolf turned his attention to a renewal of the conflict with Poland in Livonia. Facing threats from the emperor and the

²⁹ Kober, 149–52; Schybergson, 52ff.; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, III.1, 33–34; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:241; Tham, 139.

³⁰ Bellin's mission to Sweden was the first by a Brandenburg representative since Hans Keiler's in 1612. Bellin's instructions were dated six days after those given by Gustav Adolf to Clas Horn for a mission to Brandenburg (Rotholmen, 24 July 1624. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 146, 340r–343v.) Horn was the first Swede to be sent directly to Brandenburg since the marriage negotiations of 1620, and the first instructed to have significant direct contact with the elector since Rasch's semi-secret mission in 1621.

³¹ “Undt Nach deme Mir . . . Christian Von Bellien sehr hochgerumet, die große ehre, die ime Umb meiner willen Von E: Kong: Wrđ: er wissen werden: Noch Viel mehr aber diesehr ruhmliche fursorge, vor das gemeine notleidende bestes, so E: Kong: Wrđ: hetten undt dringen, Als hab ich nicht Umbgang gehabt E: Kong: Wrđ: die besonder gute Vergnugung So mir hiedurch wiederfahren, Vermittels dieses meines handtbriefleins zu erkennen zugeben. Ich bitte aber auch zu gleich freundt dienstlich E: Kong: Wrđ: wolten Ihr das *bonum publicu[m]* umb des darunter *uersirenden* algemeinen *interesse* willen, im besten noch Weiters an befohlen sein laßen.” Georg Wilhelm to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 10 November 1624. RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 163. A draft of this letter dated 9 November is in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4, 34r–35.

³² GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 250 Schweden, fasc. 1; *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 440, 441, 447, 450; *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 4, 5, 8, 12, 20, 27, 31, 33, 45, 46, 67, 68, 80, 81.

³³ For documents relating to Götze's mission, see RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176; and *RAOSoB*, I.3. See also Ahnlund, “Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget,” 288–91. For the broader diplomatic efforts in general, see Kober, 153; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:244–45; Tham, 140–42; Schybergson, 86ff.

return of Schwarzenberg from the Rhine, Georg Wilhelm returned to his position of attempting to cling to neutrality in a war that was creeping ever closer to his borders.

Although Brandenburg's engagement in the Protestant alliance negotiations was in this respect a dead end that changed nothing, a different picture appears when the episode is viewed as a stage in the development of Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Brandenburg had led a continental-wide effort to engage Sweden. The plan put forth by Bellin had succeeded in capturing Gustav Adolf's ear in a manner that proposals put forth by more prestigious powers (such as England) had not, and it had been Brandenburgers who in turn communicated the king's response to others in Europe and urged them to accept his terms.³⁴ At the same time, the alliance negotiations brought about a firmer alignment of the activist Protestant elements in Brandenburg towards Sweden, and in particular revealed a decided preference amongst these men for Sweden rather than Denmark as a desired partner.³⁵ It is fair then to say that the alliance plan demonstrated reciprocal interest between Brandenburg and Sweden on a deeper level than had been apparent before. Concretely, the newly expressed mutual interest ushered in a period of enduring, direct, and increasingly autonomous diplomatic interaction between Brandenburg and Sweden. Excluding the (not infrequent) moments when the two were at war, diplomatic contact between Brandenburg and Sweden would not break off for an extended period for the remainder of the century.

The Transylvanian Marriage

An immediate impact of the changes wrought by the alliance negotiations was Sweden's active support of the marriage of Georg Wilhelm's sister Katharina to Prince Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania in March 1626.³⁶ As was the case with most early modern dynastic marriages, the

³⁴ Roberts discussed Gustav Adolf's preference for the Brandenburg over the English plan, and suggested reasons why this may have been so, centered on Sweden's sour relations with Denmark. See *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:238–41.

³⁵ Roberts (*Gustavus Adolphus*, I:237) noted that while peddling the alliance plan in Copenhagen Bellin was suspected as "being too patently Swedish in sympathy." For the Reformed councilors' preference for alliance with Sweden rather than Denmark, see Kober, 153–54.

³⁶ On Swedish support for the marriage building off of the alliance negotiations, see J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 35; Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 167–68.

Brandenburg-Transylvania match was long in the making, and Sweden was one of a number of states involved in a supporting role in arranging the match.³⁷ Contemporary documents make clear that Sweden's encouragement of the match was conceived as furthering both dynastic and broadly Protestant agendas. Gustav Adolf, in his search for international recognition and potential alliance partners, had long desired a connection to the enigmatic Calvinist Prince of Transylvania who was simultaneously a recurrent spur in the Habsburgs' sides, an on-again off-again aspirant to the Polish throne, and a connected if inconstant adherent of international militant Protestantism.³⁸ The Hohenzollern became involved in the equation as early as 1621 when Margrave Johann Georg of Jägerndorf fled to Transylvania while under the Imperial ban. Both he and Bethlen Gabor issued statements from Transylvania to Gustav Adolf urging the king not to abandon the embattled Protestant cause.³⁹ Although Sweden would not have taken a fugitive junior member of the electoral house as representative of official Brandenburg policy, it seems possible that this incident planted the seed that Brandenburg could serve as an avenue to achieve the desired connection to Bethlen Gabor. As Sweden and Brandenburg drew closer together during the alliance negotiations in 1624 a series of events occurred that encouraged the Swedes to explore this option. In May 1624 Bethlen Gabor reached a peace agreement with Emperor Ferdinand II following one of their numerous border disputes. He even floated the idea of seeking a match with a Habsburg princess. These moves alarmed the Habsburgs' opponents and set in motion their push to arrange a Hohenzollern marriage that would reinforce Bethlen Gabor's ties to the Protestant camp. The ever-opportunistic prince sensed the possibilities of this changing situation and dispatched an envoy, Dr. Matthias Quaedt, to survey the diplomatic climate. Quaedt carried with him a letter to Gustav Adolf and instructions to visit Brandenburg and Sweden as well as a number of other governments. Unfortunately for these plans Quaedt was captured while traveling through Poland and the papers he was carrying seized.⁴⁰ News of this incident appears to have first reached Sweden

³⁷ Kober (155–59) places Sweden's involvement within a larger field of diplomatic activity that included England and the Palatinate. Roberts (*Gustavus Adolphus*, II:311) points to Dutch support as well. See also Tham, 162–63.

³⁸ The standard if dated account of Swedish-Transylvanian relations is Carl Wibling, *Sveriges förhållande till Siebenbürgen 1623–1648* (Lund: Collin & Rietz, 1890).

³⁹ Thyresson, 249.

⁴⁰ See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:310–11; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 286 n. 3.

in a letter from Bellin to Axel Oxenstierna in October 1624 that linked Quaedt's mission to the marriage negotiations between Bethlen Gabor and the Brandenburgers. Oxenstierna responded by requesting from Bellin a copy of Quaedt's instructions and letter if he had them.⁴¹ Götze, who was taking over primary correspondence with Oxenstierna with Bellin about to embark on his western trip in support of the alliance plan, sent the Chancellor the copy of the instructions he sought.⁴² This set in motion a pattern where Sweden looked to Brandenburg, and particularly Götze, as an intermediary for contact to Transylvania.⁴³

From the initial talks with Bellin in Sweden Gustav Adolf had been explicit in his desire that Bethlen Gabor be included in the proposed Protestant alliance.⁴⁴ Oxenstierna reiterated these sentiments in his correspondence with Bellin and Götze, and Gustav Adolf repeated them to Götze during his visit to Stockholm in May 1625.⁴⁵ As time went by and hostilities with Poland were reopened the requests to Götze became more pointed. In August 1625 Oxenstierna wrote to Götze, reminded him of the conversations in Stockholm in May, and plainly requested his assistance in discerning Bethlen Gabor's willingness to join Sweden in offensive military action against Poland.⁴⁶ Sweden's diplomats in Germany also began to

⁴¹ Axel Oxenstierna to Christian von Bellin, Vadstena, 16 November 1624. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 440, 770–73. Oxenstierna stated that this letter was written in response to Bellin's letter of 13 October. See also Axel Oxenstierna to Pfalzgraf Johann Kasimir, Vadstena, 13 November 1624. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 438, 766–77.

⁴² See Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Jönköping, 20 January 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 4, 3–7. Sweden's legate in northern Germany, Johan Adler Salvius, reported on the Quaedt incident from Berlin in March 1625 and also sent along a copy of Quaedt's instructions that mentioned the marriage negotiations and Bethlen Gabor's interest in a Transylvania-Sweden-Muscovy alliance against Poland. Johan Adler Salvius to Gustav Adolf, Berlin, 8 March 1625. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, *Germanica*, vol. 253.

⁴³ As early as January 1625 Oxenstierna wrote to Götze: "Deest vero Regi meo ob itinerum difficultatem commoda cum Transylvano communicandi facultas; ideoque si tu mihi aliquam ejus commodam rationem monstrare poteris, aut si id per aulam vestram fieri queat, certe puta te Regi meo, imo tuo Principi magnum officium præstiturum." Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Jönköping, 20 January 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 5, 8–9, here 8.

⁴⁴ Christian von Bellin to Georg Wilhelm, Riga, 13 October 1624. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 4, 4r–33r, here 18r.

⁴⁵ Axel Oxenstierna to Christian von Bellin, Stockholm, 8 December 1624. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 450, 786–87; Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Jönköping, 20 January 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 5, 8–9; Gustav Adolf's resolution for Sigismund von Götze, Stockholm, 10 May 1625. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, *Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 176; *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 48, n. 4, 89–95.

⁴⁶ Götze was asked pointedly to bring this issue up with Georg Wilhelm and to report his thoughts back to Oxenstierna. Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Swedish army camp outside of Birsen, 31 August 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 81, 157–67, here 166–67.

use Brandenburg as an intermediary to establish contact to Transylvania. During his trip to Germany in 1625 Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna was instructed to ask Georg Wilhelm and his councilors about the best ways to establish correspondence with Bethlen Gabor with an aim of bringing Transylvania into the war against Poland.⁴⁷ Berlin developed into something of a crossroads in Swedish-Transylvanian diplomacy. Johan Adler Salvius interacted with a Transylvanian diplomat during his stay in Berlin in March 1625, and Philip Sadler crossed through the Brandenburg capital (with the help of a pass from Georg Wilhelm) on his way from Stockholm to Transylvania in 1626.⁴⁸ A few years later Axel Oxenstierna's secretary Johann Nicodemi (Lillieström) and the Transylvanian envoy Martin Bonczidai held secret talks in Königsberg.⁴⁹ That the purpose of Swedish-Transylvanian contact was frequently anti-Polish makes Brandenburg's role that much more noteworthy.

These developments ran parallel to Sweden's support for the Brandenburg-Transylvanian marriage plan. Sweden approved of this match for several reasons. First, like many other Protestants the Swedes believed that the marriage would keep Bethlen Gabor tied to the Protestant camp and increase his chances of joining a Protestant alliance. In a letter to Götze in January 1625 that pledged Sweden's support for the marriage, Axel Oxenstierna placed the proposed match squarely within the context of the broader Protestant cause, arguing that "to oppose [the marriage] is to stand above all against concern for the preservation of the common cause, which this same marriage can be seen to support."⁵⁰ The marriage would bind Bethlen Gabor not only to international Protestantism in general, but to Sweden in particular. Oxenstierna was careful to point out that the bride to be was "the sister of our Queen," and when the marriage was

⁴⁷ "Instruction Uthi ährenden som Kong: Maytt: hafuer allernådigst tillbetroott Her Gabriel Oxenstierna Göstafson J Tyskland att för retta," Stockholm, April 1625. RA, *Diplomatica, Germanica*, vol. 254.

⁴⁸ Johan Adler Salvius to Gustav Adolf, Berlin, 8 March 1625. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 253; Th. Westrin, "Philip Sadlers beskickning till Siebenbürgen 1626," *Historisk Tidskrift* 10 (1890), 169–75, here 171; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 89.

⁴⁹ The meetings took place in February 1629 and led to very little. Nicodemi's Memorial is dated Elbing, 28 January 1629. *RAOSoB*, I.4, Nr. 233, 347–49. See also Axel Oxenstierna to Martin Bonczidai, Elbing, 24 January 1629. *RAOSoB*, I.4, Nr. 230, 339–40; Wibling, 27–28.

⁵⁰ "Quominus autem id dissuadeat, obstat primo quidem cura communis rei conservandæ, quæ isthoc matrimonio videtur quodammodo fulciri posse, ac Transylvanus retineri, ut eodem studio, quo hactenus, impediatur ac distineatur nimis excrescentem potentiam." Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Jönköping, 20 January 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 4, 3–7, here 6.

about to come to fruition he wrote again to Götze of Gustav Adolf's great pleasure that the special bond of affinity that Sweden and Brandenburg shared would now be extended to include Transylvania. Family ties would sit alongside the dangers of a common enemy to encourage Swedish-Transylvanian cooperation for the common [Protestant] cause, and thus implicitly for the interests of Brandenburg as well. Götze was asked once again to serve as an intermediary to bring this connection about.⁵¹

Philip Sadler's mission of 1626 offers a stark example of Sweden's use of the Brandenburg-Transylvanian marriage as a connection to Bethlen Gabor. With the marriage approaching Gustav Adolf wrote to Axel Oxenstierna in December 1625 that "it would be good now to correspond with Bethlen Gabor, as we are now brothers-in-law."⁵² Sadler was chosen for this role, and he departed Sweden in March 1626 to bring Gustav Adolf's congratulations to the new couple. Despite its seemingly tranquil origins the true purpose at the heart of Sadler's mission was very serious indeed: to move Bethlen Gabor to a combined Swedish-Transylvanian attack on Poland as part of the international Protestant struggle against Catholicism and the Habsburgs. In conversation with the prince Sadler was sure to cast Poland as "a principal member of the Catholic League and the flank of the House of Austria" whose suppression would be invaluable to the Protestant cause.⁵³ The original plan had been for Sadler to arrive in Berlin before Katharina's departure for the wedding and to travel incognito with her entourage to Transylvania. This would secure him safety of passage through the war-torn German countryside, and would provide him cover from the prying eyes of those who would react with alarm to a Swedish embassy reaching Transylvania. When Sadler reached Berlin he learned that Katharina and her party had long since departed, and it was only after receiving a special Brandenburg pass and a letter of recommendation to Count Schwarzenberg (who was traveling with Katharina) via Georg Wilhelm's chamberlain Adam von Winterfeld that Sadler was

⁵¹ Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Wolmar, 5 January 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 5, 3r–5v; *RAOŠoB*, I.3, Nr. 150, 292–97.

⁵² Gustav Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, 17 December 1625. Cited in Wibling, 11 n. 2.

⁵³ "...hunc hostem, hunc principale membrum Catholicæ Ligæ et latus domus Austriacæ esse. Hoc oppresso, magnum accidere causæ communæ: Nostros Polonicis viribus augeri, Cæsarem distahi (!), Danum lævari." Philip Sadler's relation to Gustav Adolf on his mission to Transylvania, Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 1626, printed in full in Th. Westrin, 171–75, here 173. On the anti-Polish purpose of the mission see also Wibling, 11–12; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 88–89; Tham, 162–63; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:314.

able to continue on his journey.⁵⁴ When Sadler arrived in Transylvania he had friendly dealings with Gerhard Romilian von Kalcheim genannt Leuchtmar, a Brandenburg official and member of Katharina's entourage who was closely tied to the international Protestant cause (he had served in the Bohemian war and later at the court of Margrave Johann Georg) and who, as we shall see, went on to play a large role in Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the future.⁵⁵ Sadler's mission—conducted in the key of international militant Protestantism directed against Poland—was thus occasioned by the Brandenburg-Transylvanian marriage; intended to make use of that marriage to transport Swedish diplomacy to Transylvania in a literal, physical sense; was conducted via Brandenburg and with vital assistance from Brandenburg officials; and brought a Swedish diplomat such as Sadler into contact with a Brandenburgier such as Leuchtmar who was in Transylvania precisely because of the marriage and who himself was an adherent of international Protestantism and would be heavily involved in the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship to come. The Brandenburg-Transylvania match continued to facilitate Swedish diplomatic activity in the future, including the various missions of Paul Strassburg to Transylvania with the ostensible purpose of assisting Gustav Adolf's sister-in-law in her personal affairs.⁵⁶

In Swedish eyes the Brandenburg-Transylvanian marriage therefore served both international Protestant and Swedish dynastic agendas, and in an important way built upon a budding relationship between Sweden and Brandenburg itself. When war reopened with Poland the Swedes hoped to use the marriage for one more purpose: to move Brandenburg into a stance friendly to Swedish aims, and perhaps even into joining the war on Sweden's side. During Samuel Winterfeld's audience with Gustav Adolf in June 1626 the king linked the Transylvanian marriage and his own marriage to Maria Eleonora as factors that had driven a decisive wedge between Brandenburg and Poland. As Winterfeld reported Gustav Adolf's words back to Georg Wilhelm, the consequences of this were grave:

The King of Poland has been given such an offense against Your Electoral Highness by the marriages with His Majesty [Gustav Adolf] and the Prince

⁵⁴ Sadler's relation of 31 May 1626, 171–72. See also Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 89 n. 3.

⁵⁵ Sadler's relation of 31 May 1626, 172.

⁵⁶ See Wibling, 22ff.; Franz von Krones, "Katharina von Brandenburg-Preußen als Fürstin Siebenbürgens 1626–1631," *Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Geschichte, Kultur-, Literatur- und Kunstgeschichte* 1 (1884), 334–58.

in Transylvania that Your Electoral Highness will never be able to erase. Your Electoral Highness seeks to preserve Yourself with good words to both the Emperor and to Poland, but this will not work. Rather, one will give You pleasant words in return until the right moment, and then will do with Your Electoral Highness as [they have done] with the others.⁵⁷

Faced with such danger, Gustav Adolf offered the prospect of Swedish protection, and indeed alliance with Sweden, as the only practical means by which Georg Wilhelm could preserve his state.⁵⁸ But this suggestion was based in more than just practicality. Rather, it cast Brandenburg-Swedish alliance as the logical extension of the web of shared connections that had been strengthened and thickened by the recent Transylvanian marriage. Sweden's encouragement of the marriage to further its own diplomatic and dynastic linkages to Transylvania had now looped back onto the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship itself, reinforcing the ties between the ruling houses and of each of them to an international Protestantism that could only stand in conflict with the Hohenzollerns' feudal obligation to Poland, itself the chief stumbling block that had stunted the development of an independent relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden in the preceding decades.

The Protestant alliance negotiations and the Transylvanian marriage that followed in their wake offered the possibility for a fundamental reorientation of the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship where dynastic affinity and international Protestantism could replace Polish concerns as the axis around which the relationship revolved. Arguments for both the alliance and the marriage were articulated in the language of Protestant brotherhood similar to that which surrounded Margrave Johann Georg's military plans in 1621. Brandenburgers of a certain religious-political bent fanned out across the Empire and the continent to advocate for Sweden's preferred version of the alliance, while Swedish diplomacy in turn lent its support to the Brandenburg-Transylvanian match. Both alliance negotiations

⁵⁷ "Es hette der König in Polen, wegen der mit Irer Mayt: und dan den Fürsten in Siebenburgen getroffenen Heyraht, einmahll eine solche *offens* wieder E. Churf. Drht: geschöpft, daß E. Churf. Drht: dieselbe nimmer außleschen wurden. E. Churf. Drht: vermeinten sich mit gueten Worten, so woll bey dem Kayser, als den Polen, zu *conseruiren*. Sie wurden es aber damit nicht treffen, Sondern man wurde Ihr, bis zu gelegener Zeit, guete Wortt wieder geben. Unnd alß dann es mit E. Churf. Drht; wie mit andern machen." Samuel von Winterfeld to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 17 July 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 11r–25, here 13v–14r.

⁵⁸ Immediately after the above-cited passage the king added: "Whan aber E. Churf. Drht: Ire Mayt so nahe an der hand, wurden sich die Polen woll eines andern bedencken." Ibid., 14r.

and marriage stood at the outset of many decades of direct and nearly continuous contact between Brandenburg and Sweden.

Personal Diplomacy in the mid-1620s

Historians have been reluctant to recognize the period of the alliance negotiations as having real potential for important change in Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Some of this is surely due to the ultimate failure of the alliance plan, and Brandenburg's less than cooperative posture during Sweden's invasion of Prussia that began in the summer of 1626. But separate from this is a hesitance to concede actual independence to Brandenburg's actions in this period. Scholars have often placed the alliance negotiations within a Great Power framework in which England and in particular France were the real driving forces behind the push to include Sweden. Although not without preferences of its own, Brandenburg was closer to a bit-player that was charmed by the more powerful into working on behalf of their initiatives than to a substantial and independent participant on its own merits.⁵⁹ In turn, Georg Wilhelm's step away from the alliance plan in 1625 was again the result of a Great Power's actions, in this case the emperor's menacing words that redirected the course of Brandenburg-Swedish interaction as the elector re-embraced neutrality. Conceptualizing Brandenburg-Swedish relations as being pushed first one way and then the other by the actions of greater powers leaves little room to consider that something significant between Brandenburg and Sweden themselves could have been taking place.

Perhaps the most important factor in interpreting why the mid-1620s matter in the course of Brandenburg-Swedish relations, though, is the scale of reference. Focusing on the level of states' interests and institutions glides over the much more complicated, and much more revealing, story that was taking place on the individual level. That story is neither one of ultimate failure, nor one that came to an end when governmental relations soured in the later parts of the decade. From the outset the movement towards closer relations in 1624 functioned through particular people with their own agendas and personal connec-

⁵⁹ Traces of this way of thinking can even be found in the work of Nils Ahnlund, who otherwise pays uncommon attention to the importance of Brandenburg in Sweden's foreign policy. See "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 269–70, where Ahnlund concludes that Bellin's mission arose as a consequence of French diplomatic initiative.

tions. The opening gesture by which Brandenburg aligned itself with the supporters of a Protestant grand coalition—Bellin's trip to Copenhagen and Stockholm—was itself made possible by Schwarzenberg's personal absence on a matter essentially disconnected from the political and diplomatic issues at hand. Bellin—a committed supporter of activist Protestantism who had pre-existing personal connections to Swedes and had assisted in arranging the marriage between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora at a time when his own government publicly opposed it—was acting at least partially on his own personal initiative in setting the terms of the alliance plan with his Swedish partners and then tirelessly advocating for their acceptance by his government and others across Europe. Sweden's own agent in northern Germany at this time, Johan Adler Salvius, shared a similar political-religious worldview with Bellin and over the coming decades fought against resistance from many other Swedes (some in very high places) to further Brandenburg-Swedish friendship and to try (in concert with like-minded Brandenburgers) to bring about another dynastic marriage between their ruling houses. Men like Bellin and Adler Salvius *were* in state service, but they had their own ideas about what was best for their lands that sometimes ran counter to those of their compatriots or even to the stated policies of their governments, and their own methods of pursuing their agendas that could lay outside of officially-sanctioned channels. These men built personal networks of friends, relatives, business associates, or other like-minded individuals with little respect for their nationality or state appointments, and it was within these networks that ideas were formed, plans were hatched, and a very real part of what we call diplomacy took place. Early modern statesmen were well aware of the personal nature of diplomatic activity, and at important junctures those in command would direct their actions not to institutions or heads of state, but to individuals who may or may not have been authorized to speak or act on behalf of their rulers or governments but who were known to have the right combination of backgrounds, belief systems, and personal connections to make them willing and reliable partners. It is worth noting that Gustav Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna reached out specifically to Götze (rather than to the privy council as a whole or to the chief minister Schwarzenberg) when they wanted to establish contacts with Bethlen Gabor. In fact, the king believed that there were others within the Brandenburg government itself with different motivations who were actively working against his efforts to build a Swedish-Transylvanian connection via

Götze.⁶⁰ Oxenstierna was especially afraid that Schwarzenberg had worked to destroy the pro-Swedish work of men like Götze and Winterfeld after returning to Berlin.⁶¹

Those committed to building a relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden in the 1620s spoke in the language of Protestant brotherhood and of the natural, logical connection between the two countries. Their persistence in the face of significant obstacles and repeated failures on the level of grand policy shows that they were driven by something other than cool pragmatism or dedication to carrying out the orders of their rulers. The opposition they faced came also not in the form of governmental structures or the irresistible forces of high politics, but rather from the personal actions of other groups of individuals with competing ideas and agendas. All involved would be severely tested by the Swedish invasion of Prussia that began only a few months after the Transylvanian marriage was celebrated, and some would pay a severe political and personal price for their loyalties, real or perceived.

War in Prussia

By the time the Swedish invasion force arrived in Prussia in July 1626 Brandenburg and Sweden had been engaged in the most intense two years of attempted (Protestant alliance) and actual (Transylvanian marriage) cooperation in the history of their relations. They had also been talking, quietly but seriously, for many months about the coming invasion. The Swedish Vasa had been attempting since the reign of Karl IX to convince continental Protestants that their struggle with their Polish cousins was an integral part of a broader Protestant-Catholic conflict. Gustav Adolf continually put forth plans for an allied-assisted or funded

⁶⁰ Gustav Adolf made these accusations during Winterfeld's audience. Samuel von Winterfeld to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 17 July 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 5, 11r–25, here 12v–13r. See also Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 87 n. 2.

⁶¹ Oxenstierna felt that Schwarzenberg's influence made it impossible for Brandenburg to be counted on, regardless of the positive words carried by men like Winterfeld. Axel Oxenstierna to Ludwig Camerarius, Stockholm, 6 June 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 165, 323–30, here 325. Oxenstierna and Camerarius had been expressing concerns in their correspondence over Schwarzenberg pulling Brandenburg away from support for a Protestant alliance since at least 1625. See Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 77. While disagreeing with Oxenstierna's harshly critical tone, Ulrich Kober has shown us that Schwarzenberg did indeed work systematically to move Brandenburg to a pro-Imperial policy, beginning ironically during his return journey from accompanying Princess Katharina to Transylvania. Kober, 160–71.

strike against Poland as a counter-proposal to continental efforts, including those of Brandenburg, to lure Sweden into the war in Germany.⁶² The main challenge facing Brandenburg was not to move Sweden to military action, for which Gustav Adolf was more than willing, but rather to make sure that when the Swedish invasion did come it would go to the west and therefore more directly against the German Catholics and away from the Hohenzollerns' own lands. Both those Brandenburgers who argued for Swedish intervention in the west and the Swedes who offered counterproposals for an attack on Poland plead their cases in terms of what would be best for the greater Protestant cause, offering an important lesson to students of early modern statecraft that espousing the same principles by no means implies advocating the same policies.

Within the first months of 1626 Gustav Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna made the final decision to carry on the Polish war via an attack through Prussia.⁶³ Coming on the heels of the Protestant alliance negotiations, the Swedish leadership ideally dreamed of Brandenburg's active cooperation in the Prussian campaign, while more realistically hoping for passive toleration and a grant of free passage for Swedish troops through Hohenzollern-controlled territory.⁶⁴ They especially pinned their hopes on persuading Georg Wilhelm—forcefully if necessary—to allow the use of one of his Prussian ports to disembark the invasion force. With these goals in mind, high-level Swedes, after some hesitation, broached the subject of gaining access to the port of Memel with their Brandenburg counterparts in 1625, when the theater of the Swedish-Polish war was Livonia and Lithuania and the final decision to shift the center to Prussia had not

⁶² During Bellin's audience in 1624 Gustav Adolf quickly returned to the theme that his wars against Poland were an important service to the Protestant cause that should be appreciated by other Protestants. The Swedes made recourse to this argument in virtually all subsequent conversations regarding the proposed alliance.

⁶³ Sweden had weighed plans for an invasion of Prussia since at least 1620, sometimes in connection to ideas of assisting Georg Wilhelm against his Polish overlord in the event that friction between them (partially caused by Gustav Adolf's marriage to Maria Eleonora) grew into open conflict. See Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 250; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:312.

⁶⁴ On Sweden's dealings with officials in Brandenburg and Prussia during the buildup to and early stages of the Prussian invasion, see Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg"; Carl Lohmeyer, "Gustav Adolf und die preußische Regierung im Jahre 1626," *Neue Preussische Provinzial-Blätter*, 3rd Series, Volume 5 (1860?), 280–93; 339–66; Volume 6 (1860?), 19–41; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:305–32; Klaus-Richard Böhme, *Die Schwedische Besetzung des Weichseldeltas 1626–1636* (Würzburg: Holzner-Verlag, 1963). A lengthy and extremely detailed seventeenth-century account that contains much material on Brandenburg-Swedish contact is Israel Hoppe, *Israel Hoppe's Burggrafen zu Elbing Geschichte des Ersten Schwedisch-Polnischen Krieses in Preussen nebst Anhang*, ed. M. Toeppen (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1887).

yet been taken.⁶⁵ Georg Wilhelm responded by pointing to his feudal relationship with Poland and insisting upon Ducal Prussia's strict neutrality. Oxenstierna raised the issue once again in a letter to Götze in January 1626 that directly requested access to Memel for what was now clearly becoming a planned invasion of Prussia.⁶⁶ On the eve of the invasion Gustav Adolf and Oxenstierna made one last effort to secure the use of a Prussian port (the focus now was on Pillau more than Memel) in a series of blunt conversations with Samuel von Winterfeld during his mission to Sweden in which the Swedish invasion plans were laid out in frank and relatively specific terms.⁶⁷ These conversations were notable not only for the candor with which military details were discussed, but also for their harsh criticism of Georg Wilhelm's inconsistent and indecisive foreign policy, and the extraordinary measures that were taken to ensure that Winterfeld was kept isolated and out of regular contact with his home government. With the hour of combat rapidly approaching, few traces remained of the atmosphere of goodwill that had accompanied the Protestant alliance and Transylvanian marriage negotiations. Winterfeld's mission was a last attempt in its own right, as his instructions called for him to make one more push to have the looming Swedish invasion directed into the Empire

⁶⁵ See Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 79; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:312–13; Tham, 161–62; Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, 5 August 1625. *RAOSoB*, I.3, 136 n. 1.

⁶⁶ The *rikskansler* deployed a full suite of interconnected arguments expressed in the key of Protestant cooperation and intended both to scare the Brandenburgers into acquiescing while simultaneously assuaging their fears of a backlash from Poland, and even suggested the possibility that Memel be handed over after a brief fake siege in order to protect the elector against Polish accusations of treason. Axel Oxenstierna to Sigismund von Götze, Wolmar, 5 January 1626. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 5, 3r–5v; *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 150, 292–97; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 80; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:313; Tham, 162. Already in 1617–1618 Gustav Adolf had requested and received plans of the city of Memel from Hans Georg von Arnim, a native Brandenburger in Swedish service. See Gustav Adolf to Hans Georg von Arnim, Jönköping, 30 January 1618, printed as document Nr. 1 in Karl Heldmann (ed.), *Fürsten- und Feldherrenbriefe aus der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913), 4–5.

⁶⁷ *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 5; RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176. See also Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 96–101; Josef Kramer, *Die diplomatische Tätigkeit des Kurfürstlich Brandenburgischen Geheimen Rates Samuel von Winterfeldt in den Jahren 1624–1627 und der gegen diesen geführte Staatsprozess* (Bonn: Carl Georgi, Universitäts-Buchdruckerei und Verlag, 1915), 54–57; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:318–21.

rather than through Prussia.⁶⁸ Gustav Adolf and his army set sail while Winterfeld was still being kept *incommunicado* in Stockholm.

Sigismund, like everyone else in Europe, knew that Swedish military action of some sort was looming, and he demanded that the elector reinforce his Prussian ports and prepare to offer military assistance in the event of a Swedish invasion.⁶⁹ To make matters worse, when the Swedish invasion began in July 1626 the Mark Brandenburg itself was awash with foreign troops following Mansfeld's retreat into Brandenburg territory after his defeat at the hands of Wallenstein in April. In May Schwarzenberg began pushing for Brandenburg to openly align itself with the emperor, and Tilly's decisive defeat of Kristian IV at Lutter am Barenberg in August sent waves of Danish and Imperial troops into Brandenburg and gave the emperor a commanding position in the north. The pressure created by Sweden's invasion of Prussia was one additional factor that contributed to a major realignment of Brandenburg policy towards the Imperial side that culminated in Georg Wilhelm's recognition of the transfer of the Palatinate electoral dignity to Bavaria against the resistance of his Reformed councilors in May 1627.⁷⁰

By this time Swedish troops had been on the ground in Prussia for ten months, having landed at Pillau without Georg Wilhelm's agreement (but also without any organized resistance) and quickly advancing inland to engage Polish troops in what would become several years of combat.⁷¹ Alongside the military offensive the Swedes pursued an extensive diplomatic campaign with the elector and the Ducal Prussian estates (as well as certain city governments) that began even before the army came

⁶⁸ Winterfeld was to suggest that the Swedes land at Wismar and advance down the Elbe to attack Tilly or Wallenstein. See the Memorial for Winterfeld's mission, Cöln an der Spree, 23 April 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 6r–8r; Winterfeld's undated proposition to Gustav Adolf in RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176; Samuel von Winterfeld to Gustav Adolf, Stockholm, 11 June 1626. RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176 (copy at GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 68r–70v); Gustav Adolf's Resolution for Winterfeld, Stockholm, 15 June 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 41r–43v; Axel Oxenstierna to Ludwig Camerarius, Stockholm, 6 June 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 165, 323–30.

⁶⁹ See Lohmeyer, 341ff.

⁷⁰ On Brandenburg's shift in policy, see Kober, 160–74. The move to alignment with the emperor came after a heated internal struggle in the Brandenburg Council and was resisted by Götze, Winterfeld, and Friedrich Pruckmann amongst others.

⁷¹ For accounts of the military side of the conflict, see Frost, *Northern Wars*, Chapter Five; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:321–45 and 388–99; and the seminal work by the Swedish Army General Staff, *Sveriges Krig 1611–1632*, Band II: Polska Kriget (Stockholm: Generalstab, 1936), 236–564.

ashore and ran along parallel tracks of repeated and public professions of friendship and benign intentions on the one hand, and increasingly impatient demands for assistance or at least an official declaration of full neutrality on the other.⁷² Sigismund's demands on his vassal to render robust military assistance increased in intensity after the Swedish landing as well, and by December 1626 the king was pushing for the Duchy to declare war on Sweden.⁷³ The elector had neither the desire to plunge himself into the war, nor the military means to make that participation meaningful. Attempting to mediate between the combatants was the only palatable course.

An agreement reached at Lochstädt in May 1627 confirmed Sweden's (temporary) possession of Pillau in exchange for the withdrawal of Swedish troops from Ducal Prussian territory save for Pillau itself and the lines of communication running to it.⁷⁴ The Lochstädt agreement became the framework for affairs in Ducal Prussia for the remainder of the war. That summer Swedish troops returned to the Duchy and Oxenstierna seized the Pillau toll revenues after Georg Wilhelm issued an order forbidding his subjects from serving in or provisioning the Swedish army and dispatched a contingent of troops as Ducal Prussia's feudal contribution to the Polish army.⁷⁵ The tolls became a central element in Swedish wartime finance, not least during Sweden's coming involvement in the Thirty Years' War.⁷⁶ Although a subsequent agreement reestablished most of the terms of Lochstädt (but not the return of the toll revenue) and stabilized the situation in the Duchy, the last reservoir of goodwill from the Protestant

⁷² *RAOSoB*, I.3; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199; and *GSStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5.

⁷³ Hoppe, 123–24; Lohmeyer, 360–65.

⁷⁴ *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199; *RAOSoB*, I.3, 552–53, n. 2. The text of the Lochstädt agreement is printed in C. Hallendorff and O.S. Rydberg (eds.), *Sveriges Traktater med främmande magter jemte andra dit hörande handlingar*, vol. 5, pt. 1: 1572–1632 (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1903), Nr. 30, 331–33. See also Hoppe, 175; *Sveriges Krig*, II:329–32; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:340; Böhme, 73–74; Tham, 165; Kober, 172.

⁷⁵ *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199; Hoppe, 187–90; *Sveriges Krig*, II:349–52; Böhme, 86–89; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:340–41; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 415.

⁷⁶ See Einar Wendt, *Det Svenska Licentväsendet i Preussen 1627–1635*, in *Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift* 1933 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1933); Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus* II:80–5; Böhme, 87–89. For a recent work that places the Prussian tolls within the much broader context of seventeenth century Swedish economic policy and political culture, see Erik MacDonald Thomson, *Chancellor Oxenstierna, Cardinal Richelieu, and Commerce: The problems and possibilities of governance in early-seventeenth century France and Sweden* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 2004).

alliance negotiations and cooperation for the Transylvanian marriage appeared to have dried up.⁷⁷ Within leading Swedish circles rumors even spread that Georg Wilhelm was converting to Catholicism.⁷⁸

This sour atmosphere did not prevent Brandenburg from throwing itself into mediation efforts from the last months of 1627.⁷⁹ Negotiating an end to this round of fighting between the Vasa cousins was an international affair, involving at various times Dutch, German, French, and English mediators. Regardless of the fact that Georg Wilhelm enjoyed the full confidence of neither of the combatants, he was still uniquely positioned with significant (if problematic) ties to both of them, not to mention that he was more immediately desperate than the other interested powers to see the Swedish-Polish fighting stop. The Brandenburg-Prussian mediators' role was intense and at certain junctures decisive. Through much of 1628 they carried on alone while other mediators withdrew. Despite French and English involvement in 1629 that made initial progress the talks were on the verge of dissolving until the Brandenburg-Prussian delegation came forward with a creative proposal that broke the impasse and formed the basis of the Truce of Altmark that was agreed to in September 1629. The truce was to run for six years, during which time portions of the land occupied by Sweden in Royal Prussia were to be placed under a sequester administered by Georg Wilhelm, to be returned to the Swedes one month before the expiration of the truce if a more permanent peace had not yet been reached.⁸⁰ As security, Sweden was allowed to continue its occupation of Pillau, Memel, Fischhausen, Lochstädt and certain other areas in Ducal Prussia, including collection of their all-important toll

⁷⁷ The agreement was agreed to in principle in August 1627 and ratified in October. RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199. For the text of the agreement see *Sveriges Traktater*, vol. 5, pt. 1, Nr. 31, 333–37.

⁷⁸ Dietrich von Falkenberg wrote to Axel Oxenstierna on 14 June 1627 that Georg Wilhelm had "sich schon catholisch erklerett." Cited in *Sveriges Krig*, II:349–50. Such rumors were afoot in Vienna as well. See Johannes Heinrich Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg in der Krisis des Jahres 1627* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1896), 100–01.

⁷⁹ GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Polen, Nr. 5, especially 5n–o; RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199; *RAOSoB*, I.4 and II.1. See also Hoppe; *Sveriges Krig*, II:375–82, 433–46, 551–62; Böhme 95–98, 124–27, 148–56; Tham, 165–70; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:344–45, 395–99; Günter Barudio, *Gustav Adolf—der Große: eine politische Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1982), 382–83.

⁸⁰ The text of the Truce of Altmark and supporting documents are printed in *Sveriges Traktater*, vol. 5, pt. 1, Nr. 35, 347–58. See also Herman Brulin, "Stilleståndet i Altmark 1629," in *Historiska studier tillägnande Professor Harald Hjärne på hans sextioårsdag den 2 maj 1908* (Uppsala & Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1908), 259–310.

revenues.⁸¹ Before the negotiations concluded Georg Wilhelm and Gustav Adolf held a cordial personal meeting at Fischhausen, something that the elector's relationship with Poland would have made unthinkable even a short time earlier.⁸²

Indeed, the Swedish invasion of Prussia and seizure of important parts of the elector's territory and revenues brought not only damage to the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship (although that was certainly present in abundance, and would linger for decades,) but also sufficiently changed the situation on the ground such that the relationship was allowed to develop in new directions. In the face of Swedish distrust, the Brandenburg-Prussian mediators were able to achieve better results than the delegations sent from more prestigious governments. It was they who introduced the decisive sequestration compromise that made the final agreement possible.⁸³ As had been the case with the Protestant alliance proposals in 1624, Brandenburg's efforts enjoyed more success with Sweden than did those of the great powers, suggesting that the Brandenburgers had a closer familiarity with the issues facing Sweden and a better sense of how to present proposals to their northern neighbors.

Furthermore, during the war and the sequestration that followed the formal diplomatic infrastructure between Brandenburg and Sweden took important steps forward. For the first time in the history of Brandenburg-Swedish relations we see the appointment of a long-term diplomatic resident (this was Jacob Godeman, sent as Swedish resident to Königsberg in 1626), the conclusion of a bilateral treaty (the Treaty of Fischhausen), and a personal meeting between the two lands' princes.⁸⁴ These developments

⁸¹ The framework governing the sequestration was formalized in the separate Treaty of Fischhausen between Sweden and the elector in November 1629. Printed with supporting documents in *Sverges Traktater*, vol. 5, pt. 1, Nr. 36, 358–66; and in *RAOSoB*, I.4, Nr. 530–531, 663–72. See also Theodor von Moerner, *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1867), Nr. 51, 102–05.

⁸² See Hoppe, 458; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, III.1, 58; *Sveriges Krig*, II:558; Brulin, 289; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 433; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:398.

⁸³ Brulin, 281–83; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:397–98; Böhme, 150–51; Tham, 169. Hoppe (451) adds that the elector's delegation had also helped calm Gustav Adolf's emotions and prevent the final talks from becoming derailed when the king became furious over a perceived slight from the late-arriving English delegate Sir Thomas Roe.

⁸⁴ Godeman was sent as representative to the Königsberg city government in particular, although he was clearly intended to deal with the Ducal Prussian government and estates as well. His mission was wrought with difficulties that caused him to depart from Königsberg relatively quickly. The language surrounding his appointment, however, made clear that he was intended "to reside there and conduct the King's affairs with the

took place in the open, not hidden away from Poland's view as most earlier contacts had been. With the Truce of Altmark in force, Brandenburg continued to urge both sides to return to the bargaining table to hammer out a permanent peace, and mediators sent by the elector would play an important role in the negotiations for an extension of the truce in future years.⁸⁵

Friends, Enemies, and Personal Contacts

Developments on the official state level were significant in their own right and show real change from earlier periods. The trajectory of development is clear: although frequently strained, suspicious, or even downright hostile, Brandenburg-Swedish relations were now far more substantial, direct, and public than ever before. The story of what was going on 'on the ground' when Brandenburgers and Swedes interacted is considerably less linear, and doesn't map cleanly onto the narrative of top-level diplomatic turns of cooperation and (more frequently) animosity steered by changing dynastic- or state policy objectives and sweeping geo-political currents, nor even onto a model of interaction between two discrete and separate sides. What it does mirror is the web-like structure of activities and contacts of those who partook in the diplomatic culture.

A characteristic feature of the source material from this period is how quickly the language describing diplomatic action gets personal, both in terms of the actors' own perceptions of how heavily individuals influenced the diplomatic situation, and in terms of how frequently diplomatic work was presented as operating through personal rather than institutional or governmental channels. Diplomatic interaction was frequently conceived of as a navigation through a forest of friends and foes, defined

government," and that this important diplomatic move had been made necessary by the shift of the Swedish-Polish war into Prussia. Axel Oxenstierna to Prussian government, Elbing, 3 November 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 207, 389–90. A copy of this document is in RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199. See also Gustav Adolf to Königsberg city government, "ex Insula", 7/27 October 1626. Document Nr. 9 in the appendices in Hoppe, 579. A few years later Brandenburg suggested maintaining a permanent agent at the Swedish army camp to ease correspondence with Gustav Adolf: "Wen eß Ihr. K.M.: gefellig, wolten Ihr Churf: Dhrlt: einen *Agenten* in dem Schwedischen lager halten, durch welchen man eineß und daß andern an Ihr. Maytt bringen könnte." Undated document with title "Puncta, darauff von H. Königl. Maytt gnedigste erklerung erfolgen soll [etc.]," [1629]. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

⁸⁵ The Brandenburgers began pushing Poland and Sweden towards further negotiations to reach the elusive permanent peace at least as early as January 1630. See Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav Adolf, Elbing, 11 January 1630. *RAOSoB*, I.5, Nr. 35, 20–24, here 22.

not so much through their attachment to particular states or governments (although sometimes by affection for individual rulers,) but more so by their personal relationships and commitments to sets of interests and values. Amongst a number of leading Swedes, for example, the greatest obstacle to gaining Brandenburg's cooperation in the Prussian campaign was not seen as Georg Wilhelm's feudal relationship with Poland nor precarious position in the Mark, nor even the fact that in the very best of cases said campaign would cut a swath of some destruction through the elector's own territory. Rather, these men pegged the chief hindrance as the personal machinations of the malicious, Catholic Schwarzenberg, the elector's favorite who was intent on furthering his own pro-Catholic, anti-Swedish agenda.⁸⁶ Similar to the ways in which they believed he had destroyed the work of friendly figures like Bellin and Winterfeld for the Protestant alliance, Schwarzenberg's Swedish critics were convinced that he wielded remarkable influence over Brandenburg's stance towards the Prussian campaign. In darker moments they feared that the fate of the entire enterprise could fall under the sway of this one ill-disposed figure. On the heels of some negative military news and with the Swedish army settling into the difficulties of life in winter quarters, Oxenstierna wrote a letter to Ludwig Camerarius in December 1626 that described the current situation on the ground and delved at some length into the ongoing negotiations regarding Ducal Prussia's position. The importance to Sweden's overall success of having Ducal Prussia well-disposed was clear, as were the dangers Schwarzenberg posed to this. An exasperated Oxenstierna concluded: "If only the Elector were of sufficiently strong disposition, and his counsels not corrupted by the striving of Count Schwarzenberg, the matter would be without danger!"⁸⁷ Gustav Adolf showed the same opinion when he declared to two Brandenburg diplomats that there would be trouble as long as Schwarzenberg was around, adding that someone "should play defenestration with the Count and strike the head from his

⁸⁶ Distrust of Schwarzenberg had been brewing for years in Swedish circles. See Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolf och tyska kriget," 267 n. 3; idem, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 93. Johan Adler Salvius wrote from Berlin in March 1625 that Schwarzenberg was one "*cui omnes malé cupiunt, nec secretiora communicari volunt.*" Johan Adler Salvius to Gustav Adolf, Berlin, 8 March 1625. RA, Diplomata, Germanica, vol. 253.

⁸⁷ "Utinam vero bono Electori sat animi esset, neque consilia ejus corrumperentur ambitu comitis Schwarzenbergii, res sine periculo esset." Axel Oxenstierna to Ludwig Camerarius, Elbing, 4 December 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 226, 418–20, here 420.

neck.”⁸⁸ Swedish hatred of Schwarzenberg was so pronounced that when the elector met with Gustav Adolf at Fischhausen he asked specifically that the king not let his anger with Schwarzenberg harm the relations between their lands.⁸⁹

Animosity towards Schwarzenberg was not confined to Swedes. Many Brandenburgers despised the count with as much vehemence as their Swedish counterparts did, and for similar reasons. Johann Bergius, Georg Wilhelm’s Reformed irenic court preacher, called Schwarzenberg’s pro-Imperial advice to the elector “the evil counsels of Ahitophels.” “Our current strange and afflicted condition,” Bergius lamented, “comes from none other than the same person of whom we have so often and faithfully warned, unfortunately for naught. The children in the streets are saying that he wants to deliver the land into the hands of the Catholics.”⁹⁰ Bergius’ close friends Sigismund von Götze and Levins von dem Knesebeck were of the same mind, and when Götze discussed Knesebeck’s reports on Schwarzenberg’s activities with the Swedish representative Joachim Transehe they scathingly and sarcastically expressed their fears that the count “would confound good counsel through his Jesuitical sincerity and humble arrogance.”⁹¹ The example of Götze and Transehe consulting privately and sharing information and concerns about Schwarzenberg shows that the lines of political cleavage could not be drawn simply between Swedes on one side and Brandenburgers on the other, nor between those

⁸⁸ “borde leka fenestration med greven och slå huvudet av hans hals.” Cited in *Sveriges Krig*, II:330. The king was speaking with Hans Georg von Saucken and Christian Winter. Schwarzenberg reported Gustav Adolf’s words to King Sigismund while on a mission to Warsaw: “Man sollte ihne herrn Graffen devenestiren und auf böhmisch tractiren oder den hals entzwey schlagen, so würde es wol besser werden oder zugehen, dan so lang dieselbe rathen würden, werde es nicht gutt werden.” Cited in Kober, 173. Carl Hannibal von Dohna informed Elector Johann Georg of Saxony of the animosity between Schwarzenberg and Gustav Adolf: “Es saint ire K.F.Dt. mit ihren landen unnd reten ser ubel daran dan alle besser schwedisch als Kurfurstisch, auser des ainzigen H. Graffen von Schwarzenberg, es hat der König [von Schweden] ser ubel von ihme geredet.” Cited in Kober, 173 n. 129.

⁸⁹ See J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 58. Roberts (*Gustavus Adolphus*, II:398 n. 3) notes that Gustav Adolf annoyed the elector at this meeting by advising him to beware of Schwarzenberg.

⁹⁰ “Das sind die bösen Rathschläge Ahitophels, unser hiesiger betrübter seltsamer Zustand rührt von niemandem anders als von der einigen Person her, vor der wir so oft und treulich, aber leider vergebens gewarnt haben; die Kinder auf den Gassen sprechen davon, daß er das Land in der Römer Hände liefern wolle.” Cited in J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 31–32.

⁹¹ “So ist khein Zweifel er werde durch seine Jesuitische redligkeit undt demütign Hochmuht gute *consilia* zurucktreiben oder Verwirren...” Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 28 August 1632. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2.

defined by formal allegiance to Vasa or Hohenzollern. Rather, a set of other factors were important contributors to a dynamic situation that grouped Brandenburgers and Swedes together in informal networks of cooperation against antagonists who could well be of the same state affiliation.

These networks were especially useful in facilitating positive movement when times became difficult. During some of the toughest moments of the Prussian campaign when relations between the Swedes and the elector's government were the most delicate, Oxenstierna mobilized his network of connections to encourage semi-private actions that could ameliorate the effects of disadvantageous official policy or even shift that policy in a desired direction. Georg Wilhelm's relocation of his court to Königsberg during the difficult neutrality negotiations of the winter of 1626/1627 was interpreted by the Swedes with some reason as an ominous sign that the elector could be drifting towards active support of Poland. When news of the elector's arrival in Prussia reached Oxenstierna he wrote to one of his 'friends' in the Brandenburg government, Levins von dem Knesebeck, with a personal appeal to Knesebeck's "zeal for the preservation of the Protestant cause and friendship between our King and Prince." As presented by Oxenstierna, these two elements formed an identity, and he called upon Knesebeck to follow their shared inclinations in service of this unified goal by working to counter any ill counsel within the elector's government that could jeopardize it.⁹² The chancellor took recourse to personal connections at sensitive moments in the neutrality negotiations with the Königsberg city government as well. His main contact here was Dr. Henning Wegner, doctor of civil and canon law and a Bürgermeister in Königsberg to whom Oxenstierna had reached out in autumn 1626 in hope of establishing politically useful personal friendship.⁹³ This exercise in pre-emptive personal network building created a channel through which Oxenstierna could operate at a critical moment when Polish machinations appeared poised to draw Königsberg away from neutral-

⁹² "At inprimis lætor te cum serenissimo Electore advenire, quod mihi affectus studiumque tuum conservandæ rei communis Evangelicæ et amicitia inter Regem Principesque nostros constet, ideoque confidam te studiosissime elaboraturum, ne locus consiliis contrariis, et quibus tolli imminuive amicitia cum utriusque nostrum iactura possit, detur; nunquam melius nec de Principe tuo nec de re communi mereberis." Axel Oxenstierna to Levins von dem Knesebeck, Elbing, 24 January 1627. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 257, 458.

⁹³ Axel Oxenstierna to Henning Wegner, Marienburg, 4 October 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 187, 364. Wegner had already played a role in Königsberg's decision to declare neutrality in July 1626, and he had taken part in negotiations with Gustav Adolf in Marienburg later that month. See Lohmeyer, 357–59.

ity in the spring of 1627. Philip Sadler was dispatched to the city on a tense mission aimed at preserving the neutrality, and alongside the traditional and expected documents that accompanied this mission (a letter of credentials for Sadler and a set of propositions to be made to the Königsberg government) Oxenstierna wrote to Wegner personally to ask him to support Sadler's efforts.⁹⁴ The chancellor began his letter with an explicit reference to the "mutual friendship and frequent correspondence" he and Wegner shared, and as the letter progressed the desire to preserve and build upon this personal bond became increasingly elided with the imperative of seeing to it that Königsberg and Sweden remained on good terms. The picture painted by Oxenstierna is one of cooperative personal partnership in which he and Wegner would each do their part to influence the policies of their respective governments so that the course of inter-governmental relations would mirror that of their own established friendship.⁹⁵ Sadler was eventually successful in securing a pledge from Königsberg to hold fast in its neutrality, and Wegner was a signatory of the pact reached later that year that reaffirmed and extended the terms of the Lochstädt agreement.⁹⁶ This episode would not mark the last time that Oxenstierna availed himself of Wegner's services via requests consistently expressed in the idiom of personal friendship.⁹⁷

Those in charge of directing governmental policy were also aware that certain people were particularly suited to procure positive outcomes from their counterparts. When relations in the Duchy reached their nadir with the dispatch of Electoral troops to Sigismund in 1627 Gustav Adolf and Georg Wilhelm both looked to men with solid personal connections to the other side in a near simultaneous exchange of missions designed to avert the disaster of open conflict. Gustav Adolf sent Philip Sadler to Königsberg to speak with the elector, while Georg Wilhelm dispatched Oxenstierna's

⁹⁴ Sadler's proposition to Königsberg, Elbing, 30 March 1627. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 285, 495–98; Axel Oxenstierna to Königsberg government, Elbing, 31 March 1627. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 286, 499–500.

⁹⁵ Oxenstierna's letter begins: "Ceptam tecum amicitiam mutua et frequenti literarum communicatione prompti animo conservassem, cum ad id et publicæ me rationes per-moverent, et benevolentia nostratibus abs te exhibita me non parum accenderet..." Axel Oxenstierna to Henning Wegner, Elbing, 31 March 1627. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 287, 501–02.

⁹⁶ See Hoppe, 168, 216–18.

⁹⁷ See, for example, the chancellor's request (Elbing, 8 January 1630) that Wegner support Gerdt Petersson Geldtsack's mission to Königsberg in January 1630 to raise loans for Gustav Adolf. *RAOSoB*, I.5, Nr. 27, 16–17.

confidant Levins von dem Knessebeck to the Swedish camp near Holland.⁹⁸ The biographies of these men called into action at such a critical moment merit attention. Knessebeck was a Brandenburg nobleman whose father Thomas von dem Knessebeck the elder led the charge for toleration of Reformed Protestants in the Mark after Johann Sigismund's conversion. Levins studied theology, law, philosophy, and politics at a number of German universities, including the center of Reformed irenicism, Heidelberg, and traveled throughout France, Italy, the Low Countries, and England before returning home for a career in government. He was associated with the informal circle of advisors with connections to foreign Calvinists who gathered around Johann Sigismund and urged the elector towards a more determined Protestant foreign policy, although Knessebeck's counsel tended towards pragmatism and balance rather than militancy. In 1620, when only twenty-three years old, he was named to Georg Wilhelm's privy council. While in government Knessebeck was politically and ideologically allied with his close friends Sigismund von Götze and Johann Bergius in a group that opposed Schwarzenberg and favored trans-confessional Protestant cooperation but stopped short of advocating radical anti-Imperial aggression. He and Götze drafted and presented the famous Leipzig Manifesto at the meeting of Protestant Imperial Estates in 1631 that called for Lutherans and Calvinists to raise a common military force to defend their liberties and return order to the Empire.⁹⁹

Knessebeck's Protestant cosmopolitanism was complemented by a range of personal interaction with Swedes. By the time he was chosen for his 1627 mission Knessebeck had already begun his correspondence with Oxenstierna and had been sent on two missions to Gustav Adolf. For his services in the first mission the king honored him with the gift of a gold

⁹⁸ Knessebeck's mission was in direct response to Sadler's, although for a time the missions overlapped. Gustav Adolf noted receiving dispatches from Sadler out of Königsberg while Knessebeck was in the Swedish camp. Gustav Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, [Swedish army camp outside Holland], 23 July 1627. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 157, 319v–320; printed also in *RAOSoB*, II.1, Nr. 282, 345–46. Documents on the two missions can be found in RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

⁹⁹ See Nischan, *Prince, People and Confession*, especially 100, 241, 251–52; idem, "Brandenburg's Reformed Räte and the Leipzig Manifesto of 1631," *Journal of Religious History* 10 (1979), 365–80; idem, "John Bergius: Irencism and the Beginning of Official Religious Toleration in Brandenburg-Prussia," *Church History* 51 (1982), 389–404, here 400. Entries for Knessebeck are included in *ADB*, XVI, 284–85 (by Siegfried Isaacsohn); and *BBL*, 226–27 (by Frank Göse).

chain and portrait.¹⁰⁰ In future years Knesebeck had extensive diplomatic contact with Sweden and developed the reputation of a friend of Sweden. In 1632 he stressed to Joachim Transehe his desire to do good service for Gustav Adolf, and his subsequent behavior suggests that there was more to this statement than formulaic diplomatic nicety alone.¹⁰¹ Knesebeck was one of the voices in the Brandenburg government calling for the retention of alliance with Sweden in 1633 after Gustav Adolf was killed and Swedish military fortunes fell on hard times, and again in 1635 when pressure was mounting on Georg Wilhelm to join the Peace of Prague. The following year he resisted the Advocatorial Edict that was a fateful step towards open hostility between Brandenburg and Sweden.¹⁰²

In early 1627 Oxenstierna had written Knesebeck as well as Wegner in his effort to drum up support for Sadler's spring mission to Königsberg. In keeping with the principles of the diplomatic culture, Oxenstierna appealed in evocative religious language to Knesebeck's "highest zeal for the common cause and welfare of your Prince" while simultaneously noting that Sadler was personally known to Knesebeck.¹⁰³ Sadler and

¹⁰⁰ See Axel Oxenstierna to Gerdt Dirichsson, Dirschau, 10 September 1626. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 178, 352–53.

¹⁰¹ "Numehr aber were die Zeit undt *occasion* da, sagt er [Knesebeck], daß E: Königl: Mt: gute *realdienste* geschehen könnten, die Er auch *pro viribus* zuthun sich bemühen wolte." Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 13 June 1632. RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 2. Transehe's initial feelings about Knesebeck were mixed. See Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 30 April 1632. RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 2. Over time Transehe and Knesebeck developed a good working relationship and shared confidential information.

¹⁰² See J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 100; *Prot.* I, XVIff.; Torgny Höjer, "Brandenburgs Brytning med Sverige Efter Gustav Adolfs Död," *Historisk Tidskrift* 68 (1948), 197–238, here 238; Gerhard Oestreich, "Kurt Bertram von Pfuel 1590–1649: Leben und Ideenwelt eines brandenburgischen Staatsmannes und Wehrpolitikers," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 50 (1938), 201–49, here 213–14.

¹⁰³ The language merits citing at some length: "Mitto igitur secretarium S.R.M:ti dominum Sadlerum tibi non ignotum; atque inprimis rogo, ut pro summo studio tuo communis rei et salutis Principis tui, tum pro humanitate tua consueta illum foveas, et causam hanc consiliis tuis juves, quo grato cum responso expeditus præbeat brevi, volente Deo, adventanti S.R.M:ti causam optime et amicissime de Principe tuo sentiendi, nobisque omnibus, qui S.R.M:ti sumus servitiis ac fide, communi autem causæ affectu addicti, in proposito tranquillitatis et amicitiae mutuæ conservandæ persistendi.

Tu ipse nosti et dijudicabis sine dubio accurate, quam nihil nunc sit salutaris, quam fidam firmamque servari inter paucos Evangelicos Principes superstites animorum conjunctionem; qua laxata quicquid reliquum est, illico ruet et dilabetur. Eadem autem firmiter adstricta, spes est communem causam, si minus pristino nitori restitui, ast sustentari in meliora tempora posse. Ego ex animo Deum precor, ut qui nos nasci voluit in hæc turbulenta tempora, quæ ipsi, si humano more loqui velimus, pravis et inertibus consiliis nostris attraximus, is pro summa misericordia sua et in Ecclesiam ineffabili amore nunc salutaribus suggestis consiliis fulciat præcipientas Evangelicorum res, et avertat spiritum

Knesebeck in fact shared much in common. Sadler, a native German, was a Swedish Royal Secretary frequently used as a diplomat. Some of his more significant missions aimed at garnering support from German and Swiss Protestants for Swedish military activity in the Empire.¹⁰⁴ Sadler's personal religious attitudes appear to have been open to Protestant irenicism. He was supportive of John Dury's Protestant unionist schemes, and Dury (who was raised Presbyterian, studied at the Calvinist academies at Sedan and Leiden, and later served as an Anglican minister) referred to Sadler, in the service of a Lutheran monarchy, as being "of our religion."¹⁰⁵ In 1636 he established a stipend to support students studying theology at Brandenburg's confessionally-mixed University of Frankfurt an der Oder.¹⁰⁶ Like Knesebeck, Sadler was involved in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy on a number of fronts.

As Oxenstierna noted, Knesebeck and Sadler knew each other personally. Knesebeck sent a short, friendly letter to Sadler in 1626 that thanked Sadler for his courtesy during Knesebeck's mission to the Swedish camp and sought to arrange an additional personal meeting between the two.¹⁰⁷ These two like-minded, friendly acquaintances were sent out on crisscrossing missions when tensions between their respective

vertiginis, ne et paululum id, quod superest, cum extremo Ecclesiae ac bonorum omnium dispendio in casum ac ruinam detur." Axel Oxenstierna to Levins von dem Knesebeck, Elbing, 31 March 1627. *RAOSoB*, I.3, Nr. 288, 502–05, here 503–04.

¹⁰⁴ See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:406–07, 598.

¹⁰⁵ Dury made this statement in a letter to Sir Thomas Roe dated 26 November/6 December 1632, cited in Gunnar Westin, *Negotiations About Church Unity 1628–1634: John Dury, Gustavus Adolphus, Axel Oxenstierna*, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1932, Teologi 3 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1932), 142. Dury's handwritten "A Summarie Relation of that w:ch Jhon Dury hath prosecuted in the worke of Ecclesiasticall Pacification in Germanie since the latter ende of July An:o 1631, till ye 26 of September An:o 1633," sent to William Laud, mentions support given to him by Sadler in his efforts to deal with Lutheran theologians at Frankfurt am Main in 1632: "thither at the rysing of the Dyet I went my self; & because both the chief Secretarie of the Swedish state Mr Sadler & Sir N Rasche hadde bidden me without scruple breake the matter to any Lutheran Divine of note, to whom I should think good..." Document is printed in Westin, *Negotiations*, 264–76, here 270.

¹⁰⁶ Carl Renatus Hausen, *Geschichte der Universität und Stadt Frankfurt an der Oder, seit ihrer Stiftung und Erbauung, bis zum Schluß des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, größtentheils nach Urkunden und Archiv=Nachrichten bearbeitet* (Frankfurt an der Oder: Friedrich Apitz, im Verlag bei dem Verfasser; Leipzig: Graff; Berlin: Belitz und Braun, 1800), 142–43. On the coexistence of Lutheran and Reformed theologians at Frankfurt an der Oder during this period, see Günter Mühlhpfordt, "Die Oder-Universität 1506–1811. Eine deutsche Hochschule in der Geschichte Brandenburg-Preußens und der europäischen Wissenschaft," in Haase and Winkler (eds.), *Die Oder-Universität Frankfurt*, 19–72, here 48–53.

¹⁰⁷ Levins von dem Knesebeck to Philip Sadler, [undated, likely 1626]. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

governments were high in the summer of 1627. It would be gravely overstating the evidence to claim that this choice of representatives alone led directly to a cooling of tempers and avoidance of conflict between Brandenburg and Sweden (Gustav Adolf's sharply worded response to Knesebeck's proposals is enough to dispel that image flatly,) but it is fair to say that the characteristics Knesebeck and Sadler shared left them well-positioned to calm the waters and personally committed to working in that direction.¹⁰⁸

Sometimes acts of cooperation could be scandalous, and directly counter to government policy. Evidence suggests that on occasion individual Brandenburgers and Prussians in positions of authority colluded with the Swedish invaders during the Prussian campaign and later activities in the Empire. In 1626 Hans Georg von Saucken, the captain of Balga, was accused of aiding and abetting the Swedes and threatened with the confiscation of his Ermland estates by the Polish administrator of the bishopric for what can be charitably described as his non-vigorous resistance to the Swedish advance.¹⁰⁹ Similar accusations were leveled against Fabian von Borck, commander of Fischhausen.¹¹⁰ Stronger evidence of collusion exists for Fabian von Dohna the younger, who stood in contact with pro-Swedish circles in Elbing and secretly communicated his intentions of offering little resistance to the Swedes at the time when he shared responsibility for Prussia's defense.¹¹¹ Hildebrand von Kracht, commander of the fortress Küstrin during the Swedish advance into the Empire in 1631, responded to a Swedish request to build a redoubt near the fortress by arranging with the Swedish secretary Heinrich Schwallenberg for the construction to be carried out at night so he could claim ignorance. Kracht asked Schwallenberg to convey to Gustav Adolf his regrets that his instructions (from his government) had prevented him from demonstrating his full affection for the king, and stressed that Gustav Adolf could count on him.¹¹² These same men engaged in subsequent activities to improve Brandenburg-Swedish

¹⁰⁸ Gustav Adolf to Georg Wilhelm, Holland, 23 July/2 August 1627. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199. This document is printed as Nr. 16 in the appendix to Hoppe, 594–95.

¹⁰⁹ Lohmeyer, 361.

¹¹⁰ Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 106 n. 2.

¹¹¹ Ahnlund (*ibid.*, 106 n. 2) cites a letter from Anders Eriksson to Gustav Adolf, dated 11 August 1626, that communicated details of Dohna's collusion.

¹¹² Kracht made efforts to avoid having these plans put in writing. Heinrich Schwallenberg to Gustav Adolf, Küstrin, 3 April 1631. Document Nr. 653 in *Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigens och krigsinrättningarnes historia*, vol. 2, ed. J. Mankell (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1860), 230–31.

relations. Saucken took part in diplomatic missions to leading Swedes and helped arrange the Swedish-Polish peace talks in Prussia in 1635, where he served as a member of the elector's mediation team. Borck's diplomatic contacts with Swedes were even more extensive. By 1629 Jacob Godeman was requesting that the elector choose Borck for dealings with Sweden since he was a "*grat[a] person[a]*" who could navigate the often difficult terrain between their governments without "adding fire to fire" as others might do.¹¹³ During his stays in Elbing in 1629 Borck wined and dined Swedish dignitaries in great joviality.¹¹⁴ Dohna entered into correspondence with Oxenstierna (who wrote to him on the need for Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation in the same evocative, religiously-tinged language we have come to associate with the diplomatic culture) and continued to enjoy a positive reputation in Swedish circles for years to come. Johan Adler Salvius tried to have Dohna appointed ambassador to Sweden in 1646 in the hopes that this could lead to a breakthrough in the moribund negotiations for a marriage between Elector Friedrich Wilhelm and Queen Christina, and as late as 1656 important and sensitive diplomatic communications were being sent in the correspondence between Fabian von Dohna and his cousin Christoph Delphicus von Dohna who was in Swedish service.¹¹⁵

Johannes Gebauer has leveled the most serious accusations of high-level collusion when he argued that the councilors left in charge of governing Brandenburg when Georg Wilhelm traveled to Prussia in late 1626 allowed free passage for troops raised in northern Germany by Johann von Streiff for Gustav Adolf's Prussian campaign, directly contradicting their orders

¹¹³ "Ich Vor nehme auß E. Gnad. schreiben, dß Ihre Churfl. Dhrt. Iemandt seiner Rätthe an die Königl. Maytt. abzufertigen in willens. Welches sehr woll gethan sein wirdt. dieses aber wil Ich *privatim* erinnern, daß es nicht *ex numero eorum* sein mügen, die zu *agiren, excipiren, repliciren, acceptiren, protestiren*, dieses undt ienes *in forma iurocratica* zu suchen, undt *intempestive* auf der Post anzudringen, *habilitiret*, sondern, dß entweder E. Gnad. selbst, oder aber der H. Borcke, *tanquā gratā personae*, so *cum discretione & respectū tantorum PP. & obsequentia convenienti* sich zu *moderiren* wissen, solche *legation* auf sich nehmen, darmit nicht mehr weitleüfftigkeit erreget, oder weiter fewer zu fewer getragen werde." Jacob Godeman to [Kreutzen.] Fischhausen, 8/18 June 1629. RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199.

¹¹⁴ Hoppe, 375–77.

¹¹⁵ For Adler Salvius' efforts, see Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 1 [11] June 1646. *UA*, IV, 442. On the correspondence between Fabian and Christoph Delphicus, see Fabian von Dohna to Friedrich Wilhelm, Braunsberg, 17 December 1656. *UA*, VIII, 142–43.

from the elector.¹¹⁶ “To put it briefly,” Gebauer wrote, “the privy councilors did not hinder Streiff’s incursion because they did not want to hinder it.”¹¹⁷ Indeed, an irony of Georg Wilhelm’s trip to Prussia (undertaken at the urging of the anti-Swedish Schwarzenberg as a demonstration of loyalty to Poland) was that the elector left the administration of Brandenburg in the hands of many of those who would form the “Sweden Party” in his government in subsequent years: Friedrich Pruckmann, Sigismund von Götze, Samuel Winterfeld, and Sebastian Striepe. These men pursued what Gerhard Oestreich has called an “independent pro-Swedish policy” until Georg Wilhelm reigned them in with the appointment of the conservative Margrave Sigismund as *statthalter*.¹¹⁸ This incident—where the elector’s policy was influenced by one group with anti-Swedish leanings (Schwarzenberg and his adherents) while another group with countervailing preferences acted in a different fashion—points to a deepening cleavage within the Brandenburg-Prussian elite where some of the fault lines were defined by differing attitudes towards Sweden. Those who fell on the pro-Sweden side of the divide were almost invariably Protestant cosmopolitans.

With Schwarzenberg and his faction in ascendance, cooperation—or the suspicion of cooperation—with Sweden could come at a steep price. This was made dramatically clear to Samuel von Winterfeld in 1627 when he was placed on trial for high treason on suspicion of collusion with Sweden during the Prussian invasion, stripped of his position as privy councilor, and imprisoned until 1629.¹¹⁹ Götze, Pruckmann, and even the recently deceased Bellin also came under scrutiny. By this time Margrave Sigismund had already expressed his belief that he “did not consider Winterfeld and Götze amongst those who had honest intentions towards the elector.”¹²⁰ Georg Wilhelm wrote to Schwarzenberg that Winterfeld had “always looked more to Denmark, Sweden and others, but I must have

¹¹⁶ For documents on Brandenburg’s reaction to the march of Streiff’s troops, see GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 1.

¹¹⁷ Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg in der Krisis*, 35–36.

¹¹⁸ Oestreich, *Der brandenburg-preußische Geheime Rat*, 12.

¹¹⁹ Kober, 174–81; Kramer, 69–97; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 47–48; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 416; Ahnlund, “Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg,” 107–08. While labeling Winterfeld pro-Swedish is fair, the specific allegations raised against him were almost certainly false.

¹²⁰ “er rechne Götze und Winterfeld nicht zu denen, die es redlich mit dem Landesherrn meinten.” Cited in J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 45.

servants who look to me alone.”¹²¹ The Swedes were aware that their own identification of friends and foes within the Brandenburg government mirrored distinctions drawn by the Brandenburgers themselves, and they followed the factional rivalry between these groups with great interest. The loss of “our excellent Winterfeldt”¹²² was of particular concern to Camerarius, who wrote to Axel Oxenstierna that “others will follow him, [and] then Schwarzenberg alone will dominate the empty court.”¹²³ In later years Schwarzenberg came to believe that his persecution of Winterfeldt was the chief cause of Swedish animosity towards him.¹²⁴

These examples of real or suspected collusion show that the existence of a network of personal connections that ran alongside the official relations between governments created possibilities for consequential political cooperation between Brandenburgers and Swedes at times when cooperation between their governments was out of the question. These people spoke to one another in the language of friendship and a common cause that was not reducible to state’s interests, although they normally believed that their acts of cooperation would serve their countries’ best interests as well as their own personal agendas. This parallel discourse of friendship and natural connection between Brandenburg and Sweden persevered even across periods of overt hostility and open warfare, allowing thoughts for a marriage between electoral prince Friedrich Wilhelm and Queen Christina to survive through the war years of the later 1630s.

The important role of friendship in early modern diplomacy has not received the attention it merits in the traditional historiography that remains tied to an image of state and statecraft conceived of in modern

¹²¹ “Was winterfelden betrifft, hab ich an meine gemahlin geschrieben, das ich solches befolgen, dan winterfeldt hette allezeit meiner intention widerstrebt, mehr auf Dennemark, Schweden undt andere gesehen, ich aber muste diener haben die auf mich allein sehen.” Georg Wilhelm to Schwarzenberg, Sigismundova, 13/23 August 1627. Cited in Kober, 177 n. 141.

¹²² “Unsern trefflichen Winterfeldt.” Ludwig Camerarius, cited in Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg in der Krisis*, 8 n. 1.

¹²³ “Andere werden ihm folgen, dann wird Schwarzenberg allein den leeren Hof beherrschen.” Ludwig Camerarius to Axel Oxenstierna, cited in J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 45.

¹²⁴ “Wie ingeleichen waß wir auß Preußen ist geschrieben worden, der {Graff von Schwartzburg} an {Samuell Von Winterfeldt} (:welcher E: Königle: Mt: von hertenzen bestendig zugethan ist:) geschrieben, weiln der beim {König in Schweden} erworbenen Ungnade auch eine undt die Vornehmbste Uhrsache sein soll, daß Ihme {Graffen Von Schwartzburg} schuldtt gegeben wurde, alß were Sie die Vornehmbste Uhrsache daran, daß {Winterfeldt} dabeuor so hart bedranget worden.” Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 9 July 1632. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2.

terms.¹²⁵ Friendship transgresses the objective, rule-bound bureaucratic professionalism with which the modern state is *supposed* to approach matters in its purview such as diplomatic interaction. From this modern perspective, diplomatic activity conducted via friendship connections smacks of amateurism, conflict of interest, corruption—perhaps even treason. Indeed, scholars have noted a pervasive modern distrust of friendship, intimately connected to understandings of state.¹²⁶ Diplomatically-consequential friendship is an antithesis of state-based modernity, often criticized as degenerate or brushed aside as aberrant by a discipline born alongside the nation-state and methodologically enthralled to the state as the natural unit of analysis.

This modern framework is anachronistic when projected onto early modern conditions. Scholars of friendship have in fact singled out the early modern period as friendship's "golden age" in which friendship "constitute[d] a central element in the political language of the day."¹²⁷ Toby Osborne writes that "[f]riendship . . . pervaded early-modern social and political culture, from the levels of individual interactions to the high politics of international relations."¹²⁸ Evgeny Roshchin adds that friendship emerged as one of the defining concepts in early modern public political discourse, with the language of friendship appearing in countless treaties and treatises as a post-Reformation political order began to emerge from the ruins of the medieval *respublica christiana*.¹²⁹

Early modern friendship straddled the line between public and private and fostered a sense of community across physical, social and

¹²⁵ On the importance of early modern friendship and its tendency to "get lost from our view," see Albrecht Classen (with Marilyn Sandidge), "Introduction: Friendship—The Quest for a Human Ideal and Value From Antiquity to the Early Modern Time," in Classen and Sandidge (eds.), *Friendship in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 1–183, here 78.

¹²⁶ See Eva Österberg, *Vänskap—en lång historia* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), esp. 66. See also idem, "Vänskap—hot eller skydd i medeltidens samhälle? En existentiell och etisk historia," *Historisk Tidskrift* (2003), nr. 4, 549–73.

¹²⁷ Eva Österberg, *Friendship and Love, Ethics and Politics: studies in mediaeval and early modern history* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 53, 59–60. See also idem, *Vänskap—en lång historia*, 183.

¹²⁸ Toby Osborne, "Van Dyck, Alessandro Scaglia and the Caroline Court: Friendship, Collecting and Diplomacy in the Early Seventeenth Century," *Seventeenth Century* 22, nr. 1 (Spring 2007), 24–41, here 24.

¹²⁹ Evgeny Roshchin, "The Concept of Friendship: From Princes to States," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, nr. 4 (2006), 599–624. Roshchin (601) writes that "[t]he 16th and early 17th centuries seem to be a cornerstone moment in the history of the concept of friendship."

political borders.¹³⁰ As such, friendship networks were ideally situated to serve vital diplomatic functions such as information procurement over extended distances or the forging of ties between disparate groups who might otherwise have been hostile.¹³¹ Friendship bonds between diplomatic actors had the potential to influence governments and affect the course of negotiations.¹³² The political role of friendship connections was especially pronounced in an early modern diplomatic landscape where those state institutions that did exist lacked maturity and efficiency, and therefore also the trust of those involved in building and maintaining diplomatic relationships.¹³³ In the case of Brandenburg and Sweden, ties of friendship kept a flickering relationship alive throughout the challenges posed by the Thirty Years' War.

The Thirty Years' War and the Pomeranian Issue

More scholarly attention has been paid to Brandenburg-Swedish relations during the period of Sweden's involvement in the Thirty Years' War than to any other period.¹³⁴ Despite what is often claimed, the war years were a time of continuity rather than revolutionary change in Brandenburg-Swedish relations that saw the intensification and redirection of impulses and patterns that were already in place from the Swedish-Polish war of the late 1620s. Sweden's involvement in the conflict in the Empire posed similar difficulties to the Brandenburgers as the Prussian invasion had: the desire to prevent Hohenzollern lands from becoming the *sedes belli*; concerns over the consequences that cooperation with the Swedish invaders could bring from a legal overlord; and fear of the long-term loss of valuable, revenue-producing territory (in Prussia the ports and their tolls,

¹³⁰ Österberg, *Vänskap—en lång historia*; idem, *Friendship and Love*, 23–89; Franz Mauelshagen, "Networks of Trust: scholarly correspondence and scientific exchange in early modern Europe," *The Medieval History Journal* 6, nr. 1 (2003), 1–32.

¹³¹ Vera Keller, "Painted Friends: Political Interest and the Transformation of International Learned Sociability," in Classen and Sandidge (eds.), *Friendship in the Middle Ages*, 675–705; Classen (with Sandidge), "Introduction," 78. Keller (677) stresses the importance of friendship networks in the "new information-based political practice" that emerged in the early modern period.

¹³² Osborne, "Van Dyck," 35.

¹³³ On the importance of friendship in the face of underdeveloped state and social structures, see Österberg, *Vänskap—en lång historia*, 26–29; idem, *Friendship and Love*, 12, 44; Ulla Koskinen, "Friends and Brothers: rhetoric of friendship as a medium of power in late-16th-century Sweden and Finland," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 30, nr. 3/4 (September 2005), 238–48.

¹³⁴ The best recent work on the war in general is Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: a history of the Thirty Years War* (London: Allen Lane, 2009).

in the Empire the Hohenzollern claims to Pomerania.) In each case the dynamic was the same: Sweden making insistent appeals for Brandenburg's assistance and promising military protection in return, all couched in the language of Protestant solidarity and the potential power of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship; Brandenburg doing its best to redirect the Swedish advance elsewhere and to encourage some kind of mediated settlement. In both instances factions within Brandenburg viewed the Swedish invasions as an opportunity and did what they could to encourage their government to embrace Sweden's friendship for the sake of political gain as well as the realization of a political-religious vision. When the Swedish army landed in Germany in the summer of 1630 Swedish and Brandenburg diplomats were already veterans of years of dealing with one another in Prussia over issues of war and peace. The Swedes knew well the indecision they could expect from Georg Wilhelm, as well as the composition of the factions at the Brandenburg court and their leanings, and could predict which kinds of arguments would make progress with whom. The Brandenburgers in turn knew that Gustav Adolf would drive a hard bargain and not shy away from taking recourse to military coercion to get what he wanted, and also that their own military resources were woefully inadequate to render any kind of independent resistance if push came to shove. When fighting did break out between Brandenburg and Sweden in 1636 it followed the pattern of the narrowly avoided hostilities in Prussia in 1627: an advocatorial edict demanding that the elector's subjects leave Swedish military service, and the dedication of electoral troops to assist the overlord against the foreign (Swedish) invader.

Roe's metaphor of Brandenburg as a grain of corn ground between two larger stones applies equally well to the Thirty Years' War as it does to the earlier war in Prussia. As late as 1647 Elector Friedrich Wilhelm would write of feeling trapped between two powers greater than he, the emperor and Sweden. Cooperating with one would bring the animosity of the other, and he himself was too weak to defend against either, despite the great danger he faced of losing his lands to them:

How such an evil should be prevented at this time is the most difficult question that could be debated by Solomon's wisdom. I think that even Solomon and David never had such a difficult deliberation [as] when one sees how my lands lay, on one side the Swedish Crown, on the other the Emperor, and I sit between them, and wait to see what they will do with me...¹³⁵

¹³⁵ "Wie man solches unheil bey Zeitten vorkommen undt verhütten solle, dieses ist die schwerste frage Welche Woll bedürfte durch des Salomonis Weissheit erorttet zuwerden,

This passage, written during the Westphalia negotiations, reflects Friedrich Wilhelm's particular concern about being deprived of his hereditary claims to Pomerania. At the time of the Swedish invasion in 1630 Pomerania was ruled by the aging and heirless Duke Bogislav XIV. Thanks to an old inheritance treaty the Brandenburg electors had legal claim to succeed to the duke's lands upon his death. Pomerania offered the attractive prospects of direct access to the Baltic sea (and thus participation in the lucrative Baltic trade) and a more direct and secure land connection to Ducal Prussia. The Brandenburg government was also aware that a Swedish invasion of Germany would almost definitely go through Pomerania, and that the Swedes would have their own reasons for wanting Pomerania for themselves, partially as consequence of the long-range Swedish drive for control of the major ports and waterways leading into the Baltic Sea (the *dominum maris Baltici*), but also since the duchy could serve as a secure base for military operations in Germany, and (if necessary) a secure path of retreat to the sea. Shortly after the Swedish army landed in Germany in 1630 Gustav Adolf concluded a treaty with Bogislav XIV that gave Sweden effective control of Pomerania for the duration of the war. As the war progressed it became clear that Sweden, despite Brandenburg's valid claim, would attempt to transform the treaty into permanent possession of Pomerania once Bogislav died, and indeed an insistence on keeping Pomerania became a central plank in Sweden's demands for satisfaction at the Westphalia peace talks.

The desire to keep the Swedes out of Pomerania as well as to spare Brandenburg itself from becoming a battlefield guided Brandenburg policy as Gustav Adolf geared up for his invasion of Germany. It was no coincidence that as Brandenburg worked to bring about a settlement between Sweden and Poland in 1629 it promised the Swedes that it would intercede diplomatically on their behalf in the Empire once the war with

glaube auch das Salomon undt Daudt nieh keine solche schwere deliberation [gehabt, noch Ihnen ihmahls] vorkommen seie, dan Wan man betrachtet Wie meine landen gelegen, auff einer seitten ist die Crohn Schweden auff der anderen der Kayser, undt sitze gleichsahm mitten zwissen Ihnen innen, undt erwahrte, was Sie mitt mir anfangen oder thun Wollen, ob Sie mir das meinige lassen, oder nehmen Wollen, eine parti zu Wehlen ist gefehrlich Wegen der gefahr die hierauss entstehen konte..." Friedrich Wilhelm's handwritten memo, "Bedencken, ob Ich einige partie itzo oder ins Künftige annehmen solle darinnen etliche obstacula Welche vorgewandt Werden mochten, als nemlich das man Sich den Kayser dem reiche pollen undt Spannien hidurch zu Wider machen Wurde, Undt dan Worrumb man diese Schwirigkeitten aussen Wegen reumen solle undt musse," [undated, likely June 1647.] *UA*, IV, 552–56, here 553.

Poland had been brought to an end.¹³⁶ An offer from February 1630 to mediate between Sweden and the emperor and to have the Swedish garrison at Stralsund replaced by troops from Brandenburg, Pomerania and the Hansa cities in order to deescalate tensions was made with the same hope in mind.¹³⁷ It was therefore plain to the Swedes that Brandenburg did not want a Swedish army in Germany, and that it was willing to take a leading role in seeking alternative solutions to Sweden's German concerns in order to stave off an invasion.

This did not prevent Gustav Adolf from becoming increasingly impatient with Brandenburg's reluctance to join his cause once the Swedish army had landed in Germany. Georg Wilhelm sent a constant stream of representatives to deal with the king and his officers with a consistent message of seeking peaceful settlement to Gustav Adolf's grievances with the emperor, or at the very least holding Brandenburg and its lands safely out of the fray.¹³⁸ Gustav Adolf insisted with equal consistency that it was in Brandenburg's, the Empire's, and Protestantism's best interests for the elector to ally with him, or at the least to adopt a *very* benign neutrality. As military exigencies pressed on the king he became less and less willing to accept Georg Wilhelm's polite "no thank you" for an answer. In July 1630 he had already made his feelings known to Peter Bergmann:

What will you [Brandenburg] then do? For I say to you clearly in advance: I will hear nothing of neutrality. The elector must be either friend or foe. When I come to your borders, you must declare yourself either warm or cold. God is fighting here with the Devil. If the elector wants to stand with God, he will come to my side. If he would rather stand with the Devil, then he must fight against me. *Tertium non dabitur*.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ See Georg Wilhelm to Gustav Adolf, Königsberg, 19/9 January 1629. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. II, Nr. 249a1 Schweden, fasc. 4.

¹³⁷ This suggestion was made by Levins von dem Kneesebeck to Axel Oxenstierna in Elbing in February 1630. Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav Adolf, Elbing, 15 February 1630. *RAOSoB*, I.5, Nr. 132, 99–105, here 103.

¹³⁸ For Brandenburg's policy during this period in general, see Kober, 271–80.

¹³⁹ "Was wollt ihr sonst machen? denn das sage ich Euch klar voraus: ich will von keiner Neutralität nichts wissen noch hören; Se. Lb. müssen fürwahr entweder Freund oder Feind sein; wann ich an ihre Grenzen komme, so muß sie kalt oder warm sich erklären. Hier streitet Gott und der Teufel. Will Se. Ld. es mit Gott halten, wohl, so trete sie zu mir; will sie es aber lieber mit dem Teufel halten, so muß sie fürwahr mit mir fechten; *tertium non dabitur*." Peter Bergmann's report on his mission to Gustav Adolf, [July 1630.] Original in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 1, fasc. 9, 68r–80v. This document is discussed and transcribed at length in Gustav Droysen, "Brandenburgische Audienzen bei Gustaf Adolf," *Zeitschrift für preußische Geschichte und Landeskunde* 15 (1878), 1–54. The cited passage here is taken from Droysen, 18.

The impetuous king's contempt for Georg Wilhelm's indecision appeared again in a discussion with Kurt Bertram von Pfuel in February 1631, when Gustav Adolf said that Georg Wilhelm could have things like Duke Bogislav of Pomerania, who had placed himself under Swedish protection and who now "sits . . . drinking his *Bierchen* in good peace without any worries."¹⁴⁰ This was followed by a threat: if Brandenburg did not cooperate, Gustav Adolf would keep Pomerania in spite of Brandenburg's hereditary claim. Swedish frustration was not limited to Gustav Adolf alone. In May 1632 Lars Grubbe wrote of the negotiations with Brandenburg that "Objection still made on grounds of *jura imperii fundamentalia*, die *Erbverbrüderung*, and other such stuff, mighty absurd."¹⁴¹ In July 1632 Transehe complained from Brandenburg of the "cold minded, sleepy, irresolute" German Protestants who had not embraced "the work of God in Germany."¹⁴²

Gustav Adolf's patience with his brother-in-law ran out long before Transehe's complaints were made. In a series of negotiations in April–June 1631 the king succeeded in forcing Brandenburg to first grant him use of the fortress Spandau, and then, with the Swedish army drawn up before the gates of Berlin, a more comprehensive agreement that included monetary payments and quartering agreements for the upkeep of Swedish troops.¹⁴³ This was short of the full alliance Gustav Adolf desired, but it was a good deal further than Georg Wilhelm had wanted to go. The dramatic Swedish military successes that followed made the elector feel more secure in his position, and he was present in the Swedish camp when Gustav Adolf came to his agreement with Johann Georg of Saxony and plans for the momentous Battle of Breitenfeld were drawn up.¹⁴⁴ By this

¹⁴⁰ Kurt Bertram von Pfuel to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 26 February 1631. Original in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 2, fasc. 6, 51r–90v. See also G. Droysen, "Brandenburgische Audienzen," 32.

¹⁴¹ Cited in Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:636.

¹⁴² "Wie nehmlich der Allmächtige die kaltsinnigkeit der *Evangelischen* Deutschen, dadurch aller Welt, daneben aber auch zuerkennen gebe, daß wann die Jenigen, Welche daß *opus Domini* in Deutschlandt am meisten betreffe, schon schläfferig handeln od gar dauon laßen würden, Gott dem herrn dennoch keine mittel mangeln wurden, Solche seine sache, durch E: Königl. Mt: dienste, hinauß zuführen. Undt müsten in mangel der kalt sinnigen, schläfferigl. undt *irresoluten* deutschn, auch weit endtlegene *barbarische* Hertzen Ihren dienst darzu ferleihn." Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 2 July 1632. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2.

¹⁴³ Von Moerner, Nr. 53, 105–06, and Nr. 54, 107–08. See also Johannes Kretzschmar, "Die Allianzverhandlungen Gustav Adolfs mit Kurbrandenburg im Mai und Juni 1631," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 17[2] (1904), 341–82; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:490–503, 510–13; Kober, 281–88.

¹⁴⁴ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:533ff.

time Schwarzenberg, declining in favor at court and feeling threatened by the advancing Swedish troops, had fled Brandenburg into a kind of self-imposed exile.¹⁴⁵ The Protestant councilors more open to cooperation with Sweden were left in command, and a small Brandenburg army began to take part in the war against the emperor in Silesia.

This change in orientation in Berlin proved important when Gustav Adolf was killed at the Battle of Lützen in November 1632. With the new queen not yet six years old, Oxenstierna assumed direction of Swedish foreign policy out of Germany with the immediate concern of preventing the defection of Sweden's German allies. His proposals for a Protestant league were intended to give formal structure to the Swedish-led alliance system while putting Sweden in position to demand satisfaction for its war efforts.¹⁴⁶ Though Brandenburg's military stature was minimal, its strategic importance and prestige as a Protestant electorate (not to mention its relations to Pomerania) made it an important part of Oxenstierna's plans.¹⁴⁷ In early January 1633 he dispatched Åke Tott, a personal favorite of Georg Wilhelm and Margrave Sigismund, to Berlin to speak with the elector about "the welfare of German Protestantism and what depends on it, and what in particular concerns your own illustrious House."¹⁴⁸ The chancellor himself visited Berlin in January–February 1633 and was pleased by the generally positive reception he received, although at no point had the elector said that he would be willing to join the Protestant Heilbronn League as a full member, and talk of the loaded issue of Pomerania was avoided entirely.¹⁴⁹ Kober has noted, however, that during this period Götze, Knesebeck, Leuchtmar and Brunne were in "confessional rapture" over the prospect of using Sweden's military successes to push forward a dramatic Protestant agenda in the Empire that agreed in its essentials with

¹⁴⁵ Kober, 278–80, 288–93.

¹⁴⁶ See Michael Roberts, *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: four studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 6–54; Johannes Kretzschmar, *Der Heilbronner Bund 1632–1635*, three volumes (Lübeck: H.G. Rahtgens, 1922).

¹⁴⁷ See Höjer; Kober, 293–304.

¹⁴⁸ Åke Tott to Georg Wilhelm, Köln an der Spree, 2 January 1633. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 6, fasc. 7. On Tott's warm relationship with the Brandenburg court, see Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Köln an der Spree, 9 July 1632 and 28 August 1632, both in RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2; Margrave Sigismund to Åke Tott, Köln an der Spree, 16 March 1633. RA, Enskilda arkiv, Tottska samlingen, Åke Tott, E 5898; Anthonius Freitag to Åke Tott, Köln an der Spree, 22 April 1633. RA, Enskilda arkiv, Tottska samlingen, Åke Tott, E 5899.

¹⁴⁹ See Carl Spannagel, "Kurfürst Georg Wilhelm von Brandenburg und der schwedische Reichskanzler Axel Oxenstierna im Jahre 1633," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 11[2] (1898), 311–327.

the aims of the Heilbronn League.¹⁵⁰ Talks of Brandenburg's membership in the League stretched into 1635, with the Pomeranian issue emerging as the dominant sticking point.

The Swedish defeat at Nördlingen (September 1634) shifted the factional balance of power in the Brandenburg council once more, with Götze's pro-Swedish party in decline and Schwarzenberg (who had returned to Brandenburg in the summer of 1633) on the rise again. In 1635 Schwarzenberg succeeded in engineering Brandenburg's entrance into the Peace of Prague, returning Georg Wilhelm to the emperor's good graces and getting Brandenburg's right to succession in Pomerania confirmed. Saxon-led peace negotiations with Sweden came to naught, and against the resistance of Götze, Leuchtmar, Levins von dem Knesebeck, and Sebastian Striepe, Georg Wilhelm issued the Advocatorial Edict in January 1636 that ordered all electoral subjects to leave Swedish service under pain of outlawry and confiscation of their goods.¹⁵¹ Droysen called this act Georg Wilhelm's declaration of war on Sweden, and five years of Brandenburg-Swedish hostilities began not long thereafter.¹⁵² Götze was driven from his post on the council on suspicion of being "Swedish at heart."¹⁵³ Leuchtmar and Kurt Bertram von Pfuel also left their positions.¹⁵⁴ When Levins von dem Knesebeck died in 1638 almost the entire pro-Sweden faction was gone.

This situation began to change when Georg Wilhelm died and was succeeded by his son Friedrich Wilhelm in 1640.¹⁵⁵ One of the first items on the new elector's agenda was a cessation of hostilities with Sweden in order to give his devastated lands a breather.¹⁵⁶ Pro-Swedish figures from earlier periods returned to office: Götze, Winterfeld, Leuchtmar, and

¹⁵⁰ Kober, 297–98.

¹⁵¹ On the resistance of the pro-Swedish councilors, see *Prot.*, I, XVIIff.; Höjer, 238.

¹⁵² J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 116. Georg Wilhelm justified his change of sides in a letter addressed to Christina in March 1636 in which he held out the prospect of peace for Sweden on good terms. Georg Wilhelm to Christina, Cöln an der Spree, 8 March 1636. RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 200.

¹⁵³ J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:1, 116.

¹⁵⁴ Oestreich, *Der brandenburg-preußische Geheime Rat*, 13.

¹⁵⁵ On Friedrich Wilhelm, see Ernst Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm der Grosse Kurfürst von Brandenburg: eine politische Biographie*, two volumes (Göttingen/Frankfurt/Zürich: Musters Schmidt, 1971–78); Derek McKay, *The Great Elector* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001). Still of interest is Samuel Pufendorf's classic *De Rebus Gestis Friderici Wilhelmi Magni, Electoris Brandenburgici libri Novendecim* (Berolini: Jeremiae Schrey & Hered. Henrici Johannis Meyeri, 1695).

¹⁵⁶ The most detailed treatment of Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the early stages of Friedrich Wilhelm's reign is Vahtola, *Brandenburgs Annäherung an Schweden*.

eventually Pfuel. These were the first men used by Friedrich Wilhelm to re-establish contact with Sweden, hammer out an armistice agreement, and see if a firm basis for regular relations could be found. Winterfeld was sent to Hamburg to deal with Adler Salvius in 1641;¹⁵⁷ Leuchtmar went to Stockholm in the summer of 1641 and worked out the armistice itself;¹⁵⁸ Leuchtmar and Hans Georg von dem Borne were in Stettin in the winter and spring of 1642 to work on having the armistice ratified;¹⁵⁹ and Leuchtmar returned to Sweden, this time with Götze, from August to October 1642.¹⁶⁰ The Swedes were happy to see the return of these friendly faces. Adler Salvius told Winterfeld that Sweden would welcome the selection of Leuchtmar in particular as an ambassador to them, since he was a figure “known to them, and in whom they trusted.”¹⁶¹ Personal ties were also rekindled. A letter to Transehe from a friend in Brandenburg was cited in a meeting of the Swedish council as a sign of an improving attitude towards Sweden in the electorate.¹⁶² Like-minded diplomats from each country resumed an old pattern by beginning to act on their own initiative to push Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. While in Stockholm Leuchtmar acted outside of his instructions to raise the topic of the marriage talks between Christina and Friedrich Wilhelm that had started in the 1630s in the hopes of getting them rolling again.¹⁶³ Adler Salvius took it upon himself to write to the Swedish commander Stålhandske before the formal armistice negotiations had begun to encourage him to act mildly towards the Brandenburgers (with whom Sweden was still technically at war) since it was clear “what a great advantage to the common Protestant cause, and especially to Her Majesty and Her arms in Germany”

¹⁵⁷ *UA*, I, 529–60; Vahtola, 84–85; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:100; Samuel Pufendorf, *Commentariorum de Rebus Suecicis Libri XXVI. Ab expeditione Gustavi Adolphi Regis in Germaniam ad abdicationem usque Christianæ* (Ultrajecti: Johannem Ribbium, 1686), Book XII, §. 37, 407.

¹⁵⁸ *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 12; *UA*, I, 522–27; *UA*, XXIII.1, 8–10. The armistice agreement was drafted in Stockholm on 14 July 1641 and signed by Leuchtmar, Transehe, Sadler, and Alexander Erskine. Von Moerner, Nr. 64, 128–31. See also Vahtola, 97ff.

¹⁵⁹ *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 13; *UA*, XXIII.1, 20ff.; Vahtola, 120.

¹⁶⁰ *UA*, I, 566–95; *UA*, XXIII.1, 34ff.; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:117–18.

¹⁶¹ “er [Adler Salvius] auch bei mir Erinnerung thuen möchte, dass E. Ch. D. sich wollte belieben lassen, den von Leuchtmar, als welcher ihnen bekannt, und deme sie zu trauen hätten, darunter zu gebrauchen und eine Abordnung dahin zu thuen.” Samuel von Winterfeld to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 18 [28] May 1641. *UA*, I, 534–38, here 534–35. See also Swedish government to Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 1 [11] May 1641. *UA*, XXIII.1, 4.

¹⁶² See Vahtola, 86.

¹⁶³ See Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:101. See also Chapter Three below.

the “friendship and neighborly trust” of Brandenburg would be.¹⁶⁴ This was a risky step to take, as Adler Salvius’ letter was intercepted by the Imperialists and presented to the Brandenburgers as evidence of secret negotiations with the enemy (which of course it was).

These moves by friendly figures aside, Pomerania remained a red-hot issue between Brandenburg and Sweden following the cessation of hostilities. As long as it remained unresolved, the struggle over Pomerania’s postwar fate precluded the possibility of true friendship on the governmental level. A Brandenburg privy council document from 1647, perhaps written by the usually pro-Swedish Götze, referred to Sweden’s position in the Pomerania issue as a punishment from God for Brandenburg’s sins that destroyed the possibility of a future relationship with Sweden and made the Catholics “laugh in their hearts” to see Protestants treat each other in such a way.¹⁶⁵ Pomerania was the preeminent issue of concern between the Brandenburg and Swedish delegations at the Westphalia talks and one of the keys to getting Sweden to agree to a general peace. All of the major powers in Europe became involved in seeking a resolution.¹⁶⁶ The solution eventually reached was a compromise: Western Pomerania, Stettin, and the mouth and the right bank of the Oder River went to Sweden, Eastern Pomerania to Brandenburg. The elector also received Halberstadt, Kammin, Minden, and an expectancy on Magdeburg as compensation for his Pomeranian losses.¹⁶⁷ Although this outcome was prob-

¹⁶⁴ Adler Salvius to Stålhandske, Hamburg, 17 May 1641. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 11a, fasc. 22. See also *UA*, I, 537 n. 1.

¹⁶⁵ “Es ist dieses gewisslich eine eben harte Züchtigung des gerechten Gottes, damit er E. Ch. D. und dero höchstgeehrtes Haus, ohn Zweifel um unser aller Sünden willen, heimsucht; dahero es wol nothwendig wird aufgenommen werden müssen und darauf zu gedenken sein, wie der gerechte Zorn Gottes durch ein inbrünstiges Gebet und gottseligen Wandel gestillet und abgewendet werden möge. . . . Es werden es die Catholische wol im Herzen lachen, dass es ihnen so wol gelungen, und ihnen die Hoffnung machen, ihre Intentiones künftig wider die Evangelische desto besser durchzudringen, dieweil die Evangelische der Assistenz ihrer Freunde und Religionsverwandten so übel genossen.” Privy council to Friedrich Wilhelm, Cöln an der Spree, 11 [21] January 1647. *UA*, IV, 493–94, here 493.

¹⁶⁶ The indispensable *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, multi-volumes (Münster: Aschendorff, 1962–), especially the volumes of Swedish correspondence in Series II.C, contain enormous amounts of material on the Pomerania issue and negotiations between the Swedish and Brandenburg delegations. This can be supplemented by the considerable number of sources in *UA*, IV, 341–736, and *UA*, XXIII.1, 70–125. No issue in early modern Brandenburg-Swedish relations has a better range of primary sources available in print.

¹⁶⁷ See Gustav Breucker, *Die Abtretung Vorpommerns an Schweden und die Entschädigung Kurbrendenburg: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Westfälischen Friedens* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1879).

ably the best that Brandenburg could have realistically hoped for given the circumstances, Friedrich Wilhelm was furious to be deprived of lands he considered rightfully his, and remained so for the rest of his life.

Several more years of hard negotiations followed to establish the borders between the Swedish and Brandenburg portions of Pomerania, and to arrange the withdrawal of Swedish troops from those areas going to the elector.¹⁶⁸ Tensions reached their high point in 1653, when Brandenburg lined up the support of the emperor and the College of Electors to withhold Sweden's formal investment with Bremen, Verden, and Pomerania and thus prevent Sweden's participation in the *Reichstag* that was to meet in Regensburg until the Swedes agreed to entirely remove their troops from Eastern Pomerania. Under this pressure an agreement over the Pomeranian border and other outstanding issues was finally reached in May 1653, and electoral troops took possession of Eastern Pomerania in June.¹⁶⁹

The negotiations over Pomerania heralded a new phase in the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship. Their lands now abutted each other, providing them with a continuous stream of bilateral concerns. Negotiations over Pomerania were long, deep, direct, and public, and it was evident that from this point forward Brandenburg and Sweden would share an important (if often acrimonious) relationship that needed to be taken seriously. Although embedded, as all diplomatic relations were, in a broad, complicated, and ever shifting international context, the relationship that existed between Brandenburg and Sweden was no longer dominated by the concerns of third parties. They now dealt with each other frequently and independently.

Geopolitical factors account for an important part of the story of how the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship got to this point. Another part lies on the micro-level of individual actions and interpersonal relationships that characterized Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. Chapter Three is an extended examination of the power of the diplomatic culture in full flower to affect relations between the countries and their governments. The remainder of the current chapter will briefly sketch a few select factors in the diplomatic culture as it reached its full form, particularly as

¹⁶⁸ See documents in RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 3–5, 176, 200; UA, IV, 843–89, 923–33; UA, XXIII.1, 127–56.

¹⁶⁹ The Pomeranian treaty is dated Stettin, 4 May 1653. Von Moerner, Nr. 89, 166–74. For a nice, short summary of the negotiations over Pomerania, see Oppenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:206–09, 264–65.

they related to the selection of diplomatic representatives, and will conclude with a series of snapshots from important moments in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy that show aspects of the culture in action.

Diplomats and Diplomatic Culture

The Traffic in Personnel

The circulation of individuals between Brandenburg and Sweden remained an important element in establishing and maintaining contacts between diplomatic actors. In particular, large numbers of nobles from the Hohenzollern lands continued to enter Swedish military service and participate in other branches of the Swedish government.¹⁷⁰ In writing to Abraham von Dohna in 1627, Adler Salvius noted the many nobles from Brandenburg who were serving in Gustav Adolf's army.¹⁷¹ Several of the more important Swedish military figures from the first half of the seventeenth century were in fact native Brandenburgers, including Hans Georg von Arnim, Hans Christoph von Königsmarck, and Adam von Pfuel.¹⁷² Other military figures moved from Swedish to Brandenburg service, including Christoph von Houwald and Count Johann von Sayn und Wittgenstein, who became the chief of the Brandenburg delegation at the Westphalia talks and dealt for years with Swedish delegates there.¹⁷³

Wittgenstein's diplomatic dealings on behalf of Brandenburg with his former Swedish employer mirror those of non-military figures we have

¹⁷⁰ See especially the works of Warnstedt.

¹⁷¹ "Ac temetsi non putit S.R.Mtas multos ejusmodi Nobiles hic inveniri, qui tanta bona in Marchia habeant, ut proptereé servitia & fidem S.R.Mtis. datam, & quem híc favorem expectant ulteriùs, deserant." Johan Adler Salvius to Abraham von Dohna, "castris ad Dirschoviam," 6/16 August 1627. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199.

¹⁷² On Arnim, see Georg Irmer, *Hans Georg von Arnim: Lebensbild eines protestantischen Feldherrn und Staatsmannes aus der Zeit des dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1894); *SBL*, II, 244–47 (by Nils Ahnlund); *ADB*, I, 568–70 (by Karl Gustav Helbig); *NDB*, I, 366 (by Heinz Gollwitzer); *BBL*, 27–28 (by Frank Göse.) On Königsmarck: Beate-Christine Fiedler, "Hans-Christoph von Königsmarck—ein brandenburgischer Junker in schwedischen Diensten," in Jürgen Frölich, Esther-Beate Körber, and Michael Rohrschneider (eds.), *Preußen und Preußentum vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart: Beiträge des Kolloquiums aus Anlaß des 65. Geburtstages von Ernst Opgenoorh am 12.2.2001* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 2002), 33–54; *SBL*, XXI, 778–81 (by Klaus-Richard Böhme); *ADB*, XVI, 528–30 (by Krause); *NDB*, XII, 360–61 (by Hans-Joachim Schulze).

¹⁷³ On Houwald, see Bahl, 504–05; *ADB*, XIII, 211–12 (by Bernhard von Poten); *BBL*, 186–87 (by Vinzenz Czech). On Wittgenstein, see *ADB*, XLIII, 619–23 (by Otto Meinardus); Bahl, 568–69.

encountered such as Birckholtz, Rasch, and Transehe, who moved from Brandenburg to Swedish service and became involved in carrying forward Sweden's diplomacy with Brandenburg.¹⁷⁴ Conversely, Adolf Friedrich and Johann Friedrich Schlezer, the sons of a former Swedish royal physician, entered Brandenburg diplomatic service, and Adolf Friedrich was appointed Friedrich Wilhelm's resident in Stockholm.¹⁷⁵ Sometimes an individual's career path could zigzag back and forth between Sweden and Brandenburg. Otto Christoph von Rochow served as a page for Elector Georg Wilhelm, entered Swedish service during the Thirty Years' War, and later was named *Oberhofmarschall* by Elector Friedrich Wilhelm.¹⁷⁶ The Schlezer brothers each entered Swedish service after leaving that of Brandenburg. Kurt Bertram von Pfuel left Brandenburg for Swedish service in the 1630s and returned to the Brandenburg government in the 1640s.

Having a well-placed expatriate in the other state's service could come in handy. Königsmarck won high marks from the Brandenburg government (a rarity for a Swedish officer!) for the mildness with which he treated the population of "his fatherland" during the Thirty Years' War.¹⁷⁷ Using expatriates in diplomatic dealings could prove advantageous as well. Birckholtz, Arnim, Rasch, and Königsmarck all took part in negotiations with their native Brandenburg while in Swedish service.¹⁷⁸

Desired Characteristics

Possessing personal connections to both Brandenburg and Sweden was one factor that helped a diplomat function successfully. Other traits were at least as important, and come closer to the values at the heart of the common

¹⁷⁴ For more on these men, see below, Chapter Three.

¹⁷⁵ On the Schlezer brothers, see below, 175–77.

¹⁷⁶ Martin Bircher, *Im Garten der Palme: Katalog einer Sammlung von Dokumenten zur Wirksamkeit der Fruchtbringenden Gesellschaft mit Beigabe eines Ausstellungskataloges* (1991) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 298.

¹⁷⁷ "...daß der General=Feldmarschall Graf von Königsmarck...seines Vaterlandes, der Churmark Brandenburg, Bestens sich jederzeit angelegen sein lassen, viele Durchzüge abwenden helfen und, wenn er im Lande gewesen, gute Ordre gehalten und auf der armen Leute und der Kriegs=Commissarien Klage gute resolutiones ertheilt, wie er denn besonders 1642, da der Schwedische Feldmarschall [Torstensson] 3 Monat über die Altmark mit schweren Contributionen beleget, den armen Unterthanen so viel Schutz geleistet, daß sie das Ihrige in den Calbe'schen Werder und an solchen Ort des Landes sich weder Soldat noch Officier vergreifen müssen." Privy council to Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 June 1652. Cited in Fiedler, 40.

¹⁷⁸ Karl Heldmann suggests that Birckholtz' success in dealings in his native Brandenburg in 1616 led to Gustav Adolf's selection of fellow Brandenburger Arnim for his 1617 mission to Berlin. Heldmann (ed.), *Fürsten- und Feldherrenbriefe*, 2.

diplomatic culture. Some will come as no surprise and could apply equally well to diplomats in other times and places. In a push to have a Brandenburg ambassador sent to Sweden during particularly tense moments in the Westphalia talks in 1646 Adler Salvius and Carl Marinus, Sweden's ambassador to the Swiss, urged that Friedrich Wilhelm send a "capable and acceptable subject" who would be "so mild" and without "choler and bluster" that he "could boldly encourage the Queen and the Council of the necessity" of improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations.¹⁷⁹ In advocating for a Brandenburg agent to be stationed in Hamburg to deal with the Swedes (and the French) during the rapprochement following Georg Wilhelm's death, Winterfeld suggested Christoph Deichman, a man "of good and praiseworthy qualities, practiced in private and public law, with much experience of affairs and state, who is known at many, including Catholic, courts . . . and enjoys virtually free access to the French and Swedish ambassadors."¹⁸⁰

Other traits, however, were more specifically suited to carrying out inter-confessional Protestant diplomacy in early modern northern Europe. The first longer-term diplomatic resident in the history of Brandenburg-Swedish relations, Jacob Godeman, was a Protestant cosmopolitan who combined the scholarly training of a Deichman and the personal connections of the figures discussed in the previous section with a religious-political outlook of Protestant confessional cooperation. Godeman was a doctor of laws, and a Lutheran with a deep interest in Lutheran-Reformed theological reconciliation. In 1628 Godeman approached John Dury with a proposal written in his own hand for a solution to Lutheran-Reformed disagreements over the Eucharist.¹⁸¹ This opened up an exchange of letters and texts between Godeman and Dury on dogmatic issues aimed at achieving harmony between the Protestant sects.¹⁸² At this same time

¹⁷⁹ Brandenburg delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 8 [18] June 1646. *UA*, IV, 442–443; Brandenburg delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 22 June [2 July] 1646. *UA*, IV, 446.

¹⁸⁰ Samuel von Winterfeld to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 25 May [4 June] 1641. *UA*, I, 542–47, here 546. Deichmann was indeed taken into Brandenburg service. See *ibid.*, 546 n. 1.

¹⁸¹ Dury wrote that Godeman sent two men to him in Elbing "ad salutandum me ejus nomine, et offerendum Scriptum propria ejus manu exaratum, continens propositionem de reconcilianda controversia, quæ inter Reformatos & Lutheranos de S. Cœna agitur." Cited in Westin, *Negotiations*, 77–78.

¹⁸² In an undated letter to Axel Oxenstierna that Westin places in 1630 Dury wrote: "Detexerat mihi Clar. D:nus Dr Godemannus dum in viuis esset se Pacis Eccles[ias]ticæ consilia mente versare; ijsdem quoque cogitationibus ut ego animum intenderem, dum

Godeman continued to have dealings with Brandenburg-Prussians, including a letter to the Ducal Prussian *Landhofmeister* in 1629 that stressed the need for harmony between Gustav Adolf and Georg Wilhelm, criticized Schwarzenberg, and thanked the elector for having sent a piece of game for the celebrations surrounding Godeman's daughter's wedding.¹⁸³ Godeman's son Caspar visited Dury in London in 1631, carried correspondence between Dury and Oxenstierna, interacted with Brandenburg's irenic court preacher Johan Bergius in Germany, and wrote to Oxenstierna in 1636 on the necessity of Lutheran-Reformed theological unity to prevent "the total destruction of both parties."¹⁸⁴ The next resident Swedish embassy sent to the elector's court in 1631 notably included both a locally-known and connected man (Transehe) and a figure involved in international militant Protestantism (Count Heinrich Matthias von Thurn, one of the authors of the Bohemian Estates' *Apologie* of 1618 and a commander at White Mountain and later at Lützen).¹⁸⁵

The traits described here built personal connections between certain Brandenburgers and Swedes and gave them intellectual and political-religious common ground that could serve as a medium of communication and incentive for cooperation. Chapter Three picks up on these issues in detail. But first, the current chapter will close with a few thin cross-sections taken at important moments that show the ability of diplomatic culture to impact Brandenburg-Swedish relations.

Samuel von Winterfeld and Stellan von Mörner, 1626

Michael Roberts has described Samuel von Winterfeld's mission to Sweden in 1626 as "the last hope of that party among the Elector's advisers which was hostile to Schwarzenberg and his imperialist policy, and which still

ad societatem operis me vocat, occasionem præbuit. Inter nos crebræ de rebus hisce colationes intercesseru[n]t & scripta de controuersis Dogmatis, non sine fructu; & pio inter nos consensu, communicata fuerunt. Post controuersiarum qualemcunque discussionem, cœptum est cogitari de via & modo procedendi, quo in pacis procurandæ negotio, pacificis utendum foret versus Ecclesias dissidentes..." Dury to Oxenstierna, printed in Westin, *Negotiations*, 191–94, here 192.

¹⁸³ Jacob Godeman to [Kreutzen], Fischhausen, 8/18 June 1629. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 199.

¹⁸⁴ Caspar Godemann to Axel Oxenstierna, Newmarket, 25 October 1636. Cited in Gunnar Westin, *Svenska kyrkan och de protestantiska enhetssträvandena under 1630-talet*, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1934, Teologi 1 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1934), 200 n.81. See also Westin, *Negotiations*, 77 n.38, 101, 110.

¹⁸⁵ RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 1; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 2, fasc. 12.

hoped for cordial relations with Sweden.”¹⁸⁶ Winterfeld’s assignment was to work to redirect the looming Swedish invasion of Prussia into a campaign to support the Protestant side in the war in Germany, thus sparing the elector’s Prussian lands from the devastation of war while also serving the Protestant political interests shared by Winterfeld, Götze, and the others in their party. Despite the fact that he traveled incognito as “Count von Erbach,” Winterfeld had been given written instructions by his prince to deal with another sovereign on a matter of grave, state-level importance, and his mission deserves to be viewed within the realm of formal diplomacy.¹⁸⁷ His ability to carry out this charge, however, depended on informal personal interactions. When Winterfeld arrived in Sweden he was suffering from a severe fever that made him incapable of completing the trip to Strängnäs (where Gustav Adolf was at the moment) to present himself to the king. While laying sick in an inn he met Stellan von Mörner, the *statthalter* of Åland and a native-born Brandenburg. Members of von Mörner’s family had established ties to Sweden in the 1580s, and his cousins Otto Helmer and Bernd Dietrich had entered Duke Karl’s service in the 1590s.¹⁸⁸ By the early seventeenth century Stellan himself made the move north at his cousins’ urging, and went on to occupy a series of important administrative posts under Karl IX, Gustav Adolf, and Christina’s regency government.¹⁸⁹ He also maintained ties to his relatives in Brandenburg, and due to his local knowledge and connections was sent ahead to Stralsund in 1620 as an advance party of Gustav Adolf’s famous incognito trip to Berlin to court Maria Eleonora, gathering the latest information on the state of affairs in northern Germany and especially in Brandenburg to present to the king’s traveling party when they landed.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:318–19.

¹⁸⁷ Documents in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5; RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 176. Roberts’ assertion (*Gustavus Adolphus*, II:319) that Winterfeld “was not even furnished with full powers; he travelled incognito and not as the official representative of the Elector” is true, although his emphasis on this as something that almost foreordained the fruitlessness of his mission seems too strong, and is perhaps based on taking Oxenstierna’s words too literally when he confronted Winterfeld after the embassy had essentially failed. See Samuel von Winterfeld to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 17 July 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 11r–25, here 22v.

¹⁸⁸ On the von Mörner, see Langer and Olesen (eds.), *Eine deutsch-schwedische Adelsfamilie*; Warnstedt, *Brandenburgisk Adel med Svensk Anknnytning*; and the various entries (including one for the entire family) in the *Svensk Biografiskt Lexikon*, XXVI, 284ff.

¹⁸⁹ On Stellan von Mörner, see Langer and Olesen (eds.), *Eine deutsch-schwedische Adelsfamilie*, 21–23; *SBL*, XXVI, 301–04 (by Magnus Mörner).

¹⁹⁰ On Gustav Adolf’s incognito trip, see below, 146.

Mörner, the native Brandenburger, proved indispensable to his ailing compatriot as Winterfeld lay incapacitated. He communicated with the king regarding Winterfeld's condition, passed along to Gustav Adolf a handwritten note from Georg Wilhelm that Winterfeld had been carrying, and brought the royal physician, barber, and a pharmacist to see him.¹⁹¹ Through this connection Mörner had wrought, Oxenstierna himself came to see Winterfeld at the inn in person, and the real work of Winterfeld's embassy was able to begin. The results of the embassy were disastrous: Winterfeld was utterly unable to dissuade the Swedes from a Prussian invasion, which actually began while he was still in Sweden, and as has been seen would himself later stand trial on suspicion of having colluded with them. The fact remains, however, that at a critical juncture in Brandenburg-Swedish relations a "last hope" attempt at good relations was made possible by a helpful and well-connected native Brandenburger in Swedish service, and through a chain of events that started with a personal encounter at an inn.

Kurt Bertram von Pfuel and Gustav Adolf, 1631

The worldviews and agendas of Brandenburg and Swedish diplomatic actors not only affected their interactions with one another, but also how they presented information back to their home governments in the hopes of nudging policy in a desired direction. When Kurt Bertram von Pfuel went on his second of two missions to Gustav Adolf while the German Protestant negotiations at Leipzig were ongoing in winter 1631, he used the occasion of writing the summary report of the mission as an opportunity for policy advocacy.¹⁹²

Pfuel had an almost reverent admiration for Gustav Adolf, and wished that Brandenburg would accept an alliance with Sweden and take a less passive stance in the war in Germany. His instructions called for him to ask the king, who had recently ordered that certain towns in Brandenburg supply his army with bread and beer, to refrain from extracting these contributions from the elector's lands. After discussing these issues they moved on to larger matters, with Gustav Adolf once more encouraging

¹⁹¹ Samuel von Winterfeld to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 17 July 1626. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 5, 11r–25, here 11r–v.

¹⁹² Documents from Pfuel's mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 2, fasc. 7. The mission is covered in significant detail, including extensive citations from Pfuel's report, in G. Droysen, "Brandenburgische Audienzen," 41–54.

Brandenburg to stand with him. Pfuel made clear both to the king, and by his act of reporting to his own government, that he supported this course as well.

If the Swedes were to leave, the king began, the fate of the Palatinate would befall Brandenburg as well, and Georg Wilhelm would rule in name alone.¹⁹³ Rather than refuting this, Pfuel admitted that these were times “of the greatest danger” when one needed more than ever to rely on God’s help.¹⁹⁴ To this Gustav Adolf replied that as an astrologer can calculate the timing of an eclipse, “so can a *Politicus* tell of a transfer of rule when he weighs political reasons, and I think it will come very close to the end for the elector.”¹⁹⁵ Pfuel agreed once more that “to judge *ex politicis rationibus*, I must well say that for my lord things have come very close to that,” but added that if God and the Protestant Estates would come to his aid, the designs against Georg Wilhelm would not be so dangerous.¹⁹⁶ The two then discussed the prospects of the Leipzig Conference yielding helpful results. Gustav Adolf said he had hoped that Pfuel would have brought news of good decisions from Leipzig that would have led to negotiations with the Swedes “over something useful to the common cause,” but now he has seen otherwise.¹⁹⁷ Pfuel again agreed, apologized that “I can’t bring

¹⁹³ “Gehen wir weg, so werden Ihre Ld. Kurfürstin gewesen sein, und nur den bloßen Namen haben, wie dero Frau Mutter, die Kurf. Witwe von Heidelberg; und dem Kurfürsten selbst wirts auch so gehen, wo sich Se. Ld. nicht eines andern bedenken. Es wird heißen: *veteres migrate coloni*. Und das sehe ich allbereits vor der Thür und ist gar nahe.” Transcription taken from G. Droysen, “Brandenburgische Audienzen,” 50.

¹⁹⁴ “Gnädigster König, ich will nicht hoffen, daß es dies Wege (die dennoch andere zu befördern wohl trachten mögen) erreichen, sondern unser Herre Gott, der seine Hülfe alsdann am allermeisten, wenn die Gefahr am größten und Menschenhülfe dabei aus zu sein scheint, hervorbrechen lässet, wohl anderer Gestalt ins Mittel greifen werde.” Ibid., 50.

¹⁹⁵ “Alleine gleichwie ein *Astrologus* die *stellas calculiret* und daraus ersehen kann, wann eine *Eclipsis* einfallen soll, also kann auch ein *Politicus*, wann er die *politicas rationes* erwäget, eine *translationem imperiorum colligire*; und also däucht mich, es sei mit Ihrer Ld. sehr nahe zum Garaus kommen.” Ibid., 50.

¹⁹⁶ “Gnädigster König, *ex politicis rationibus* zu urtheilen, muß ich wohl sagen, daß es mit meinem gnädigsten Herren *in particulari* sehr nahe dahin gediehen. Wann Gott aber und die evangelischen Stände Sr. Kurfl. Durchl. assistieren (wie ich denn daran nicht zweifle) so wird dasselbe, so man wider Se. Kurfl. Durchl. vorhaben möchte, wohl geändert werden und nicht also gefährlich hinaus schlagen.” Ibid., 50.

¹⁹⁷ “Ja wohl, ich hätte sonst verhoffet, der Herr würde uns gute Zeitung von einem rechtschaffenen Schluß, den man zu Leipzig gemacht, gebracht, und etwa eins und das andere, so dem gemeinen Werke nützlich, mit uns tractieret haben und das wäre uns recht lieb gewesen. Anitzo aber vernehmen wir, daß er nichts anders, als lauter Querelen führe.” Ibid., 51.

better things [over which to negotiate] than I have been given,” and added that “for my part” he truly wished to be able to have happier talks with the king “at another time.”¹⁹⁸

Pfuel’s report therefore presented to his superiors a picture of grave danger facing Brandenburg, and the need to combat it through combined action with other Protestants, including Gustav Adolf, portrayed as both ready and willing to do the task. This message was presented not only in the words of Gustav Adolf (which of course would have entered the document only through the mediation of Pfuel’s pen), but also in Pfuel’s own, self-reported agreement with the essentials of the king’s position. Participating in diplomatic activity (where one of the main duties was reporting the words and opinions of others) gave an individual diplomat the opportunity to work within the potentialities of literary form—in this case the form of diplomatic dispatches—to advance a line of argument to the very highest levels of the home government. We have no way of independently verifying the fidelity of Pfuel’s report to what actually was spoken between him and the king, but the impression given here (and one that is corroborated by other evidence) is that they were both in their own way advocating a similar policy course.

Pomerania as a Threat to Friendship

Advocates of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship recognized the potential of the Pomeranian issue to destroy, perhaps permanently, any possibility of the two governments having truly warm relations. A member of the Brandenburg privy council, likely the pro-Swedish Götze, wrote that the Swedes’ conscience after stealing the elector’s land would be so heavy that they would never trust Brandenburg and would work to see that its power never became great enough to cause them harm.¹⁹⁹ Clusters of like-minded

¹⁹⁸ “Gnädigster König, Ich kann es nicht beßer bringen als ichs empfangen habe, und wäre wohl zu wünschen, daß man nicht Ursache zu Klagen hätte. Sonst hätte ich meines Theils gerne sehen mögen, daß ich E. Kön. Mt. ein solches, wie es deroselben angezeigeter Maaßen angenehm gewesen, hätte zubringen mögen. Ich habe aber das Glück nicht haben können. Vielleicht kann es zur andern Zeit geschehen.” Ibid., 51.

¹⁹⁹ “so würden die Schweden sich dadurch nur mehr verstärken; sie würden E. Ch. D. dennoch stets an der Seiten verbleiben; ihr Gewissen würde sie dahin treiben, dass sie E. Ch. D. nimmer trauen, sondern immer darauf sinnen und gedenken würden, damit E. Ch. D. en bas gehalten und nicht wieder aufkommen könnte.” Privy council to Friedrich Wilhelm, Cöln an der Spree, 11 [21] January 1647. *UA*, IV, 493–94, here 493. A sharp exchange between Johann Fromhold and Adler Salvius shows that the Pomeranian issue could place real tensions on relations between otherwise friendly Brandenburgers and Swedes. Brandenburg

Brandenburgers and Swedes worked together—often against their official orders and in the face of resistance from others in their states—to urge the governments to find a mutually-acceptable solution that would avoid this situation. Johan Adler Salvius came to Wittgenstein in February 1646 and said that although his instructions insisted that he negotiate for all of Pomerania, he was privately convinced that a compromise solution could be reached if the two sides agreed to divide the Duchy.²⁰⁰ Several months later Adler Salvius spoke with Wittgenstein again and told him that even though he had to officially stand by the line of demanding all of Pomerania, he had always advocated dividing Pomerania in half, but he had been resisted by others in the Swedish government.²⁰¹ Wittgenstein himself later told the Swedish diplomat Mattias Biörnklof of his frustrations over Friedrich Wilhelm's uncompromising hard-line position over Pomerania, which Wittgenstein claimed was supported by a group of advisors who were either Pomeranian themselves or hoped to be given lands there, and against which he had been unable to gain any concessions. Wittgenstein said that he was even considering resigning his post over the matter.²⁰² In January 1647 a deeply concerned Adler Salvius came to Wittgenstein, showed him original copies of his recent correspondence with the Swedish government, and almost begged the Brandenburgers to adopt a softer line “to prevent great disaster.”²⁰³ Wittgenstein rushed to get this news to the elector by sending “in all haste” a report written in his own hand.

delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 10/20 February 1648. *UA*, IV, 663–72, here 668.

²⁰⁰ Brandenburg delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 9 [19] February 1646. *UA*, IV, 424–25, here 425.

²⁰¹ Brandenburg delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 29 June [9 July] 1646. *UA*, IV, 448.

²⁰² “Förutan det, att Churf. själfv är mäktig hågad på Pommern, så hade han kring sig en hop sina confidenteste tjänare, som antingen vore Pomrer eller väntade få gods där i landet; de hörde gärna alla consilia, som kastas fram tillä at behålla Pommern och bragte den efter lägenheten framför Chuf. Vid så fatta lägenheter kunde han [Wittgenstein] och H. v. Löben, ehvad remonstrationer de gjorde, intet uträtta.” Johan Oxenstierna to Christina, Osnabrück, 28 October [7 November] 1646. *UA*, XXIII.1, 98–99, here 99.

²⁰³ “Welcher [Adler Salvius] endlich so treuherzig worden, dass er mir von I. Kön. Maj. in Schweden drei an ihn kurz nach einander abgegangene Handschreiben, nebens der letzten Königl. Resolution an ihre ganze Gesandtschaft in Original fürgezeigt und selbst lesen lassen, damit ich ohne Umschweif wissen möchte, was sie endlich in Commission hätten. Darbei er dann betheuret, dass sie auch nicht eines Buchstaben darvon weichen noch ändern dürften; dannenhero er von Herzen wünschete, dass E. Ch. D. der Zeit zu weichen und grösser Unheil zu verhüten gnäd. resolviren möchten.” Wittgenstein to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 17 [27] January 1647. *UA*, IV, 510–11, here 510.

In the effort to avoid the worst in the Pomerania dispute, Brandenburgers and Swedes of similar dispositions conversed with each other in trust and advocated policy directions to their home governments that matched a line that they themselves agreed upon and supported as a path towards friendship (or at least minimal animosity) between their countries. A similar dynamic, typical of the diplomatic culture, played out over a longer timescale in the marriage negotiations that are the object of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

MARRIAGE ALLIANCES: DIPLOMATIC CULTURE IN ACTION

The machinations surrounding two proposed Brandenburg-Swedish dynastic marriages in the first half of the seventeenth century displayed the diplomatic culture's style of interaction in full form. The first culminated in the marriage of Gustav Adolf to Maria Eleonora in November 1620, while talks of an additional match between Queen Christina and her cousin Friedrich Wilhelm began in the early 1630s and continued off and on until 1646 but never came to fruition. The existence of two marriage projects following so closely after one other demonstrates the developing sense of connectedness and commonality between Brandenburg and Sweden—a recognition that the two lands were part of a common whole and as such could be natural allies (or natural rivals) of each other. While geopolitical contexts and pragmatic political concerns framed the marriage plans at the highest level, work in favor of them on the ground was carried forward by the personal diplomacy and private networks of Protestant cosmopolitans acting within the confines of the diplomatic culture and in many cases independently of governmental direction. For these men, who often shared scholarly inclinations and an irenic religious outlook, the marriage plans presented an image of Brandenburg-Swedish partnership that resonated with their own vision of how the political-religious world should be ordered. The progress of the marriage negotiations is testament to the creative potential of diplomatic culture to empower informal coalitions of the likeminded to condition significant political outcomes.

Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora

The idea of a possible match between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora appears to have originated during a visit paid by Hieronymus von Birckholtz, the Brandenburg-born Swedish agent active in northern Germany, to Brandenburg in the summer of 1615.¹ Birckholtz arrived in

¹ For a discussion of Birckholtz' 1615 mission to Brandenburg and subsequent involvement in the marriage negotiations, see Hammarstrand; and Droste, "Hieronymus von Birckholtz," 80.

Küstrin in July 1615 under the guise of a private visit. He first met with Dr. Saffius, his longtime acquaintance and personal physician to Elector Johann Sigismund. Saffius was able to arrange a personal audience for Birckholtz with the elector, during which Birckholtz expressed his desire to work for closer relations between Sweden and Brandenburg, a sentiment that Johann Sigismund echoed. While in Küstrin Birckholtz had further informal conversations with Saffius and other Brandenburg officials, and in these discussions the prospect of a marriage between Gustav Adolf and Johann Sigismund's eldest unmarried daughter Maria Eleonora was raised.² Birckholtz reported on these conversations when he returned to Sweden later that year, and the long and uneven process of negotiations that eventually led to the marriage was set in motion.

The complicated relationships that both Brandenburg and Sweden had with Poland influenced the course the marriage negotiations followed over the next five years. The bitter dynastic feud between the Swedish and Polish Vasa remained heated at the time that Birckholtz made his trip to Brandenburg in 1615, and in fact the main reason he had come to Germany in the first place was to organize a system of paid correspondents to monitor Polish actions. Under these circumstances the opportunity to enter into closer relations with Brandenburg could only have been welcome to the Swedish king. A marriage alliance in particular would have offered Gustav Adolf three distinct benefits. First, if the marriage served as the base of a broader alliance Sweden would gain a well-situated ally in dangerous times. Next, the king's marriage to a princess from a high-ranking German princely house would lend an air of legitimacy to the Swedish Vasa and their (usurped) claims to the Swedish throne, and would give Gustav Adolf the opportunity to produce a legitimate heir who could secure the succession of Karl IX's line. Finally, marriage to a Hohenzollern princess would represent a diplomatic coup for the Swedish king over his Polish rival, as Sigismund was the Hohenzollerns' feudal overlord in Prussia. The Prussian feudal relationship presented not only an enticing opportunity for Gustav Adolf to humiliate his cousin Sigismund via a Brandenburg marriage, but also the greatest single obstacle standing in the way of the success of the marriage plan.

As we have seen, the Brandenburg Hohenzollern, as administrators of Ducal Prussia for the mentally incapable Duke Albrecht Friedrich,

² See von Birckholtz' report to the Swedish government on his dealings in Germany, dated Stockholm, 9 November 1615. Cited in Hammarstrand, 31 n. 1.

enjoyed a *de facto* relationship of feudal obligation to Sigismund that they hoped would become *de jure* once the mad old duke finally died. Securing investiture of the Duchy from the king was the necessary step in finalizing the succession in Prussia, and promoting a positive relationship with Poland so that the investiture would be obtained was a driving force in Brandenburg foreign policy in the mid- to late-1610s—precisely the time when Birckholtz arrived in Brandenburg and discussions of a Swedish marriage began.

All involved were aware that a marriage with Sigismund's arch-enemy would infuriate the king and could serve as a death-blow to the Prussian investiture. Brandenburg's relations with Poland had in fact already been deteriorating following Johann Sigismund's conversion to Calvinism in 1613 and his joining the Evangelical Union in Germany. Furthermore, many in the rigidly Lutheran Estates of Ducal Prussia were jealous of protecting the liberties guaranteed them under the 'Polish' system and were distrusting of coming under Calvinist Brandenburg rule. This put Johann Sigismund into the very difficult position of having to distance himself publicly from even the slightest sign of warming relations with Sweden, while at the same time having more need than ever for a good relationship with Sweden in case Brandenburg's tensions with Poland were to boil over into an open breach. Johann Sigismund himself gave voice to this situation in one of his first conversations with Birckholtz where he expressed his admiration for Gustav Adolf and his desire to enter into "good correspondence and a special friendship" with him, but added that he dare not express this openly "due to Prussia, since many of that land's inhabitants are more Polish than Brandenburgian in their hearts, and could easily be moved to rebellion."³

The Brandenburg government's position, then, was that it would be willing to engage in covert talks regarding the establishment of closer relations with Sweden, including a possible marriage alliance, but that no trace of these plans was to be made public, at least not until after the

³ Birckholtz' relation to Swedish government, dated Stockholm, 9 November 1615 [cited in Hammarstrand, 30 n. 2]: "Bekreftigtens J.C.G. mitt diesem Schwur: Sagende, so war mier Gott helfe ich trage ein gutt Herz zu eurem jungen Princen Gustafo, den S.L. wirdt mier vonn vielenn, wie dann auch vom Könige in Dennemarkenn selbst hoch gerühmet, das ehr seinem Alter nach ein geschikter verstendiger Resolut, vndt tapferer Herr sey, ich möchte woll gerne mitt S.L. gutte Correspondentz vndt sondere Freundtschafft haltenn, darf mich aber Preussenn halber noch nitt eussernn, weyll viele desselben Landes Einwohner in ihren Hertzen mehr Polnisch als Brandenburgisch seinn, vndt leichtt zum Abfall könten bewogen werdenn."

investiture for Prussia had been secured. Gustav Adolf desired a restrained approach as well. Birckholtz was sent back to Germany in spring 1616 under explicit instructions to speak only in basic terms about seeking closer relations in general. He was to investigate whether Brandenburg's favorable statements in favor of friendship were sincerely meant, and if so he was to make known that it was to be left to the elector to make the first move, either by sending a representative or a letter to the king. If the Brandenburgers raised the topic of the proposed marriage, Birckholtz was to reply in general terms, leaving this matter to the time after friendly relations had been established.⁴

When Birckholtz arrived in Berlin in August 1616 he found the elector's sensitivity over offending Poland piqued by recent events that had transpired at the meeting of the Polish Estates in Warsaw, where Duke Wilhelm of Kurland had been stripped of his lands on suspicion of having entertained secret negotiations with Gustav Adolf.⁵ The elector was so paranoid about Poland learning of his talks with Birckholtz that he had Saffius arrange a series of secret private meetings in Küstrin in late August 1616. Here again Johann Sigismund expressed his heartfelt desire "before the almighty God" that nothing would be dearer nor more welcome to him than to come into "good understanding, correspondence and friendship" with Gustav Adolf, but added that he "dare not declare myself in these troubled times for Prussia," especially when his own wife, the Electress Anna, had "an entirely Polish heart."⁶ The electress was indeed the most formidable enemy of the marriage plan at the Brandenburg court,

⁴ Axel Oxenstierna sent Birckholtz two letters in March 1616 in preparation for his return to Germany, the first in Swedish and intended to be read by Birckholtz alone, the next in Latin and intended to be shown to the Brandenburg councilors as a demonstration of Sweden's good intentions. The Swedish letter mentions the marriage plan and stresses caution; the Latin praises efforts to establish Brandenburg-Swedish friendship but makes no mention of the marriage. Axel Oxenstierna to Hieronymus von Birckholtz, Åbo, 23 March 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 164, 260–62 [Swedish]; Axel Oxenstierna to Hieronymus von Birckholtz, Åbo, 23 March 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, 263 [Latin]. On Gustav Adolf's desire to proceed with caution in the marriage negotiations at this time, see also Hammarstrand, 33–34.

⁵ See Hammarstrand, 36.

⁶ Johann Sigismund's words cited (in Swedish translation) in Birckholtz' report to the Swedish government, Stettin, 14 September 1616: "Men hvad skall jag väl göra jag är så sannt mig Gud hjelpe därför böjd, men törs i dessa oroliga tider för Preussens skull ej yttra mig. Jag vet ej hur det kommer sig men min gemål är af någon mig obekant anledning Sverige alls icke huld. Hon har ett allt för polskt hjerta." Cited in Hammarstrand, 38.

motivated by her grave fear of losing her native Prussia if the Poles were to find out about the negotiations.⁷

Over the next several years talk of the marriage advanced haltingly and under the cloak of secrecy. Johann Sigismund increasingly favored the plan, but as his health deteriorated following a stroke he came to play less of a role in the direction of state affairs. Electoral Prince Georg Wilhelm was not staunchly opposed to the marriage idea in principle, but his overriding concern was obtaining the Prussian investiture, and especially after Duke Albrecht Friedrich of Prussia died in 1618 Georg Wilhelm pushed for a delay in the marriage negotiations until the investiture was secured. Electress Anna remained dead-set against the idea, going so far as to say that she would rather see her daughter dead than married to the King of Sweden.⁸ Thus little progress was made in this matter, and when Birckholtz himself died in 1618 the issue was no closer to resolution than it had been when he first discussed it in 1615.

Gustav Adolf was by now becoming impatient and began to make plans to travel to Berlin in person to push the matter to a conclusion and triumphally lead his bride home.⁹ He dispatched Gustav Horn to Berlin in July 1619 to test the waters and see if the time was ripe for a royal visit to the Brandenburg court.¹⁰ Horn seems to have been successful in eliciting something close to a full declaration of support for the marriage from the ailing elector. The electress, however, was quick to dampen any enthusiasm. Due to her continuing and vocal resistance, and to Johann Sigismund's worsening health, Gustav Adolf canceled his voyage to Berlin

⁷ See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:175–76.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 177–78.

⁹ These ideas appear to have originated in fall 1618. See Hammarstrand, 133.

¹⁰ Horn's instructions made clear that he was to proceed with caution, announcing first the king's intention to visit certain German courts, and then carefully watching for any response from the elector, electress, or councilors to the suggestion that he may travel to Brandenburg. He was also to speak in general terms of friendship between king and elector, though if the marriage issue was mentioned he was to say that it would without question benefit them both: "Och skall han der någon Churfurstens förtrogen, begifwa sigh medh honom i snart, altidh der hän *dirigera* sitt taal, att han *in generalbius terminis* på wenskapen emellan H:K:Mtt: och Curf: Nde: består; Och der om någon Gifftermålshandell blefwe *mentioneret*, att han önsker ded bågges dera, både H:K:Mttz: och H:Curf:Ndes: sinne der till warte blifwa bewekte, effter som det fuller på både syder kunde wara twifwels Utan, nyttigt och hugneligit." Gustav II Adolf's Memorial for Gustav Horn's mission to Berlin, Stockholm, 12 July 1619. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 133, 1619, 216r–217v. This document makes clear that Gustav Adolf was not at all certain he would be welcome in Brandenburg at this time, and that the marriage plan was still delicate and secretive. On Johann Sigismund's positive reaction to Horn's mission, see Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:177.

at the last minute.¹¹ Johann Sigismund's death later that year, however, opened an unexpected window of opportunity. At first glance it may appear that the elector's passing would have boded ill for the prospects of the marriage. Whereas Johann Sigismund had come to be in favor of the match, his successor was the cautious Georg Wilhelm who wanted no part of anything that could anger Poland and jeopardize the Prussian investiture. On top of this Johann Sigismund's death brought with it an increase in Electress Anna's influence over Brandenburg policy. Luckily for Gustav Adolf, however, the new elector and his mother were on bad terms with one another, and in astonishingly quick fashion Anna's firm opposition to the Swedish marriage transformed into active support when she began to fear that her son would try to arrange a marriage between Maria Eleonora and a Polish prince in order to increase his standing with the Polish crown. Anna therefore took advantage of established Hohenzollern family custom that gave her and not her son control over the marriages of her unmarried daughters to carry on with the Swedish marriage plan herself.¹² Georg Wilhelm, away in Prussia at the time, put up modest resistance to his mother's efforts, but since his main concern was not so much to block the marriage from occurring but rather to deflect all responsibility for it from himself he seemed largely content to smother the Polish court with statements of his loyalty and his abhorrence for the actions of his mother while doing relatively little to try to bring those actions to an end.¹³

With Anna now positively disposed towards the plan, Gustav Adolf decided to embark on his famous incognito trip to Berlin in the spring of 1620, when he secretly met with Anna and Maria Eleonora and his formal engagement to the Brandenburg princess took place. The king was back in Stockholm by July 1620 to conduct the preparations for the wedding. He sent Axel Oxenstierna to Berlin in August 1620 to

¹¹ See Hammarstrand, 135–36. In response to Johann Sigismund's statements to Horn Electress Anna reportedly wrote to the queen-mother of Sweden that her husband was senile and was putting his entire land in danger. See Hammarstrand, 136 n. 3.

¹² See Hammarstrand, 194; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:178. Roberts notes that the hostility between Anna and her son Georg Wilhelm was based partially in religious differences (she was Lutheran, he was Calvinist), which led her to desire that her second son Joachim Sigismund, a Lutheran, would become Duke of Lutheran Prussia. Anna believed that Georg Wilhelm was seeking the support of the Polish crown against her and her plan, and this led her to embrace the Swedish marriage plan that she had so strongly resisted before.

¹³ See, for example, Georg Wilhelm to Archbishop Laurentius Gemabiczky of Gnesen, Angerburg, 5 September 1620. Cited in Hammarstrand, 215 n. 3. On Georg Wilhelm's half-hearted resistance to the actual marriage, see Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I:180.

finalize the negotiations, and by November Maria Eleonora and her entourage had arrived in Sweden.¹⁴ The marriage took place in Stockholm on 25 November.

The immediate political results of the marriage were not what Gustav Adolf had desired: a formal political alliance with Brandenburg did not follow, and, as Michael Roberts has written, “[i]ts direct effects on Sweden’s position were few and insignificant” before Sweden’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War.¹⁵ This did not mean, however, that the idea of building a dynastic connection between the two countries was discredited. Just over ten years later talks began of an additional marriage between the two houses, this time involving Gustav Adolf’s and Maria Eleonora’s daughter Christina and Georg Wilhelm’s son Friedrich Wilhelm.

Christina and Friedrich Wilhelm

The first steps in suggesting a marriage between Christina and Friedrich Wilhelm appear to have been taken by Gustav Adolf himself during a discussion with Sigismund von Götze at Bärwalde in January 1631.¹⁶ The issue was raised again during Gustav Adolf’s time in Berlin later that year, and by 1632 high-level (although secretive) discussions regarding the marriage were taking place at Frankfurt am Main between Axel Oxenstierna, Götze and Leuchtmar.¹⁷ A Swedish Council document written in March 1633 that outlined the benefits Sweden stood to gain via the proposed

¹⁴ Gustav Adolf’s instructions for Axel Oxenstierna’s trip were dated Stockholm, 29 July 1620. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 135, 1620, 592r–600v. For Oxenstierna’s trip to Germany see Hammarstrand, 212–14; Nils Ahnlund, *Axel Oxenstierna intill Gustav Adolfs död* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1940), 234–40.

¹⁵ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 1181.

¹⁶ See Oscar Malmström, *I Änkedrottning Maria Eleonora och hennes Flykt till Danmark. II. Underhandlingarna om ett Giftermål mellan Kristina af Sverige och Friedrich Wilhelm af Brandenburg* (Helsingborg: Tryckeriaktiebolaget Helsingborgs Dagblads Tryckeri, 1895), XII; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:512; Kretschmar, “Die Allianzverhandlungen Gustav Adolfs,” 380. The theory that Gustav Adolf was the originator of the plan is supported by a seventeenth-century annotated index of documents relating to Swedish-Brandenburg relations found in the Svenska Riksarkiv and entitled “Notitia Actorum inter Potentissimos Reges Sueciæ et Serenissimos Electores Brandeburgicos, a tempore Regis Gustavi Adolphi.” Under the section for 1631 it reads: “. . . wid denna tyden att drifwa på ett giftermähl emellan hennes Kl: Mtt: drottning Christina och ChurPrintzen. Salig Kl. Mtt. hade sielf forst gifwit anledning dertill, och jämwal begynnet derom att tractera.” RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 206. This same document paints a positive picture of the success of the Gustav Adolf-Maria Eleonora marriage.

¹⁷ Malmström, XIIIff. By April 1632 Götze and Leuchtmar were sounding cautiously optimistic about the chances for success in the marriage issue. See Sigismund von Götze

match emphasized that dynastic alliance with Brandenburg would augment Swedish power and thus be helpful in conducting the current war in Germany as well as pursuing the larger Swedish goal of *dominium maris Baltici* while also offering prospects for a positive resolution to the Pomeranian question.¹⁸ The point regarding Pomerania was crucial.

The Pomeranian issue occupied a pivotal position in the Friedrich Wilhelm-Christina marriage plans that was every bit as central as that of Poland had been in the first marriage alliance negotiations. As we have seen, Pomerania had been a major source of tension in Brandenburg-Swedish relations since the beginning of Sweden's involvement in the Thirty Years' War, much to the chagrin of each government. Gustav Adolf, especially in the early stages of his German campaign, had no desire to alienate a potential ally like Brandenburg, while the Brandenburgers understood that they would have no chance of making good their hereditary claim to Pomerania against Sweden via military force. One of the strongest appeals of the plan for a further dynastic alliance between the two houses was that it offered the potential of a compromise solution to this Pomeranian dilemma.¹⁹ As early as the Frankfurt talks in 1632, and in Brandenburg's support of the plan for a general Protestant union under Swedish directory that same year, there was the clear hope that a marriage between Christina and Friedrich Wilhelm could lead to a peaceful and mutually satisfactory solution to the Pomeranian question.²⁰

to von dem Knesebeck, Frankfurt/Main, 17 April 1632. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 4, fasc. 3, 24r–31v.

¹⁸ "Dock likväl deras oförgripliga mening kanslern att upptäcka, så synes detta giftermålet för dessa orsaker rådligt och nyttigt. 1) Att personerna själfva både i ålder, härkomst och makt i det närmaste äro lika. 2) Att det så hafver varit salig K.M:s vilja. 3) Detta konungsliga och det kurbrandenburgska huset blefve därigenom så mycket högre allierade. 4) Svenska makten emot alla fiender märkligen förbättrad. 5) Dominium af Östersjön stabilieradt, det tyska kriget mycket faciliteradt. 6) Och kunde vid denna aliansen Pommern förmodligen vinnas under Sveriges krona evärdligen." Council's Memorial to Axel Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 29 March 1633. Printed in full in Malmström, XXIII–XXIV.

¹⁹ Malmström (XII) goes so far as to say that Gustav Adolf was driven by political necessity to invent the marriage alliance idea in order to counter Brandenburg's animosity that had arisen after the king concluded his treaty with Bogislav XIV. In looking at the situation a decade later, Ferdinand Schevill has written that Axel Oxenstierna continued to hold the door to the Brandenburg match (which held for him few other attractions) ever so slightly open into the 1640s due to his hopes for "the whole cantankerous quarrel [over Pomerania] to be in this manner magically put to sleep." Schevill, *The Great Elector* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), 117.

²⁰ Malmström, XIIIff.; Pufendorf, *de Rebus Suecicis*, Book IV, §. 39, 73.

With Gustav Adolf's death at Lützen and the threat of declining military fortunes Sweden feared being deserted by its erstwhile allies. Maintaining Brandenburg's affection therefore took on an added sense of urgency, and the ongoing marriage discussions were a prime avenue to achieve this. Per Brahe was dispatched to Berlin in February 1633, and although little is known of the discussions that took place it appears that the purpose of his mission was to prop up Brandenburg's morale following the king's death and to keep hopes for a marriage alliance high.²¹ Pufendorf noted that Brandenburg's support for Sweden remained strong in 1633, despite the fact that Saxony and many of the other Protestant states cooled towards the Swedes following Gustav Adolf's death, and he attributed this to the rising hopes for a marriage alliance.²² Talks regarding the marriage plan continued over the next several years, but came to a crashing halt in early 1636 when Brandenburg, having accepted the terms of the Peace of Prague the previous year, entered into active Imperial alliance against Sweden.²³ Brandenburg and Sweden were now at war, and would remain so for the next five years. For all intents and purposes the marriage idea appeared to be dead.

Friedrich Wilhelm, however, had never given up hope in the marriage plan. The electoral prince had not supported his father's switch to the anti-Swedish alliance, and had in fact written a private letter to Christina in August 1636 expressing his dismay over Brandenburg's actions towards Sweden, the responsibility for which he placed squarely on his father's chief minister Schwarzenberg.²⁴ The tone of this letter, which stressed Friedrich Wilhelm's devotion to the young queen, suggests that he held

²¹ See C.T. Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens im Westphälischen Friedenscongress und die Gründung der schwedischen Herrschaft in Deutschland* (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1877), 20.

²² Pufendorf, *de Rebus Suecicis*, Book V, §. 35, 101–02.

²³ On some of the later marriage negotiations before Brandenburg switched sides, see Sigismund von Götze to Georg Wilhelm, Mainz, 15 January 1635. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 9, fasc. 3, 1r–7v.

²⁴ "Ich muß mit großen hertzenleib beklagn wie es ietzunder in der Marck Brandenburg durch dieses Mensch [Schwarzenberg] Verursachung so ubel zugehet, und durch denselben so viel böses zwischen der Cron Schweden, undt dem Churhause Brandenburg gestiftet wird. Ich bitte aber Gott, das er seine böse anschläge zu nichten machen wolle, wie dan auch E Kö: Mtt. ich underthenigst bitte . . . das ChurHauß Brandenburg, und meine Persohn umb meiner unschuld willen in gnaden *recommendirt* sein laßen, und sich gnedigst versichern, das ich deroselben underthenigster gehorsambster undt getrewer diener leben undt sterben werde. E. Kö. Maytt thue ich hiemit Göttlicher bewahrung zu langwiriger guten gesundheit undt allem königlichen wollstand, deroselben mich aber zu beharlicher gnedisten gewogenheit underthenigst empfehlen." Friedrich Wilhelm to Christina, The Hague, 1/11 August 1636. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 200.

on to the idea of marrying his Swedish cousin despite the hostilities that were raging between their states. And indeed, shortly after Friedrich Wilhelm came to power he began making efforts to revive the marriage alliance negotiations. By spring 1641 Leuchtmar, who was in Sweden to negotiate the armistice, was being encouraged to raise the marriage issue with the Swedes once more.²⁵ Leuchtmar discussed the matter with Johan Oxenstierna at Stralsund and Stettin in January 1642, and the following month Johan Adler Salvius wrote to Axel Oxenstierna that the elector seemed poised to pursue the marriage with Christina publicly, whereas everything had been done indirectly and in secret before.²⁶ Friedrich Wilhelm himself wrote to Oxenstierna in July 1642 asking for his support in the marriage negotiations.²⁷

The desire to reach an acceptable settlement regarding Pomerania was still the central issue driving Brandenburg's efforts to revive the marriage discussions with Sweden, and the Brandenburgers placed enormous value on trying to carry the negotiations through to a successful conclusion. The elector wrote to his council in June 1645 that "next to God the welfare . . . of Ourselves and Our entire Electoral House depends to the largest extent" upon the success of the marriage negotiations.²⁸ Oxenstierna,

²⁵ See Samuel von Winterfeldt to [Sigismund von Götze], Hamburg, 19/29 May 1641: "Aus des von Leuchtmar's Schreiben, so er bei seinem Ufbruch anhero gethan, erlange ich so viele Nachricht, dass er in puncto eines Heurats nichts in mandatis; consilium non improbo; ich verstehe aber von einem vertrauten Freunde, dass die inclinationes gar gut, und wol dörfte übel genommen werden, wann davon ganz nichts sollte erwähnt werden, dass auch wol alle Negociation dadurch möchte zu Wasser werden; derwegen ich bei dem alten Hünerfresser, so heute uf Schweden ufbricht oder gehet, doch durch eines andern Mittel dem von Leuchtmar an die Hand gebe, dass er vor sich zu Abwendung des Disgusto und Facilitirung seiner Negociation super illo passu die inclinationes sobrie sondiren und praepariren wölle, damit man gute Opinion erhalte, und was Gott etwan schicken mochte, nicht schwerer mache." *UA*, I, 538–42, here 539.

²⁶ Adler Salvius made this observation based upon a letter written by Leuchtmar: "Han [Leuchtmar] skriver hit, . . . att härtili hafva de talt par parabolas, men nu snart vela de begynna offentlig vārfva om Churfs. giftermål i Sverige. Kanhända något sådant nu kommer på banen." Johan Adler Salvius to Axel Oxenstierna, Hamburg, 5 [15] February 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 19. On the discussions in January 1642, see Malmström, XIV.

²⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm to Axel Oxenstierna, Königsberg, 27 July 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 33.

²⁸ "Nächst Gott beruht Unser und Unseres gantzen Churfürstlichen Hauses Wohlfahrt und Aufnehmen zum grössesten Theile darauf." Friedrich Wilhelm to privy council, Königsberg, 13 June 1645. Cited in Richard Armstedt, *Der schwedische Heiratsplan des Grossen Kurfürsten*. Beilage zum Programm des Altstädtischen Gymnasiums zu Königsberg i. Pr. Ostern 1896. (1896 Progr. Nr. 9 [8]) (Königsberg i. Pr.: Hartungsche Buchdruckerei, 1896), 11. Statements like this led Armstedt (11) to conclude, with some overstatement in the eyes of the current author, that the Swedish marriage plan was the "Hauptziel" of Brandenburg foreign policy for the first five years of Friedrich Wilhelm's reign.

however, had come to see a marriage alliance with Brandenburg as inimical to Sweden's best interests and sense of national independence.²⁹ He did, however, recognize that keeping the Brandenburgers' hopes alive could be of tactical value in the coming general peace negotiations. Johan Oxenstierna thus received orders in March 1642 to keep the elector's spirits regarding the marriage high so that Sweden could use this to its advantage.³⁰ This set the pattern for the marriage plan for the next several years, with the Brandenburgers trying via a succession of special missions as well as through their representatives at the Westphalia negotiations to move the issue forward, and the Swedes carefully stringing them along without ever giving a definitive yes or no. Friedrich Wilhelm even toyed with the idea of following in Gustav Adolf's footsteps and making an incognito trip to Sweden to push the plan forward himself.³¹ By 1645 Graf Johann von Sayn und Wittgenstein, the chief Brandenburg negotiator in Osnabrück who had consistently made the point to his Swedish counterparts that a marriage was the best way out of the Pomeranian dilemma, was losing faith in the plan.³² In December of that year Adolf Friedrich Schlezer, Brandenburg agent in Stockholm, felt compelled to write that "not without sorrow I must report that I have little hope left for the marriage [plan]."³³ The elector himself stubbornly clung to a sliver of hope, but by 1646 he had also been driven to the conclusion that the Swedes

²⁹ See Pufendorf, *de Rebus Suecicis*, Book XIV, §. 47, 493: "Cancellarii tamen Oxenstiernæ mens erat, id connubium Sueciæ non expedire. Nam præter discrepantiam circa sacra, Principem eum pervicaci videri ingenio, cui cum splendidum patrimonium sit, Sueciam minus cordi fore. Extaneis Regibus solitum Sueciam opibus exhaurire, easque cum præcipuis muneribus in populares suos transferre. Nec suevisse eum cum Ordinibus tractare, & eorum libertatem ferre. Fortasse & ipsum amitæ exemplo cælum, solumque Sueciæ fastiditurum." See also Malmström, XIV.

³⁰ "...i det andra och öfvriga [marriage issue] gå caute, hålla Churf. i så god humeur I kunne, anten då stilleståndet slutes eller uppskjutes, att våra ministrar och officerare därute må så mycket friare njuta landen." Swedish government to Johan Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 15 [25] March 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 21.

³¹ "Und gesinnen demnach hiemit an Euch gnäd., Ihr wollet bei dem Herrn Reichscanzler Eurer habenden Instruction nach Euch in geheim und Vertrauen bestes Fleisses erkundigen, ob Wir würden sicher gehen können, auch mit demselben auf verspürenden Fall der Sicherheit, da Ihr also gut befindet, es in Rath stellen, ob Wir Uns nicht durch Conduicte des Oberst Goldstein mit gar wenig Personen in höchster Geheim in Schweden selbst der Abrede gemäss möchten finden lassen können." Friedrich Wilhelm to Götze and Leuchtmair, Königsberg, 12/22 September 1642. *UA*, I, 579–81, here 581.

³² See Pufendorf, *de Rebus Suecicis*, Book XVII, §. 101, 596.

³³ "Gestalt ich E *Excell.* hiermit underdienstlichst, wie wohll nicht ohne trawren, anfügen muß, das ich zu der Heÿrath wenig Hoffnung mehr übrig habe." Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to [von Löben?], Stockholm, 13 December 1645. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 2, 35r–v, here 35r.

were only using the marriage issue as a ruse.³⁴ In May he ordered his representatives in Westphalia to give no more effort to the marriage plan from that point forward.³⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm resigned himself to the likelihood that with the marriage plan abandoned he would have to surrender part of Pomerania to the Swedes in the peace agreement, and before the year was out he turned the page on the proposed Swedish match by marrying Luise Henriette of Orange.

Important differences between the two marriage plans extend beyond the obvious point that one was successful while the other was not. In the first marriage Sweden had been the pursuer and Brandenburg the pursued, whereas the opposite was the case with the second proposed match, at least in the decisive phase of the 1640s. The core issue in the first match had been a matter external to the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship—namely their respective (and separate) relationships with Poland—while the second plan was seen especially as an avenue for resolving the conflict between Brandenburg and Sweden themselves over Pomerania. Despite these differences, the marriage plans together represent the integral positions the two countries had come to occupy in each other's diplomacy. But more than this, the marriage alliance plans illuminate the fact that Brandenburg and Sweden were coming to conceive of themselves as potential, or even logical, dynastic and political partners, as states that naturally belonged together in the same grouping. A key to understanding this lies in an aspect of the marriage negotiations this chapter has not yet addressed, religion.

Religion and the Marriage Plans

By 1618 the plan for Gustav Adolf to marry Maria Eleonora had become an international pan-Protestant project that drew support from Protestant states (and Protestant cosmopolitans) across northern Europe. The Palatinate, center of the Protestant cause in Germany, was dynastically

³⁴ Schevill writes that "at length he could no longer blind himself to the fact that the Swedes were making sport of him." *Great Elector*, 117. McKay adds that by late 1645 Friedrich Wilhelm "accepted he had been led a dance." *Great Elector*, 30.

³⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm to the Brandenburg negotiators in Westphalia, Königsberg, 12 May 1646. *UA*, IV, 439. The elector wrote that Swedish discourse on this issue was "so general, zweifelhaftig und also bewandt, dass daraus die geringste Gewissheit nicht zu nehmen, daher Wir bei sothaner Ungewissheit Uns hierauf weiter herauszulassen gar nicht thunlich noch rathsam ermesen können." See also Friedrich Wilhelm to the Brandenburg negotiators in Westphalia, Berlin, 22 June/2 July 1646. *UA*, IV, 446–47.

linked to both the Hohenzollern and the Swedish Vasa. Georg Wilhelm was married to Luisa Juliana, the younger sister of Elector Friedrich V of the Palatinate, while Count Palatine Johann Kasimir of Zweibrücken was married to Gustav Adolf's half-sister Katarina. Members of this house were extremely active in working to bring about the Brandenburg-Swedish match for reasons that were simultaneously dynastic, political and religious. Gustav Adolf made use of Johann Kasimir as a go-between with the Brandenburgers during the negotiations, and the king made his famous incognito trip to Berlin while disguised as a commoner member of Johann Kasimir's entourage.³⁶ The *Pfälzer* conceived of the marriage plans in terms of the European Protestant cause and as part of the larger struggle against Catholic/Habsburg power, as a letter written by 'Winter King' Friedrich to Gustav Adolf in August 1620 makes clear:

As we now entirely believe that this marriage has been foreordained by God, and that through it the welfare and prosperous ascent of both the Royal and Electoral houses, and also that of Protestantism in general, will be furthered in many ways, and on the other hand that the pernicious pomp and progress of the Spanish Monarchy can be thwarted so much the more: therefore we have reason to ask God the Almighty that he follow Your Majesty's wish and request and bring this good work to a happy conclusion to the honor of His name.³⁷

In a letter written to the elector several days later Friedrich urged a quick resolution to the marriage issue, and stressed to Georg Wilhelm the dangers that Protestantism would face if Gustav Adolf were to die without an heir and Sweden were to return to Polish Papist rule.³⁸ The other leading

³⁶ For the extensive Pfalz involvement in the marriage negotiations, particularly that of Johann Kasimir, see Hammarstrand, 131ff.

³⁷ "Gleich wie wir nuhn gentzlich darvor hallten, ess sey diesser Heirath von Gott also vorsehen, vnd dass hierdurch die Wollfart vnd dass gedeilliche Aufnehmen beider Königl. vnd Churfürstl:n Heusser, auch des gemeinen Ewangelischen Wesens in viel Wege befürdert, vnd hingegen die itz vorseiende scheddliche Prachtiken vnd vorhabende Stabilirung der Spanischen Monarchi vmb so viel mehr hindertrieben werden könne: also haben wir Vrsach, Gott den almächtigen zu bitten, das er diesses guette Werck, zu seines Nahmens Ehr, zu glücklichem Ende, E.L. Wünsch vnd Verlangen nach, bringen wolle;" Friedrich von der Pfalz/Böhmen to Gustav Adolf, Prague, 10/20 October 1620. Cited in Hammarstrand, 206 n. 4. In this letter Friedrich went on to pledge his support for the marriage plan, including a promise to write to Georg Wilhelm, his wife Luise Juliana, and to the Electress-Dowager Anna in support of the marriage.

³⁸ Friedrich von der Pfalz/Böhmen to Georg Wilhelm, Prague, 15/25 August 1620. See Hammarstrand, 208–09.

princely light of German pan-Protestantism, Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, also became involved in furthering the marriage plans.³⁹

Sweden made efforts to involve the Dutch as well in the push to see the marriage become reality. Axel Oxenstierna wrote to Albert Joachimi, a Dutch diplomat who had been involved in mediating peace between Sweden and Russia in the 1610s, in March 1618 with a request that he urge the States General to support the marriage plan. He stressed to Joachimi that, as Brandenburg and Sweden were both allies of the Dutch, no one would be better situated to encourage the marriage than the States General, and that a marriage bond between Brandenburg and Sweden would strengthen the ties that held all three countries together.⁴⁰ Oxenstierna also wrote to the Swedish representatives in the Netherlands, Jakob van Dyk and Jan Rutgers, with instructions to encourage Joachimi, Oldenbarnevelt, and Hugo Mysius to use their influence with the States General to have them send either an ambassador or a letter to Brandenburg in support of the marriage plan. Van Dyk and Rutgers were to stress that the marriage would “increase [all of their] power to resist the common enemy,” a not-so-subtle confessional reference to the Catholic powers.⁴¹ The Dutch response to this request was positive, and in the latter stages of the negotiations they wrote to the elector upon Gustav Adolf’s request in praise of the proposed marriage.⁴²

It is clear, then, that the first Brandenburg-Swedish marriage enjoyed considerable support amongst the leading Protestant circles of northern Europe, and was seen by them as part and parcel of the larger striving for Protestant unity against the common Catholic threat. The religious aspect of the second proposed marriage was far more complicated as it involved navigating the treacherous waters of confessional difference,

³⁹ Hammarstrand, 134. Moritz may have been in correspondence with Gustav Adolf as early as 1616 regarding the marriage plan. See J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, II.2, 451.

⁴⁰ “Etenim si inter Serenissimum meum et filiam præfati Electoris pacta matrimonii iniri possent, multo adstringeretur duplici vinculo fortius fœdus quod vobis et cum Rege meo, et cum Electore est, cum hi non vobiscum tantum, sed et inter se mutuo nexu copularentur. . . . Nemo omnium est, qui hoc negotium suscipiat maiori cum spe boni successus, aut minori cum offensione animorum, si fuerit denegatum, quam potentissimi Domini Ordines Generales Belgii.” Axel Oxenstierna to Albert Joachimi, Vadstena, 25 March 1618. *RAOSoB*, I.1, Nr. 198, 315–17.

⁴¹ “Quodsi successerit negotium, fœdus cum D:nis Ordinibus initum, duplici hoc vinculo arctius necteretur, et vires ad resistendum communibus hostibus crescerent.” Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyk and Jan Rutgers, Vadstena, 26 March 1618. *RAOSoB*, I.1, Nr. 199, 317–19, here 318.

⁴² Hammarstrand, 209–10.

since Friedrich Wilhelm was Reformed and Christina from staunchly Lutheran Sweden.⁴³ The difference in religion was recognized from the outset as the greatest challenge to the success of the marriage plan. The early Swedish proposals, in fact, included the insistence that Friedrich Wilhelm convert to Lutheranism, which not surprisingly was flatly rejected by Brandenburg's Reformed councilors and court clergy.⁴⁴ Rather than to allow this intra-Protestant confessional issue to defeat the marriage plan before it even started, supporters of the marriage in Brandenburg proposed that a general synod of Protestant theologians and political thinkers be convened under Gustav Adolf's leadership in the hopes of patching over the differences between Lutherans and Calvinists and thus paving the way for the marriage to take place.⁴⁵ These plans were never realized, and when Friedrich Wilhelm revived the marriage plan in the early 1640s the difference in religion remained a formidable hindrance.⁴⁶ The young elector also turned to Protestant irenicism as an avenue to overcome the confessional obstacle to the match. As early as April 1642 he was making efforts to encourage dialog between Lutheran and Calvinist theologians in Prussia with the aim of bringing them closer to unity, and in 1643 he was elated to receive positive responses from his Calvinist court clergy as to whether one could be "blessed" in Lutheranism, and whether he could with clear conscience appoint a Lutheran court preacher.⁴⁷ As late as November 1645 the Brandenburgers were still striving for religious

⁴³ There were no confessional complications with the first marriage as Maria Eleonora had been raised Lutheran.

⁴⁴ See Armstedt, 6; Malmström, XIII; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II:645–46.

⁴⁵ See Georg Wilhelm to Axel Oxenstierna, Cöln an der Spree, 27 May 1632. GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl. Fritz Arnheim (Dep.), Nr. 4, 1–6; Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 28 August 1632. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2; Leuchtmar to Georg Wilhelm, Berlin, 25 November 1632. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 5, fasc. 2, 67r–85v. See also Malmström, XIII; Richard Schulze, *Das Project der Vermählung Friedrich Wilhelms von Brandenburg mit Christina von Schweden* (Halle a. S.: Erhardt Karras, 1898), 6.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Leuchtmar's diary for his mission to Stockholm in 1642: "Ist darauf deflectirt auf die Religionssache, und dass dieselbe die meiste Hinderung in diesem Werk bringen würde, mit vielfältiger Einführung. Darauf dann auch der Nothdurft nach geantwortet worden, und dass ein Mittel zur Linderung zu finden; welches er, der Reichscanzler, aber gar schwer geachtet." *UA*, I, 591–95, here 593.

⁴⁷ On the actions of April 1642 see *UA*, I, 104. See also Schulze, 19–22, who is clear that these efforts were directly related to the Swedish marriage issue. On the elector's reaction to his court clergy's response of 1643, see Johan Adler Salvius to Andreas Gyldenklou, Minden, 7 [17] November 1643. *UA*, XXIII.1, 61.

reconciliation between Lutherans and Calvinists as a means to further the marriage plan.⁴⁸

Although Brandenburg's encouragement of Protestant irenicism as a means to overcome the confessional barrier to a Swedish marriage came to naught, it is noteworthy that syncretic efforts were mobilized repeatedly across a span of almost fifteen years in an effort to bring the Brandenburg and Swedish houses together in dynastic marriage, much in the same fashion that the leading political forces of European Protestant unionism had united to support the earlier match between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora. A broad Protestant sensibility therefore underlay each of the marriage plans, and in turn was a key factor in the growing sense that Brandenburg and Sweden were parts of a larger common whole. Each of these factors—a search for Protestant common-ground, tied to a political vision of Brandenburg-Swedish complementarity—were elements of the Protestant cosmopolitan worldview shared by many of the diplomatic actors who carried out the actual work of moving the marriage alliance plans forward on the ground. Indeed, the bulk of activity in conceiving and advocating the marriage plans was conducted through the personal actions of transnational networks of individuals operating according to the codes of the diplomatic culture. These men were connected to each other through common scholarly interests, particularly regarding international study-travel and its relationship to diplomatic activity, personal and familial relationships, a shared proclivity for Protestant irenicism, and a sense of personal allegiance not confined to a single political body. The very personal and creative manner in which these diplomats, officers, clergymen, physicians, and scholars acted in matters of the highest importance to their princes was only loosely coordinated by their respective governments, and shows that thinking in terms of state entities may not be the most appropriate framework for understanding aspects of early modern diplomacy.

Diplomatic Culture in Action

The remainder of this chapter is not arranged to tell a specific story in a linear fashion. Rather, its form is meant to reflect the decentralized,

⁴⁸ See, for example, Friedrich Wilhelm's support for the Duke of Lüneburg's proposal for religious unity between Calvinists and Lutherans. Friedrich Wilhelm to Brandenburg representatives in Westphalia, Königsberg, 18 November 1645. *UA*, IV, 407.

web-like structure of personal connections between the individuals motivated by a shared religious-political worldview who came together to suggest and support the marriage plans because they fit into their *own* vision of how Brandenburg and Sweden should relate to one another. Discussion will zigzag back and forth between the two marriage plans, and between Brandenburgers and Swedes, in tracing the actions and interconnections of this person who knew that person who in turn knew that person, and so on. In doing so, it will strive to give a sense of the tangled, personal mechanisms through which important segments of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy took place in the early modern period.

We can begin with Birckholtz. He maintained contact with friends and relatives in Brandenburg after entering Swedish service, and while on his trip to northern Germany in 1615 (during which the prospect of a Brandenburg match for Gustav Adolf was first discussed) dealt with private and familial affairs alongside the main task of establishing a Swedish correspondence network.⁴⁹ Birckholtz' sense of dual obligation to his adopted country and that of his birth was central to his desire to deepen the connection between the two countries to their mutual benefit. Though the source material is not conclusive, he appears to have begun discussions with Johann Sigismund regarding the marriage on his own initiative.⁵⁰ One prominent historian has gone so far as to say that establishing Brandenburg-Swedish friendship through dynastic marriage was Birckholtz' "dearest wish."⁵¹ In Axel Oxenstierna's instructions to Birckholtz from March 1616 he referred to Birckholtz' known desire to be a "useful instrument" in bringing about closer relations between Brandenburg and Sweden, which Birckholtz had made clear would give him a "special happiness, especially as His Majesty's loyal servant and resident [of Sweden], but also as the Elector's born subject." Oxenstierna recognized that Birckholtz' personal connection to Brandenburg would be useful as well, and he therefore ordered Birckholtz to travel back to

⁴⁹ Droste, "Hieronymus von Birckholtz," 79–82; Hammarstrand, 29; *SBL*, IV, 407. For an earlier trip Birckholtz made back to Brandenburg to deal with personal matters in 1609, see RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 109, 68v–69r.

⁵⁰ Axel Norberg suggests the possibility that Birckholtz may have been acting at Queen-Mother Christina's request. Norberg, *Polen i Svensk Politik 1617–26* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1974), 35. Droste notes that Birckholtz himself never explained to Oxenstierna his reasons for discussing the marriage. "Hieronymus von Birckholtz," 80 n. 16.

⁵¹ Ahnlund, *Axel Oxenstierna*, 230.

Brandenburg in 1616 under the pretense of “your private affairs,” and to use this opportunity to push for closer relations between the states.⁵²

The avenues through which Birckholtz pursued his efforts to bring Brandenburg and Sweden into a closer relationship, including the marriage plan, depended from the beginning on a web of personal connections. He had gone through his old friend Dr. Saffius to gain quick personal access to Johann Sigismund shortly after he arrived in Küstrin in 1615, and Saffius was one of his earliest discussion partners in the first talks regarding the marriage plan.⁵³ He went on to hold further discussions with Saffius and other Brandenburg officials, and it was during these discussions that the idea of a possible marriage was first raised. Birckholtz also ingratiated himself with certain Brandenburgers with the promise of choice Swedish gifts, such as fine deer-skin for a cap, and squirrel-fur lining for bedding, remarking that “with such items I’ll be able to make a good reputation with them, and enter into a special relationship with them.”⁵⁴ Gift giving was an important element in the construction of early modern friendship networks, mobilizing a complex symbolic language centered more on establishing and maintaining a personal relationship between giver and receiver than on the value of the exchanged items themselves (no matter how much this may have been noted.)⁵⁵ The ‘special relationships’

⁵² “... då lathe dem förstå att sedhan I för ett år sedhan förstodhe både aff H. Churf. N:de sielff och dem, sosom och aff den ähre eder där vederföhrs, att H. Churf. N:de var H. K. M:tt väl affectionerat, fattade I däraff en synnerlig hugnad, serdeles mädhan I såsom H. K. M:ttz edzsvorne och inbyggjande, men H. Churf. N:des borne undersåter sådant hoppades att niute till godhe... Hvarföre hade I föregiffuedt att äther vele draga till Brandenburgk i eder privat ährender, att försöke om I och kone niuta den ähran och lyckan att I till en sådan venlig correspondens kone giffue orsak och tilfelle, och bliffue därtill ett nyttigt instrument.” Axel Oxenstierna to Hieronymus von Birckholtz, Åbo, 23 March 1616. *RAOSoB*, I.2, Nr. 164, 260–62.

⁵³ See Hammarstrand, 29–31.

⁵⁴ “mitt solchen Sachenn könnte ich mier ein gross Ansehendt bey ihnen machen, vndt bey ihnen in ein sonderes Vernehmen gerathenn.” Hieronymus von Birckholtz to Axel Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 10 November 1615. Cited in Hammarstrand, 32 n. 1.

⁵⁵ Jacques T. Godbout stresses “la valeur de lien” in evaluating gift exchange. Godbout, *Ce qui circule entre nous: donner, recevoir, rendre* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2007), esp. 117–18. The classic work on early modern gift exchange is Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000). For discussions of gift-giving in the context of early modern diplomacy, see Falcke, *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen*; Diana Carrió-Invernizzi, “Gift and Diplomacy in Seventeenth-Century Spanish Italy,” *The Historical Journal* 51, nr. 4 (2008), 881–99; Majja Jansson, “Measured Reciprocity: English Ambassadorial Gift Exchange in the 17th and 18th Centuries,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, nr. 3–4 (2005), 348–70; Heinz Duchhardt, “Das diplomatische Abschiedsgeschenk,” *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 57, nr. 2 (1975), 345–62.

Birckholtz sought to build through the provision of gifts would form the bedrock for his work to bring about the dynastic marriage.

While making his return trip to Brandenburg in 1616 Birckholtz stopped off along the way in Güstrow, where he ran into Colonel Jakob Hyll, an expatriate Swede now living in Germany whom Birckholtz had become acquainted with in Küstrin the previous year. Hyll gave Birckholtz valuable intelligence about the current state of affairs at the Brandenburg court, and accompanied Birckholtz on the remainder of his voyage to Berlin. Saffius came to see Birckholtz as soon as he arrived in Berlin, and informed him of the elector's fears in light of the recent actions against Duke Wilhelm of Kurland of news of Birckholtz' presence in Brandenburg reaching King Sigismund's ears.⁵⁶ Saffius suggested that Birckholtz depart immediately for Küstrin, where he could meet clandestinely with Johann Sigismund, who was expected to pass through there in a few days while en route to Prussia. This plan, made possible by Birckholtz' personal connections, worked well, and he held several secret and productive meetings with the elector. While in Küstrin Birckholtz expanded his network of connections by coming into contact with the elector's secretary, Christoph Ludwig Rasch. After Johann Sigismund departed, Birckholtz and Rasch made independent plans to meet several days later, when Rasch was to be wed. Birckholtz was invited to the wedding, and afterwards he and Rasch held long, candid conversations on a wide range of political issues, including the desire to deepen Brandenburg-Swedish relations.⁵⁷

Rasch himself became part of the network working in favor of the marriage plan.⁵⁸ His background and outlook mark him as a Protestant cosmopolitan. He had studied at a variety of German universities and traveled through France and Italy before entering Johann Sigismund's service. His work in favor of the Brandenburg-Swedish match following his meeting with Birckholtz made him a logical choice for the traveling party that accompanied Maria Eleonora to Sweden for her wedding, and he remained in Sweden afterwards. In 1622 he was named a Swedish councilor, and he came to enjoy Gustav Adolf's confidence. The king used him on a variety of diplomatic missions in the 1620s and early 1630s, especially

⁵⁶ Hammarstrand, 35.

⁵⁷ See Birckholtz' report to the Swedish government on his dealings in northern Germany dated Stettin, 14 September 1616. Cited at length in Hammarstrand, 39 n. 2.

⁵⁸ See entries for Rasch in *Svenska Män och Kvinnor. Biografisk Uppslagsbok*, vol. 6 (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 1949), 221 (by Thure Månsson); *ADB*, LIII, 205–09 (by Hessel).

in matters that stressed the need for Protestant unity.⁵⁹ In 1633 he led the Swedish negotiations with the Hansa cities in an effort to get them to join the Protestant Heilbronn League, and later that year he was named an assessor with the Protestant alliance and a legate with the Protestant armies in the Lower Saxon and Westphalian Imperial circles. Rasch's religious beliefs were such that the Protestant irenic John Dury referred to him as being "of our religion."⁶⁰ He was also the author of two anti-Habsburg political pamphlets ("*Hansischer Wecker*" [1628] and "*Nachklang des hansischen Weckers*" [also 1628]) in which he warned the Hansa cities of the dangers of an Imperial ambush. He may have been involved in producing Spanheim's *Le soldat suédois* (1633–1641) as well.

Rasch was not the only person with whom Birckholtz dealt regarding the marriage plan who later became an active part of the network. At Rasch's wedding in Stettin Birckholtz made the acquaintance of Dr. Martin Chemnitz (the younger,) chancellor of Eastern Pomerania.⁶¹ After the wedding they continued to meet socially, and Birckholtz was able to engage Chemnitz in supplying the Swedish government with monthly intelligence reports that he could gain from Duke Bogislav's extensive intelligence-gathering efforts. In these conversations Chemnitz also raised the issue of Gustav Adolf's marital status and heartily recommended a match between him and Maria Eleonora.⁶² Chemnitz' subsequent correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna included much information about Brandenburg and Poland. Chemnitz' sons later became involved in militant Protestant politics in Germany and entered Swedish service. Martin Chemnitz (III) attached himself to the German Protestant 'action party' led by men such as Count Wilhelm of Hessen and Dukes Wilhelm and Bernhard of Weimar.⁶³ He entered Swedish service in December 1630 and was involved in a variety of important issues during Sweden's involvement in the Thirty Years' War. Bogislav Philip von Chemnitz went on to become the official Swedish historiographer and author of the famous

⁵⁹ On Rasch's diplomatic dealings with Brandenburg in 1634, see Höjer, 208. For a planned mission to Brandenburg from the mid-1620s that may never have been carried out, see RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199; Ahnlund, "Gustaf II Adolfs första preussiska fälttåg," 92–93.

⁶⁰ Cited in Westin, *Negotiations*, 142 n. 57.

⁶¹ On Martin Chemnitz the younger, see the entries in *ADB*, IV, 118 (by Steffenhagen); *SBL*, VIII, 403–04. On Rasch as the connection point between Birckholtz and Chemnitz, see Droste, "Hieronymus von Birckholtz," 87.

⁶² Hammarstrand, 42–43.

⁶³ On Martin Chemnitz (III), see the entries in *SBL*, VIII, 404–14 (by Bertil Boëthius); Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 385 (entry B22); *ADB*, IV, 118 (by Steffenhagen).

propagandistic history of Sweden's involvement in the Thirty Years' War, *Königlichen Schwedischen In Teutschland geführten Kriegs*.⁶⁴ A third son, Franciscus Chemnitz, became a Swedish royal physician.

The intellectual credentials of the Chemnitz family were substantial. Martin the younger's father was a famous Lutheran theologian who studied at Brandenburg's University of Frankfurt an der Oder and under Melanchthon at Wittenberg.⁶⁵ During the Schmalkaldic Wars he moved to Königsberg in Ducal Prussia, where he became a *Magister* and was named librarian of the Ducal palace library. He entered Braunschweig service later in his career and was one of the first and loudest Protestant voices in Germany to speak out against the Jesuits and the decisions of the Council of Trent.⁶⁶ Martin the younger received his doctorate in law at Frankfurt an der Oder and became a Professor of Law at the University of Rostock. He married the daughter of Heinrich Camerarius, also a Professor of Law at Rostock and Syndicus of the city, in which capacity he traveled to Sweden on a number of occasions for diplomatic missions.⁶⁷ Martin the younger's son Martin III studied extensively at both the universities of Rostock and Tübingen, where he produced a variety of disputations and dissertations on questions of law and politics.⁶⁸ He received his Doctorate of Law from Rostock in 1623. In his later years he developed a relationship with Hugo Grotius (who himself stood in Swedish diplomatic service) based in part on their common scholarly interests. Bogislav Philip studied law and history at Rostock and Jena, fought with the Dutch army in the 1620s, and joined the Swedish army when Gustav Adolf invaded Germany in 1630. In 1640 he published the anti-Habsburg polemic *De ratione status in imperio nostro romano-germanico* under the pseudonym Hippolithus a Lapide.

Members of the Chemnitz family therefore possessed personal connections to those involved in pursuing the marriage plan (Birckholtz and

⁶⁴ Bogislav Philip von Chemnitz, *Königlichen Schwedischen In Teutschland geführten Kriegs*, four volumes (Alten Stettin: Johann Valentin Rheten, 1653). On Bogislav Philip, see the entries in *SBL*, VIII, 414–19 (by G. Jacobson); *ADB*, IV, 114–16 (by Fr. Weber).

⁶⁵ See *ADB*, IV, 116–18 (by Brecher).

⁶⁶ He published his *Theologiae Jesuitarum praecipua capita* in 1562, and his famous four-volume *Examen concilii Tridentini* from 1565–1573.

⁶⁷ See *ADB*, III, 719–20 (by Fromm).

⁶⁸ *Disputation de fœderibus* (Rostock, 1617, under P. Wasmodius); *Dissertationes III de iustitia et jure, quibus jus universum compendiose tractatur, & simul ad forum casuque conscientiae studiose confirmatur* (pt. 1–2, Tübingen, 1618–1619, under Chr. Besold); *Thesmata... criminalia* (Tübingen, 1619, under Joh. Halbritter); *Theses inaugurals de jure belli* (Rostock, 1623, under E. Cothmann).

Rasch); participated themselves in advocating for the marriage in informal, interpersonal settings (Martin the younger); helped carry out Sweden's official diplomacy in Germany (Martin III); and blended advanced scholarly interests with activist Protestantism. The combination of these factors helped them build connections to both Sweden and Brandenburg, and this makes the Chemnitz family particularly representative of the diplomatic culture.

Birckholtz himself, although he had studied at Heidelberg in the 1580s, could not come close to matching the Chemnitz family in terms of scholarly accomplishment.⁶⁹ He did, however, have an interesting connection to another man of intellectual achievement, Hieronymus von Elver. Their interaction is indicative of the personal nature through which ties of diplomatic relevance were established, and the set of traits and experiences that were seen as conducive to activity within the diplomatic network.⁷⁰ While in search for a Danzig correspondent for his information system in 1616 Birckholtz was contacted by one of his Brandenburg connections, Hans Felix Klärner, who mentioned that Elver, also in Brandenburg service, might be interested in filling the post. Birckholtz subsequently wrote to Elver to inquire about his interest, being sure to add that his confidence that Elver could succeed in the position was increased by his family name, which suggested a relation to Birckholtz' good friend Dr. Leonhard Elver, Bürgermeister of Lüneburg.⁷¹ Elver had therefore been brought to Birckholtz' attention by one personal connection and was given credence by familial ties to another, and this was the first step in his entrance into Birckholtz' clandestine information network. It wasn't long before Elver himself sought to work through Birckholtz to get an acquaintance of *his* a Swedish position as well. In advertising this acquaintance to Birckholtz, Elver placed the highest emphasis on his learning, academic (and military) travel, and linguistic abilities:

⁶⁹ *SBL*, IV, 406.

⁷⁰ On Birckholtz' connections to Elver, see Droste, "Hieronymus von Birckholtz," esp. 83–84. Correspondence between the two is in RA, Enskilda arkiv, von Birckholtz, E 3253.

⁷¹ "... auch mehr zu das Heren *person affectioniret* undt gewiggt, weil ich seines *cognominis* halber... es musse der Herr meines groß gunstigenn Herrn Schwagers undt altem Hochbekanten *amici* undt *patroni* D. Doct: Leonhardi Elfers... Bruder oder nachverwanter sein, Was weg ich ihme desto kühnlicher trawenn, undt solche *vocation* entragenn wolenn." Hieronymus von Birckholtz to Hieronymus Elver, Rostock, 17 July 1616. RA, Enskilda arkiv, von Birckholtz, E 3253. The *ADB* (VI, 74) states that Hieronymus and Leonhard Elver were half-brothers.

...there is a learned and skilled man here who has studied in Germany, Italy, Spain and France, who knows the Spanish and Italian languages as well as German, who speaks good Latin, understands Greek and French, and has fought in Hungary and Malta. This fellow would gladly serve a power that could use him and his knowledge of three languages in all sorts of matters and missions...⁷²

Elver was also careful to brag of his own travels through Germany, Italy, Spain, France, England and the Low Countries as part of his efforts to negotiate an unusually high salary for his correspondence.⁷³

Elver's emphasis on linguistic ability and (especially) foreign study-travel as crucially important characteristics of a successful political correspondent stands in perfect harmony with his first major published work, *Deliciae Apodemicae: Hoc est, Selectiorum discursuum Ethico-Politicorum Sylloge Epistolica: Nata In peregrinatione Italicâ, Gallicâ, Belgico-Britannicâ, Germanicâ, Polonicâ* (Leipzig, 1611), a collection of correspondence between Elver and a range of scholarly contacts throughout Europe that is in essence an extended panegyric to study-travel.⁷⁴ Study abroad, according to Elver, teaches the individual civil prudence and gives him a kind of cosmopolitan diversity that cannot be acquired by other means. Perhaps most importantly, foreign study serves the public good by preparing the returning traveler to be better able to provide council to his state.⁷⁵

⁷² "Hirbey dan ich auch nicht unterlassen zugedenken, daß diese örter sich auffhalt thutt ein geleter und geschickter gesell, welcher in theutslande, *italien*, *Hispanien* und Frankreich studirt, kan auch die sprachen insonderheit so gutt Spanisch und *italiansch* alß sein theudtzh, redt gut *Lateinsch*, vorstehet Sein grickisch und Französisch, hatt in Ungern und *Malta militirt*. Dieser gesell ... woll an einen *potentaten*, welcher ihn zu allerhandt sachen und vorschickung, *item* in ... dre sprache gebrauchen könte ..." Hieronymus Elver to Hieronymus von Birckholtz, Brandenburg, 26 October 1616. RA, Enskilda arkiv, von Birckholtz, E 3253.

⁷³ He added that Gustav Adolf "ein sothaner löblicher Herr sein, welcher wissentreiche leute nicht alleine liebet und werth helt, sondern dieselben auch gebührender massen *remunerirt*." Hieronymus Elver, undated memorial. RA, Enskilda arkiv, von Birckholtz, E 3253.

⁷⁴ Hieronymus Elver, *Deliciae Apodemicae: Hoc est, Selectiorum discursuum Ethico-Politicorum Sylloge Epistolica: Nata In peregrinatione Italicâ, Gallicâ, Belgico-Britannicâ, Germanicâ, Polonicâ. Lipsiæ Iam primum, propter studiosos Sapientiae Politicæ, Edita Cum præfatione Io. Friderichi Fr. Linguae & Historiarum Professoris publ. Michael Lantzenberger excudebat* (Lipsiæ: Iacobi Apellii, 1611).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Epistola VII, Elver to Christophoro à Schlieben S.D. in Hierosolymas, written from Venice, 8–10: "In multis Academiis, & terris, ad multos annos dimicavimus simul pro sapientiâ, pro politicâ prudentiâ, & salute patriæ. Utinam & tu, & ipse essemus assecuti, quod cum multo labore & sumtu sumus secuti. Tu, non Europæ politioribus & principalioribus provinciis visis & perquisitis contentus, insuper in Asiæ atq. Africæ partes pericula & curricula facis, ut potentiam Turcicam meliùs scias, patriæ rectiùs caveas & consulas.

The *Deliciae* were meant to represent the fruits of Elver's own study-travels, as was his more traditional work of political theory that appeared in Frankfurt in 1620, *Consvalia, Hoc est: De Conciliis, Consiliariis et Consiliis, Doctrina Politica*.⁷⁶ Although Elver himself, despite his political work for Brandenburg and Sweden, was not part of the network that supported the marriage plans (in fact he later converted to Catholicism and became quite a villain in the eyes of German Protestants through his Imperial diplomatic service during the Thirty Years' War,) his emphasis on the importance of study travel as a path to useful cosmopolitanism and therefore vital preparation for diplomatic activity is something he shared with many practitioners of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture.

Now back to Elver's contact Birckholtz and the marriage negotiations in Germany. Little progress was made in the months following Birckholtz' conversations with Rasch and Chemnitz in Stettin, and with his frustration growing Birckholtz returned to his birthplace of Küstrin for several weeks in the summer of 1617. Here he made the acquaintance of the Brandenburg official Johan von Benckendorff, with whom he developed a friendship and entered into correspondence. Their conversations included discussion of the marriage plan, which Benckendorff pledged to support.⁷⁷ Nearly three decades later Joachim Christoff von Benckendorff, possibly a relative of Johan and an acquaintance of Oxenstierna, took part in a secret mission to Sweden on behalf of the second marriage plan.⁷⁸

Macte hoc tuo studio, qui bono publico es natus . . . Non solùm amore, vel nudâ curiositate illarum terrarum me trahi & rapi fateor, sed caussa est, ut meliùs aliquando patriæ consulam. Non cujuslibet est intelligere & scire, quid sit utile Christianæ reipublicæ: ex tali autem peregrinatione id haurire possumus."

⁷⁶ Hieronymus von Elver, *Consvalia, Hoc est: De Conciliis, Consiliariis et Consiliis, Doctrina Politica. Ex ipsa Experientia, Sapientumque virorum testimoniis concinnata. Bonorum Consiliorum Symmno Datori* (Francofurti: Ioannem Theobaldum Schönwetterum, 1620).

⁷⁷ Hammarstrand, 41. A fleeting remnant of this correspondence is to be found in Birckholtz' papers in RA, Enskilda arkiv, von Birckholtz, E 3253.

⁷⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm sent Joachim Christoph von Benckendorff, one of his councilors, to Sweden in the summer of 1645 in a last-gasp effort to bring the negotiations for the second marriage to a successful conclusion. Benckendorff had earlier been in Swedish service, and (as Birckholtz had done in 1616) traveled to Sweden under the pretense of private affairs. Once there his charge was to secretly negotiate for the marriage. Friedrich Wilhelm sent a top-secret, handwritten note to Axel Oxenstierna in August 1645 explaining Benckendorff's mission and stating that he had been specifically chosen because Oxenstierna was familiar with him (presumably from the time of his Swedish service): "Ich habe für gutt geachtet, mitt dem herrn Reichs Cantzler eine meiner allerwichtigsten Sachen in geheim zu communiciren durch gegenwertigen Meinen Rahtt . . . Jochim Christoff von Benckendorff, welchen Ich umb so viell mehr zu dieser Verrichtung hab brauchen wollen, weil Ich seine Treue und Aufrichtigkeitt zu Meiner Vergnügung sonst vermerckett, auch weil Ich weiß, das er dem herrn nicht onbekandt ist." Friedrich Wilhelm to Axel Oxensti-

Birckholtz returned to Sweden in November 1617 and died there the next year, and Benckendorff appears to have been the final Brandenburg official with whom he dealt regarding the marriage plan. His first contact on the issue, however, Dr. Saffius, continued to work for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship for years to come. In May 1631 Count Heinrich Mathias von Thurn and Joachim Transehe von Roseneck arrived in Berlin to negotiate with Georg Wilhelm regarding a Brandenburg-Swedish military alliance. Saffius provided lodging to the Swedish delegates in his home, and made a positive impression on them.⁷⁹ Within a few weeks Saffius' boarders were writing to Gustav Adolf in glowing terms about their host, who had expressed to them his desire to enter Swedish service.⁸⁰

Saffius' houseguest Transehe was also a member of the network who played a role in the marriage negotiations. Transehe was born in Kurland in 1589 and by 1612 was serving as Brandenburg's resident in Bayreuth. He entered Swedish service in 1631, shortly before his mission to Berlin. While in Berlin he married Magdalena Roseneck in 1632. His diplomatic contacts with Brandenburg were numerous: the aforementioned mission to Berlin in 1631–1632; a second mission to Berlin in 1634; a stint as part of the negotiating team that worked out the Brandenburg-Swedish armistice in 1641; another on the Swedish commission established to negotiate with Götze and Leuchtmar in Stockholm in 1642; a third mission to Berlin in 1643; and a final commission to negotiate with the Brandenburg ambassador Ewald von Kleist in Stockholm in 1649. Through his diplomatic activity he developed personal relationships with several Brandenburg officials, including Götze, Leuchtmar, and Samuel von Winterfeld.⁸¹ In 1642 he was corresponding with Götze regarding the second marriage alliance plan.⁸²

erna, Königsberg, 8 August 1645. *UA*, XXIII.1, 71–72. Benckendorff's efforts in Sweden on behalf of the marriage alliance went absolutely nowhere, and he was recalled in February 1646. On Benckendorff, see *ADB*, II, 314 (by Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer).

⁷⁹ Heinrich Mathias Graf von Thurn to Gustav Adolf, Berlin, 8 May 1631. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 1.

⁸⁰ Heinrich Mathias Graf von Thurn to Gustav Adolf, Berlin, 28 May 1631. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 1.

⁸¹ See Swedish government to Joachim Transehe, Stockholm, 10 [20] June 1643. *UA*, XXIII.1, 50–52. Transehe had written words of praise for Götze and Leuchtmar as early as July 1632. See Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, 18 July 1632. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 2.

⁸² Sigismund von Götze to Joachim Transehe von Roseneck, Königsberg, 5/15 November 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 40–41; Sigismund von Götze to Joachim Transehe von Roseneck, Berlin, 22 March [1 April] 1643. *UA*, XXIII.1, 43.

In 1643 Friedrich Wilhelm himself sought to convince Transehe to work covertly on behalf of the marriage plan. The elector's letter of September 1643 outlined in some detail the arguments in favor of the marriage alliance and his own desire to have it come to fruition. In what was becoming a pattern, he suggested that Transehe use the pretense of his own private affairs to travel to the Swedish court and secretly negotiate for the marriage.⁸³ Transehe, who was on one of his missions to Brandenburg when this request was made, discussed the matter in person with Friedrich Wilhelm in Küstrin, although there is little evidence that he ever followed through on the elector's request and may actually have been opposed to the marriage in general.⁸⁴ Despite this lack of result, Friedrich Wilhelm's efforts to enlist Transehe's support show that the elector was well aware of the utility of personal diplomatic action carried out by individuals with connections to both countries in moving the Brandenburg-Swedish marriage plan forward.

Transehe's friend Götze was amongst several in the diplomatic network who approached the second marriage plan through a religious lens. As we have seen, some of the supporters of the Gustav Adolf-Maria Eleonora match sensed a deep religious purpose in their efforts, which they believed were guided by the hand of God to ensure the welfare of His hard-pressed Protestants threatened by Catholic Habsburg hegemony. Within this confessional vision, however, the marriage itself was seen as serving a primarily political function of forging bonds of alliance between Protestant powers that could translate into military and political solidarity. The proposed match between Friedrich Wilhelm and Christina was for many of its proponents even more religiously charged, as it served not only important political goals of Protestant cooperation, but also the spiritual, syncretic mission of intra-Protestant religious understanding.

Götze was a man of deep personal piety who has been described as the most enthusiastic advocate of the second marriage in the Brandenburg government, as he saw the match as a work of Divine providence.⁸⁵ He was involved in encouraging efforts to clear a path to the marriage through projects of theological accommodation, and he believed that the

⁸³ Friedrich Wilhelm to Joachim Transehe von Roseneck, Küstrin, 20 [30] September 1643. *UA*, XXIII.1, 55–59. See also *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 200; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 16a, fasc. 10.

⁸⁴ See Friedrich Wilhelm to Joachim Transehe von Roseneck, Cöln an der Spree, 4 [14] April 1644. *UA*, XXIII.1, 62–63. See also *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 200; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 16a, fasc. 10. On Transehe's negativity towards the marriage, see Schulze, 30.

⁸⁵ Schulze, 3.

coming together of these Lutheran and Reformed dynasties in marriage would itself serve the larger syncretic dream of Protestant confessional reconciliation. In keeping with the multi-layered outlook of Protestant cosmopolitanism, Götze's belief in the religious significance of the match for all of Protestantism in no way precluded his appreciation of the pragmatic political benefits it could offer to Hohenzollern dynastic interests in particular, and both factors contributed to the support he showed for the plan across its long years of on-again, off-again discussion and despite the ups and downs of his own political fortunes. His actions on behalf of the marriage show the harmony between the religious and the political, between the narrowly dynastic and the broadly transnational, that formed the Protestant cosmopolitan worldview.

Götze was involved with the second marriage plan from the moment of its origin in his conversation with Gustav Adolf in 1631, and as late as 1646 refused to admit defeat even after it became apparent that the plan was doomed.⁸⁶ Gustav Adolf had made clear that he placed value on Götze's ability to personally see the issue through against the resistance he knew it would encounter from the Catholic Count Schwarzenberg.⁸⁷ The king's confidence in Götze's affections was not ill-placed, as the Brandenburger earned the reputation of being thoroughly pro-Swedish.⁸⁸ Götze became one of the central figures in the 'Sweden party' that formed in the Brandenburg council in the 1630s. He even went so far as to accept a deanship in Magdeburg from the Swedes, which gave rise to suspicions of bribery that at least for a time lessened Götze's prestige and authority in the council.⁸⁹ In 1635 he was part of the faction that lobbied for retention of the alliance with Sweden and against Brandenburg's acceptance of the Peace of Prague, and he was equally staunch in his opposition to the Advocatorial Edict of 1636 that led to the open break with Sweden.⁹⁰ When Brandenburg returned to an Imperial alliance Götze's pro-Swedish sympathies were responsible for his being driven from office at Schwarzenberg's urging in 1637, with a document drawn up against

⁸⁶ See Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:145.

⁸⁷ Malmström, XIII.

⁸⁸ For a report of Götze's pro-Swedish affections in 1632, see Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, 18 July 1632. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 2.

⁸⁹ Oestreich, *Der brandenburg-preußische Geheime Rat*, 12.

⁹⁰ For Götze's resistance to the Advocatorial Edict of 1636, see *Prot.*, I, XVIff. For his advocacy of remaining in alliance with Sweden and refusing to accept to the Peace of Prague, see J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 100; Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 466.

him accusing him of being “Swedish at heart.”⁹¹ It wasn’t until Friedrich Wilhelm came to power in 1640 that Götze was recalled to service.

Götze’s well-known pro-Swedish tendencies combined with his personal religious convictions to make him the logical choice to put forth Brandenburg’s first major religious proposal on behalf of the marriage plan in 1632. His links to Protestant unionist politics stretched back into the 1620s, when he had been a member of the faction in the Brandenburg privy council that worked under the leadership of Christian von Bellin to build a European-wide pan-Protestant alliance.⁹² Götze made his first syncretic proposal to the Swedes in a meeting with his friend Transehe in Berlin on 26 August 1632. As Transehe reported to Gustav Adolf, “the Chancellor wished that, if the Lord God should grant, matters in Germany would be calmed . . . so that Your Royal Majesty could call together a Synod of peace-loving theologians and political thinkers in greater numbers than those who gathered a year and a half ago in Leipzig, and there syncretism in religion could be reached.”⁹³ Götze was given further instructions to push for a pan-Protestant synod to clear away the differences between the Protestant confessions in his meetings with Axel Oxenstierna in 1633, anchored in the argument that essential agreement between the confessions on the fundamentals of religion already existed, while the differences between them were only minor.⁹⁴ He raised this issue once more in a meeting with Oxenstierna in Mainz in January 1635.⁹⁵

The urgency and sense of religious mission with which Götze worked on behalf of the marriage plan did not wane following his return to office in the 1640s. He wrote to Oxenstierna in February 1644 that God’s bringing Brandenburg and Sweden together “must be considered a certain

⁹¹ For connections between Götze’s pro-Swedish reputation and his removal from office, see Kober, 360; *Prot.*, I, XXViff.; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 121.

⁹² Schybergson, 39.

⁹³ “Hierbey wündschte der Cantzler, Wann Gott der Herr Väterlich Verleihen wurde, daß die sachen in Deutschlandt möchten gestillet undt man füglich darzu gelangen könnte. Alßdann E. Königl: Mt: wolten einen *Synodum* von Friedliebenden *Theologischen* und *Politischen* Leuthen, in größerer anzahl, alß für 1 ½ Jahren zu Leipzig, außschreiben, ob daselbst *Syncretismus in religione* könnte getroffen werden.” Joachim Transehe to Gustav Adolf, Cöln an der Spree, 28 August 1632. RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 2.

⁹⁴ Georg Wilhelm to Sigismund von Götze, Cöln [Spree], 2 August 1633. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 7, fasc. 2, 1r–17v, esp. 12v–13r.

⁹⁵ Sigismund von Götze to Georg Wilhelm, Mainz, 15 January 1635. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 9, fasc. 3.

sign of Divine providence.”⁹⁶ He then virtually pleaded with the Swedish Chancellor to communicate with him openly about the marriage issue, appealing to the personal friendship the two had long shared and stressing all of the hardships that he had gone through for the sake improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations: “I have learned and experienced from my own example, in that I’ve been persecuted for no other reason than that I’ve been accused of having sought to establish too great and close of a friendship between the Swedish Crown and this state...”⁹⁷

After Götze’s initial efforts, Kurt Bertram von Pfuel was the next Brandenburger to make Protestant syncretist proposals to the Swedes for the sake of the second marriage plan. Like Götze, Pfuel was a known member of the ‘Sweden party’ in the Brandenburg government. He possessed longstanding personal connections to Sweden dating back to the first dynastic marriage, when he and his brother and sister had been part of the entourage that escorted Maria Eleonora to Sweden.⁹⁸ Pfuel returned to Brandenburg after the wedding, while brother Adam remained in Sweden and became a major general in the Swedish army during the Thirty Years’ War, and sister Katarina Elisabeth married the famous Swedish general Johan Banér. Pfuel therefore enjoyed personal connections with the upper echelons of Sweden’s military hierarchy in the years leading up to the war, and when the Swedes invaded Germany in 1630 Georg Wilhelm dispatched Pfuel repeatedly on missions to Gustav Adolf and other Swedish military figures.⁹⁹ His personal ties and diplomatic activity made him a well-known figure in Sweden when he was sent there on an embassy from June 1633 to January 1634, during which he was charged with making syncretic proposals as a solution to the marriage issue in terms similar to those used by Götze.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ “wie nahe der Allerhoheste die status beider Reiche und Lande zusammen gefüget, dieses billig vor ein sicheres argumentum der göttlichen...Vorsehung halten müssen.” Sigismund von Götze to Axel Oxenstierna, Berlin, 7 [17] February 1644. *UA*, XXIII.1, 68–70, here 68.

⁹⁷ “Dann dergleichen habe ich gnugsam nicht allein aus anderer, sondern auch mit meinem eignen Exempel erlernet und erfahren, indem ich umb keiner anderen Ursachen willen bin ich verfolgt worden, als daß man mich beschuldiget, ich suchte nur gar zu große und enge Freundschaft zwischen der Kron Schweden und diesen Staat zu stiften...” *Ibid.*, 69.

⁹⁸ Much of the following discussion is based on Oestreich, “Kurt Bertram von Pfuel.”

⁹⁹ Documents in: *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 2, fasc. 6–7, 9; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 1; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 5, fasc. 14; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 200; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 7.

¹⁰⁰ See the documents for this mission in *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 7, especially Georg Wilhelm’s instructions for Pfuel dated Cöln an der Spree, 28 June 1633.

As was the case with so many figures in the diplomatic network, Pfuel himself came to serve both Brandenburg and Sweden during his career. Pfuel, like Götze, fell out of favor due to his pro-Swedish tendencies when Brandenburg switched to the Imperial alliance in 1636, and in 1637 he fled Brandenburg and entered Swedish service as the General Commissary of the War Council of the Swedish army. He held this position until 1640, during which time he gained a comprehensive knowledge of Swedish military practice. He brought this knowledge with him when he returned to Brandenburg service in 1643, and in March 1644 he submitted an influential military memorandum to the Brandenburg council that contributed to the reorganization of the Brandenburg military apparatus along the lines of the Swedish model.¹⁰¹

The precursor of the 'Sweden party' to which Götze and Pfuel belonged in the 1630s was the Protestant unionist circle centered around Christian von Bellin in the 1620s. Bellin was the most zealous Calvinist on the Brandenburg privy council and the electorate's leading proponent of Protestant unionist policies.¹⁰² He not surprisingly came out strongly in favor of the plans for a marriage between Gustav Adolf and Maria Eleonora, writing to Johann Kasimir in July 1620 that he was prepared to "render all of the services that His Majesty [Gustav Adolf] can desire in the alliance affair."¹⁰³ When Gustav Adolf sent Oxenstierna to Berlin to finalize the marriage negotiations he instructed the chancellor explicitly to seek out Bellin's advice on how best to proceed with the final stage of negotiations.¹⁰⁴ Bellin remained in correspondence with Oxenstierna

¹⁰¹ "Herrn Curt Bertram von Pfuels Vorschläge wegen einer Kriegsverfassung." Berlin, 2 (12) March 1644. *Prot.* II, Nr. 128, 349–78. See also Oestreich, "Kurt Bertram von Pfuel"; Daniel Riches, "Early Modern Military Reform and the Connection Between Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia," *Scandinavian Studies* 77 (2005), nr. 3, 347–64.

¹⁰² Schybergson (38ff.) places Bellin amongst the main driving forces behind the entire unionist movement in all of Europe in the mid-1620s. See also Koser, *Geschichte der brandenburgischen Politik*, 398.

¹⁰³ "Cependant je luy voulu remercjer treshumblement de la tresgrande affection qu'elle me tesmoigne par sa lettre, m'asseurant aussy de celle du Roy envers moy, auquel je rendray tous les serujces, que S.M. puisse desjrer en l'affaire de l'alliance." Christian von Bellin to Johann Kasimir, Ruppin, 1 July 1620. Cited in Hammarstrand, 202 n. 1. Bellin also assured Johann Kasimir in this letter that Georg Wilhelm was not actually opposed to the marriage, but rather was only interested in deflecting the responsibility for it from himself and onto his mother.

¹⁰⁴ "Han skall och J medler tydh om han kommer till talls medh Christienn V: Bellin *complimeret* förträgen sigh hoos honom, lyka såsom den H:K:Mtt. Jtt systerligitt gott förtröende tillsetter. På hwadh sett han mener, at dette ährendedh nu beqwembligest wore att andraga, och hoos hwem dedh först sökies skulle, att han Uthÿ dette wille gifue Cantzleren såsom en Fremmande och okendh anledhningh." Instruction for Axel Oxenstierna's mission to Germany, Stockholm, 29 July 1620. RA, Riksregistraturet, vol. 135, 592r–600v,

following the marriage, and in 1624 traveled to Sweden in his (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to get Gustav Adolf to join a Protestant alliance and the war in Germany.¹⁰⁵

Pfuel's mission of 1633–34 proved no more successful than Götze's efforts to further the mutually supportive goals of syncretism and marriage. While in Sweden, however, Pfuel had contacts with Gustav Horn, another of the interconnected web of Protestant cosmopolitan figures involved in the marriage negotiations.¹⁰⁶ Horn had also spent many years studying abroad, at German universities—primarily Wittenberg—from 1609–1612, and then further west from 1614–1618, when he studied political science and languages in France and received military training in the Netherlands under Moritz of Orange. He became involved in the negotiations for the Gustav Adolf-Maria Eleonora match when he traveled to Berlin in 1619 to scope out the attitudes at court regarding the proposed marriage.¹⁰⁷ He returned to Berlin the next year as a member of Oxenstierna's entourage that completed the marriage negotiations. In the following years Horn took part in a variety of activities aimed at forms of Protestant cooperation, including an embassy to the Netherlands in 1623 that sought to establish a Swedish-Dutch offensive alliance which the German Protestant states would also be allowed to join. He played a role in the second marriage plan in 1642 when he and Åke Axelsson (Natt och Dag,) on behalf of the regency government, communicated Götze's and Leuchtmar's proposals for the marriage to Christina and raised the prospect that the young queen at least consider the possibility that the confessional and other hurdles to her marriage to Friedrich Wilhelm could be overcome.¹⁰⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm himself wrote to Horn from Küstrin in October 1643 in request for his support of Transehe's secret mission regarding the marriage alliance.¹⁰⁹

here 593r. The same document suggested that Oxenstierna may want to write to Bellin in advance.

¹⁰⁵ GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 4. For an extensive secondary account see Schybergson.

¹⁰⁶ See the entry for Gustav Horn in *SBL*, XIX, 361–64 (by Alf Åberg).

¹⁰⁷ See Horn's instructions for this mission, dated Stockholm, 12 July 1619. RA, Riksregistratoriet, vol. 133, 216r–217v.

¹⁰⁸ See Åke Axelsson (Natt och Dag) to Axel Oxenstierna, Örebro, 2 [12] September 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 37–38.

¹⁰⁹ Similar letters, dated Küstrin 30 September [10 October] 1643, were sent to Axel Oxenstierna, Jakob De la Gardie, Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna, and Åke Axelsson (Natt och Dag). See *UA*, XXIII.1, 60.

Far more involved than Horn in the second marriage plan was Johan Adler Salvius. Adler Salvius was one of the central figures in Swedish diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War, and he was also a man with broad intellectual interests and Protestant cosmopolitan sentiments.¹¹⁰ His educational credentials are impressively international, including time spent at Swedish, German, and French universities in studies that ranged from eloquence to medicine to law. His education was broadly humanist at its base, and his *Oratio de eloquentia* (1613) held during his time at the University of Rostock is a classically humanist encomium to eloquence.¹¹¹ As is true with so many early modern diplomats, Adler Salvius' correspondence takes note of intellectual and cultural matters alongside political and (of crucial importance to him) financial affairs and weaves them together into a singular whole.

Sven Göransson has characterized Adler Salvius as a religiously-motivated pan-Protestant who opposed orthodox Lutheran confessional intolerance, especially as it affected relations between Protestant states.¹¹² He was a shrewd political observer and pragmatic political and financial operator who rendered valuable service to the Swedish crown while remaining aware that Sweden existed within a broader body of international Protestantism. The interests of the two could be and in fact were complementary, even if Adler Salvius spent the bulk of his time thinking of Sweden first. His multi-layered cosmopolitan allegiance is displayed in a letter he wrote to the Calvinist industrial magnate and noted Protestant unionist Louis de Geer upon learning of Gustav Adolf's death. After describing his own sense of devastation he goes on to say that the king's passing was "an incurable plague sent by the grace of God upon all of

¹¹⁰ The best recent work on Adler Salvius' diplomatic activity is by Heiko Droste. See his "Ein Diplomat zwischen Familieninteressen und Königsdienst: Johan Adler Salvius in Hamburg (1630–1650)," in Thiessen and Windler (eds.), *Nähe in der Ferne*, 87–104; "Johan Adler Salvius i Hamburg: ett nätverksbygge i 1600-talets Sverige," in *Mare Nostrum: om Westfaliska freden och Östersjön som ett svenskt maktcentrum* (Stockholm: Ekblad & Co., 1999), 243–55; and the relevant portions of *Im Dienst der Krone*. See also Sune Lundgren, *Johan Adler Salvius: problem kring freden, krigsekonomin och maktkampen* (Lund: Lindstedt, 1945). For biographical information see Adler Salvius' entry in *SBL*, I, 143–56 (by B. Boëthius).

¹¹¹ Johan Adler Salvius, *Oratio de Eloquentia*, in *Collegio Oratorio Clarissimi, Doctissimi & Humanissimi Viri, Dr. M. Johannis Simonii, Eloquentiae in celebri ad Varnum Academia Professoris publici, Conscripta & Pronunciata à Johanne Salvio Sveco* (Rhodopoli: Calculis Joachimi Pedani, 1613).

¹¹² Sven Göransson, *Den Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning 1654–1660. Religion och utrikespolitik under Karl X Gustav*, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1956:3 (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska, 1956), 27–28.

Protestant Christendom.” Protestants needed to bear their suffering with Christian patience and combine together to avenge the king and bring about “the complete restitution of his Church.”¹¹³ Gustav Adolf’s death was a national disaster of the first order, but it could also become a tool guided by the hand of God to bring all Protestants together on behalf of their (singular) Church.

Adler Salvius’ Protestant cosmopolitan worldview allowed him to be a successful and indeed popular negotiating partner in his innumerable dealings with Brandenburgers throughout his diplomatic career. Several of these interactions had the explicit goal of Protestant cooperation, such as his mission to Brandenburg shortly after the Battle of Breitenfeld to encourage the elector to enter into a Swedish-led *Corpus Evangelicorum*, and his efforts to establish “friendship and neighborly trust” between Sweden and Brandenburg in early 1641 as “a great advantage to the common Protestant cause, and especially to Her Royal Majesty and her arms in Germany.”¹¹⁴ Adler Salvius continued to hope for good relations with Brandenburg at the Westphalia negotiations, particularly by urging Christina to soften her demands for Pomerania and to be content to settle for part of Pomerania given with Brandenburg’s consent rather than to insist upon taking all of it without consent.¹¹⁵ Through actions like this

¹¹³ “... mon messagier retourne avec les nouvelles tres tristes du trespas de sad.te M.té dont ie suis tant perturbé, que ie ne scay presque que faire. Dieu par sa sainte grace a qu’il a pleu infliger ceste playe irremediable à toute la chrestienté Evangelique... nous ne desesperions de ce grand coup, ains nous fece sa grace, que la receuions avec patience chrestienne & taschions tant plus diligemment de consulter & faire tout ce qui appartient a la revenge de ce Roÿ incomparable, et a la restitution totale de son Eglise.” Johan Adler Salvius to Louis de Geer, Hamburg, 12/22 December 1632. RA, Enskilda arkiv, De Geersamlingen, E 3514.

¹¹⁴ “was vor eine grosse advantage dem gemeinen evangelischen Wesen und sonderlich Ihrer Kön. Maj. und dero Waffen in Deutschland durch eines so vornehmen deutschen Churfürsten *Freundschaft* und *nachbarliches Vertrauen* zuwachsen kann.” Johan Adler Salvius to Stalhans, Hamburg, 17 May 1641. *UA*, I, 537 n. 1. For the 1631 mission see RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 199; *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 3, fasc. 3; B. Boëthius, “Aktstycken rörande Salvius’ underhandlingar med Brandenburg i september 1631,” *Historisk Tidskrift* 33 (1913), 125–45.

¹¹⁵ “Och måste jag bekänna, att där mig så mycket vidkomme, att jag skulle säga min mening, hvilket bättre vore, behålla hela Pommern utan Brandeburgs consens eller halfva Pommern med hans consens, så hölle jag rådligare och säkrare, att heller taga något mindre med interessenternas consens, än mera utan consens.—Hvad E. Kgl. Mt. med interessenternas vilja får, det är säkert och durabelt, med ovilja, är hvarken säkert eller durabelt.” Johan Adler Salvius to Christina, Osnabrück, 14 [24] December 1646. *UA*, XXIII.1, 104–05. See also Pufendorf, *de Rebus Suecicis*, Book XVIII, §. 158, 670–71.

Adler Salvius earned the reputation of a 'friend of Brandenburg' in much the same fashion that Götze was seen as a 'friend of Sweden.'¹¹⁶

The parallel between Adler Salvius and Götze as 'friends' of each other's states is strongest in their dogged support for the second marriage alliance plan. Adler Salvius shared with Götze the tenacious refusal to give up on the plan even after it was apparent that the issue was dead. As early as the summer of 1642 he had written to both Axel Oxenstierna and Queen Christina that the marriage could provide "the best fundament to peace."¹¹⁷ Despite the conspicuous lack of progress in the marriage talks Adler Salvius held firmly to this belief deep into 1646. In January 1646 he told Wittgenstein that he still considered the marriage alliance the best means to solve the difficulties between the states, and he urged the Brandenburgers not to act too hastily in seeking a different marriage for the elector.¹¹⁸ As time went by Adler Salvius became more and more frantic in his efforts. In February he implored the Brandenburgers to send an embassy to Sweden immediately in a last-second effort to salvage the marriage issue, and he suggested that if possible Götze himself should be sent because he was so popular in Sweden.¹¹⁹ He repeated this request in June, this time suggesting Fabian von Dohna, another Brandenburg who was popular with the Swedes.¹²⁰ As late as October 1646 Wittgenstein reported to Friedrich Wilhelm that Adler Salvius "still incessantly hopes for this marriage."¹²¹ Adler Salvius also let the Brandenburgers know that

¹¹⁶ For a statement of concern from a Brandenburg diplomat that Adler Salvius' death would make it more difficult to bring negotiations on certain matters to the desired conclusion, see Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 August 1652. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 9.

¹¹⁷ "Går den ambassaden väl af, så hoppas alla män det bästa fundamentet vara lagt till freden." Johan Adler Salvius to Christina, Hamburg, 23 July 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 36 n. 6; "In summa, i alla mäns mun är nu intet annat så högt, som huru den Brand. ambassaden i Sverige vill aflöpa, menande, att därvid lätt de bästa fundamenta till Svenska friden kunna läggas. De tyska protesterande Ständerna skulle fuller största delen gärna se den coniunctionen." Johan Adler Salvius to Axel Oxenstierna, Hamburg, 20 [30] August 1642. *UA*, XXIII.1, 36.

¹¹⁸ Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 2 [12] February 1646. *UA*, IV, 421–23.

¹¹⁹ Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 9 [19] February 1646. *UA*, IV, 424–25.

¹²⁰ Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 1 [11] June 1646. *UA*, IV, 442. For more on Fabian von Dohna as a pro-Swedish figure, see above, 115–16.

¹²¹ "und hätte er, Salvius, zu selbiger Heirat noch immerzu Hoffnung gehabt, wie noch, wann nur an E. Ch. D. Seiten res noch integra wäre." Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 5 [15] October 1646. *UA*, IV, 462.

he was in secret private correspondence with the queen herself through which he continued to impress upon her that the marriage alliance would be a way to solve the Pomeranian question.¹²²

Adler Salvius' main negotiating partner amongst the Brandenburgers at Westphalia, Count Johann von Sayn and Wittgenstein, also supported the marriage plan, although he had a more pessimistic view of its potential for success. Wittgenstein was a military expert who had been involved in the directorate of the Heilbronn League and had served in the Swedish army. He entered Brandenburg service shortly before the Westphalia negotiations began and served as the chief of the Brandenburg delegation.¹²³ Although he had left Swedish military service on less than positive terms (he felt underappreciated and underpaid,) the Swedes viewed Wittgenstein as a friendly figure in Westphalia who could help look after their interests.¹²⁴ His dealings with Adler Salvius intermixed appeals to the good of Protestantism as a whole with fierce advocacy of the interests of their respective states.¹²⁵ In discussions regarding the marriage he downplayed the significance of the confessional difference, stressing that Friedrich Wilhelm was committed to the Augsburg Confession just as the Lutherans were.¹²⁶

Despite Wittgenstein's positive disposition and their own best efforts, Adler Salvius' and Götze's hopes for an eleventh-hour reprieve for the Christina-Friedrich Wilhelm marriage plan were in vain, and all hopes ended in 1646 with Friedrich Wilhelm's marriage to Luise Henriette of Orange. Brandenburg's agent in Stockholm at the time of the plan's final collapse was Adolf Friedrich Schlezer, a member of a family that typifies the tangled web of personal connections between Brandenburg and Sweden that affected their diplomacy.¹²⁷ Adolf Friedrich's father Johann

¹²² Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 26 October [5 November] 1646. *UA*, IV, 464–65.

¹²³ See *UA*, IV, 347–48; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:149; Odhner, 123.

¹²⁴ See Mattias Biörnkloou to Christina, Osnabrück, 22 May [1 June] 1648. *UA*, XXIII.1, 119–20.

¹²⁵ As the Westphalia talks ground to conclusion, Wittgenstein sent a personal appeal to Adler Salvius to drop one of his demands. It began: "I beg you for God's, for all of Protestantism's, and indeed for your own state's sake." ["E. Exel bitte ich Umb Gottes, Umb des gantzssen Evangelischen Wesens, ja Umb ihres selbst eigenen staats Willen"], demonstrating that individual states' and general Protestant interests need not be seen as conflicting. Johann von Sayn und Wittgenstein to Johan Adler Salvius, 6 July 1648. RA, Enskilda arkiv, Johan Adler Salvius och hans sekreterare Georg Kellers Samling, E 5270.

¹²⁶ Schering Rosenhane to Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius, Münster, 25 October [4 November] 1645. *UA*, XXIII.1, 73–74.

¹²⁷ Some information on the Schlezer family is in Bahl, 571–72.

(the younger) married the daughter of the Brandenburg chancellor and privy councilor Friedrich Pruckmann, one of the officials who supported Johann Sigismund's conversion to Calvinism in 1613, was a member of the pan-Protestant circle around Bellin in the 1620s, resisted Schwarzenberg's plan for an Imperial alliance in 1626, and allowed free passage to Streiff's troops in 1627.¹²⁸ Another of Pruckmann's daughters married Sebastian Striepe, also a member of the privy council who supported an activist Protestant policy, gave Streiff free passage, and resisted the Advocatorial Edict of 1636.¹²⁹ The Schlezers therefore enjoyed familial connections to the top activist Protestant circles in Brandenburg. Johann (the younger) became a royal physician in Sweden, and later in Schwerin, where Adolf Friedrich was born in 1615. By the 1640s Adolf Friedrich had entered Brandenburg service, and he served as Brandenburg agent in Stockholm from 1643 to 1654. During his first few years in Stockholm Schlezer worked to move the marriage alliance negotiations forward, although like Wittgenstein he seems to have been pessimistic about the prospects for success.¹³⁰ In 1645 Schlezer's older brother Johan Friedrich also entered Brandenburg service, and he was involved in a wide range of diplomatic missions, including a long embassy to Cromwell in England. Adolf Friedrich left Brandenburg service and entered Swedish service in 1655, and Johan Friedrich did the same in 1659.

The Schlezer brothers were immersed in the political-religious milieu typical of the diplomatic network. While in Sweden Adolf Friedrich worked with Louis de Geer on behalf of Protestant unionist schemes.¹³¹ He also maintained contacts with Johannes Matthiæ, the leading unionist theologian in the Swedish Lutheran church, with whom he discussed Protestant irenicism.¹³² Both Matthiæ and Johann Friedrich Schlezer were affiliated

¹²⁸ Nischan, *Prince, People and Confession*, 92, 100, 120–21; Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 169; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III.1, 42; Schybergson, 39; Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg in der Krisis*. Biographical information on Pruckmann can be found at ADB, XXVI, 672 (by K. Lohmeyer); BBL, 316–17 (by Udo Geiseler).

¹²⁹ See *Prot*, I, XVIIff. For biographical information, see Bahl, 601–02.

¹³⁰ See Schlezer's reports from Sweden in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 1–5.

¹³¹ See the documents cited in Chapter Four, n. 161.

¹³² Schlezer and Matthiæ discussed Protestant irenicism in February 1649: "Kam hierauf von *Religions* sachen zu reden und bezeugte, wie hertzlich er [Matthiæ] wunschte, dß zwischen den *Reformirten* und Lutherischen eine Vergleichung zutreffen sein möchte. Er hette Ihr Maj: untertehnigt an die Hand gegeben die sache auf den zu Lübeck angesetzten Tag durch ein *Colloquium* von Zween oder dreÿen iederseits *Theologis* zuversuchen. die Hamburgische *Theologos* befunde er zur vereinigung nicht ungeneigt. Beÿ dem Polnischen *Colloqui* zu Torn aber, hielte er, hette man hierunter verstoßen, dß man die Päpstlichen mit dazu gezogen. Es bedunckte ihn, diese beyde *Religionen* musten erst zur Bruderlichÿen einigung gebracht sein, so muchte man hernach so viel leichter mit den Catholischen einen

with the international, apocalyptic pan-Protestant circle that formed around John Dury, Samuel Hartlib, and Jan Comenius and attempted for decades to bring Sweden and Brandenburg (as well as other Protestant states) together into an anti-Catholic alliance.¹³³ Contemporary documents refer to Johann Friedrich Schlezer as a *Schwärmer* ("enthusiast"). He was in familiar correspondence with Hartlib, and in their letters referred to the prophetic preacher Peter Figulus (who had close connections to de Geer) as their mutual friend.¹³⁴ In the winter of 1645/1646 Adolf Friedrich made efforts to enlist Matthiae's support for the marriage plan.¹³⁵

The move to involve Matthiae was a logical one. He enjoyed personal connections to a number of figures involved in the marriage negotiations and had impeccable unionist credentials.¹³⁶ He saw Friedrich Wilhelm as the key to his unionist plans, and in future years stood in correspondence with the elector's court preacher, Johan Bergius.¹³⁷ Bergius was himself the leading Protestant unionist theologian in Brandenburg and a significant religious influence on Friedrich Wilhelm.¹³⁸ He had studied

Religion Frieden treffen können. Ihr Maj. were zu diesem werck sehr geneigt, sagten aber, sie sorgten, es were noch nicht die rechte Zeit es anzugreifen." Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 17 February 1649. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 6, 16r–17v, here 16v–17r.

¹³³ For an excellent discussion of Matthiae's membership in Dury's circle, and on the circle's efforts to bring Brandenburg and Sweden together in an anti-Catholic military alliance in the 1650s, see Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*. For more on this group, see below, 221–23.

¹³⁴ See *UA*, VII, 823–24. In reference to a letter from Johan Friedrich Schlezer to Samuel Hartlib dated Elsingör, 27 December 1659, a note in an unknown hand in the archives says that this letter shows that Schlezer was an 'enthusiast': "Aus diesem Schreiben sehe ich, dass Herr Schlezer ein Schwärmer ist; denn Hartlieb (welcher ein Elbinger und sonst gelehrter Mann ist) ist aller neuen Propheten Patron und Advocatus. Figulus [der in Schlezers Brief als gemeinsamer Freund erwähnt wird] ist ein Prediger, hat Herrn Comenius Tochter, prätendirt Visionen, welche er auch drucken lassen, und prophezeit Schweden grosse Dinge."

¹³⁵ Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Konrad von Burgsdorff, Stockholm, 3 January 1646. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 3.

¹³⁶ On Matthiae, see Hjalmar Holmquist, *D. Johannes Matthiae Gothus och hans plats i Sveriges kyrkliga utveckling: studie- och läretiden (1592–1643)* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1903); Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*; *SBL*, XX, 210–13 (by Sven Göransson).

¹³⁷ Adolf Friedrich Schlezer played a role in later ties between Matthiae and Bergius. See Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 21 December 1650. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 19c, fasc. 11, 2r–5v; Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 12 July 1651. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 8, 49r–52v. On later ties, see Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*, 204, 263.

¹³⁸ The best source on Bergius and his irenic activities is the work of Bodo Nischan. See his *Prince, People, and Confession*, and the essays collected in *Lutherans and Calvinists in the Age of Confessionalism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.) See also von Thadden, *Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Hofprediger*, 175–78; Johan Christoph Becmann, *Notitia Universitatis*

in Heidelberg, Saumur, Cambridge, Oxford, Paris and Leiden, and had been chosen as Brandenburg representative to the Synod of Dordrecht, although he refused to attend due to the Synod's illiberalism and intolerance and rejected its condemnation of Arminianism. Bergius was a close friend of the marriage plan's great advocate, Sigismund von Götze, as well as other activist Protestants in Brandenburg. He played a central role in the Leipzig Colloquy in 1631, where serious efforts were made to bridge the theological differences between Calvinists and Lutherans. He published the Protocol of this meeting (with an introduction) in 1636, and made a point of mentioning that he had sent a copy of the agreement to Dury in England.¹³⁹ Bergius was also an important figure at the Colloquy of Thorn in 1645, where discussions were held between Polish Calvinists, Lutherans and Catholics.¹⁴⁰ Bergius was initially resistant to the Friedrich Wilhelm-Christina marriage plan since it called for Friedrich Wilhelm's conversion, but when the irenic option was introduced as a way around the confessional problem he became an active participant in supplying theological justification.¹⁴¹ He was also one of the theologians who helped reinvigorate the negotiations in the early 1640s by guiding Friedrich Wilhelm towards an irenic path.¹⁴²

Concluding Word

Ending this chapter with Johannes Matthiæ and Johan Bergius, men who throughout their lives played no role in diplomacy in the formal sense,

Francofurtanæ, Una cum Iconibus Personarum aliquot Illustrium, Aliorumq. Virorum Egregiorum, Qui eam Præsentia Sua ac Meritis Illustrarunt, Professorum deniq. Ordinariorum Qui Anno Seculari Universitatis Secundo vixerunt (Frankfurt an der Oder, 1706), 134–36; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:24.

¹³⁹ Johannes Bergius, *Relation Der Privat-Conferentz/ Welche Bey wehrendem Convent Der Protestirenden Evangelischen Chur-Fürsten und Stände zu Leipzig/ Im Jahr 1631. im Monat Martio, Zwischen den anwesenden Chur-Sächsischen/ Chur-Brandenburgischen/ und Fürstlichen-Hessischen Theologen gehalten worden/ Nebenst einer Vorrede/ Darinn auff das jenige/ was Herr D. Matthias Hoe von Hoenegg/ Churfürstl. Sächsischer Ober-Hoffprediger/ in seiner Rettung deßfalls fürgebracht/ gebürlich geantwortet wird/ Durch D. Johannem Bergium, Churf. Brandenburgischen Hoffprediger* (Berlin, 1636). Bergius mentions sending a copy to Dury on p. 26.

¹⁴⁰ The Leipzig Protocol of 1631 and Thorn Declaration of 1645, both of which Bergius helped formulate, became (along with Johann Sigismund's *Marchica* of 1614) the official doctrinal documents of Brandenburg's Reformed Church.

¹⁴¹ For Bergius' initial resistance see Armstedt, 6. For his leadership of the irenic efforts on behalf of the marriage alliance, see Schulze, 19–20.

¹⁴² See Malmström, XVI.

is appropriate for summarizing what the marriage plans reveal about Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. If we move beyond a narrow definition of diplomacy as the actions of credentialed representatives of state to one that embraces the expanse of activities that crafted relationships between countries and their governments, we see that a significant portion of early modern diplomacy was conducted by individuals who were not clearly-identifiable diplomatic agents, but rather were theologians, or military officers, or local officials, or princely physicians, or scholars, and so on. The diplomatic activity they engaged in was intensely personal, originating as often in the private initiative of individual actors motivated by their own values and beliefs as in the counsels of governmental deliberation and reason of state. Early modern diplomacy, even in matters of paramount importance to central governments like princely marriages, functioned as much through random meetings, social events, personal correspondence, small gift exchange, and cloak-and-dagger missions under the pretense of private affairs as it did through the more formal avenues of diplomatic interaction that were continuing to develop as the seventeenth century progressed. When working together, relatively small groups of individuals, some quite removed from the levers of state power, had the opportunity to influence major international policy decisions.

The shape of early modern diplomatic activity was also more complex than a state-centered model would suggest. It resembled the tangled web of the second half of this chapter, where individual diplomatic actors worked their way through the overlapping and shifting strands of personal contacts and political/religious commitments, more than the clean but flawed image of bilateral negotiation between defined centers of power. The bilateral model also fails in its implication that diplomatic actors must align with one pole or the other. As we have seen, the Protestant cosmopolitans who pursued the marriage plans were defined precisely by their ability to elude total identification with a single identity or allegiance, maintaining instead the ability to envision the world and their place within it on multiple levels, even if one may have been far more important than the others. In the case of Brandenburg and Sweden, Protestant cosmopolitanism encouraged a segment of their diplomatic actors (in the broad sense of the term proposed here) to envision a world of common ground as much as of geopolitical competition, and to carry out their diplomatic work accordingly.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONNECTION, 1653–1691

When the smoke cleared after the Thirty Years' War ground to its end and Eastern Pomerania was pried from Sweden's unwilling hands a major diplomatic relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden was already fully in place. In the decades that followed scarcely an event of significance could hit one of the countries without having implications for the other, and the density of diplomatic contact between the two—both formal and informal—reflected an awareness that their fates were linked. The forms of decentralized, personal interaction epitomized by the marriage negotiations of the earlier period continued on in full-force and interpenetrated the world of official ambassadors with formal instructions drawn up by central governments. As the period covered by this chapter progressed, however, the bonds that held the diplomatic culture together began fray, before snapping in a sequence of confessional scandals that are the subject of Chapter Five. The current chapter centers on the bases of the diplomatic culture during the period when the connection between Brandenburg and Sweden was at its height, and describes the first movements that led to the common culture's decline.

Warfare, Sovereignty, and Factions

The Thaw after the Pomeranian Settlement

The settlement in Pomerania brought a measure of closure to the issue that had dominated Brandenburg-Swedish relations for the previous decade. Although Friedrich Wilhelm continued to seethe, particularly over the loss of Stettin, and Brandenburg would never come to fully accept Sweden's acquisition of Western Pomerania as irreversible and legitimate, the settlement of June 1653 nudged a major stumbling block out of the way for the time being and allowed the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship to enter new territory. Within days of the agreement both sides sent out feelers to see if better times could lie ahead. The Swedish negotiating team wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm from Stettin that they hoped the agreement would serve as a "lasting foundation of good neighborly correspondence

and understanding.”¹ The elector himself wrote to Oxenstierna in the hopes of moving “everything towards enduring and sincere friendship and understanding, and trusting correspondence for the greater security of the hard-pressed Protestant religion and the maintenance of the general peace.”² Such attestations, of course, were commonplace after the conclusion of major negotiations and need to be taken with large grain of salt, but in this case words were followed closely by action. In July Friedrich Wilhelm ordered his delegation at the Regensburg *Reichstag* to drop their resistance to Swedish precedence in Pomerania’s representation, citing the need to work with Sweden for the sake of Protestantism in the Empire.³ The Swedish government drew up plans to send Lillieström to Friedrich Wilhelm to seek an alliance in Pomerania.⁴ Even the normally anti-Swedish Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal had to skeptically admit

¹ Arvid Forbus, Johan Nicodemi Lillieström, and Henrik von Schwallenberg to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stettin, 19 June 1653. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 200.

² The elector urged Oxenstierna “nuhmero alles zu bestendigerer und aufrichtiger Freundschaft undt Vernehmen, auch vertrautter Correspondens zu mehrer Sicherheitt der bedrengtten evangelischen Religion undt Maintenirung des algemeinen Fridens an allen Orten zu dirigiren. Ich werde solches an meinem Ortte gleicher gestaldt thun undt in der Thadt erweisen, das ich die Freundschaft mitt der Königin undt Chron vor alle hoch halte. Undt weill ich mich erinnere, das der Herr Graff hiebeforen gegen meinen Abgeordneten offermahlen erwenet, das wan der Streitt wegen Pommeren nur hingelegt wehre, Er zu keiner Freundschaft mehr als zu dieser rahten wolte, so hoffe ich auch nuhmer davon den Effect zu verspühren.” Friedrich Wilhelm to Axel Oxenstierna, Cöln an der Spree, 15 [25] June 1653. *UA*, XXIII.1, 156.

³ “Weil bei jetziger Beschaffenheit, da Wir der Königin in Schweden Autorität und Assistenz zu Beforderung des evangelischen Wesens Besten und des Reichs Wolfahrt Uns fruchtbarlich zu gebrauchen verhoffen, ungern einige Streitigkeit zwischen Uns und ihr wollten einreissen lassen: als seind Wir gnäd. zufrieden, dass Ihr vor diesmal (mit Vorbehalt und Verwahrung Unsers Rechters ins künftige) den Schwedischen wegen Vorpommern des erste Votum zu führen und den Vorsitz zu nehmen gestattet, mit dem Bedinge, dass sie sich des evangelischen Wesens desto eiferiger nebenst Uns annehmen.” Friedrich Wilhelm to Brandenburg delegation in Regensburg, Cöln an der Spree, 3 [13] July 1653. *UA*, VI, 255.

⁴ The instructions for Lillieström’s mission, which never took place, began with a clear reference to the Pomerania settlement opening up the door to Brandenburg-Swedish friendship and cooperation: “Efter H.K.Mt. med Churf. af Brandenburg öfver gränserna i Pommern, simultanea investitura darsammastädes, Nyemärkiske expectanzen och hvad mera afhandlat är, är förent och på den sidan intet öfvrigt är, hvilket en fullkomlig vänskap kan hindra eller removera, när allenast det, som slüet är, fast och obrottsligt blifver hållet, så hafver H.K.Mt. dess stat och rationibus funnit likmätigt, att tänka uppå, huruledes en närmare förbindelse sig, sina successorer och Sveriges Chrono på den ena och det churfl. huset på den andra sidan [emellan] må kunna stiftas, på det icke allenast ett gott förtroende härefter allt framgent må kunna blifva befäst, utan ock en arctior amicitia, som vorre ett förbund likmätigt, till begges välstånd upprättas, särdeles efter begges land och provincier med hvarandra så nära är situerade, att de i många saker hafva coniunctas rationes och H.K.Mt. blifver berättad, det Churf. själf därtill god inclination hafva skall...” Instruction for Johan Nicodemi Lillieström, Uppsala, 7 [17] November 1653. *UA*, XXIII.1, 157–60, here 157. On the cancellation of Lillieström’s mission, see Hjalmar Crohns, *Sverges*

that friendship with Sweden could be valuable and at least theoretically possible at this juncture.⁵

The developments of 1653 corresponded with a general shift in Brandenburg policy away from reliance on the emperor and towards assuming a leading position in Protestant politics in the Empire.⁶ This included taking a more active role in building the Lower Saxon Imperial Circle (of which Sweden was also a member by merit of its German possessions) into a more effective and autonomous body that could, if necessary, serve as an armed counterweight to the emperor. Brandenburg subsequently sought entry into the Hildesheim Alliance that had formed between Braunschweig, Sweden (on behalf of Bremen and Verden), and Hessen-Kassel. This brought Brandenburg and Swedish representatives together in alliance negotiations only months after the height of tensions over Pomerania had broken.⁷

The leader in this redirection of course was Count Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, a man who shared many of the elements of the diplomatic culture.⁸ After foreign travels and military service with the Dutch army during the Thirty Years' War Waldeck entered Brandenburg service in 1651 and achieved a position of prominence in both domestic and foreign affairs. He self-consciously saw himself as drawing upon an earlier tradition of Brandenburg policy from the days of Götze and Pruckmann as opposed to

Politik i Förhållande till de Federativa Rörelserna i Tyskland 1650–54 (Helsingfors: Finska Litteratur-Sällskapet Tryckeri, 1894), 133–34.

⁵ Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal to Friedrich Wilhelm, Regensburg, 18/28 July 1653. *UA*, VI, 262–67, here 264–65. Blumenthal's letter sounded a cautious tone designed to slow down any rush to friendship following the Pomeranian settlement until Sweden's good intentions could be confirmed.

⁶ See J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte der Preußischen Politik*, III:2, 8off.; Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 191–92; Crohns, 126ff.

⁷ Talks were held in Stade and Hamburg in late 1653 and early 1654. See the documents in *UA*, VI, section III; and *UA*, XXXII.1. The most comprehensive treatment of these and later efforts to have Brandenburg join the Hildesheim Alliance is Crohns. See also Georg Landberg, *Den Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia, I:3: 1648–1697* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1952), 65–66.

⁸ The literature on Waldeck is sizeable. See Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer, *Graf Georg Friedrich von Waldeck: ein preußischer Staatsmann im siebzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1869); William Jannen, *The Count of Waldeck in the Service of the Elector of Brandenburg 1651–1658* (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1970); Gerhard Menk, *Georg Friedrich von Waldeck (1620–1692): eine biographische Skizze* (Arolsen: Waldeckscher Geschichtsverein, 1992); Pieter Lodewijk Müller, *Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kampfes um das europäische Gleichgewicht*, two volumes (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1873–1880); Bahl, 609; and Waldeck's entries in *ADB*, VIII, 701–09 (by Pieter Lodewijk Müller); *NDB*, VI, 230f. (by Thomas Klein); and *BBL*, 409 (by Meta Kohnke).

the more recent course set by his pro-Imperial rival Blumenthal.⁹ Waldeck was an adherent of international activist Calvinism with a political worldview grounded in the principles of being pro-Orange, pan-Protestant, and anti-Habsburg.¹⁰ Ferdinand Schevill has written with some hyperbole (but also a kernel of truth) that “[h]is policy was as partisan and violent as his nature and can fairly be summed up in the battle cry: Death to the house of Hapsburg!”¹¹ Waldeck envisioned a grand Protestant coalition, both within the Empire and without, in which Brandenburg would play an important role in coordinating resistance to the Habsburgs.¹² On the last day of 1653 he submitted a lengthy memorandum to Friedrich Wilhelm outlining his unionist plans within the Empire.¹³ In evocative language he pointed to the threats posed by Papists and Jesuits and the need to join with others (or go it alone if necessary) in defense of “God’s Church [and the] preservation of the old German liberty that has been acquired and preserved with so much bloodshed.”¹⁴ The duty to act from religious and political obligation was matched by the strength that uniting with others with similar principles would bring. Waldeck ended with an appeal that Friedrich Wilhelm adopt a Protestant unionist course: “therefore I conclude: it is safe to stand with those who stand with God; those who

⁹ Waldeck wrote to the representative of the County of Waldeck in December 1653 that “Wir haben nun zwei im Archiv sitzen, so nur die alte consilia von Kanzler *Götzen* und *Pruckmann* aufsuchen, halten auch fleissig und förmlich Rath, machen Anstalt zu Volck und Geld.” Georg Friedrich von Waldeck to Dr. Joh. Vietor, Berlin, 4 [14] December 1653. *UA*, VI, 355–56, here 355.

¹⁰ It is worth noting that Waldeck married Countess Elisabeth Charlotte von Nassau-Siegen in 1643, creating a family connection with the House of Orange (and thus also with the House of Hohenzollern).

¹¹ Schevill, 152. He added that Waldeck “had so steeped himself in the Orange atmosphere that the only foreign policy he could conceive for his new employer [Friedrich Wilhelm] was to bring him into the closest possible association with all the Protestant states of Germany and Europe in order to checkmate the projects, politically even more nefarious than religiously, of his and the elector’s lawful suzerain, the Kaiser.”

¹² See Erdmannsdörffer, *Waldeck*, 152–298; Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 191–92. Opgenoorth (*Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:237) notes that this grand plan was in keeping with Waldeck’s propensity to fantasy and impractical projects.

¹³ “Gutachten Waldeck’s über Alliancen,” Cöln an der Spree, 31 December 1653 [10 January 1654.] *UA*, VI, 488–500.

¹⁴ “Will niemand mit, so ist besser allein den Vorstand Gottes Kirch, Erhaltung der alten teutschen mit so vielem Blutvergiessen erworben und noch erhaltener Freiheit, Befreiung einer schändlichen Untersässigkeit, Vertheidigung so vieler nothleidender Christen in Ungunst der Feinde Christi unter den Waffen zu sterben, als durch eine schändliche Furcht sich gutwillig mit Beschwerung seines Gewissens gegen die Treu, so man dem Vaterland schuldig, denen, so E.Ch.D. und aller Evangelischen Untergang suchen, in den Rachen zu werfen.” *Ibid.*, 494–95.

profess the Gospel stand with God; those who seek to maintain German liberty will bring Your Electoral Highness security.”¹⁵

Waldeck's memorandum was as much a manifesto as a set of concrete political suggestions, a document Erdmannsdörffer has rightly referred to as a “noteworthy piece of political eloquence.”¹⁶ It does, however, give a sense of the direction Brandenburg policy vis-à-vis Sweden would take under his direction: a fear of Swedish preponderance in northern Germany as a threat to German liberties and a reluctance to fully trust Sweden's intentions, combined with the sincere desire to cooperate with Sweden in Germany and beyond as a natural Protestant ally.¹⁷ In the mid-1650s similar discussions were taking place within the Swedish government that shared the mixture of excitement over the prospect of a Brandenburg-Swedish alliance with suspicion over the elector's true intentions.¹⁸ Waldeck later wrote his brother that the first and foremost item on the agenda of establishing good relations between Brandenburg and other Protestant states would be to send a skilled and trusted ambassador to Sweden to scope out Sweden's attitudes towards the Protestant cause and other important matters.¹⁹ As his star continued to rise in the Brandenburg government Waldeck became increasingly identified with pro-Swedish leanings, and for his efforts to unite Sweden with Brandenburg (and others) in a broad Protestant alliance.

He was joined in the conduct of affairs by a cadre of others with varying levels of sympathy for his political vision and in whose hands an

¹⁵ “Schliesse demnach also: die mit Gott es halten, bei denen ist sicher zu stehen; die sich zum Evangelio bekennen, halten es mit Gott; die die teutsche Freiheit suchen zu erhalten, bringen E.Ch.D. Sicherheit; denen beizufallen, ist deroselben Vortheil.” *Ibid.*, 499.

¹⁶ Erdmannsdörffer, *Waldeck*, 179.

¹⁷ In the memorandum Waldeck writes both of rumors of Swedish-Spanish cooperation (498–99), but also in strong favor of Brandenburg joining the Hildesheim Alliance, adding (497) “so könnte alsdann mit den Schweden desswegen etwas Näheres geheim gemacht werden.”

¹⁸ See the body of documents from 1655 in RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 11.

¹⁹ “Das beste wird sein vor S.Ch.D., mit allen evangelischen Fürsten sich in guter Verständniss zu erhalten und sonderlich denjenigen, damit Sie sichere Verständniss und nähere Freundschaft ohne Gefahr machen können. Zuvorderst und für allen Dingen möchte ich wünschen zu vernehmen, dass S.Ch.D. eine rechte vertraute und geschickte Person förderlichst nacher Schweden schicken und vor allen andern Dingen diese Gewissheit von dem itzigen Könige und seiner Intention mit allem Fleiss erforschen liessen, obs I. Maj. und zuvorderst dero vorntheils Ministri zum Krieg oder Frieden incliniren, und ob sie mit dem, was das Inst. Pac. giebet, zufrieden sein wollen; zweitens ob sie auch des evangelischen Wesens hier in Deutschland sich mit mehrerem Ernst annehmen wollen.” Georg Friedrich Waldeck to Count Wolrad, undated [1654]. *UA*, VI, 599–602, here 601.

important percentage of Brandenburg's dealings with Sweden would come to be concentrated: Johann Ulrich Dobrzenski von Dobrzeniec, Matthias Wesenbeck, and Otto von Schwerin. Each of these men was well-situated to participate in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. Dobrzenski was a close adherent of Waldeck's whose political fortunes were closely tied to those of his patron.²⁰ His extensive diplomatic activity gave him ample opportunity to work towards implementing Waldeck's vision of closer Brandenburg-Swedish relations under the aegis of Protestant brotherhood. Wesenbeck had been part of the elector's negotiating team at Osnabrück (and also at the Nürnberg *Executionstag*) and had developed relationships with a number of Swedes there. He was the grandson of a famous jurist of the same name who had emigrated from Antwerp for religious reasons and taught at Jena and Wittenberg.²¹ Wesenbeck himself studied at a number of German universities, received a degree in law, and later married the daughter of the Frankfurt/Oder law professor Cyriacus Herdesianus. Although Wesenbeck's energetic advocacy of Calvinists' rights in the Empire had earlier caused some friction with Sweden (this was especially true when Friedrich Wilhelm appointed the Calvinist Wesenbeck to exercise Lutheran Pomerania's vote in the *Fürstenrat* at the Osnabrück talks), in their dealings under Waldeck's ascendancy the Swedes came to view Wesenbeck as a friendly figure.²² By 1657 rumors were even circulating that he was receiving a Swedish pension.²³

Schwerin, by this time a veteran of a decade and a half of dealings with the Swedes, had a more complicated and ambiguous relationship with

²⁰ On Dobrzenski, see Bahl, 462; *ADB*, V, 276–77 (by Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer); *NDB*, IV, 7 (by Hans Saring). Waldeck's support of Dobrzenski was apparently so insistent that in October 1653 an exasperated Blumenthal wrote to Waldeck that "to recommend Herr Dobrzenski at great length is unnecessary, for I know that you love him." Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal to Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, Regensburg, 26 October [5 November] 1653. *UA*, VI, 317.

²¹ Biographical information for Wesenbeck can be found in Bahl, 618–19; and *ADB*, XLII, 758–61 (by Herman Granier).

²² On tensions between Wesenbeck and the Swedes, see Brandenburg delegation to Friedrich Wilhelm, Osnabrück, 24 November [4 December] 1645. *UA*, IV, 413. Count Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach later wrote to Karl X Gustav in 1656 of Wesenbeck's profession of his "special passion" for the king. Schlippenbach to Karl X Gustav, Königsberg, 18 [28] October 1656. *UA*, XXIII.1, 371–72, here 371.

²³ Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Berlin, 29 December 1657 [8 January 1658]. *UA*, XXIII.1, 547.

both Waldeck and Sweden.²⁴ His position in the Brandenburg government was of higher profile and greater independence than Dobrzanski's, and he rivaled Waldeck for influence. The two did not see eye to eye on a number of issues, though by the end of 1653 Schwerin was reconciling himself with Waldeck's prominence.²⁵ He was also alternately liked and hated by various Swedes throughout his long years of interaction with them.²⁶ Nonetheless, he possessed a full set of tools to work within the diplomatic culture: studies at Greifswald (while the city was under Swedish occupation) under David Mevius, who himself had studied at Leiden and Groningen, offered tutorials on Lipsius' *Politica*, and later entered Swedish diplomatic service;²⁷ travels as a young man throughout the Netherlands, England and France; an impressive private library with especially strong holdings in the classics (including Lipsius' editions of Tacitus and Seneca) and contemporary history;²⁸ personal familiarity with a number of leading Swedes built up over years of interaction; and a fervent personal Calvinism that sat comfortably within a vision of Lutheran-Calvinist coexistence consistent with the prospect of Brandenburg and Sweden getting along.²⁹ In coming years Schwerin played an important

²⁴ On Schwerin, see Max Hein, *Otto von Schwerin: der Oberpräsident des Großen Kurfürsten* (Königsberg: Gräfe und Unzer, 1929); *ADB*, XXXV, 754–63 (by Ferdinand Hirsch); Bahl, 584–85; *BBL*, 365–66 (by Oliver Hermann).

²⁵ "Herr Schwerin lässt mich auch täglich um Freundschaft ansuchen." Georg Friedrich Waldeck to Dr. Joh. Vietor, Berlin, 4 [14] December 1653. *UA*, VI, 355–56, here 355.

²⁶ Schlippenbach, for example, called Schwerin a "godless man" who was working single-handedly against a Brandenburg-Swedish alliance and whose position at court he was intent on ruining ("Der gottlose Mann der *Schwerin* ist vorgestern hinaus zum Churf. und verhindert auf alle Weise, daß ich so bald nicht möge den Churf. wieder sprechen. Er soll aber erfahren, daß ich ihme an diesem Hof ruiniren will." Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach to Karl X Gustav, Königsberg, 15 [25] October 1656. *UA*, XXIII.1, 368), and then only two months later worked to soothe Karl X Gustav's anger against Schwerin so that Schwerin's planned mission to the king could take place. See Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach to Karl X Gustav, Marienfelde, 8 [18] December 1656. *UA*, XXIII.1, 407; Otto von Schwerin and Friedrich von Jena to Friedrich Wilhelm, Holland, 20 December 1656. *UA*, VIII, 143–44.

²⁷ Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the early modern State*, 96–97. On Mevius, see Nils Jörn (ed.), *David Mevius (1609–1670): Leben und Werk eines pommerschen Juristen von europäischem Rang* (Hamburg: Kovac, 2007).

²⁸ The collection was later expanded by his son. See *Catalogus Bibliothecae Schwerinianae, Optimis et Nitidis, Maximam Partem, ex Omni Scientiarum Genere Libris Ornatae, ad diem 3. Octobr. Anni MDCCXXXVI. Horis Consuetis, in Aedibus Schwerinianis, ad Forum, Vulgo Molcken-Markt Dictum, Sitis Publicae Auctionis Lege Wendendae* (Berolini: Christiani Ludovici Kinstii, [1746]). See also Hein, 266.

²⁹ During the Osnabrück negotiations Fromholtz had provided the Swedish delegation with a copy of a letter from Schwerin (dated The Hague, 3 May 1648) in which Schwerin

role in crafting Friedrich Wilhelm's religious policies aimed at lessening tensions between his Calvinist and Lutheran subjects, and when Schwerin was placed in charge of delivering a strict Calvinist education to the electoral princes he encouraged his young charges to attend both Calvinist and Lutheran services as preparation for their future careers as rulers of a multi-confessional state.³⁰

Swedish-Polish Warfare and Hohenzollern Sovereignty in Prussia

Before this group could get to work on the opportunity to reform Brandenburg-Swedish relations the northern world was rocked by the abdication of Queen Christina and the ascension of her cousin Karl X Gustav to the Swedish throne in 1654.³¹ The new king, the son of Johann Kasimir of Pfalz-Zweibrücken and Gustav Adolf's half-sister Katarina, was a familiar figure to a number of leading Brandenburgers from his military service in Germany during the Thirty Years' War.³² He had gotten to know Waldeck during Waldeck's time as administrator of Culemborg in the 1640s, and as Schevill has written "the King of Sweden and Count Waldeck were men of related mettle and felt for each other an instinctive respect."³³ A bellicose nature and desire to take the fight to the enemy marked Karl Gustav's short reign, and was one of the traits he shared in common with Waldeck. The king and his top diplomat, Count Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach, set out working almost immediately to form an

linked the survival of the elector and of Protestantism to friendship with Sweden, which he swore before God to support: "Gott helfe, daß ihre Prophezeiung, die Cron Schweden und S.Chufl.Durchl. in enger Freundschaft zu sehen, bald wahr werde, und lasse mich Gott nimmer selig werden, wann ichs nicht von Herzen wünsche und alles dahin richte. Ich wünsche denen Vermaledeiung, die das contrarium suchen; denn solche, wiewohl sie es nicht meinen mögen, Sr.Churfl.Durchl. und des evangel. Wesens Untergang befördern werden." *UA*, XXIII.1, 118 n. 2.

³⁰ Hein, 263–64; Gericke, 38, 43, 45; Martin Lackner, *Die Kirchenpolitik des Großen Kurfürsten* (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1973), 128–32, 166–69. Excerpts from Friedrich Wilhelm's instructions to Schwerin for the education of electoral prince Carl Aemil (dated 12 August 1662) are reprinted as document #15 in Gericke, 171–72. On Schwerin's role as princely educator, see Ferdinand Hirsch, "Die Erziehung der älteren Söhne des Großen Kurfürsten," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 7 (1894), 141–71.

³¹ Adolf Friedrich Schlezler followed these events closely and reported back to Berlin. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 12; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 2.

³² The biographical literature on Karl X Gustav is surprisingly thin. See Sven Ingemar Olofsson, *Carl Gustaf: hertigen-tronföljaren* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1961); *SBL*, XX, 641–50 (by Stellan Dahlgren); Roberts, *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII*, 55–143.

³³ *ADB*, VIII, 702; Schevill, 174.

alliance with Brandenburg for a planned strike against Poland.³⁴ Although Waldeck feared that renewed conflict between Sweden and Poland could distract from his plans for an anti-Habsburg movement in the Empire, the multiple layers and multiple allegiances of his Protestant cosmopolitanism allowed him over time to see the Swedish plan both as an opportunity for political and territorial gain for his lord, and as a chance to unite Protestant arms against a Catholic enemy.³⁵ He eventually became the Swedes' chief ally in working for a military alliance.

Waldeck's protégé Dobrzanski arrived in Stockholm in November 1654 to succeed Schlezer as Friedrich Wilhelm's resident in Sweden.³⁶ By this time it was clear to all that Karl Gustav was set on a course for conflict with Poland, and the elector feared a return to the situation of 1626 when Ducal Prussia became a battlefield for Swedish and Polish armies.³⁷ Although Dobrzanski was instructed to offer the elector's mediation, few entertained hopes for peace as a realistic possibility. Schlippenbach in fact appears to have spoken quite frankly with Friedrich Wilhelm as early as September 1654 of Karl Gustav's plans for war.³⁸ The real question evolved around what Brandenburg's reaction to the Swedish offensive would be. In early 1655 Karl Gustav dispatched Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to be his resident at the Brandenburg court and to monitor attitudes there towards the coming war against Poland.³⁹ Wolfsberg had worked in the Swedish field chancery during the Thirty Years' War and at the Westphalia

³⁴ Reinhold Koser, "Der Große Kurfürst und Karl X. von Schweden," *Hohenzollern-Jahrbuch* 18 (1914), 4–18, is a good source on these efforts. Much of the correspondence between Schlippenbach and Karl Gustav, as well as other relevant documents and commentary, can be found in Albert von Schlippenbach (ed.), *Zur Geschichte der Hohenzollerischen Souveränität in Preußen: diplomatischer Briefwechsel des Königs Karl Gustav von Schweden und des Gesandten Grafen Chr. K. von Schlippenbach aus den Kriegsjahren 1654–1657* (Berlin: Egon Fleischel & Co., 1906).

³⁵ For Waldeck's initial concerns see Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:289–91; Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*, 37.

³⁶ Documents regarding Dobrzanski's mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 10; RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176; UA, VI, 663–73.

³⁷ Waldeck interestingly wrote that in certain respects the situation in 1626 had actually been better, with one of the reasons being that at that time Brandenburg had higher-quality statesmen and more effective diplomacy: "Damals waren viel E.Ch.D. staatskundige und geübte Leute, welches jetzt ziemlich mangelt... es war Direction in allen Sachen, welches gegenwärtig nicht erscheint; fleissige Correspondenzen wurden unterhalten, zu Schickungen wurde nichts erspart, welches jetzt anders erscheint." Waldeck's [undated] response to a set of 26 questions posed by Friedrich Wilhelm. UA, VII, 346–53, here 352.

³⁸ See Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:287.

³⁹ Wolfsberg's instructions are dated Stockholm, 30 December 1654 [9 January 1655]. UA, XXIII.1, 170–72. His first report is dated Cöln an der Spree, 22 March 1655. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 6; abridged version in UA, XXIII.1, 175–76. Wolfsberg served as Swedish resident until June 1658. The correspondence from his mission is in

negotiations before serving as Karl Gustav's secretary during the long process of implementing the terms of the peace.⁴⁰ Afterwards he had embarked on extended study travels through the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Hungary under Karl Gustav's patronage, during which time he sent reports of his progress back to his sponsor. His posting to Brandenburg appears to have been his first permanent diplomatic appointment.

Wolfsberg constructed his embassy on the foundations of the diplomatic culture's emphasis on personal relationships with likeminded individuals and informal channels of exchange. Upon arriving in Berlin he went first to see Waldeck, with whom he developed a trusting relationship that included the mutual exchange of sensitive information.⁴¹ Waldeck began sending and receiving secret correspondence with the highest levels of the Swedish government through Wolfsberg.⁴² In June 1655 he approached Wolfsberg, "not as an Electoral minister or on the orders of the Elector, but rather as a particularly good friend," with a clandestine proposal written by Friedrich Wilhelm on a half-sheet of paper suggesting the terms under which he might accept a military alliance against Poland.⁴³ In this and later correspondence Wolfsberg and Karl Gustav

RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 6–10, and is reprinted at some length in *UA*, XXIII.1.

⁴⁰ On Wolfsberg, see Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 414 (entry B113); and Fritz Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift aus dem Jahre 1661 über die Wiederanknüpfung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Brandenburg," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 7 (1894), 193–207, here 200–01.

⁴¹ Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Cöln an der Spree, 22 March 1655. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 6.

⁴² "Und gleich wie offtbemüheter Herr Graff [Waldeck] im übrigen sich darauff beruffen, das Er sowoll an E. Kön. Mt. selber, als auch an den Hern ReichsCantzlers *Excellt*: mit dieser Post eigenhändig schreiben, und sich dadurch weiter *expectoriren* wolte: Also hat Er mir auch gestern mittag solche schreiben unter ein verschloßen *couvert* zugeschicket, und dabÿ inständig begeret, das solche nicht alleine gehöriger maßen bestellet, sondern auch die darauff etwa erfolgende *resolution*, wieder an mich *dressiret* werden möchte." Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Cöln an der Spree, 12 April 1655. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 6.

⁴³ "bei der benannten Person [Waldeck] angefundnen, hat dieselbe mich dergestalt angedet, daß sie mir nicht zwar als ein churfl. Minister oder auf des Churf. Befehl, sondern als ein particulier guter Freund etwas offenbaren, jedoch dabei aufs höchste protestiret haben wollte, auf den Fall an den hohen Ort, wohin ich es sonder Zweifel gelangen lassen würde, dergleichen übel mesnagiret oder durch Veränderung der Gemüter und der Zeit gegen S. Churf. Durchl. gemäßbrauchet, ja endlich wider Zuversicht publiciret werden sollte, sie es nimmer gestehen, sondern solchem allem als einem unwahrhaften Bericht, so von mir selber wäre erdacht worden, widersprechen wollte, maßen sie denn auch hierunter ihres Namens in der Überschreibung nicht gerne gebraucht wissen möchte. Diesem nach mir einen halben Bogen Papier, worauf etwa ein zehen oder 12 Zeilen geschrieben sein könnten,

referred to Waldeck as “the person in question” to protect his identity in case their correspondence was intercepted.⁴⁴ The king expressed his wish that the pro-Swedish Waldeck remain continually at the elector’s side as the alliance negotiations progressed.⁴⁵

With Karl Gustav preparing for war, Waldeck’s was the clearest voice in Brandenburg urging Friedrich Wilhelm to consider cooperating with, and perhaps profiting from, the inevitable.⁴⁶ The prize to be sought was significant: sovereignty in Ducal Prussia. In July and August 1655 negotiations took place in Stettin between Brandenburg and Swedish representatives on a possible military alliance.⁴⁷ Early and dramatic military successes in the war that had now begun gave the Swedes little incentive to budge from their original positions (which included the insistence that Brandenburg abandon an alliance with the Dutch that Karl Gustav saw as potentially threatening to Sweden’s position in the Baltic), and the talks broke off with some acrimony. The impulsive Waldeck was so incensed by

zwar gezeigt, aber nicht zu lesen verstatet, sondern diese Erwähnung getan, daß S. Churfl. Durchl. obgedachter Person diesen Zettel, als welchen Sie eigenhändig geschrieben, zugestellt, und dabei gnädigst anbefohlen: Weiln dieselbe allemal zu Antretung der Alliance mit E. Kgl. Mt. so eifrig geraten und S. Churfl. Durchl. durch die bisherig so kalt-sinnige Bezeugung, auch bei Ihr einlangende unterschiedliche Berichte und Warnungen zu allerhand ungleichen Gedanken und Mutmaßungen, insonderheit aber dahin veranlasset würden, sich hierunter bei Zeit wohl vorzusehen und auf Ihre Sicherheit zu gedenken, als sollte mehrgedachte Person das Werk . . . ferner überlegen.” Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Berlin, 24 May [3 June] 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 198–201, here 198–99.

⁴⁴ See also Karl X Gustav to Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg, Stockholm, 16 [26] June 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 212–13, here 213.

⁴⁵ “Och skulle Vi helst se, att gr. af *Waldeck*, som så högt tesmoignerar sin affection emot Oss, komme snart utur Pryssen till hofvet igen och blefve där stadigt, hållandes Vi vara bäst, att han (gr. af *Waldeck*) är hos Churf. och andra brukades till att tractera med de Våra [in Stettin].” Karl X Gustav to Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg, Stockholm, 5 [15] May 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 191–92, here 192.

⁴⁶ In July Waldeck wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm that the war was unavoidable and that “so wir nicht mitmachen, so geht es über uns aus.” Georg Friedrich von Waldeck to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stettin, 10 [20] July 1655. *UA*, VII, 387–88, here 387.

⁴⁷ Brandenburg’s representatives were Waldeck and Schwerin, Sweden’s Bengt Oxenstierna and Johan Lillieström. See *UA*, VII, section II.3; *UA*, XXIII.1; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:304ff; Koser, “Große Kurfürst und Karl X.,” 5–6. An air of secrecy surrounded the talks, and Waldeck and Schwerin drafted a full set of dummy dispatches to be read by the entire privy council as opposed to the true set to be read by the inner-circle alone. On the need for secrecy see also Waldeck to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stettin, 8 [18] July 1655: “Unterdess bitte ich E.Ch.D. unterth., Sie wollen un Gottes Willen mit keinem Menschen als M. *Somnitzen* aus diesem Werk reden; denn kein Mensch kann glauben, was vor particularia man alhier weiss von E.Ch.D. Discursen, und scheint es, dass man Leute daselbst bestellt, so bald diese bald jene Zeitung bringen, nur E.Ch.D. Gedanken zu hören.” *UA*, VII, 384–85, here 384.

what he perceived as Swedish high-handedness that he became for a brief period the most anti-Swedish of all of Friedrich Wilhelm's councilors.⁴⁸

The important events that followed in rapid-fire succession need only be sketched out here. A surprising and rapid Polish military recovery in December 1655 forced Karl Gustav to reconsider the utility of Brandenburg support, and after two weeks of negotiations the Treaty of Königsberg was signed on 17 January 1656 in which Friedrich Wilhelm recognized Swedish as opposed to Polish feudal overlordship in Ducal Prussia and pledged military support for the Swedes in exchange for guarantees of Ducal Prussia's territorial integrity and certain domestic concessions.⁴⁹ By this time Waldeck was back on board and was once again the leading pro-Swedish voice in the privy council. As Sweden's military position continued to worsen Friedrich Wilhelm was able to secure a better set terms for his continued support in the Treaty of Marienburg (15 June 1656).⁵⁰ This proved to be a good deal for Karl Gustav, as the following month a sizeable Brandenburg contingent under Friedrich Wilhelm and Waldeck played an important role in defeating the Poles at the three-day Battle of Warsaw (28–30 July), the event that marked the entry of the Brandenburg-Prussian army onto the European stage. This and other factors gave Friedrich Wilhelm increased leverage to insist upon yet another revision of terms, this one granted in the Treaty of Labiau (20 November 1656) in which the feudal relationship between Sweden and Brandenburg was dissolved and Karl Gustav recognized Ducal Prussia as a sovereign entity under Hohenzollern rule in return for an "eternal alliance."⁵¹ Subsequent

⁴⁸ See Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Berlin, 30 July [9 August] 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 227; Schlippenbach to Karl X Gustav, Berlin, 18 [28] August 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 230–31; Wolfsberg to Mattias Biörnkrou, Berlin, 27 August [6 September] 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 234; Wolfsberg to Mattias Biörnkrou, Berlin, 3 [13] September 1655. *UA*, XXIII.1, 235. Waldeck even proposed military action against the Swedes if their army were to cross the Ducal Prussian border. See Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, I:319–20; Koser, "Große Kurfürst und Karl X.," 7.

⁴⁹ The signatories were Erik Oxenstierna for Sweden, and Otto von Schwerin, Lorenz Christoph Somnitz, and Dobrzanski for Brandenburg. Von Moerner, Nr. 105, 195–98. See documents in *UA*, VII, section II.6; *UA*, XXIII.1; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 182.

⁵⁰ Von Moerner, Nr. 109, 201–05. Signatories in this case were Erik Oxenstierna, Schering Rosenhane, and Sten Bielke (for Sweden); Waldeck, Dobrzanski, and Nicolaus Ernst von Platen for Brandenburg. See documents in *UA*, VII, section III; *UA*, XXIII.1; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 183.

⁵¹ Von Moerner, Nr. 115, 211–14. Signatories were Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach, Mattias Biörnkrou, and Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg for Sweden; Schwerin and Friedrich von Jena for Brandenburg. See documents in *UA*, VIII, section II; *UA*, XXIII.1; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 6; *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 184.

events would prove in what little esteem the term “eternal” was held in early modern diplomatic language, as even before the Labiau negotiations were complete the elector had entered into talks with Poland about switching sides in the conflict in exchange for *Polish* recognition of his sovereignty in Ducal Prussia. These negotiations were completed in the Treaty of Wehlau, signed on 19 September 1657.⁵²

Friedrich Wilhelm was now a sovereign lord in Prussia, a watershed development in Brandenburg-Prussian history. He was also, however, on the way to being at war with Sweden, although open hostilities didn't break out until 1658. The change in sides in the northern war was one of several factors that contributed to Waldeck's resignation of his positions in the elector's government, and in 1658 he entered Swedish service.⁵³ His zeal for militant Protestantism continued to burn for the remainder of his life, and he ended his career as a General Field Marshall in Dutch service and close confidant of William III in his struggles against Louis XIV.⁵⁴ Schwerin, who had supported the switch to an alliance with Poland for political rather than ideological reasons, was now the most powerful official in Brandenburg, and in 1658 he was given the title *Oberpräsident* of the privy council to reflect his pre-eminent position.

Brandenburg's war against Sweden, which included campaigns in Jutland, Prussia, and Pomerania (where the elector hoped to secure by arms that which he had not been able to obtain through diplomacy at

⁵² See Heinz Duchhardt and Bogdan Wachowiak, *Um die Souveränität des Herzogtums Preußen: der Vertrag von Wehlau 1657* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1998), which includes Latin and German texts of the treaty (24–43). Primary documents in *UA*, VIII, section III.

⁵³ Schevill oversimplified matters in writing (183) that Waldeck resigned “owing to his bitter opposition to the elector's exchange of the Swedish for the Polish alliance.” For a more nuanced discussion of Waldeck's reasons for leaving Brandenburg service, see Erdmannsdörffer, *Waldeck*, 420–43. Waldeck had first approached Wolfsberg about the possibility of entering Swedish service in July 1657: “... was gestalt der Graf von Waldeck gestern zu mir gekommen und vor mir beteuert, daß, weiln die Sachen hie bei Hofe sich dergestalt anlassen dürften, daß ihm nicht anstehen möchte, je länger dabei zu verbleiben, möchte also gern wissen, ob auf solchen Fall E. Kgl. Maj. ihn accommodiren könnten und wollten. Es möchte nun die Resolution nach E. Kgl. Maj. gn. Belieben fallen, so hat er gebeten, daß dieses sein Begehren gar geheimb gehalten werden möchte.” Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg to Karl X Gustav, Königsberg, 10/20 July 1657. *UA*, XXIII.1, 482. Karl Gustav responded positively: “Gleichwie Uns nun dessen verspürende Affection sonders lieb zu vernehmen, also wollet Ihr auch denselben unter der Hand versichern, daß, da er dergleichen Veränderung resolviren sollte, Wir ihm schon dergestalt honorablement wieder excipiren würden, daß er Unser demselben zutragende sonderbare Zuneigung im Werke zu verspüren haben sollte.” Karl X Gustav to Wolfsberg, Mühle Groß Eichsen unweit Gladbusch, 18 [28] July 1657. *UA*, XXIII.1, 482 n. 2.

⁵⁴ See P.L. Müller, *Wilhelm III von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck*.

Westphalia), lasted from 1658 until 1660. Karl Gustav's sudden death in February 1660 at the age of thirty-seven opened the door for a quick end to the war, which was finalized in the Treaty of Oliva in May.⁵⁵ To Friedrich Wilhelm's great disappointment, the peace required that he return to Sweden those parts of Western Pomerania that had been conquered from the Swedes, which did nothing but add fuel to his determination to gain the land he still considered rightfully his.

Distrust and Alliance

Sweden's new king, Karl XI, was four years old when his father died, meaning that Sweden stood under the direction of a minority government for the 1660s and into the 1670s.⁵⁶ As had been the case following the Pomerania settlement of 1653, the significant common interests that Brandenburg and Sweden shared once again led to a prompt resumption of bilateral relations following the cessation of hostilities. Sweden in particular hoped to benefit over rising Brandenburg-Polish tensions over Elbing, a town in Royal Prussia that had stood under Swedish occupation during the war but that had been pledged by Poland to Friedrich Wilhelm as security in the Treaty of Wehlau and the Treaty of Bromberg that followed shortly thereafter.⁵⁷ After the war was over Poland delayed in delivering Elbing into Friedrich Wilhelm's hands, and the Swedes carefully monitored the situation for opportunities to separate Brandenburg and Poland from one another. That they now viewed Friedrich Wilhelm as a significant independent threat—made more dangerous by possible aspirations for the Polish throne—was made abundantly clear by the fact that the minority government considered a variety of plans to support Sweden's traditional enemy, Poland, in the event of a struggle with the elector over Elbing.⁵⁸ But as had been the case so many times in Brandenburg-

⁵⁵ Von Moerner, Nr. 129a, 239–49. Brandenburg's negotiators were Johan von Hoverbeck, Lorenz Christoph von Somnitz, and Albrecht von Ostau; Sweden's were Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, Bengt Oxenstierna, Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach, and Andreas Gyldenklau. For documents from the negotiations, see *UA*, VIII, 683–734; *UA*, XXIII.2.

⁵⁶ Birger Fahlborg's works still provide the most detailed discussions of Swedish foreign policy in the 1660s. See his *Sveriges Yttre Politik 1660–1664* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1932) and *Sveriges Yttre Politik 1664–1668*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1949).

⁵⁷ The town was to be returned to Poland upon payment of 400,000 *Reichstaler*. On tensions over Elbing and other issues in Brandenburg-Polish relations at the time, see Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, II:11–17.

⁵⁸ See the documents in *UA*, XXIII.2, 617–22. This came at a time when Schlippenbach was working to build good relations between Sweden and Poland after years of animosity.

Swedish relations, complications involving Poland could also pull the two lands together. In August 1660 Johan von Hoverbeck approached Schlippenbach in Danzig to ask for Swedish assistance in encouraging Poland to hand over Elbing, and by December developments in Sweden and on the continent led Chancellor Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, one of the most powerful of the regents, to state in a meeting of the Swedish Council that it could be entirely possible to bring Brandenburg back over to Sweden's side.⁵⁹ These thoughts were echoed by Claes Tott, who said such a development would be strongly in Sweden's interests and suggested making concessions to the elector to help bring about an improvement in relations.⁶⁰ From this point the resumption of friendly relations with Brandenburg became a frequently discussed issue in the Council. Per Brahe in particular stood at the forefront of those arguing for friendship, and he suggested that Wolfsberg (who had been recalled with the breakdown of relations in 1658) be sent back to Berlin to secure Brandenburg's friendship. In March a long memorandum by Wolfsberg himself in favor of the resumption of relations and of sending an ambassador to Berlin was read out in the Council.⁶¹

Like their counterparts in Brandenburg who had led the charge for an improvement of relations with Sweden in 1653, Brahe and De la Gardie were well-equipped to work within the diplomatic culture. As a youth Brahe had spent five years traveling abroad and had studied in Giessen, Strassburg, Padua and Bologna.⁶² His personal library of roughly 1500 volumes was particularly strong in theology, law, and philology, and included the manuscript of his own Swedish translation of Lipsius' *Politica*.⁶³ His many dealings with Brandenburg began with a mission to Berlin in 1633 that was designed to keep Brandenburg allied to Sweden following Gustav

⁵⁹ On Hoverbeck's request for Swedish intercession regarding Elbing, see Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach to minority government, Danzig, 18/28 August 1660. *UA*, XXIII.2, 620.

⁶⁰ Protocol of the Riksråd, 10 [20] December 1660. *UA*, XXIII.2, 622. See also documents in *RA*, *Diplomatica*, *Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 202. On this and other aspects of the debate in Sweden regarding relations with Brandenburg in late 1660–1661, see Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift," on which the following discussion draws.

⁶¹ Printed in Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift," 202–07; abridged version in *UA*, XXIII.2, 628–31.

⁶² For biographical information, see *SBL*, V, 686–704 (by Georg Wittrock).

⁶³ Arne Losman, "Drei schwedische Büchersammler des 17. Jahrhunderts: Per Brahe d.J., Carl Gustaf Wrangel und Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie," in Dieter Lohmeier (ed.), *Arte et Marte: Studien zur Adelskultur des Barockzeitalters in Schweden, Dänemark und Schleswig-Holstein* (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz, 1978), 159–72, here 163–64.

Adolf's death, and continued throughout the 1630s and 1640s.⁶⁴ Brahe was one of the Swedes to speak warmly of Brandenburg to Götze and Leuchtmar as relations were being rekindled in the early 1640s, and to place the blame for the animosity of the late-1630s on Schwarzenberg's shoulders.⁶⁵ The strict Lutheran Brahe later remarked to Adolf Friedrich Schlezer that divisions between Brandenburg and Sweden "would bring nothing more than the strengthening of the Catholics and the ruination of the Protestants."⁶⁶

De la Gardie's intellectual credentials were every bit as strong as Brahe's. A precocious student, De la Gardie enrolled at Uppsala before he was thirteen years old, delivered a number of Latin orations there, and served as *rector illustris* of the university in 1639–1640.⁶⁷ He traveled abroad from 1640–1644, including studies at Leiden and Paris. In later years he maintained a network of correspondents stretched across Europe, including Harald Appelboom in The Hague and Peter Trotzig in Amsterdam, from whom he received a steady flow of books, maps, globes, and natural specimens in addition to news. His own library grew to around 6000 volumes, and he developed the reputation as the leading independent patron of the arts in Sweden.⁶⁸ Like Schwerin, De la Gardie's position vis-à-vis Brandenburg-Swedish relations was ambiguous, and his inter-

⁶⁴ On the 1633 mission, see Odhner, 20.

⁶⁵ "Am 24. Aug./3. Sept. wurden wir von dem Herrn Reichstruchsessen, Herrn Grafen von Brahe, visitiret; der contestirte eine sonderbare Affection gegen E.Ch.D.; man entschuldigt hier selbst E.Ch.D. Herrn Vatern und leget alle Schuld auf den Grafen von Schwartzenberg, den General Lieutenant Arnheim und denen, so von ihnen dependiret." Götze and Leuchtmar to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 31 August/10 September 1642. *UA*, I, 576–78, here 578.

⁶⁶ "Unterdeßen habe ich Ihr *Excell.* dem Herren ReichsTruchses Ew. Cuhrfürstl. Durchl. beständige begierde mit dieser Hochlöblichen Kron in beherlicher freundschaft zuleben, und wie boshaftig dieselbe handelten, welche durch allerhand verleumbdungen mistrawen zwischen Ihr Königl. Maj: und Ew. Cuhrfürstl. Durchl. anzurichten bemuhet weren . . . derselbe antwortete: Er erfrewte sich, dß Ew. Cuhrfürstl. Durchl. Ihr Königl. Maj: dero beständigen *affection* hette versichern wollen. Was bisher were ausgestrewet worden, kenne von geringen leuten, denen man in so wichtig sachen keinen glauben zugestellet. die *separation* zwischen Ihr Königl. Maj. und Ew. Cuhrfürstl. Durchl. könnte nichts anders nach sich ziehen, als eine versterckung der Catholischen und *ruinirung* der Ewangelischen." Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 14 April 1648. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 5, 74r–78v, here 74v–75r.

⁶⁷ For biographical information, see *SBL*, X, 657–80 (by Georg Wittrock with T.O. Nordberg).

⁶⁸ Arne Losman, "The European Communications Network of Carl Gustaf Wrangel and Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie," in Rystad (ed.), *Europe and Scandinavia*, 195–200, here 198–99; idem, "Drei schwedische Büchersammler," 167–68.

actions with Brandenburgers were frequently strained, particularly due to his close relationship with France, about which more will be said below. Nevertheless, his background had prepared him to work within the system and achieve tangible results.

The first formal steps to re-establishing full diplomatic relations came in 1661, when Friedrich Wilhelm dispatched Gerhard Johannes von Ledebaur to Stockholm, partially to begin to rebuild a working relationship, but also to keep a close eye on Swedish military preparations.⁶⁹ His stay in Sweden was brief—little over a month—but included the exchange of formal diplomatic niceties as well as informal interaction at dining and drinking parties with the full range of Swedish governmental elite.⁷⁰ At this same time the regency government ordered Andreas Gyldenklou, president of the government in Swedish Pomerania, to begin correspondence with Brandenburg officials in the hopes of improving relations.⁷¹ The selection of Gyldenklou for a goodwill campaign was wise, as he was a prototypical Protestant cosmopolitan who had already won the affection of certain Brandenburgers. Gyldenklou had visited both Swedish and German universities as a young man, including a stop at Helmstedt, where he was taught by the noted Protestant unionist theologian Georg Calixtus, and at Wittenberg, where he took his degree. His studies included theology, eloquence, and poetry, and Gustav Adolf appointed him professor at Uppsala in this last-named field in 1630. Scholarly interests and marriage connections brought him into a circle that included the Skytte, Stiernhielm, and Bureus families, the cutting (and at times quite radical) edge of Swedish intellectual life.⁷² He entered Crown service as a secretary in 1635, and progressed through the ranks as a client and close correspondent of the Protestant cosmopolitan Adler Salvius. He was connected in this capacity to the secret correspondence Adler Salvius carried out with Christina and which included arguments in favor of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation

⁶⁹ Ledebaur's instructions are dated Cleve, 26 March 1661. He arrived in Stockholm in early May. Documents from his mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 10; *UA*, IX, 733–42.

⁷⁰ See Ledebaur to Friedrich Wilhelm, Cleve, 4 July 1661. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 10; *UA*, IX, 735–42.

⁷¹ Swedish government to Andreas Gyldenklou, Stockholm, 27 April [7 May] 1661. *UA*, XXIII.2, 639. See also Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift," 199–200. For biographical information on Gyldenklou, see *SBL*, XVII, 504–07 (by Nils Runeby).

⁷² Runeby, *Monarchia Mixta*, 458. Runeby discusses Gyldenklou's own political thought on pp. 470–97.

on both political and religious grounds.⁷³ His dealings with Brandenburg in the 1640s and 1650s had included extensive contacts with the Protestant unionist Adolf Friedrich Schlezer, through whom Gyldenklou sent expressions of gratitude to Friedrich Wilhelm for the favor the elector had shown him.⁷⁴ Gyldenklou's involvement helped bring about meetings between Heinrich Coelestin von Sternbach, chancellor of Swedish Pomerania, and Brandenburg councilor Laurenz Christoph von Somnitz which were followed by a series of other contacts that helped reestablish regular diplomatic intercourse between the countries.⁷⁵

An even more significant step came in October 1662, when Friedrich Wilhelm instructed Lorenz Georg von Krockow to travel to Stockholm as his resident, the first permanent Brandenburg representative to be stationed at the Swedish court since Dobrzenski followed Karl Gustav from Sweden on his campaign to Poland in 1655.⁷⁶ Krockow remained in Sweden until August 1668, dealt with a plethora of issues of greater or lesser importance, and saw the Brandenburg-Swedish relationship progress from a very low point in 1663 to important alliances later in the decade. The regency government for its part authorized short missions by Esais Pufendorf to Königsberg (Autumn 1662), and by Paul von Würtz (January–March 1664) and Schweder Dietrich Kleihe (August–October 1665) to Berlin, before appointing Hermann Wulfrath permanent resident to the Brandenburg court in 1666.⁷⁷ Wulfrath remained in Brandenburg

⁷³ On Gyldenklou's role as mediator of information between Christina and Adler Salvius, see Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 282. See also Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna, "Utrikesförvaltningens historia 1611–1648," in Sven Tunberg, Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna, Arne Munthe, Arne Forssell, Torsten Gihl and Nils G. Wollin (eds.), *Den svenska utrikesförvaltningens historia* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1935), 41–107, here 65.

⁷⁴ Adolf Friedrich Schlezer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 27 January 1649. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 6, 9r–11r, here 10v–11r. The tone suggests that this favor consisted of a monetary gift.

⁷⁵ UA, XXIII.2, 640–41; Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift," 200. Sternbach was sent to Berlin itself the following year. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 13; UA, XXIII.2, 642–59.

⁷⁶ Krockow's instructions were dated Königsberg, 21/31 October 1662. His first report out of Stockholm is dated 10 [20] January 1663. Documents from his mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 8–15; RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 176; UA, IX, 742–819; UA, XII, 167–213; UA, XXIII.2. For biographical information, see Bahl, 524; NDB, XIII, 56.

⁷⁷ For Pufendorf's mission: RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 14; UA, XXIII.2, 663–71. Pufendorf was the older brother of the famous Samuel von Pufendorf, and had stood in Swedish service since the late 1650s. See ADB, XXVI, 695–99 (by Reinhold Brode); Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 405 (entry B84). For von Würtz' mission: RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 15; UA, XXIII.2, 690–722. For Kleihe's mission:

until 1669, and returned again for shorter missions in 1671 and 1672.⁷⁸ Krockow, von Würtz, Kleihe, and Wulfrath all took part in a series of negotiations that began in 1663 and culminated in several major agreements: Brandenburg's entry into the defensive Rhenish Alliance (of which Sweden was a member on behalf of Bremen and Verden) in 1665;⁷⁹ a ten-year defensive alliance between Brandenburg and Sweden alone in 1666;⁸⁰ a treaty pledging cooperation in the coming Polish royal election in 1667;⁸¹ Sweden's entry into an additional defensive alliance along the Rhine formed by Cologne, Brandenburg, Braunschweig-Lüneburg, and Hessen-Kassel in 1668;⁸² and a further treaty between Brandenburg, Sweden and Pfalz-Neuburg pledging support for Philip Wilhelm von Neuburg's candidacy in Poland.⁸³

The Prominence of France and Swedish Factionalism

The second half of the 1660s was therefore a fruitful period in Brandenburg-Swedish relations, with each maintaining a resident ambassador at the other's court for the first time in a decade, and with the two governments

UA, XXIII.2, 742–44, 747–51; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 14; biographical information in Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 396–97 (entry B57).

⁷⁸ Documents from these missions are in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 16–18; UA, XXIII.2, 770ff; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 10, 84r–87r; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 454. The decision to send Wulfrath was made in June 1666 with the express purpose of having a permanent envoy at the Brandenburg court to match the presence of Krockow in Stockholm. Swedish regency government to Hermann Wulfrath, Stockholm, 29 May [8 June] 1666. UA, XXIII.2, 770. His formal instructions, however, were not issued until 12 [22] December 1666 (UA, XXIII.2, 777–83), and he didn't arrive in Berlin until March 1667 (see his first letter from Berlin, dated 4 March 1667, in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 16; abridged version in UA, XXIII.2, 784–85).

⁷⁹ The agreement for Brandenburg's entry was signed in Regensburg on 8/18 November 1665. The signatory for Brandenburg was Gottfried von Jena, for Sweden Georg von Snoilsky. Von Moerner, Nr. 152, 268–72. See also UA, XI, 436–82.

⁸⁰ Signed in Stockholm on 27 March 1666. Signatories were Krockow (for Brandenburg) and Peter Julius Coyet and Edvard Philipsson Ehrensteen for Sweden. Von Moerner, Nr. 155, 277–79.

⁸¹ Signed in Stockholm on 22 June 1667. Signatories were Krockow (for Brandenburg); Mattias Biörnklo, Johan Gyllenstierna, and Franz Joel Örnstedt (for Sweden). Von Moerner, Nr. 178, 314–16. Documents in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 9.

⁸² Signed in Braunschweig on 20 February/1 March 1668. Signatories were Johann Butendach for Brandenburg, Jürgen Marschalck for Sweden. Von Moerner, Nr. 188a–b, 323–24. See documents in UA, XII, 162–66.

⁸³ Signed in Stockholm on 6 May 1668. Signatories were Krockow (for Brandenburg); Sten Bielke, Mattias Biörenklau, Johan Gyllenstierna, Stefan Gambrotius Hirschenstierna, and Franz Joel Örnstedt (for Sweden). Von Moerner, Nr. 191, 328–30. Swedish foreign policy during this period of agreements is placed in broader context in Landberg, 146–59.

coming together repeatedly in formal agreements of broad significance. The time was also filled with recurrent tensions and ever-present suspicions that came to revolve ever more around the issue of Europe's rising hegemon: Louis XIV's France. Concern over the growing power and even more quickly growing ambitions of France was felt throughout all of Europe, including in Brandenburg and Sweden. As had been the case with the Habsburg threat earlier in the century, fear of France gave certain Brandenburgers and Swedes something they could share in common and an issue around which they could unite—indeed, the agreement to cooperate in the Polish election had been motivated largely by a mutual desire to prevent the election of a French candidate. On the other hand, overawing French power, skillful French diplomacy, and seemingly bottomless French wallets could exercise a seductive pull on both individuals and states, and at times Brandenburg and Swedish statesmen and their governments were drawn into Louis' sphere of influence. This was the time of factions, when in the eyes of both Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats their opposites were dividing into mutually-antagonistic groups defined above all by their attitudes towards France. Governments viewed visiting diplomats through the same prism. The lines of communication and cooperation between diplomats and host officials took on a factional nature themselves, with Brandenburgers and Swedes of similar disposition towards France being drawn to work with one another—often against the active resistance of others in their own states—to encourage a relationship between their lands consistent with their own shared attitudes towards French power. The attractions and repulsions of French power therefore added an important dynamic to a diplomatic culture already disposed to working less along rigidly-defined state lines and more through affective relationships and ideological affinities not confined by political borders.

A commitment to an expansive vision of the Protestant cause in Europe that formed a constitutive element of Protestant cosmopolitanism and Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture was likely to dispose its bearer to a dim view of Louis' expansionist policies, particularly after they took a confessionally aggressive turn later in the century. It is not surprising then that many of those who shared most fully in the diplomatic culture fell into the anti-French camp. During Krockow's years in Sweden the two men with whom he got along best and dealt with in most confidence were Mattias Biörnkrou and Sten Bielke (the younger). Biörnkrou was a recognized leader of the anti-French party in the Swedish government that stood in opposition to the pro-French faction led by Chancellor

De la Gardie.⁸⁴ His personal correspondence shows a persistent concern with the linked themes of distrust of Catholics, fear of universal monarchy, and anxiety over Sweden's defense.⁸⁵ As Biörnkrou's political career progressed these three issues increasingly coalesced in the anti-French sentiment that Brandenburg diplomats marked as his distinguishing characteristic and that was situated within his Protestant cosmopolitanism.

Biörnkrou, born Mattias Mylonius in 1607, had been a student and protégé of Johannes Rudbeckius, the leading mind in the Swedish Lutheran Church during the first half of the seventeenth century and a man who read deeply in continental Calvinist theology and admired the political thought of Althusius and Lipsius.⁸⁶ Biörnkrou went on to Uppsala with Rudbeckius' support and studied theology, law, politics, and classical languages. In 1637 he was named Professor of Eloquence at the university, although foreign travels (Denmark, the Netherlands, England, and France) and political duties quickly took him away. He became secretary to the Swedish delegation at the Westphalia talks in 1643, and here enjoyed his first diplomatic contact with Brandenburgers as well as introduction through Adler Salvius to the highest circles in Lutheran pan-Protestantism, including to Calixtus and his student Hermann Conring, with whom Biörnkrou remained in correspondence in the future.⁸⁷ Biörnkrou's correspondence also includes the expected efforts to procure books, including from the noted home of Lutheran Protestant unionist sentiment, Calixtus' Helmstedt.⁸⁸ Already at Uppsala several years earlier Biörnkrou had delivered a speech (dedicated to Rudbeckius) in praise of Gustav Adolf in which he contrasted the dangerous and degenerate plague of Papacy with the ancient Gothic virtue of the Swedes.⁸⁹ The strands of

⁸⁴ For biographical information on Biörnkrou, see *SBL*, IV, 465–73 (by Georg Wittrock); Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 380 (entry B9).

⁸⁵ See, for example, the letters contained in RA, Enskilda arkiv, Mattias Björnkrou's arkiv, E 3254.

⁸⁶ See Cnattingius; and Runeby, *Monarchia Mixta*, 142.

⁸⁷ Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*, 274ff. Adler Salvius in fact was instrumental in securing Biörnkrou's ennoblement in 1646. See Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 151. For examples of correspondence with Conring, as well as with other scholars such as Johannes Loccenius and Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff, see RA, Enskilda arkiv, Mattias Björnkrou's arkiv, E 3259.

⁸⁸ See RA, Enskilda arkiv, Mattias Björnkrou's arkiv, E 3256, 137r–138v.

⁸⁹ "Sitiant nostrum sangvinem *Poloni*, moliatur nobis perniciem illa orbis pestis *Papa*; verà tamen in Deum pietate, & vigili magistratus nostri diligentia nobis tectis non modò non nocebunt, sed etiam in orbem redysse & modernis inesse priscam Gothorum virtutem, quæ teneatur pari liberatis suæ amore, fatebuntur." Matthias E. Mylonius [Biörnkrou], *Oratiuncula De Revolutâ periodo Bellorum Gothicorum extra patriam Sub Potentissimo Et*

scholarship, politics, and the Protestant cause remained intertwined for Biörnkrou, who later attempted to recruit his friend Conring into Swedish service as a politically and religiously useful voice in Sweden's struggles against Poland. While serving on a commission dealing with Swedish religious law in 1650 Biörnkrou resisted inclusion of the severe Lutheran Formula of Concord amongst the symbolic books of the Swedish church.⁹⁰ From 1652–1654 he served as Swedish representative at Vienna, Prague, and Regensburg and worked on behalf of the Protestant cause against Catholic Counter-Reformation efforts in what Göransson has described as the spirit of Helmstedt Philippism.⁹¹

There were real theological limits to Biörnkrou's Protestant unionism: he remained committed to an image of Sweden as a uniformly Lutheran country and disapproved of sweepingly syncretic writings like those of Matthiae.⁹² This put him in good company with many of the men involved in Brandenburg-Swedish relations who combined the desire for international, trans-confessional Protestant cooperation with a more restrictive (although still relatively moderate) domestic policy vision. Krockow saw Biörnkrou as a pro-Brandenburg figure and a reliable partner to work with in keeping De la Gardie in check and Sweden away from alliance with France.⁹³ In 1665 he suggested that Friedrich Wilhelm send Biörnkrou a monetary payment to strengthen his hand and reward him for being "very attached to Your Electoral Highness."⁹⁴ Biörnkrou and Krockow

Invictissimo Hero Gvstavo Adolpho Svecorum, Gothorum, Vandalorumq; Rege celsissimo, Magno Principe Finlandiae &c (Ubsaliae: Eschillus Matthiae, [1631]), A2r. On Biörnkrou's scholarly publications, see Johannes Scheffer, *Svecia Literata seu de scriptis et scriptoribus gentis sveciae, opus postumum, Holmiae initio anno MDCLXXX. excusum, Nunc autem denuo emendatius editum, & Hypomnematis Historicis illustratum, Johanne Mollero Flensburga Cimbri* (Hamburgi: Gothofr. Liebezeit, 1698), 154, 395.

⁹⁰ *SBL*, IV, 467.

⁹¹ Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*, 276.

⁹² See Anjou, 416.

⁹³ "Sonst *incliniret* er [De la Gardie] sehr und mehr alß vor diesem zu der französischen Partey, der französische *Ambassadeur* besucht fast niemand alß ihn, und hat ein großen *ascendentz* über ihn gewonnen. Berenkrou aber ist nichts minder alß französische, und halt den Reichß Canzler zurücke." Lorenz Georg von Krockow to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 6 [16] April 1667. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 13, 178r–188v, here 188r. Abridged version in *UA*, XII, 192.

⁹⁴ "Auß diesem, waß abgemeldet, daß ich nicht mehr alß 2000 Rthl. bekommen, Und dannenhero, weil ich dieselbe sehr hoch bedurft, H. Biörenklaw nichts davon bezahlen können . . . alß nemlich die 1333. Rthl. demselben zuschlagen wollen, solches stehet zu dero selben Gnädigstem Gefallen, Es ist wehen sonst sehr dienlich, daß ihm auf seine foderunge etwas bezahlet Und er dadurch in etwa *obligiret* wurde, dan er nicht allein in sehr großer *consideration* ist im *Senat*, besondern auch Ewrer Churfl. Durchl. sehr zugethähn ist." Lorenz Georg von Krockow to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 8 [18] April 1665. *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 12, 313r–315v, here 314v–315r. See also *UA*, IX, 801–02.

were negotiating partners who worked together to see the alliance negotiations of 1666–1668 come to happy conclusions. Biörnkrou died several months before Krockow's successor as Brandenburg representative in Sweden, Christoph von Brandt, arrived in Stockholm.⁹⁵ Brandt, whose primary concern was to monitor Swedish attitudes towards France on the eve of a war between France and the Dutch in which Brandenburg would take part, nevertheless continued to refer to the anti-French faction as "the Biörnkrou party," terminology adopted by Pufendorf as well in his *De Rebus Gestis Friderici Wilhelmi*.⁹⁶ In March 1672 Brandt wrote to the elector that Brandenburg had nothing to fear from Sweden "as long as the Biörnkrou party remains on top as it is now."⁹⁷ Brandt was followed in Sweden by Ludolf Lorenz von Krosigk, Brandenburg envoy in Stockholm from February–July 1673.⁹⁸ Krosigk used the term "good patriots" to refer to the Swedish anti-French faction, but the referents remained exactly the same.

Krockow, Brandt, and Krosigk all identified Sten Bielke as a central member of Biörnkrou's anti-French faction.⁹⁹ As can now be expected, Bielke had traveled abroad as a student and had studied at Leiden.¹⁰⁰ His diplomatic contacts with Brandenburg stretched back to the 1650s, and he had been one of the leading voices arguing on behalf of resuming relations in 1661. As a man of lofty social rank, Bielke was sometimes seen as the leader of the party opposing De la Gardie, although that title rightly belonged to Biörnkrou. De la Gardie's hatred of Bielke, and Brandenburg's

⁹⁵ Biörnkrou died on 20 August 1671. Brandt's instructions were dated Cöln an der Spree, 10 [20] October 1671, and his first report out of Stockholm is dated 5 [15] December 1671. Documents from his mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 453; *UA*, XVII, 147–234. See also Theodor Wolpers, *Die politischen Beziehungen Brandenburgs zu Schweden in den Jahren 1672 bis 1675* (Borna-Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1912), 4ff. For biographical information on Brandt, see *ADB*, III, 251–52 (by Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer); *NDB*, II, 530 (by Hans Saring); Bahl, 438–39.

⁹⁶ Pufendorf, *De Rebus Gestis Friderici Wilhelmi Magni*.

⁹⁷ "solange die Björenclouische Partei oben schwebet, wie itzt." Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 20 [30] March 1672. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 453; abridged version in *UA*, XVII, 198–200, here 199.

⁹⁸ Krosigk's instructions are dated Rüsselheim am Main, 22 November/5 December 1672. His first report out of Stockholm is dated 25 January [4 February] 1673. Documents from his mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 455–460; *UA*, XVII, 235–85. See also Wolpers, 20ff.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Krockow to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 14 December 1667. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 13, 367r–369v; Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 12 [22] March 1672. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 453; abridged version in *UA*, XVII, 197; Ludolf Lorenz von Krosigk to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 15 [25] March 1673. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 458; abridged version in *UA*, XVII, 258–60.

¹⁰⁰ For biographical information on Bielke, see *SBL*, IV, 233–41 (by Georg Wittrock).

affection for him, was such that when reports of his death proved false Brandt could write “the rumor that Steno Bielke has drowned is, thank God!, false, and the Chancellor’s joy is in vain.”¹⁰¹

The animosity between De la Gardie and Biörnklou’s party may seem surprising. Biörnklou had in fact been De la Gardie’s tutor in the 1630s, and as we have seen De la Gardie possessed sparkling credentials to partake in the diplomatic culture. The angry rift between them attests to the increasingly charged atmosphere that characterized northern European politics as the pressure exerted by Louis XIV increased, and to the power of this pressure to tear apart bonds between northern European political elites, sometimes in dramatic and damaging form, as will be seen in Chapter Five. The case of De la Gardie also reminds us that the mere possession of the elements of the diplomatic culture (developed scholarly and cultural interests, an international outlook built through travel abroad and experience in the Netherlands, and ample personal dealings with Brandenburgians over the course of many years) by no means automatically made one an adherent of the principles of Protestant cooperation or an advocate of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. De la Gardie’s orientation was thoroughly French, for cultural and intellectual as well as political reasons, and this contributed to his political behavior and personal relationships in the same way that militant Protestantism influenced Waldeck’s.¹⁰²

Brandenburg’s attitude towards France was an analogous concern for Sweden and was tracked closely by Swedish diplomats. The shift in Brandenburg orientation from a generally anti-French position in early 1667 to the Brandenburg-Franco alliance of December 1667 was followed with great attention by Wulfrath in Berlin and reported back to Stockholm in detail.¹⁰³ Concerns were equally strong when Brandenburg switched to a strongly anti-French course in 1672, entering into alliance with the Dutch in May of that year and joining in the war against France that began the following month.¹⁰⁴ The pro-French party in Sweden had succeeded in

¹⁰¹ “Die Sage, dass *Steno Bielke* ertrunken wäre, ist Gottlob! falsch, und des Reichscanzlers Freude vergeblich gewesen.” Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Copenhagen, 25 June [5 July] 1672. *UA*, XVII, 233–34, here 234.

¹⁰² De la Gardie’s diplomatic activity was itself a channel of French cultural influence into Sweden. Göransson (*Studieresorna*, 51) describes his 1646 mission to France as an important event in exposing the Swedish nobility to the French aristocratic lifestyle.

¹⁰³ See Wulfrath’s correspondence in *RA*, *Diplomatica*, *Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 16.

¹⁰⁴ For overviews of the complex twists and turns of both Brandenburg and Swedish foreign policy in the early 1670s, see McKay, 206–20; Landberg, 164–90; and Harald Bohr,

bringing Sweden into alliance with France two months earlier, a move seen with great alarm in Brandenburg. The main purpose of Wulfrath's 1672 mission to Berlin was to soothe fears caused by the alliance, which raised the specter of Sweden and Brandenburg going to war.¹⁰⁵ Despite the alliance, even the pro-French faction in Sweden had absolutely no desire to become involved in the war, and the rapid French military successes early in the war fed Swedish fears of a total disruption of the European balance of power and led to Swedish efforts to mediate a settlement.¹⁰⁶ Bernhard Christian Wangelin was sent on a series of missions to Friedrich Wilhelm (who was on campaign with the army in the Rhineland) and to the government in Berlin in 1672 and 1673 to work towards a mediated settlement. Brandenburg and France did come to terms in the Treaty of Vossem in June 1673, although Swedish mediation played only a limited role. Later that year Wangelin was joined in Berlin by Konrad Mardefelt, and together they negotiated a renewal of the Brandenburg-Swedish defensive alliance of 1666.¹⁰⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm even raised the prospect of Brandenburg and Sweden coming together to form a 'third party' to balance the warring powers and look after Protestant interests.¹⁰⁸ A crisis in Brandenburg-Swedish relations appeared to have been averted.

Brandenburg and Sweden at War

That impression proved illusory. In April 1674 Sweden agreed to maintain an army of 22,000 men in Germany in exchange for a 900,000 Thaler

Sverige, Danmark och Frankrike: från avslutandet av Sveriges förbund med Frankrike i April 1672 till utbrottet av Sveriges krig med Brandenburg i December 1674 (Stockholm: Isaac Marcus, 1933).

¹⁰⁵ See the correspondence in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 18; UA, XVII, 286–96; and UA, XXIII.2, 916–23. The French alliance came up immediately in Wulfrath's first audience with Friedrich Wilhelm. Hermann Wulfrath to Swedish government, Berlin, 22 May [1 June] 1672. UA, XXIII.2, 919–20. Wulfrath held an extended discussion over the alliance with Schwerin, Somnitz, and Friedrich von Jena a few days later, and despite his best efforts to put a positive and non-menacing spin on things had to report back to Stockholm that "Es scheinet aber daß man nicht wenig *ombrage* dieses ohrts aus diesem *foedere* nimmet." Hermann Wulfrath to Swedish government, Berlin, 28 May 1672. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 18.

¹⁰⁶ See Wolpers, 18–25.

¹⁰⁷ On Wangelin's (and Mardefelt's) missions of 1672–1674, see the documents in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 19–25; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nrs. 454, 462, 465; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 18–19; UA, XVII, 297–323; and UA, XXIII.2, 923–76. See also Wolpers, 20ff. The treaty renewing the defensive alliance of 1666 was signed in Cöln an der Spree on 1 December 1673. Von Moerner, Nr. 215, 377–80.

¹⁰⁸ See especially Bernhard Christian Wangelin's report out of Berlin, 3 December 1673. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 20, abridged version in UA, XXIII.2, 944–45.

French subsidy.¹⁰⁹ In July Brandenburg rejoined the war against France.¹¹⁰ Brandenburg and Sweden were on a collision course once more, and Christoph von Brandt was sent back to Sweden to try to deal with the deteriorating situation.¹¹¹ In his first report out of Stockholm he wrote that “it is indescribable how resolutely partisan the talk is here for France,” adding that the postmaster had been ordered to keep out any news reports “that don’t ring out for France.”¹¹² Brandt clearly feared the worst, and in December 1674 his fears were realized when Sweden gave in to French pressure and entered the war by invading Brandenburg from Swedish Pomerania. Brandenburg and Sweden were back at war for the first time since 1660.¹¹³

Brandt was still in Stockholm when the Swedish invasion began, and it is important to note that he continued to hold long, trusting conversations with Sten Bielke and Johan Gyllenstierna of the Biörnklou party even *after* their respective governments were at war.¹¹⁴ Bielke:

swore most sincerely that he was very sorry that Your Electoral Highnesses’ land is now attacked so, which he called an open rupture and assured me [Brandt] that neither he nor the majority of Senators had known the slightest bit about it . . . He said it was unheard of in Sweden to decide upon war without the consent of the estates and the Council. The Chancellor [De la Gardie] and Wrangel alone have done this.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁹ See Landberg, 185. France was especially eager to buy Swedish support at this juncture due to the recent peace between England and the Dutch and the defection of other French allies.

¹¹⁰ See McKay, 216–19.

¹¹¹ Brandt’s instructions are dated Cöln an der Spree, 20 [30] April 1674. His first report out of Stockholm was dated 14 [24] July 1674. Documents from this mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 463; *UA*, XVII, 327–80. See also Wolpers, 37ff.

¹¹² “Es ist nicht zu beschreiben, wie partialisch man sich alhier hautement vor Frankreich in Discoursen und sonst anzeigt.” The postmaster was ordered to refuse entry for newspapers “die nicht vor Frankreich klingen.” Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 14 [24] July 1674. *UA*, XVII, 330–31, here 330.

¹¹³ For a selection of documents dealing with Brandenburg’s military and diplomatic activities at the outbreak of the war, see *UA*, XVII, 381–533. On the war itself, see Frost, *Northern Wars*, 208–16; and the works of Nils Wimarson, especially *Sveriges Krig i Tyskland 1675–1679*, three volumes (Lund, 1897–1912).

¹¹⁴ For a long conversation between Brandt and Gyllenstierna where Gyllenstierna speaks of the Swedish invasion as an unjust war that he wants to see stopped, see Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 January 1675. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 463; *UA*, XVII, 371–79.

¹¹⁵ “Daß vornehmste, so ich Ew. C. Dl. unterthänigst zuberichten habe, ist was mier {Reichß Raht Steno Bielke} alß ich gestern abschiedt von Ihme genommen, in abwesenheit der andern {Reichs Rächte} von {der Biörenklouschen Partey in geheim} vertrauet hatt . . . {Er} betheurete gar hoch, das es Ihme sehr leidt wehre, daß {E. Churf. Dhrt. Lande

This kind of contact between officials of warring states highlights the durability of bonds that could form within a diplomatic culture not tied to the course of high diplomatic developments alone nor defined in rigidly state-based terms. In 1675 Brandenburg published the well-known anti-Swedish propaganda pamphlet, *Teuschlandes Warhafftes Interesse*, which contains an all-out attack on Sweden's pro-French party and demonizes Wangelin in particular as a duplicitous pawn who had cynically worked for the renewal of the Brandenburg-Swedish alliance as a cover for French purposes.¹¹⁶ The same pamphlet praised the "honest patriots" within the Swedish government who had struggled heroically but in vain against "the French-minded" who had brought Sweden into dependence on France and war against Brandenburg.¹¹⁷ Other documents concentrated on Biörnkloou in particular as the force of heroic resistance who had gallantly held Sweden aloof from France's clutches, mourning his death as a turning point in northern European relations and a tragedy for Sweden and the region.¹¹⁸

izt} so angegriffen würden, hieß {es eine} offenbahre {ruptur} undt versicherte mich, das weder {er} noch {die meiste Senatores} daß geringste davon gewust hatten, als einige Zeit nachdem {die resolution} genommen worden. Er sagte eß wehre ein *inunditum* {in Schweden einen Krieg} *absq. consensu {statuum} et {senatorum}* zu *decerniren*. {der Reich Canzler und Wrangel} hatten es alleine gethan." Christoph von Brandt to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 13 [23] January 1675. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 463, 191v; abridged version in UA, XVII, 368–70, here 370.

¹¹⁶ Wangelin "alles *de concerto* mit dem Franztösischen Envoye Verjus handelte/ und sie beyde aus einem Munde sprachen/ jener aus nichts *avancirete*/ als was dieser ihm aufgab." *Teuschlandes Warhafftes Interesse, Bey jetzigen Conjoncturen/ und fürnemlich/ was es bey der Schweden Einbruch in die Chur-Brandenburgische Lande zu consideriren, vorgestellet in einem Send-Schreiben Eines Teutschen an Einen Teutschen* (1675), 13–14. Wangelin was captured by the Brandenburgers in 1675, released shortly thereafter in a prisoner exchange for General Major von Götze, and then captured again the following year, a feat which joyous Brandenburgers attributed to divine providence. Documents on Wangelin's captivity are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 566; references to divine providence on 40r–v (Eastern Pomeranian government), 52r (Lorenz Christoph von Somnitz). See also Nils Wimarson, "Die zweite brandenburgische Gefangenschaft des Obersten Wangelin und die Frage wegen eines Separatfriedens zwischen Schweden und Brandenburg 1676–1677," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 15 (1902), 200–17.

¹¹⁷ "Ob nun wol/ wie vorhin dargethan/ Schweden Vermöge der Alliantz nicht gebunden war Franckreich/ als dem *Aggressori*, Hülffe zu leisten/ solches auch von den redlichen Patrioten gar wol dargethan/ die sich dabey deß verstorbenen Königes/ Caroli Gustavi/ Glorw. Andenckens erinnert/ welcher beständig verweigert/ in einige Wege von Franckreich zu dependiren/ so haben doch die Frantzösisch-Gesinnete das Werck durchgetrieben." *Teuschlandes Warhafftes Interesse*, 15.

¹¹⁸ A document entitled "Extract Schreibenß vom 18. August. 1676" stated that "So wird vorhero bekandt sey, wie der erste Tritt, dadurch sich Schweden zu ihrem gegenwertigen *ruin* genähert, die *Alliance* gewesen, so vor etlichen Jahren *per certamina et factiones Procerum* zwischen Ihnen undt Franckreich geschlossen worden; der Seel. Reichs-Raht

Brandenburg and Sweden remained at war until 1679, during which time Friedrich Wilhelm sought yet again to drive the Swedes from Pomerania to reverse the injustice of the Westphalia settlement. Despite military successes, the Peace of St. Germain that ended the war once again deprived him of these hopes and left Pomerania an issue that would continue to trouble Brandenburg-Swedish relations well into the eighteenth century.¹¹⁹ The return of peace brought with it a return to the routine of re-establishing relations that had been followed in 1653 again in 1660, with indirect feelers and short, specific missions building slowly to the resumption of full contact and the exchange of resident ambassadors.¹²⁰ In 1682 the old hands Brandt and Wulfrath each made brief visits to the other's capital, and in 1683 Karl XI appointed Eberhard von Grafenthal as his permanent representative in Berlin.¹²¹ Friedrich Wilhelm responded by

Bärenklaw, so darzu gar nicht rahten wollen, ist mit dem Reichs-Cantzler darüber in große Wiederwertigkeit gerahten; Undt hat derselbe endlich sein *Sentiment* schriftlich in den Raht abgegeben, damit es zu seiner künftigen Entschuldigung im *Archivo* beygelegt werden möchte; hierdurch hat wolermeldete Bärenklaw so viel gerichtet, daß eß mit der *Alliance* nicht zum Stande kommen, biß Er, zum großen Unglück der Schweden mit Tode abgangen, da den seine Parthey durch Verlust eines in dern *affaires* so *auctorisirten* Mannes sehr geschwächet, so daß die Frantzösischen *consilia* durchgedrungen..." GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 570.

¹¹⁹ The treaty is dated 29 June 1679. Von Moerner, Nr. 237, 408–12.

¹²⁰ For an example of the less-direct contacts that built up towards a resumption of relations, see the interaction between Brandenburg's representative Friedrich Gottlieb Raumer and Sweden's representative Georg von Snoilsky in Regensburg in 1681: "...Herr von *Schnolsky* selbigen *discours* gegen Mir in guten Vertrauen geführt, und zu gleiche Zeit verspühren laßen, daß Ihm nicht zuwieder, Wann Ewr: CFürstl. durchl. ich etwan davon *part* gebe; dannenhero auch ich dafür gehalten, daß Ihm hingegen gar wohl könne tröstet werden. Wasgestalt solches erfolget, und was ferner weit deßfalls zu ereichung des heilsamen Zwecks zuwißen verlanget würde. Worauff mir dieße antwort worden: Er H. *Schnolsky* vernehme gern, daß ich davon *favorabiler referiret*, wolle gleichfals den Herrn Graffen *Bengt* Ochsenstern, als Seines Königs gegenwärtig Vertrautesten *Ministro*, so die Schwedische Reichs=*affaires* *dirigirte*, geheim *apertur* von dieser *incaminirung*, der Zwischen beyden höchsten *Interessenten* zustifttenden sichern *intelligenz* und nachbarschaft thun, undt was darauff Ihm ferner für *ordre* zukommen würde, mir *communiciren*." Friedrich Gottlieb Raumer to Friedrich Wilhelm, Regensburg, 24 November 1681. This and related material in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 21.

¹²¹ Brandt's instructions are dated Cöln an der Spree, 14/24 July 1682. His first report out of Stockholm is dated 16/26 September 1682. Documents for Brandt's mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 22; and *UA*, XXII, 424–31. Wulfrath arrived in Berlin in March 1682. Documents for his mission are in RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 26; and *UA*, XXIII.2, 1010–18. Grafenthal's instructions are dated Stockholm, 26 May [5 June] 1683. He remained in Berlin until 1687. Documents for his mission are in RA, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 28–30; RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1684–1687; *UA*, XXII, 431–32; *UA*, XXIII.2, 1020–67. Biographical information on Grafenthal is in Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 392–93 (entry B43).

placing his own ambassador in Stockholm two years later.¹²² By 1686 the situation had improved such that Brandenburg and Sweden entered into a defensive alliance.¹²³ France remained a salient issue as this next phase of Brandenburg-Swedish relations began before exploding in the later 1680s with a new valence that was as much cultural as political and that marked a fundamental transformation of the diplomatic culture itself. This will be the subject of Chapter Five. Before moving on to that it is necessary first to explore elements of the common culture as they stood in the period of intense contact covered by the current chapter.

Personnel Exchange and Personal Ties

The movement of individuals and networks of personal connections continued to be vital forces linking Brandenburg and Sweden together, irrespective of the often strained or even belligerent state of relations between the two governments. In fact, it was during bad times that personal ties proved most useful as channels of communication when official lines were blocked and as voices of understanding willing to work together for better days. As a few high-profile examples will show, many of these figures fit well into the worlds of Protestant cosmopolitanism and Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. Christoph Delphicus von Dohna was a member of the powerful Prussian noble family with a long history of service to the Hohenzollern and connections to the leading Protestant dynasties.¹²⁴ His maternal aunt Amalia von Solms-Braunfels was the wife of Friedrich Heinrich of Orange and thus the mother of William II of Orange and of Luise Henriette, the future wife of Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg. Christoph Delphicus was born in Delft and was raised with Prince William. His brothers Friedrich and Christian Albrecht achieved high positions in Dutch and Brandenburg military

¹²² This was Pierre de Falaiseau, about whom more is said in Chapter Five.

¹²³ The alliance was signed in Berlin on 10 February 1686. Signatories were Paul von Fuchs and Eberhard von Grafenthal. Von Moerner, Nr. 284, 478–81.

¹²⁴ For biographical information on Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, see *SBL*, XI, 328–33 (by G. Jacobson and Bengt Hildebrand); *NDB*, IV, 48f. (by Lothar Graf zu Dohna). On the von Dohna family in general, see Siegmars Graf Dohna, *Auszugsweise Mittheilungen aus den Familiengeschichtlichen Schriften die Donin's und die Dohna's* (Berlin: Julius Sittenfeld, 1887); Volker Press, “Das Haus Dohna in der europäischen Adelsgesellschaft des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts,” in Andreas Mehl and Wolfgang Christian Schneider (eds.), *Reformatio et Reformationes: Festschrift für Lothar Graf zu Dohna zum 65. Geburtstag* (Darmstadt: Technische Hochschule Darmstadt, 1989), 371–402.

service respectively. Christoph Delphicus entered Swedish service at the request of Queen Christina in 1653, was promoted to general under Karl X Gustav, and served in a series of key military and administrative positions before rising to the rank of Field Marshall in 1666. He ended his career with important diplomatic missions to the Dutch Republic and England, where he helped negotiate the Swedish-English-Dutch Triple Alliance of 1668.¹²⁵

Christoph Delphicus married Anna Oxenstierna, the sister of the future *kanslipresident* Bengt Oxenstierna, and the couple raised their family in Sweden, thus establishing the Swedish branch of the von Dohna family that was an important element of Swedish society into the nineteenth century. Von Dohna also maintained contacts with his relatives in Brandenburg and Prussia as well as with leading Brandenburg statesmen while in Sweden.¹²⁶ Both governments recognized that this rendered him uniquely positioned to work on behalf of Brandenburg-Swedish understanding when relations between them were tense. During the rapprochement of 1653 Friedrich Wilhelm wrote to von Dohna of the “recent discord regarding Pomerania” and asked for his help in establishing “a closer correspondence [between Brandenburg and Sweden] upon which the welfare of Protestantism and Our mutual security” could rest at a time when “Our letters [to Christina] have been received but have not yet been answered,” adding that “We hope that you will use this occasion [von Dohna’s entry into Swedish service] to further lasting good trust between the Queen and Us.”¹²⁷ During

¹²⁵ This and the following discussion of Derfflinger draws upon my “Early Modern Military Reform and the Connection Between Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia,” *Scandinavian Studies* 77 (2005), Nr. 3, 347–64, where the actions of von Dohna, Derfflinger, and others are placed within the broader context of early modern Brandenburg-Swedish military connections.

¹²⁶ On important Brandenburg-Swedish communication taking place between Christoph Delphicus and his cousin Fabian von Dohna, see Fabian von Dohna to Friedrich Wilhelm, Braunsberg, 17 December 1656. *UA*, VIII, 142–43. For von Dohna’s correspondence with Brandenburg elites, see for example Otto von Schwerin to Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, Wildenhafen bei Königsberg, 1/11 October 1661. *GStA PK*, VI. HA, Fürstliches Hausarchiv Dohna-Schlobitten, Karton 20 (Christoph Delphicus), Nr. 72. My sincere thanks to Dr. Sophie Mathilde Gräfin zu Dohna for permission to use her family’s archive.

¹²⁷ “Also wunschen wir Unß daß Ihr dieser *occasion*, zu beförderung eines beständigen guten Vertrauens zwischen deroßelben [Christina] undt Unßs . . . Unsers ohrts können wir woll versichern, daß auch die wegen der Pomerischen Lande Vergewesene mißhelligkeiten Unßer zu Ihre K. Wrd Person und Staadt tragende *affection*, nith *alteriret*. Daß wir dann also gleich nach geschloßenen *Tractaten* durch Unmittelst eines handschreibens . . . und zu einer engeren *Correspondentz*, Uff welcher das Ewangelische wesens woll fahrt und Unser Beydertheils sicherheit gutt theilß bestehen will, d. anfang. machen woll: Wie es aber kein deselbiges Unser schreiben zwar woll auffgenom(en), aber bißhero unbeantwortet bleiben daß und was Unß auch dabey sonst zur nachricht Dienlich sein möchte, wolten Wir

the tense times of the 1650s Karl X Gustav used Dohna's connections to the House of Orange to communicate with the Princess of Orange regarding her concerns for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship.¹²⁸ In the next round of Brandenburg-Swedish reconciliation following Karl Gustav's death the regency government took advantage of a private trip von Dohna was making to the Netherlands in 1661 to have him stop off along the way to meet with Friedrich Wilhelm and some of his officials in Kleve as a way of informally re-establishing friendly correspondence.¹²⁹ De la Gardie wrote to von Dohna that his mission "would be the beginning and give the first attestation from our side" of Sweden's commitment "to re-establish the old friendship and at the same time build from anew a close trust to the considerable benefit and uplifting of Protestantism."¹³⁰ In subsequent years the von Dohna family remained a connecting point between Sweden and Brandenburg-Prussia.

A similar role was played by Prince Johann Georg II of Anhalt-Dessau.¹³¹ After travels as a young man that included time in the Netherlands the prince entered Swedish military service in 1655 before moving to Brandenburg service in 1658 as a cavalry general and *statthalter* in the Mark Brandenburg. The following year he married Princess Henriette

in Unterthanigsten Vertrauen von euch hieran berichtet werden. Ihr werdet Unß davon zu gnädigsten gefallen thun." Friedrich Wilhelm to Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, Küstrin, 5 September 1653. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17b, fasc. 18.

¹²⁸ See GStA PK, VI. HA, Fürstliches Hausarchiv Dohna-Schlobitten, Karton 20 (Christoph Delphicus), Nr. 7.

¹²⁹ See documents in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 12; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 10; UA, XXIII.2, 624–35; GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl. Fritz Arnheim (Dep.), Nr. 25. See also Arnheim, "Eine schwedische Denkschrift," 196ff.

¹³⁰ "...da nun die von Ihr Churfürstl. Durchl. kegen Meinem Hochgeehrtem herren Graffen geschene *Contestation* (:wie zu wünschen:) gleicher gestaltdt aus *sinceren* gemühter sein solte, so würde kein zweiffel zu nehmen sein, die alte Freundschaft wieder *restabliret* und gleichsahm von newen ein festes vertrauen zu mercklichen nutzen und aufnehmen des algemeinen *Evangelischen* Wesens werde gestiftet werden können... Und alß hie von durch Meinem hochgeehrtem Herren Graffen der anfang gemachet und die erste *tesmoignage* Unsers Orts abgegeben, also wirdt an itzo kegenseits von Ihnen ein gleiches zuerwarten sein beÿ deren erfolung dan nicht zu Zweiffelen, man durch einen *expresse* dazu verordneten weitere versicherung wirdt erspühren laßen." Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie to Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, Stockholm, 16 March 1661. GStA PK, VI. HA, Fürstliches Hausarchiv Dohna-Schlobitten, Karton 20 (Christoph Delphicus), Nr. 15. Swedish officials also pointed to von Dohna's mission as a clear gesture for friendship in conversations with Ledebaur in Stockholm. See Gerhard Johannes von Ledebaur to Friedrich Wilhelm, Cleve, 4 July 1661. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 10, 58r–78v.

¹³¹ See Michael Rohrschneider, *Johann Georg II. von Anhalt-Dessau (1627–1693): eine politische Biographie*, Quellen und Forschungen zu Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte, vol. 16 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998); Bahl, 510–11; ADB, XIV, 116–17 (by Siebigk); BBL, 204 (by Hartmut Ross).

Catharine of Orange in a match set up through Brandenburg diplomacy.¹³² For the remainder of his lengthy career he pushed for a pro-Orange, anti-French policy at the Brandenburg court. He also remained a friend to his former Swedish employers and their interests. Schlippenbach had in fact supported the idea of Anhalt being named *statthalter* in Ducal Prussia in 1657 as part of a design to keep Friedrich Wilhelm well-disposed to Sweden.¹³³ Subsequent Swedish representatives in Brandenburg over the span of several decades got along well with Anhalt, and some made an explicit connection between his earlier Swedish service and his current support of pro-Swedish policies.¹³⁴ As late as 1688 he was pledging to Peter Macklier to work for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship out of the gratitude he still felt for the honor shown him by Karl X Gustav in the 1650s.¹³⁵ It shouldn't be surprising that Waldeck, who had just moved

¹³² See Ernst Müsebeck, "Der Eintritt des Fürsten Johann Georg II. von Anhalt-Dessau in schwedische, sein Übertritt in brandenburgische Dienste und seine Vermählung mit Henriette Katherine von Oranien," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 16[2] (1903), 477–515.

¹³³ See Christoph Karl von Schlippenbach to Karl X Gustav, Königsberg, 17 [27] June 1657. *UA*, XXIII.1, 474.

¹³⁴ For examples of Swedish ambassadors' positive interactions with and assessments of Anhalt, see Heinrich Coelestin von Sternbach to Swedish government, Berlin, 13 [23] February 1662. *UA*, XXIII.2, 643–46: "Der Fürsten von *Anhalt*, welcher seither meinem Jüngsten Allerunderthänigsten von *Dessau* wieder anhero gekommen, hab Ich, auch in Seinen *quartier* auf dem Schloß besucht, so Er mirh auch folgendes tages wieder in Meinem *quartier* abgegeben. Unnd Alß Er Seine zu E. Königl. Maytt. unnd dero *Cron*, auß Seinen Vorgen diensten her, annoch tragende sonderbahre *Devotion* unnd *Affection* sehr hoch *contestirte*."; Paul von Würtz to Karl XI [regency government], Cöln an der Spree, 26 January 1664. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 15: "so weiß doch daß Er [Anhalt] ein Freundt ist von Ew. Königl. Maytt. *interesse*."; Eberhard von Grafenthal to Karl XI, Berlin, 16 October 1683. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 27: "Weil alle die andere *Ministri* den Fürsten von Anhalt auch *complimentieret* so habe ich gestern bey demselben auch ein *compliment* Abgelegt und Ihn ersuchet Seinem hohen wollvermögen nach dahin *coopöiren* zuhelffen das eine gute *intelligence* und freundschaft zwischen Ewer Königl. Maytt. und dem Chur Hauße iederzeit *etabliert* bleiben, welches Er dan mit vielen *contestationen* versprochen, und Eüer Königl. Maytt: zuversichern gebehten, das er als ein Alter diener von Ewer Königl. Maytt: sein gantztes vermögen dahin *employiren*, daß die gute freintschaft zwischen Ewer Königl. Maytt: und Sr. Churfl. Dhl. bestendig *conservieret* und beybehalten werde."; Peter Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 24 June 1688. *RA*, *Diplomatica*, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 30.

¹³⁵ "Es haben Sr. Durchl. der Fürst von *Anhalt* mir gestern die *visite* gegeben, damit deroselben ich wegen der Hollsteinischen *Affaire* ausführlich gesprochen und dieselbe ersuchet Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. Seinen hohen wollvermögen nach *disponieren* zuhelffen, daß dieselbe nicht allein die *restitution* des *Hertzoges* mit nachdrück befodern, sondern auch mit Ewer Königl. Maytt: in vertraulicher guten *intelligence continueren* mögen Welche Sr. Dhl. mir *sancté promittierten*, und bey Ewer Königl. Maytt: Seine gantz gehorsambste *recommendation* zumachen, bahten, mit dieser *contestation*, daß Sie hierin sehen laßen wollen, daß Sie die Gnade welche Ewer Königl. Maytt: hochsehl Herrn Vater Glorwürdigsten

from Brandenburg to Swedish service, reached out to Anhalt, who had made the same move in an opposite direction, in semi-formal correspondence in the winter of 1658–1659 in an attempt to bring the war between Sweden and Brandenburg to a mediated conclusion.¹³⁶

Baron Georg von Derfflinger is a final example of an individual who served both Brandenburg and Sweden and later saw himself as an advocate for their friendship.¹³⁷ As a teenager Derfflinger had fought with the Protestant armies against the emperor in Silesia. He then passed through Saxon into Swedish military service and remained with the Swedish army until the Thirty Years' War's conclusion.¹³⁸ Derfflinger participated in a number of campaigns, made the acquaintance of the top Swedish military figures, and rose through a series of promotions to major general of the cavalry. He left the Swedish army when the war ended and in 1655 joined the Brandenburg army as a major general. For the next three decades he was one of the leading military figures in Brandenburg, and in 1670 was promoted to General Field Marshall, the army's highest position. Derfflinger was not only a successful field commander but also a significant military reformer, working throughout his career to reorganize and develop the Brandenburg military into a more efficient and effective force. He took part in diplomatic activity as well. In a conversation with Grafenthal in 1683 he described his own resistance to French bribes and his loyalty to both the elector's and Sweden's interests (interestingly linked in his mind), remarking on the period before Grafenthal's arrival when Sweden had no permanent representative in Berlin that "he had been so good for Your Majesty here that it had been as if You had had Your own minister here."¹³⁹

Angedenckens Ihn vor diesen betzeiget, annoch in unverrückten Angedencken hetten..." Peter Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 4 July 1688. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 30.

¹³⁶ See Waldeck to Anhalt, *Mittelfahrt*, 29 December 1658 [8 January 1659.] *UA*, XXIII.2, 600; Anhalt to Waldeck, [January 1659]. *Ibid.*, 601.

¹³⁷ On Derfflinger, see *ADB*, V, 60–63 (by F. von Meerheimb); *NDB*, III, 605f. (by Hans Saring); *SBL*, XI, 117–19 (by G. Jacobson); Bahl, 460–61.

¹³⁸ See Curt Jany, "Derfflingers militärische Jugendjahre," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 43 (1930), 334–39.

¹³⁹ "So habe auch Gelegenheit gehabt, mit dem Hrn FeldMarschal Dörffling zu sprechen, der dan züfoderst seine unterthänigste zuneigung gegen Ew: Königl. Maytt: *contestirte*, undt beÿ seinen wieder Franckreich, undt alles was davon *dependiret*, gefahren un- undt wiedervillen nicht *dequi*(..)ren könnte, sagende Man hette Ihm sehr grose *summen* Geldes gebohten undt Ihn damit *persuadiren* wollen, m[it] in die *partey* zu treten, Er hette aber sothanes geldt undt andere *offerten* nebenstallen denen jenigen so schöden Gewinstes halber, Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. etwas Rahten wolten, so wieder dero eignes *interesse* wieder

Von Dohna, Anhalt, Waldeck, and Derfflinger form only the tip of a larger set of individuals to move between Brandenburg and Swedish service during this period and/or to enjoy direct family ties to each land.¹⁴⁰ The circulation of individuals and overlapping strands of personal ties that crisscrossed the Baltic helped construct the common cultural space within which the Brandenburg and Swedish diplomatic classes operated. The transmission of people, ideas, and affective bonds across the sea was in turn facilitated by these same cultural commonalities that allowed the relatively easy movement back and forth between the Brandenburg and Swedish political, military, and diplomatic worlds.

Cultural Connection

Parallel to the flow of political, military and diplomatic personnel between Brandenburg and Sweden was a traffic in cultural figures that included the professor of Greek language and literature Joachim Ehrenbursch, the artist and professor of medicine Gustav Kasimir Gahrlied von der Mühlen, the professor of Hebrew and librarian Christianus Ravius, the antiquarian and historian Martin Friedrich Seidel, the architect Philipp von Chieze, and most famously of all the great scholar Samuel Pufendorf.¹⁴¹ Some of

dero *Gloire* undt Gewißen auch Christlichen billigkeit lieffe, Verfluchet, wurde auch dabey biß an sein Ende Verharren, wolte Ew: Königl. Maytt: Versichern unterthänigst, daß Er für dieselbe eine Zeitlang hir so guth gewesen, alß wen sie einen eigenen *Ministrum* hir gehabt hetten, undt daß auß Antrieb seines Gewißens, des sichern Vertrauens, daß Er Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. seinem Gnädigsten Hrrn darunter auch keinen Undienst gethan." Eberhard von Grafenthal to Karl XI, Berlin, 16 October 1683. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 27. For an additional attestation of Derfflinger's desire for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship, see Karl XI to Hastfer, Stockholm, 9 April 1689. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1689, 332r–333r. It must also be noted that Derfflinger was still owed a sum of money from his earlier Swedish military service, and in the 1680s made efforts to have this sum paid. He therefore had an ulterior motive in presenting himself to the Swedes (and especially to Karl XI) as a friendly figure, but also sufficient cause for personal bitterness that could have led him to an anti-Swedish position.

¹⁴⁰ Some other important figures include Friedrich von Börstel, Claus von Brand, Landgraf Friedrich II von Hessen-Homburg, Prince Boguslaus Radziwiłł, and Count Friedrich Hermann von Schaumburg.

¹⁴¹ Ehrenbursch, a native of Ruppín in Brandenburg, became an official in Swedish Pomerania in 1667 and a Professor at Lund in 1668. *SBL*, XII, 249–51 (by Alf Åberg). Gahrlied von der Mühlen moved from Sweden to Brandenburg in the 1670s. Lothar Noack and Jürgen Splett (eds.), *Bio-Bibliographien: Brandenburgische Gelehrte der Frühen Neuzeit*, multi-volumes (Berlin: Akademie, 1997–), II:160ff. Ravius was born and raised in Berlin, taught at Uppsala, and then later at Frankfurt/Oder. Becmann, 267–70. On Friedrich Wilhelm's efforts to lure him to Brandenburg, see Friedrich Wilhelm to the faculty of the University of Frankfurt an der Oder, Köln an der Spree, 29 April 1672. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep.

this movement was due to the standard patterns and flows of a European cultural scene that had always witnessed mobility. In other instances the paths of peregrination for scholars and diplomats alike (groups that were by no means mutually exclusive) were smoothed by Protestant cosmopolitanism.¹⁴² Dutch intellectual and cultural influence in particular remained vigorous in Friedrich Wilhelm's Brandenburg and contemporary Sweden.¹⁴³ Familiarity with Dutch thought, and often travel or study in the Dutch Republic itself, continued to supply Brandenburg and Swedish elites with intellectual common ground that could serve as an avenue for them to communicate in a particular way. Many of the main figures encountered in this chapter had spent time in the Netherlands before entering diplomatic life: Waldeck, Schwerin, Wolfsberg, Hoverbeck, De la Gardie, Biörnkloou, Bielke, Gyllenstierna, von Dohna, Anhalt. In the 1670s a cultural circle that included a number of leading Swedish intellectual and political figures formed in Stockholm around the Dutch resident C.C. Rumpf.¹⁴⁴ The group came together for conversation, served as a clearinghouse for the latest news and texts, and facilitated correspondence between Swedish and Dutch scholars and universities. Rumpf served in particular as a mediator between his Swedish circle and his main contact in the Dutch cultural world, the esteemed intellectual Gisbert Cuper, who

51 Universität Frankfurt a. O., Nr 9a 1539–1710, M.A. 17. Seidel was educated at Frankfurt/Oder and Königsberg before becoming an official in Brandenburg service and later in Swedish-Pomerania. See Noack and Splett (eds.), I:409ff.; Rainer Schulz, "Bemerkungen zu den Anfängen der archäologischen Urgeschichtsforschung in der Mark Brandenburg im Zusammenhang mit der Universität Frankfurt (Oder)," in Haase and Winkler (eds.), *Die Oder-Universität Frankfurt*, 203–15, here 206–08. Chieze, a native Italian, moved from Swedish to Brandenburg service in 1660. Georg Galland, *Der Grosse Kurfürst und Moritz von Nassau der Brasilianer. Studien zur Brandenburgischen und Holländischen Kunstgeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Heinrich Keller, 1893), 195. Pufendorf moved to Sweden in 1668, and from there to Berlin in 1688. See Detlef Döring, *Pufendorf Studien: Beiträge zur Biographie Samuel von Pufendorfs und zu seiner Entwicklung als Historiker und theologischer Schriftsteller* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992); *SBL*, XXIX, 512–22 (by Bo Lindberg); *ADB*, XXVI, 701–08 (by Harry Breßlau); *NDB*, XXI, 3–5 (by Klaus Luig); Bahl, 558–59; *BBL*, 318 (by Hans-Joachim Schreckenbach).

¹⁴² Not all of the cultural figures listed here can be said to have shared in Protestant cosmopolitanism insofar as it can be equated with the ability to feel at ease in a range of Protestant settings. Pufendorf himself struggled at times to feel comfortable in a Reformed environment.

¹⁴³ For an excellent study of Dutch cultural influence in the seventeenth-century north, see Noldus, *Trade in Good Taste*.

¹⁴⁴ See Peter J.A.N. Rietbergen, "C.C. Rumpf, G. Cuper and Cultural Relations Between Sweden and the Dutch Republic During the Last Quarter of the 17th Century," in Lemmink and van Koningsbrugge (eds.), *Baltic Affairs*, 315–42.

himself was a vital node of connection between the world of diplomacy and the Republic of Letters.¹⁴⁵ Affiliates of Rumpf's circle included many Swedes involved in diplomacy with Brandenburg (Bengt Oxenstierna, Franz Joel Örnstedt, Johan Bergenhielm, Edvard Philipppson Ehrensteen, Nils Gyldenstolpe, Erik Lindschöld, Thomas Polus). Rumpf himself got along well with Brandenburg's representatives in Stockholm, and Cuper stood in correspondence with the Berlin court librarian Mathurin Veyssière de La Croze.¹⁴⁶ Shared membership in Rumpf's circle did not ensure friendly relations with one another (Oxenstierna and Lindschöld, for example, hated each other), nor a positive attitude towards Brandenburg-Swedish relations, but it did expose its participants to intellectual and cultural currents that formed part of the diplomatic culture through which they interacted with their Brandenburg counterparts.

Two additional examples further illustrate the cultural common ground on which elements of the Brandenburg and Swedish elites stood: the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft*, and the plans of the Swedish nobleman Bengt Skytte to establish a scholarly oasis in Brandenburg.

The Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft

The *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* was a German secret lodge and language society founded in 1617 by Prince Ludwig of Anhalt-Cöthen and Christoph von Dohna, the father of Christoph Delphicus, and patterned after Friedrich Heinrich of Orange's "Great Lodge."¹⁴⁷ The *Gesellschaft* brought together many of the leading figures in German society, politics, and cul-

¹⁴⁵ On Cuper's connections with diplomats, see Bianca Chen, "Digging for Antiquities with Diplomats: Gisbert Cuper (1644–1716) and his Social Capital," *Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts* 1, nr. 1 (May 2009), <http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/36>. For Rumpf's role in mediating contact between Cuper and the Swedish scholar Laurentius Normannus, see KB, Handskrifter, Bref till Laurentius Normannus, Ep. N. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Pierre de LaFolaisieu (in Stockholm 1685–1690) and Alexander von Dohna (1690–1691) each wrote to Berlin of their cooperation with Rumpf. The embassies of these two men are covered in detail in Chapter Five. On Cuper's contacts with de la Croze, see Anne Goldgar, *Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters 1680–1750* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 13.

¹⁴⁷ See Martin Bircher, *Im Garten der Palme: Kleinodien aus dem unbekannten Barock: die Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft und ihre Zeit* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992). For an (overstated) emphasis on the Dutch, Neostoic flavor of the society, see Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the early modern State*, 124–25. For early modern German language societies in general, including the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft*, see Christoph Stoll, *Sprachgesellschaften im Deutschland des 17. Jahrhunderts* (München: List, 1973); and R.J.W. Evans, "Learned Societies in Germany in the Seventeenth Century," *European Studies Review* 7 (1977), 129–51.

ture in a body that stressed cooperation, intellectual exchange, and a diffuse sense of intra-Protestant confessional toleration. Members adopted a pseudonym, a motto, and a botanical symbol to represent themselves, and pledged to lead an honorable Christian lifestyle and support the appropriate written and spoken use of the German language. Some members were serious scholars and collectors, others amateurish dilettantes or seekers of the measure of social prestige that society membership could bring. Many were military leaders and active diplomats.

In 1647 the society put out its first official publication, Carl Gustav von Hille's *Der Teutsche Palmbaum*.¹⁴⁸ Hille had served under Elector Johann Sigismund as a boy, and he dedicated the *Palmbaum* to Friedrich Wilhelm.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, the connections between the *Gesellschaft* and the Brandenburg ruling house were strong: five members of the House of Hohenzollern joined the society (Electors Georg Wilhelm and Friedrich Wilhelm, Margraves Johann and Sigismund of Brandenburg and Christian of Brandenburg-Bayreuth).¹⁵⁰ The future Karl X Gustav of Sweden was a member as well. More importantly, many of the individuals directly involved in carrying out Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy on the ground shared membership in the society: Johann Georg II von Anhalt; Bernd von Arnim; Hans Georg von Arnim; Johan Banér; Otto Wilhelm von Berlepsch; Sten Bielke (the younger); Konrad von Burgsdorff; Robert Douglas; Alexander Erskine; Sigismund von Götze; Friedrich von Jena; Gerhard Romilian von Kalcheim genannt Leuchtmar; Wilhelm von Kalcheim genannt Lohausen; Ewald von Kleist; Hempo von dem Knesebeck; Levins von dem Knesebeck; Thomas von dem Knesebeck (the elder); Hans Christoph von Königsmarck; Johann Köppen; Ludolf Lorenz von Krosigk; Joachim Mitzlaff; Axel Oxenstierna; Christoph Ludwig Rasch; Hans Georg von Ribbeck; Hans von Rochow; Otto von Schwerin; Torsten Stålhandske; Matthias Wesenbeck; Bartholomaeus Wolfsberg; Karl Gustav Wrangel. A number of these men had lived in and/or served both states (Anhalt; Hans Georg von Arnim; Königsmarck; Lohausen; Rasch). Several others involved in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy had close relatives who were society members (including two of

¹⁴⁸ Carl Gustav von Hille, *Der Teutsche Palmbaum* (Nürnberg, 1647; reprint München: Kösel, 1970).

¹⁴⁹ For biographical information on Hille, see the appendix to the 1970 reprint of the *Palmbaum*.

¹⁵⁰ Biographical data on society members and information relating to their participation in the society can be found in Klaus Conermann, *Die Mitglieder der Fruchtbringenden Gesellschaft 1617–1650* (Weinheim: VCH, 1985).

the main figures in Chapter Five, Bengt Oxenstierna and Alexander von Dohna).

Steve Murdoch's investigation of interactions between Scottish members has convincingly demonstrated that the bonds created by *Gesellschaft* membership were extremely loose at best, and efforts to portray the *Gesellschaft* as a functioning social network bringing tangible change to modes of behavior are flawed.¹⁵¹ What matters more for the case of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy is that the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* represented a shared model of cultural aspiration that transcended political divisions, was non-denominational but essentially Protestant, and prioritized at least in theory exchange and fellowship amongst its members. This model, rather than actual contacts brought about by the *Gesellschaft*, could contribute in an indirect way to the common cultural stock upon which both Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats drew and which gave them a sense of coherence and a style of operation even at times when wars and territorial conflicts placed their governments at odds. At tense, crucial moments throughout the history of Brandenburg-Swedish relations the diplomats who sat across the negotiating table from one another shared with each other a familiarity with this cultural model, even if it never amounted to more than a faint echo in the back of their minds: Götze and Oxenstierna at many points during the Thirty Years' War and in the talks for the Christina-Friedrich Wilhelm match; Leuchtmar and Erskein in the armistice negotiations of 1641; Erskein and Wesenbeck at the Westphalia talks and those that followed to implement the peace; Wolfsberg, Schwerin and Jena in the negotiations for the Treaty of Labiau; Krosigk and Bielke in Stockholm during the tense days of the early-1670s, to cite only a few examples. The vision represented by the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* rather than the activities of the institution itself was one piece of the complex puzzle that contributed to certain Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats moving within the same cosmopolitan cultural space with a degree of autonomy from the status of official relations between their governments.

Bengt Skytte's Universal University

In 1666 the renegade Swedish nobleman Bengt Skytte sought Elector Friedrich Wilhelm's sponsorship for a fantastical project to construct a self-governing international scholarly community in Brandenburg

¹⁵¹ Steve Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and covert associations in Northern Europe, 1603–1746* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), 367–73.

territory.¹⁵² The plan captured the elector's interest for a short time before it, like so many other early modern projects, collapsed and came to nothing.¹⁵³ Although Skytte's activities in Berlin were monitored carefully by Wulfrath, who was concerned that this *persona non grata* could be up to no good, they never came to play a role in Brandenburg-Swedish relations.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the values embodied in Skytte's proposal, the initially positive reception they received, and the personal methods through which he made his approach to Friedrich Wilhelm are relevant to an understanding of the diplomatic culture.

Skytte (1614–1683) was a well-traveled and highly-educated son of Johan Skytte and had occupied a number of important political and diplomatic positions before falling from grace and being stripped of his offices in 1664. At this point the plans he had begun to formulate years earlier for an international scholarly village to be built on the principles of academic and religious freedom took on greater urgency, as he began to identify his own condition as that of a persecuted intellectual. While looking for a princely patron to provide the necessary money and land Skytte's thoughts turned to Brandenburg. His first move was to contact an old acquaintance of his, Andreas Nikolaus de Bonnet, Friedrich Wilhelm's

¹⁵² The plan has attracted a fair amount of interest from German scholars, but relatively little from Swedish historians. Recent treatments include Stephanie Irrgang, "Gründungsvisionen in der Frühen Neuzeit: das gescheiterte Bemühen um eine Universitätsgründung in Tangermünde," *Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte* 6 (2006), 113–31; Torsten Husén, "Comenius and Sweden, and Bengt Skytte's *Sophopolis*," *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* 47, nr. 4 (September 2003), 387–98; Tore Frängsmyr, *Svensk idéhistoria: bildning och vetenskap under tusen år. Del I 1000–1809* (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 2000), 113; Susanna Åkerman, *Queen Christina of Sweden and her Circle: the transformation of a seventeenth-century Philosophical Libertine* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 125–30. Still useful are William W. Brickman, "Swedish Supranationalist in Education, Science, and Culture: Bengt Skytte (1614–1683)," *Western European Education XV* (1984), 3–42; Fritz Arnhem, "Freiherr Benedikt Skytte (1614–1683), der Urheber des Planes einer brandenburgischen 'Universal-Universität der Völker, Wissenschaften und Künste,'" in *Beiträge zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 65–99; idem, "Die Universal-Universität des Grossen Kurfürsten und ihre geistigen Urheber," *Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft für Kultur und Geistesleben* 20 (1911), 19–35; Anders Grape, "Om Bengt Skyttes planerade universal-universitet," *Biblioteksbladet* 2 (1917), 155–59. For a provocative eighteenth-century treatment, see Jean Pierre Erman, *Sur le Projet d'une Ville Savante dans le Brandebourg* (Berlin: François de Lagarde, 1792).

¹⁵³ Documents related to Skytte's dealings in Brandenburg are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Allgemeine Verwaltung, K lit. m II, Fasz. 1.

¹⁵⁴ See Wulfrath's correspondence in RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 16. For a broader selection of documents that covers Skytte's fall from grace as well as the university plan, see Georg Adlersparre (ed.), *Handlingar rörande Sveriges äldre, nyare och nyaste historia, samt historiska personer*, vol. 8 (Stockholm: Kongl. Ordens-Boktryckeriet, 1832), I–LXVI. See also Brickman, "Swedish Supranationalist," 18–22.

personal physician.¹⁵⁵ In a manner reminiscent of Saffius' assistance to Birckholtz in 1615, Bonnet approached the elector on his friend's behalf and advocated for his plans.¹⁵⁶ Bonnet served as the go-between while Friedrich Wilhelm and Skytte communicated, and he provided the cover for Skytte's incognito voyage to Berlin to present his proposals to the elector in person by claiming that Skytte was a patient coming to see him for medical treatment. Skytte dazzled the elector with visions of the prestige and fiscal benefits he would accrue from hosting an economically-thriving scholarly center that would attract intellectuals (and craftsmen) from all corners of Europe to live and work in an atmosphere of full academic and religious freedom for Christians of all denominations (even Jews and Muslims were to be allowed to practice their faiths privately). Friedrich Wilhelm was briefly swayed, and pledged up to 15,000 Thaler for the scheme before realizing the impracticality of the plan and backtracking, but this not before a letter of invitation to the new settlement had been published in his name.¹⁵⁷ Skytte departed Berlin in May 1667 with nothing more than a small monetary token of the elector's affection to show for his efforts. His next move was to visit his old friend Johann Christian von Boineburg, a well-known irenic, at whose home he met the young Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the future founder of the *Akademie der Wissenschaften* in Berlin.¹⁵⁸

Skytte's plan combined two of the pillars of the diplomatic culture, international higher education and trans-confessional religious understanding, although admittedly with a far more ecumenical reach than most Protestant cosmopolitans would have been comfortable with. He pursued his plan through a third pillar of the common culture, the personal relationship between an individual Swede and an individual Brandenburger who worked together through unofficial channels to encourage action by a central government that would be both personally beneficial to their own agendas and in service to a broad international vision. That Skytte and Bonnet used these tools to succeed in getting an outlandish plan an honest hearing before a sober ruler like Friedrich Wilhelm is testament to the potential of this way of doing business.

¹⁵⁵ For biographical information on Bonnet, see Bahl, 437.

¹⁵⁶ See above, 142.

¹⁵⁷ "Fundatio Novæ Universitatis Brandenburgicæ, Gentium, Scientiarum & Artium." A copy can be found at GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 9 Allgemeine Verwaltung, K lit. m II, Fasz. 1, 64r–65v.

¹⁵⁸ Arnheim, "Freiherr Benedikt Skytte," 93; Brickman, "Swedish Supranationalist," 23–24. On Boineburg, see *ADB*, III, 222–24 (by Karl Bernhardt).

Pan-Protestantism Before and After Westphalia

Skytte was an acquaintance of Jan Comenius and Samuel Hartlib, who in turn were close associates of John Dury, the tireless advocate of Protestant unionism. As we have seen, various schemes to unite Europe's Protestants, or at the very least for Protestant states to assist one another in wars against Catholics, had played a role in Brandenburg-Swedish relations as early as Karl IX's efforts to gain Brandenburg's support for his rebellion against Sigismund in the 1590s. The marriage alliance talks that began in the 1610s contained for certain Brandenburgers and Swedes a serious and more theologically infused desire to unite Brandenburg and Sweden in a durable fashion in the spirit of Protestant brotherhood. Christian von Bellin's work in the mid-1620s to build a broad Protestant alliance in which Brandenburg and Sweden would be cornerstones was driven by a religious-political vision that united him with other like-minded men across the Protestant world. Bellin's good friend and political adherent Götze was a follower of Johan Bergius' Reformed irenicism, and, along with another of Bergius' friends, Levins von dem Knesebeck, wrote the Leipzig Manifesto of 1631. Dury held up the protocol of the Leipzig Colloquy that Bergius himself had drawn up (and had communicated to Dury) as a model for developments in Sweden, and in 1636 attempted to have copies of the protocol printed and distributed there.¹⁵⁹ All of these men (Bellin, Götze, Knesebeck, Bergius) had Swedish correspondents and were supporters of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship.

The ability of Protestant unionist sentiment to unite Brandenburgers and Swedes did not end with the Peace of Westphalia. An attraction to aggressive Protestant politics united men like Waldeck, Derfflinger, and Christoph Delphicus von Dohna who felt personal ties to both Brandenburg and Sweden. As the century progressed the chief Catholic antagonist feared by these men may have shifted from the Habsburgs to France, but the nature of the sentiment remained the same. Waldeck and Derfflinger each took to the field against Louis XIV's armies, and von Dohna negotiated Sweden's entry into the anti-French Triple Alliance of 1668.¹⁶⁰ The desire for Lutheran-Calvinist theological understanding persisted as well,

¹⁵⁹ Westin, *Svenska kyrkan och de protestantiska enhetssträvandena*, 191–93.

¹⁶⁰ Anhalt also fought against the French, militarily as well as politically, although his personal views tended towards Protestant-Catholic cooperation within the Empire and a consistently pro-Imperial attitude rather than towards militant Protestantism. See Rohrschneider, *Johann Georg II. von Anhalt-Dessau*.

bringing together Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats, theologians, and other prominent citizens in a shared project.¹⁶¹

The activities of Dury and his circle show a continuity of sentiment spanning both sides of the supposed divide of 1648. In fact, the desire to bring Brandenburg and Sweden specifically into friendly alliance as a crucial step towards achieving the broader irenic vision of full Protestant union was more pronounced in Dury and his comrades Hartlib and Comenius *after* the Thirty Years' War than it had been during the war.¹⁶² Brandenburgers and Swedes who had contact with Dury's circle and sympathy for his unionist dreams were frequently in contact with each other as well and involved in one way or another in affecting the course of Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Jacob Godeman, the first long-term Swedish resident to be stationed at the Brandenburg elector's court, was also Dury's first Swedish contact when he began working for his plan in 1628.¹⁶³ Christoph Ludwig Rasch, the man who moved between Brandenburg and Swedish service and was involved in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy, helped put Dury in touch with leading Lutheran statesmen.¹⁶⁴ Dury called Götze "a very understanding & learned man" who "did oblige himself assuring me y:t hee would cause his Master neuer leaue of to sturre in this businesse."¹⁶⁵ Georg von Snoilsky, the Swedish negotiator in the agreement for Brandenburg's entry into the Rhenish Alliance in 1665, had

¹⁶¹ See, for example, Adolf Friedrich Schlezer's work with Johannes Matthiæ and Louis de Geer for international Protestant unionist projects. Documents in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 19c, fasc. 11; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 6; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 24c, Nr. 17e, fasc. 8; *UA*, VI, 652.

¹⁶² Documentation of Dury's activities in Sweden is vast, and spread amongst multiple collections. A sample of his correspondence can be found in: RA, Enskilda arkiv, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E589 [with Axel Oxenstierna]; RA, Enskilda arkiv, De Geersamlingen, E 3514 [with Louis de Geer]; UUB, Handskrifter, Brev till Johannes Matthiæ, G171 [with Johannes Matthiæ]. Printed collections with important sets of documents relating to Dury in Sweden include: Gunnar Westin, *John Durie in Sweden 1636–1638: documents and letters* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1934–36); E.W. Dahlgren (ed.), *Louis De Geers Brev och Affärshandlingar 1614–1652* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1934). The best secondary works are Murdoch, *Network North*, 280–312; Westin, *Negotiations*; idem, *Svenska kyrkan och de protestantiska enhetssträvandena*; Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*; idem, *Ortodoxi och synkretism i Sverige, 1647–1660* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1950). Documentation regarding his efforts in Brandenburg is also large. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 19c, fasc. 7–10 and 15; SBPK, Handschriftenabteilung, Nachlaß Johann Karl Konrad Oelrichs, Kasten 92. See also Hugo Landwehr, "Johannes Duraeus' Unionsverhandlung mit Kurbrandenburg," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 10 (1889), 463–79.

¹⁶³ Westin, *Negotiations*, 77. On Godeman, see above, 132–33.

¹⁶⁴ Westin, *Negotiations*, 142.

¹⁶⁵ Dury, "A Summarie Relation," in Westin, *Negotiations*, 264–76, here 275.

held discussions about unionism with Dury in Frankfurt am Main.¹⁶⁶ Christianus Ravius, the native Brandenburger working in Uppsala and then later at Frankfurt an der Oder, was married to the niece of Dury's chief Swedish partner, Johannes Matthiæ, and himself corresponded with Dury, Matthiæ, Hartlib, Comenius, and De Geer.¹⁶⁷ Bengt Skytte shared a friendship with Comenius and Hartlib, while his father Johan was a friend of Dury as well.¹⁶⁸

Brandenburgers and Swedes involved in Protestant unionism were open to viewing each other and their countries as natural partners with the potential to unite for a higher cause. Indeed, many of the same figures who supported the schemes of Dury and his group were those who devised and supported the marriage plans discussed in Chapter Three, as they saw each as mutually constitutive pieces of their larger religious-political aspirations. Practitioners of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture continued to draw a common purpose and a particular transnational language from the font of Pan-Protestantism for years after the ink on the Westphalian agreements had dried.

Beginnings of a Drifting Apart

Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture remained vibrant into the later decades of the seventeenth century. As the end of the century drew nearer, however, cracks in the foundation began to appear. The consolidation of Swedish royal absolutism in the 1680s brought with it a renewed commitment to Lutheran orthodoxy and a new round of restrictions on the foreign travels of Swedish students, raising the prospect of Lutheran-Calvinist confessional divisions of the sort the diplomatic culture sought to overcome. At the same time the efforts of France to win (or retain) Protestant friends in northern Europe while pursuing military aggression abroad and confessional aggression at home added new tension to international relations in the north. Although an event of no great significance in its own right, the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* ceased operations in

¹⁶⁶ Westin, *Svenska kyrkan och de protestantiska enhetssträvandena*, 310.

¹⁶⁷ UUB, Handskrifter, Epistolæ ad Chr. Ravium Prof. Ups, Nordin 478; Dahlgren (ed.), *Louis De Geers Brev och Affärshandlingar*, Nr. 440, 591; Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*, 38ff.

¹⁶⁸ Arnheim, "Freiherr Benedikt Skytte," 69.

1680, signaling a decline of the earlier cultural world that Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats had shared.

Even at its height the diplomatic culture had been no guarantor of friendship, or even peace. Clashes between Brandenburg and Sweden were frequent, dramatic, and sometimes bloody, and were likely made more so precisely because the countries had so many issues in common. Under these circumstances a mode of diplomatic contact based in personal actions and cultural commonalities that had some separation from the course of state-level relations was a definite asset, as it provided a bond with a measure of immunity from the political passions of the moment that allowed individuals to continue to interact and work for improvement when times were not good. When the cultural common ground started to crumble away, however, what had once been a strength became a liability, as the very same individual and cultural factors became hurdles that could have deleterious effects on relations even at times when the governments themselves wished for smooth sailing. A diplomatic system that hinged on personal interaction was unable to operate when those people could no longer figure out how interact. This is exactly what happened in the case of Brandenburg and Sweden in the later 1680s.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE OF CONFESSIONAL TENSION: DIPLOMATIC CULTURE UNDER DURESS

The reign of Louis XIV sent competing and at times contradictory impulses through the diplomatic and religious climate in Protestant northern Europe, and the repercussions of the king's expansionist and anti-Protestant policies on the relations between Protestant countries were varied and complex.¹ Taken in conjunction with the ascension of Catholic James II in Britain in February 1685 and the succession of the Catholic House of Neuburg in the Palatinate following the death of the last Calvinist elector in May of that year, Louis' reintroduction of the mass in the "reunited" territories and his increasing persecution of the Huguenots in France added to an acute sense among many European Protestants, and especially amongst Protestant cosmopolitans, that the survival of their religion was threatened. The standard literature on seventeenth-century Europe notes that the culmination of Louis' attack on the Huguenots in his revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685 galvanized the continent's Protestant powers in a common sense of outrage and united them in a spirit of political cooperation against France.² Indeed, such an astute contemporary observer as Leibniz was to write in the early 1690s that it appeared now "as if all of the north is opposed to the south of Europe; the

¹ An earlier version of this chapter has been published as "The Rise of Confessional Tension in Brandenburg's Relations with Sweden in the Late Seventeenth Century," *Central European History* 37 (2004), nr. 4, 568–92.

² See, for example, Donald H. Pennington, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Longman, 1989), 516; Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers, 1679–1793* (London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1990), 38; Geoffrey Treasure, *The Making of Modern Europe, 1648–1780* (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), 269; Leonard W. Cowie, *Seventeenth-Century Europe* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1960), 271; Ernst Heinrich Kossmann, "The Dutch Republic," in *The Ascendancy of France, 1648–1688*, ed. F.L. Carsten, vol. 5 of *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 297; Geoffrey Symcox, "Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years War," in *Louis XIV and Europe*, ed. Ragnhild Hatton (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), 183–84; Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London and New York: Routledge, 1987), 218–19. Nicholas Henshall (*The Myth of Absolutism: change and continuity in early modern European monarchy* [London and New York: Longman, 1992], 202–03) writes of an "outraged international Protestantism in fear of its life" in which "the Protestant brotherhood" declared "common cause . . . with the oppressed Huguenots."

great majority of the Germanic peoples are opposed to the Latins.”³ Even Bossuet had to concede that “your so-called Reformation . . . was never more powerful nor more united. All of the Protestants have joined forces. From the outside, the Reformation is very cohesive, more haughty and more menacing than ever.”⁴

According to this account, one of the most damaging international consequences of Louis’ territorial and religious policies was the alienation of his former Protestant allies in northern Europe and the subsequent unraveling of the alliance and clientage system that French diplomacy (and French money) had put together so painstakingly in previous years.⁵ In particular, Brandenburg and Sweden were driven definitively away from the French camp, and by February 1686 the two governments had set aside their longstanding differences over Pomerania and had entered into an alliance held together by a desire to preserve European Protestantism and a mutual distrust of France.⁶ In short, the prevailing historiographical consensus is that Louis’ anti-Protestant activities rekindled the flickering

³ “Maintenant, c’est quasi tout le nord qui s’oppose au sud de l’Europe; c’est la plus grande partie des peuples germaniques opposés aux Latins.” Leibniz to Bossuet, 18 April 1692, cited in Paul Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience européenne, 1680–1715* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1961), 81–82.

⁴ “Votre prétendue Réforme, à ne regarder que les soutiens du dehors, ne fut jamais ni plus puissante ni plus unie. Tout le parti protestant se ligue. A l’extérieur, la Réforme est tout ensemble, plus fière et plus menaçante que jamais.” Bossuet, *Premier avertissement aux Protestants* (1689), cited in Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience*, 82.

⁵ Those who note the particular anger of Louis’ erstwhile Protestant allies include John Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime, 1600–1789* (London and New York: Longman, 1991), 253; David Parrott, “War and international relations,” in *The Seventeenth Century: Europe 1598–1715*, ed. Joseph Bergin, The Short Oxford History of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 133; Thomas Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598–1700*, Macmillan History of Europe (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1990), 375; G. Zeller, “French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in their European Setting,” in *The Ascendancy of France, 1648–1688*, ed. F.L. Carsten, vol. 5 of *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 220–21; William Doyle, *The Old European Order, 1660–1800*, The Short Oxford History of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 271; Robin Briggs, “Embattled Faiths: Religion and Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Early Modern Europe: an Oxford History*, ed. Euan Cameron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 178.

⁶ See above, 209. For recent assessments of the Brandenburg-Swedish alliance of 1686 as driven by a common desire to defend European Protestantism and a shared animosity toward France, see McKay, 252–56; Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime*, 253. Anthony F. Upton describes the alliance with Brandenburg as an integral part of Sweden’s shift toward viewing Louis XIV as the greatest threat to peace and stability in Europe. See his *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 102–06. Imperial diplomats were convinced that France was doing all that was in its power to prevent Brandenburg and Sweden from coming to an agreement over Pomerania, and they in turn sought to help such an agreement as part of the struggle against Louis XIV. See

embers of pan-Protestant religious sympathy and unleashed a wave of Protestant political cooperation of which Brandenburg's improved relationship with Sweden was part.

Another deeply-entrenched historiographical narrative argues that religion itself became an increasingly insignificant factor in European interstate relations following the Thirty Years' War. John Gagliardo writes that although popular religious tensions remained high after the Westphalia agreements, religion "was never again to be . . . more than a very secondary influence on the conduct of foreign policy."⁷ Jeremy Black speaks of an "abatement" of religious tension in later seventeenth-century diplomacy, while Marsha and Linda Frey claim that confessional passions survived only as "distant rumblings" on the European diplomatic horizon.⁸ Theodore K. Rabb states even more plainly that from the middle of the seventeenth century "religion did cease to affect foreign policies."⁹ This line of reasoning is championed most strongly in the Swedish historiography by Sven Göransson, who argues that confessional issues ceased altogether to be a factor in European (and especially Swedish) diplomacy from around 1660.¹⁰ Though challenged in recent years by a growing body of innovative research, the theory of the post-Westphalian secularization of diplomacy remains an influential model for many historians and the dominant paradigm for most political scientists and international relations theorists.¹¹

These prominent historiographical claims of renewed Protestant cohesion against the French-Catholic threat on the one hand, and of the

documents in HHStA, Gruppe VIII Staatenabteilungen, Brandenburgica, Karton 21; HHStA, Gruppe VIII Staatenabteilungen, Schweden, Karton 7.

⁷ Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime*, 177–78.

⁸ Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, 16; Frey and Frey, 214.

⁹ Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 78–82.

¹⁰ Göransson, *Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning*.

¹¹ For historical work that challenges the supposed Westphalian secularization of warfare and diplomacy, see the essays (and literature cited therein) in David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009). Such work has grown up alongside efforts by international relations scholars to reintroduce religion as a factor in their analyses. See Nexon; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens (eds.), *The Sacred and the Sovereign: religion and international politics* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Though complementary in many ways, these two bodies of literature rarely engage with one another.

growing irrelevance of religion's role in international affairs on the other, may seem at odds with one another. Nevertheless, both would suggest that the late-1680s and early-1690s should have been a period of relative political harmony and lack of religious conflict between Brandenburg and Sweden. However, diplomatic records reveal that it was precisely during this period that religious tensions between Brandenburg and Sweden that had previously been held in check boiled to the surface, igniting a spirit of confessionalized politics that posed a very real obstacle to the ability of the two governments to cooperate politically, even though both agreed that the circumstances of the time made such cooperation desirable. This rise in intra-Protestant confessional tension was part and parcel of a larger shift in Brandenburg-Swedish relations that occurred within an atmosphere of heightened religious sensitivity brought to northern and central Europe by the French military and religious offensives. Not coincidentally, much of this tension centered on the activities of a man directly impacted by Louis' religious policies, the Huguenot refugee Pierre de Falaiseau who had stood in Brandenburg service since the early 1680s. Falaiseau's actions were grounded in an intense form of Protestant cosmopolitanism and drew upon the tools of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture. They also placed unwelcome strain on the boundaries of that diplomatic culture at a time when those boundaries were beginning to change. Understanding Falaiseau is a key to understanding these broader transformations.

Falaiseau in Sweden

Falaiseau counted among his several diplomatic missions on behalf of the Brandenburg Electors an embassy to Sweden from July 1685 to June 1690.¹² His five years in Stockholm were marked by a series of controversies, often religious in nature and complicated by a unique confluence of international diplomacy, domestic Swedish politics, and Falaiseau's own personal

¹² Falaiseau also served as Brandenburg representative in England from September to December 1682 (though he was not received by Charles II), as ambassador to Denmark from September 1690 to February 1698, and as envoy to Spain from October 1699 to January 1701. See Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Gross, *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol. 1 (Oldenburg I.O. and Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1936), 30, 35, 62.

contentiousness and sense of religious responsibility.¹³ Relatively little is known about Falaiseau and his background beyond what he himself reveals with characteristic flair at various points in his correspondence, and this must be interpreted with a shade of caution.¹⁴ The Falaiseaus were a noble family of financiers from Blois in central France who became well established in the Paris Huguenot Church. Members of the family appear to have been educated at leading Calvinist universities such as the University of Geneva.¹⁵ Pierre left France several years before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and established himself in England before entering Brandenburg service in 1682.¹⁶ Upon revocation of the edict some members of his family refused to abjure their Calvinist faith and were expelled from France. Several of them fled to Brandenburg, including Pierre's parents, who settled in Berlin and whom he supported financially for a number of years while serving as a diplomat. After over twenty years in Brandenburg service Pierre himself returned to England in the early

¹³ Falaiseau's problems in Stockholm can be viewed through the lens of the 'diplomatic incident.' On this phenomenon, see Lucien Bély and Géraud Poumarède (eds.), *L'incident diplomatique (XVI^e–XVIII^e siècle)* (Paris: A. Pedone, 2010).

¹⁴ Only a small portion of Falaiseau's correspondence has been published. See UA, XXII; John M. Kemble (ed.), *State Papers and Correspondence Illustrative of the Social and Political State of Europe from the Revolution to the Accession of the House of Hanover* (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857); Konrad Varrentrapp, "Briefe Pufendorf's an Falaiseau, Friese und Weigel," *Historische Zeitschrift* 73 (1894), 59–67; Onno Klopp (ed.), *Correspondenz von Leibniz mit der Prinzessin Sophie*, three volumes (Hannover: Klindworth's Verl., 1873); and various locations in the ongoing edition of Leibniz' *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe* (Berlin: Akademie). Brief biographical notes (which sometimes contradict one another as well as Falaiseau's own claims) can be found in Jean Pierre Erman and Pierre Christian Frédéric Reclam, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des Réfugiés François dans les États du Roi*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Jean Jasperd, 1784), 31–35; Eug. and Em. Haag, *La France Protestante ou Vies des Protestantes Français qui se sont fait un nom dans l'histoire depuis les premiers temps de la Réformation jusqu'à la reconnaissance du Principe de la liberté des cultes par l'Assemblée Nationale*, vol. 5 (1846–59; reprint, Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1966), 54–55; Rev. David C.A. Agnew, *Protestant Exiles From France in the Reign of Louis XIV, or, the Huguenot refugees and their descendants in Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (London: Reeves & Turner; Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1871), 77–80, 315; Kemble (ed.), *State Papers and Correspondence*, 2. Falaiseau's longest and most detailed autobiographical descriptions can be found in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 240e Spanien, fasc. 8.

¹⁵ See Suzanne Stelling-Michaud (ed.), *Le Livre du Recteur de l'Académie de Genève (1559–1878), III: Notices Biographiques des Étudiants D–G* (Genève: Droz, 1972), 267–68.

¹⁶ Falaiseau had spent time in the service of Lord Montagu before entering Brandenburg service. See Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, London, 24 October/3 November 1682. GStA PK, I HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 72–75, England, Konv. 9F. He was naturalized as an English subject by Royal letter patent in 1681. Agnew, *Protestant Exiles from France*, index volume (London: Reeves & Turner; Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1874), 28.

eighteenth century, where he remained active in a variety of political and intellectual endeavors until his death in 1726.

Like many Huguenot refugees, Falaiseau was rabidly anti-French. Some of this was surely due to his own condition: his family, as he put it, had been “scattered to the four corners of Europe,” and he to his enduring rage had lost to confiscation a French estate he claimed to be worth over 70,000 *écus*.¹⁷ The root causes of his animosity, however, ran much deeper than a sense of personal victimization and injustice alone, and relate to Falaiseau’s Protestant cosmopolitanism. His reports out of Stockholm are full of invective against France as a cruel and bigoted state driven by an insatiable lust for power and set upon the total destruction of Protestantism. In a report to Elector Friedrich III (reigned 1688–1713) from March 1689 Falaiseau described France as “that arrogant and tyrannical power which for twenty years has done so much indignity to all of the princes of Europe and whose design is the destruction of the Protestant religion and the establishment of a universal monarchy.”¹⁸ In a different report that same month he wrote that “I hope that the year does not pass that God does not punish France for the incredible cruelties” that it has committed for many years, cited specifically France’s “more than barbaric” excesses in the current war in the Palatinate, and called for the Protestant princes of the empire above all to remain united “to abase the arrogance and the tyranny of a power that recognizes neither the law of nations nor that of nature, neither human law nor divine law.”¹⁹ Falaiseau’s own situation made him keenly aware of the plight of Huguenot refugees forced out of France, and of the difficulties faced by persecuted Protestant minorities in general. He considered it his duty to assist his fellow refugees during his diplomatic career, and to discourage intra-Protestant religious perse-

¹⁷ Falaiseau to Ilgen, Southampton, 21 June/2 July 1713. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 240e Spanien, fasc. 9; Falaiseau to [Ilgen], Southampton, 15 August 1711. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 240e Spanien, fasc. 8.

¹⁸ “cette Puissance orgueilleuse et Tyrannique qui a fait éprouver depuis vingt ans tant d’indignitez à tous les Princes de l’Europe et dont le dessein estait le Ruine de la Religion Protestante et l’establissement d’une Monarchie Universelle.” Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 23 March 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41, 142r.

¹⁹ “...j’espere que l’année ne se passera pas, Que Dieu ne punesse la France des Cruautés inouies qu’elle exerce de tout Costé depui tant dannées et que les Exces plus que Barbares qu’elle vient de commettre dans le Palatinas, feront connaistre à tous les Princes de l’Empire et principalement aux Protestans la Necessite qu’il y a de demeurer bien unis pour abbaissier l’orguiuil et la Tyrannie d’une Puissance qui ne connaist ny le droit des Gens ny celuy de la Nature ne les Loix humaines ny les loix divines, et qui crait estre on Droit de violer impuniment tout ce qu’il doit y avoir de plus saint et de plu sacré, parmis les hommes.” Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 13/23 March 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41, 123v.

cution where he could. These three issues—a virulent Francophobia, the desire to assist Huguenot refugees driven from France, and a heightened sensitivity to the persecution of Protestant (especially Calvinist) minorities—played a prominent role in his embassy to Sweden and in the controversies to which it gave rise.

Falaiseau's embassy was part of a conscious effort in the mid-1680s to improve the diplomatic climate with Sweden following the war years of the second half of the previous decade. Friedrich Wilhelm had recalled Christoph von Brandt from Stockholm shortly after hostilities had broken out and had not replaced him with a new long-term representative once the war had ended in 1679.²⁰ As late as 1684 the elector had still been trying to rally support for a planned invasion of Swedish Pomerania. By early 1685, however, the international situation dominated by France was such that Brandenburg desired a return to more normal relations with Sweden, and Friedrich Wilhelm made the both practically and symbolically significant gesture of commissioning Falaiseau as Extraordinary Ambassador and dispatching him to Stockholm in order to further this goal.²¹

The aims of Falaiseau's mission, however, went far beyond the regularization of Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Like Falaiseau himself, the Brandenburg government was deeply concerned that the actions of Louis XIV, both religious and political, were the engine of an even larger Catholic movement that posed a serious threat to the survival of Protestantism in Europe. This movement was directed against Calvinists and Lutherans equally, and resisting it demanded unity amongst the Protestant confessions. Friedrich Wilhelm wrote to Falaiseau in April 1686 that "it is known throughout all of Europe in what great danger the entire Protestant religion of both confessions . . . stands at this time, and with what great cunning and violence" it was confronted. The threat of this "common enemy" should lead naturally to a "much closer and more solid union" among the Protestants. The disruption of such unity by confessional conflict between the Protestant denominations, however, would equate to "none other than an acceleration of their imminent calamity, and a certain and infallible means to the highest danger and misery for both parties, nay to the

²⁰ See Bittner and Gross, *Repertorium*, 61. Brandenburg did maintain a limited diplomatic presence in Sweden in the years leading up to Falaiseau's embassy, but only in the form of short-term missions or lower-level correspondents.

²¹ Falaiseau's instructions are dated Potsdam, 6 June 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28. An abridged version is printed in *UA*, XXII, 433–34. See also Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, II:260.

entire obscuration of the Evangelical Truth.”²² The leading official Paul von Fuchs, a Protestant cosmopolitan heavily involved in foreign affairs, argued that the Catholics were the mutual enemy of both Lutherans and Calvinists, and that they were seeking “now more than ever to overwhelm the Protestant religion and to bring everything under the Papacy once more.”²³ The Catholics “knew well that they could make no greater progress in their evil designs than when the Protestants were divided amongst themselves and would not tolerate one another.” He added that it was precisely because of these “shameful divisions amongst the Protestant powers” that the Catholics had been able to make such frightening progress up to this point, threatening to accomplish more in two or three years than they had in the entire preceding century. Rather than a united Protestant front to face Catholic aggression, “one sees unfortunately almost the opposite, that [the Protestant confessions] seek to destroy one another, from which nothing else can result but that the Papists will bring one part after the other under the yoke, and, even if they leave the Lutherans for last, they will be no better treated than the Reformed.”²⁴

²² “Es ist durch gantz Europa bekant in was großer Gefahr die gesambte Evangelische Religion beyder confessionen Jetiger Zeit fast aller Notn stehet, und mit was großer List und gewalt derselben nachgehachtet wird. Es solte auch Ja billig diese, allen beyden theils bevorstehende Gefahr Sie wieder Ihre Gemeinen feind umb so Viel näher und fester Verb[inden], weiln leicht zu erachten wan Sie nicht allen Keine des egen nötige *mesures* unter sich fasten sondern sich noch daß unter einander anfrieden und Verfolgen solten, das solches nichts anders als eine beschleunigung ihres bevorstehenden Unglücks worden und zu beyder theils hochstem bedenck und Elend Ja zu eine ganse Verdunckelung der Evangelischen Waarheit ein gewißes und unfehlbares Mittell sein werde.” Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 9 April 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 69v–70r.

²³ Von Fuchs, though less confessionally strident than firebrands like Falaiseau, had vast Protestant cosmopolitan credentials: he had studied at Leiden and Franeker and taught Dutch-style natural law at the University of Duisburg; he had been involved in the pamphlet-literature campaign against Louis XIV in the 1670s and was instrumental in welcoming Huguenot refugees into Brandenburg; he developed a warm friendship with the noted Protestant unionist theologian Daniel Ernst Jablonski, who composed a funeral oration upon his death; and in the late 1690s he was appointed by Friedrich III to work alongside Jablonski on plans for the union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches. See Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the early modern State*, 121; Hubert Gillot, *Le Règne de Louis XIV et l'Opinion Publique en Allemagne* (Paris: Édouard Champion, 1914), v; von Thadden, *Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Hofprediger*, 57; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 19c, fasc. 22. Fuchs died in 1704, and Jablonski's funeral oration was published by Johann Wessel in Berlin later that year.

²⁴ “...daß Sie [the Lutherans] dannenhero auch Ewrn feind, nemlich die Papisten, hatten, welche sich jetzo mehr als jemalen bemüheten die Evangelische Religion über hauffen zu werffen und alles wieder unter das Pabsthumb zu bringen. es were Ihnen auch solches durch des högsten verhängnüß, (welcher, sonder zweifel über die schädliche

The Swedish government shared this desire for Protestant cooperation in the face of Catholic aggression, and this affected the way in which it dealt with its Brandenburg counterpart. Karl XI wrote to his representative in Berlin of the "highly necessary unity" of the Protestants in light of the "current dangerous circumstances."²⁵ Similar sentiments began to appear with increasing frequency in the official correspondence between the governments, and they undergirded the improvement in Brandenburg-Swedish relations after years of tension. Many Brandenburgers remained concerned, however, that France could lure Sweden away from a pro-Protestant position and back onto its side. There were solid reasons for these fears. France and Sweden shared a long tradition of military and political cooperation dating back to the Thirty Years' War, and as we have seen as recently as 1674 the Swedes had instigated a new round of hostilities with Brandenburg at the urging of France in order to draw the Brandenburg army away from the allied force fighting the French in the west. Heavy French subsidies allowed Sweden to remain in the war for the following four years, and French influence was able to secure for the Swedes a more favorable peace than their performance on the battlefield would have merited. Serious discussions continued into the 1690s over how best to defend Brandenburg in the event of a new Swedish military strike in conjunction with the current French war.²⁶ Indeed, certain members of the Brandenburg ruling elite had come to view the tradition of Franco-Swedish cooperation as so firmly established that the foreign

divisiones und spaltungen, so annoch unter den Evangelischen Regirten, erzürnet were) in den negsten Zwey oder drey Jahren leider mehr gelungen als sonst vorhin in einm gantzem Seculo; Und, wil Sie wohl wüsten, daß Sie keinen größern progres in Ihr bösen orhaben thun könnten, als wan die Evangelischen unter sich getrennet sein, und ein ander nichts dulden wollen. So were kein Zweifel, daß Sie sich hierüber nicht allein sonderlich erfrewen, sondern auch Ihn vorthail auf die eine oder andere weise daraus Ziehen, und unter der Handt dergleichen faviren würden; Anstat nun daß die Evangelischen sich in vollkommener einigkeit zusammenthu(.) und dieses Ihres gemeinen feindes schädliches vorhaben mit vereinigter macht unterbrechen solten, bevorab das jetzo die Papistische Macht die Evangelische weit überwieget, So sähe man leider! fast dß wieder spiel, und daß diese nur sucheten sich untereinander selbst zu destruiren, worauß dan anderst nichts erfolgen könnte, als, daß die Papisten ein theil nach dem andrn unters Joch bringen, und, wan Sie ja den Lutheranern die letzte frist ließ, es doch mit ihnen nicht besser machen würden, als mit den Reformirten, ..." Paul von Fuchs to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 14 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 33.

²⁵ Karl XI to [Macklier], Stockholm, 23 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

²⁶ See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 707.

policy interests of the two countries seemed almost inseparable.²⁷ A major purpose of Falaiseau's embassy was to prevent Sweden's return to its traditional orientation toward France.

A development in Swedish domestic politics made achieving this goal more complicated. Falaiseau's stay in Stockholm coincided with a heightened phase in the long and painful process known as the *reduktion*, a stage in the advance of Swedish absolutism in which the Crown confiscated much of the property that had been granted to the Swedish nobility by earlier monarchs.²⁸ Not surprisingly the *reduktion* produced great bitterness amongst the nobility, many of whom found themselves facing drastically-reduced financial prospects and in some cases real financial challenges. The Brandenburgers were well aware of this bitterness, and the initial instructions for Falaiseau's embassy warned him to pay close attention to the sentiments of the nobility since the Crown's actions had "noticeably disgusted the greater part of its most considerable subjects."²⁹ The French were equally aware of the disaffection and economic hardship wrought by the *reduktion*, and they capitalized on their awareness by offering leading members of the nobility substantial sums of money in order to win their affection and use their influence to move Sweden toward a French alliance.³⁰ France complemented this effort with large monetary offers to the Crown itself, and it relied upon the friends it had made in the nobility to pressure Karl XI to accept these offers.³¹ One of the

²⁷ See Sylvester Jakob von Danckelman to Friedrich III, Regensburg, 12/22 April 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41, 169r–173v.

²⁸ On the *reduktion*, see Kurt Ågren, "The *reduktion*," in Michael Roberts (ed.), *Sweden's Age of Greatness, 1632–1718* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 237–64; Göran Rystad, *Karl XI: en biografi* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2003), 181–203; Upton, *Charles XI*, 51–70; Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), esp. 127–35.

²⁹ "Dieweilln es auch fast überall ruchtbar, daß Ihre Königl. Mt. in Schweden durch die bekante *reunionen* dere von Ihnen Vorfahren am Reich *alienirten* *Domainen* Güter fast den mehreren theil Ihrer *considerablesten* Unterthanen mercklich *disgustiret*, So soll gedachter *Falaiseau* zeit seiner anwesenheit in Schweden sich mit allem fleiß erkundigen, wie schon dieser und anderer ursachen halber die Schwedische *Noblesse* und andere Unterthanen gegen den König und das ietziige *Gouvernement intentioniret*..." Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 6 June 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

³⁰ See, for example, French offers of bribes to Bengt and Gabriel Oxenstierna (Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 22 March/1 April 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 44, 116r–123r), and to Count Hassert and Count Wreede (Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 30 April/10 May 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 44, 197r–204v).

³¹ See, for example, Falaiseau's characterization of Guldenstolp and Field Marshall Aschenberg as the leaders of a pro-French movement urging Karl XI to accept French

purposes of Falaiseau's embassy was to work against the machinations of this "French party" of high-ranking Swedes with an economic interest in bringing Sweden into a French alliance.

The rising influence of Sweden's orthodox Lutheran clergy was another byproduct of the *reduktion* with which Falaiseau had to contend. The clergy had always been influential in Sweden, and the alienation of a large segment of the nobility through the *reduktion* had made the Crown that much more desirous of maintaining the clergy's support. The clergy took advantage of this to increase their leverage in the state. In the early stages of his embassy Falaiseau wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm that the clergy "was the Estate of the Kingdom which has contributed the most to the abasement of the nobility in the Kingdom, and for that reason . . . the King is obligated to be very obliging to them," with the result being that the clergy's power was "far greater than it ought to be."³² Sweden's Chancery President (and *de facto* foreign minister) Bengt Oxenstierna himself confided to Falaiseau that the king did not dare resist the clergy on certain issues.³³ The Swedish church utilized the increase in its influence to push forward its traditional anti-Calvinist agenda.³⁴ As the representative of a Calvinist ruling house attempting to keep Sweden in a transconfessional Protestant alliance, and as a victim of anti-Calvinist religious persecution himself, Falaiseau took it upon himself to combat this agenda.

The situation that Falaiseau found himself in, then, was one in which he had been sent to Sweden with the expressed purposes of improving

offers of massive subsidies in return for Swedish military action in Germany. Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8/18 June 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41.

³² "Je conais l'humeur des Prestres, Je sçais avec quelle peine ils demordent de ce qu'ils ont une fois entrepris. Je sçais aussi le pouvoir qu'ils ont icy, Ils y sont Estats du Royaume ce sont eux qui ont le plus contribué a l'abbaissement de la Noblesse dans ce Royaume et par cette raison je sçais aussi, que le Roy est obligé d'avoir beaucoup de complaisance pour eux, et si je l'ose dire, de leur accorder beaucoup plus qu'il ne devrait." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 54v.

³³ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

³⁴ In March 1686 Falaiseau wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm about a recent incident in which a prominent member of the Swedish clergy publicly stated that Calvinism was worse than Papism: "... l'aversion mortelle qu'ils avaient pource tous les Reformez en general, qui estait si grande que le Prestre de l'Eglise Cathedrale de Stockholm avait presché publiquement il n'y avait pas quinze jours, que la Religion Reformee estait pire que la Papiste." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 52v. Falaiseau viewed this incident as representative of the sentiments of the Swedish clergy in general.

Brandenburg-Swedish relations and of keeping Sweden in the anti-French camp, while at the same time feeling a sense of personal and political obligation to counteract the anti-Calvinist activities of the Swedish clergy. His challenge was to champion the Calvinist cause in Sweden without angering the Swedish authorities at a time when the strongest anti-Calvinist element in Swedish society (the clergy) was emboldened and in high favor with the Crown, and when the segment of society that was traditionally most tolerant of Calvinists (the nobility) was weakened and leaning toward a French alliance.³⁵

Falaiseau and the Brandenburg leadership saw the twin goals of combating Swedish anti-Calvinism and promoting Sweden's membership in a pan-Protestant/anti-French alliance as inextricably linked. The concept of a pan-Protestant alliance built upon ideas that had long held sway amongst Protestant cosmopolitans and attracted broader support in the face of the French menace. It demanded that intra-Protestant confessional conflict be minimized, as any expression of tension between Lutherans and Calvinists was seen as a threat to the viability of the alliance and therefore a potentially significant political and military liability. In a mild form the fear of religious conflict and its potential for destroying political cooperation was present from the very beginning of Falaiseau's embassy. Conrad Tiburtius Rango (1639–1700) was a Lutheran clergyman and theologian residing in Stettin in Swedish Pomerania who had authored an inflammatory anti-Calvinist polemic that had greatly angered the Brandenburg government.³⁶ Friedrich Wilhelm had written to Karl XI regarding Rango in 1683, declaring that his writing contained "horrendous slanders, lies and injuries" against the Calvinist faith and demanding that Karl take action against him for the sake of harmony between the Protestant denominations.³⁷ The Swedish envoy in Berlin, Eberhard von Grafenthal, had promised

³⁵ Falaiseau wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm in 1686 about the nobility's pro-Calvinist sentiment and his hopes that it would sway Karl XI away from his support for the clergy: "J'espere Monseigneur que cela produira un tres bon Effet, que le Roy voyant presque toute la Noblesse favoriser la Religion Reformée, cela l'affermira d'autant plus conte les Cabales et les artifices du Clergé..." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 29 September/9 October 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 196r.

³⁶ The work in question was the *Historia Syncretisimi* (Stettin, 1674–1680). For Rango's biographical information see Noack and Splett (eds.), I:317–33.

³⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm to Karl XI, Potsdam, 6 December 1683. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28. Karl's response dated Stockholm, 12 April 1684 is in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 16b, fasc. 13.

that Sweden would take measures against Rango, but by the time Falaiseau was dispatched to Sweden the issue had not been addressed to Friedrich Wilhelm's satisfaction. Falaiseau's instructions directed him to raise the issue once more with the Swedish authorities, and to push for an "exemplary punishment" for Rango. Allowing him to go unpunished would have "grave consequences," giving other Lutheran zealots "the courage and occasion" to act in a similar fashion, therefore threatening to "hinder and upset the mutual tolerance and unity between Protestant fellow-believers that is so necessary at the present time."³⁸ Falaiseau discussed the Rango issue in one of his first audiences with Bengt Oxenstierna and was careful to phrase his objections in terms of an appeal to the king's well-known piety and wisdom to take the steps necessary to preserve Protestant unity.³⁹ These efforts appear to have met with some success. In August 1685 Falaiseau wrote to the elector that he was confident that the king would grant Brandenburg's request to have Rango punished.⁴⁰ In September of that year Karl had Grafenthal express to Friedrich Wilhelm the king's displeasure with Rango's writings, and indeed with intra-Protestant polemics in general because they threatened Protestant unity in those dangerous times.⁴¹ Rango was eventually tried before the Wismar Tribunal, where he was acquitted.⁴²

Even though the ultimate result in the Rango issue was not what Brandenburg had desired, Falaiseau had been able to deal amicably with the Swedish authorities on a religious issue, and he had made the point

³⁸ "...und gleich woll es eine sache von schlimmer *consequentz* seyn würde, wan gedachten *Rangoni* ... dieser fervre und bößheit dergestalt hingehen und anderen dadurch Muht und anlaß gegeben werden solte. Unser *Religion* und deren bekennere noch ferner dergestalt zu verlüsten, und anzutesten, folglich die jetziger Zeit so nötige *mutuelle tolerantz* und einträchtigkeit zwischen den Evangelischen Glauben genoßen immer mehr zu hindern und zu stöhren." Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 6 June 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

³⁹ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 18 July 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

⁴⁰ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 29 August 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

⁴¹ Karl XI to Grafenthal, Stockholm, 16 September 1685, RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1685, 348v–353r.

⁴² Rango's acquittal may well have been due to royal influence on his behalf, a theory made more likely by the fact that he was held in high regard by the Swedish Queen-Mother Hedvig Eleonora and that he received several important appointments from the Crown later in his life. See the entry for Rango in *ADB*, XXVI, 230–32 (by Theodor Pyl). This does not change the fact that Karl at least publicly accepted the basic premise of Brandenburg's argument of the danger posed by Rango's writing to Protestant unity, and that he acted on the issue by allowing Rango to be brought to trial.

that anti-Calvinism threatened Protestant political unity without creating tension between the two governments. His ability to proceed with a controlled and gentle hand, however, was soon challenged when a religious issue of higher stakes arose. In 1686 a committee of Swedish clergy made a series of suggestions for a new church ordinance, including the provision that only Lutheran schools be allowed to exist in the kingdom. When Falaiseau learned of the suggested ordinance he became alarmed, and, as he later wrote to the elector, felt immediately obliged to register a protest with Oxenstierna without waiting for orders from the elector because he viewed the clergy's suggestion as aimed at the total destruction of the Calvinist religion and "there was no time at all to waste." Falaiseau complained to Oxenstierna in a decidedly more heated tone than the exchanges over Rango had enjoyed. His frame of reference, consistent with Protestant cosmopolitanism, was of an interconnected world of international Protestantism where localized actions had continent-wide ramifications, and where in turn local actors needed to identify with and look after transnational as well as localized interests. He painted a picture of fraught religious tension throughout the continent, and told the Swedish Chancery President that, if implemented, Sweden's anti-Calvinist measures "would be a scandal throughout all of Europe" at a time when even Spain, "the most superstitious Papist Kingdom in the world," was granting Calvinists asylum, and when the "most schismatic and barbaric" Muscovites were allowing them a level of religious freedom. Such actions would also pose a threat to the Protestant unity that was now so necessary. Perhaps most tellingly, Falaiseau accused the Swedish clergy of following the "pernicious example" set by France in persecuting its Calvinist population.⁴³

⁴³ "J'ajoutay, qu'il n'estait pas nouveau de voir Mrs: du Clergé chercher à aggrandir leur autorité, et en abuser des qu'ils estaient en pouvoir de Refaire: que la France en fournissait un grand exemple, mais que c'estait un exemple si perniscieux que je n'eusse jamais crû qu'un Clergé Protestant l'eust voulu suivre... Et que j'avais trop bonne opinion de luy Mr. d'Oxenstern pour n'estre pas persuadé qu'il estait du Sentiment que dans les conjonctures ou sont presentement les affaires de la Religion en France, en Savoye, en Angletterre et en plusieurs autres lieux, et dans un temps ou les Lutheriens et les Reformez avaient un si grand interests d'estre dans une estroite union, Ce serait un Scandale pour toute l'Europe de voir les Reformez, exterminer, en Suede pendant qu'ils trouvaient des aziles en Espagne, qui est le Royaume du monde le plus superstitieusement Papiste, et que les Moscovites mesme tous Schismatiques et tout barbares qu'ils sont, leurz accordentir des Privileges, des Franchises et l'exercice de leur Religion." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 51r-54v.

Falaiseau knew that his words had been harsh, and he ended by asking Oxenstierna to request the king's pardon for his having spoken so forwardly. Oxenstierna expressed sympathy for Falaiseau's complaints, and promised to do what he could to resist the clergy's proposal. Friedrich Wilhelm responded favorably to the actions Falaiseau had taken on his own initiative, and ordered him to continue to work diligently against the ordinance. He also presented a formal complaint about the ordinance to Grafenthal in Berlin, and wrote to his representative in The Hague to have him urge the States General to encourage their representative in Stockholm to work with Falaiseau in resisting the proposal.⁴⁴ Falaiseau eventually wrote a respectful and circumspect memoir to Karl that stressed once more the special need for pan-Protestant cooperation against their common enemy and urged the king to prevent the clergy's ordinance from being implemented.⁴⁵ Falaiseau wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm in early May that this memoir had been well received by the king and that he was expecting the king's response to fulfill all of his expectations.⁴⁶ Several months later Falaiseau happily reported the king's efforts to convince the clergy of the necessity of living in harmony with the Calvinists in the interests of their mutual preservation, and of the positive steps that were taken in the Swedish *Riksdag* to protect the Calvinists' rights of religious practice.⁴⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm responded with praise for the Swedish action and Falaiseau's conduct in this matter.⁴⁸ The church ordinance issue appeared to have been resolved to Brandenburg's complete satisfaction.

Falaiseau's actions regarding the ordinance did, however, have one negative result that would come to play an important role later in his embassy. In a letter to Grafenthal in May 1687 Karl blamed Falaiseau for having made a scandal of the issue by bringing unpublished drafts of the ordinance containing unedited language to the attention of the elector, which combined with Falaiseau's own fantastical interpretations had given Friedrich Wilhelm an inaccurate vision of what the ordinance

⁴⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Cöln/Spree, 9 April 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, [68r?]-71v; Friedrich Wilhelm to von Diest, Cöln/Spree, 9 April 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 76r-77v.

⁴⁵ Falaiseau to Karl XI, Stockholm, [1686]. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 100r-v.

⁴⁶ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 5/15 May 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 95v.

⁴⁷ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 29 September/9 October 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 194r-196v.

⁴⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 16 October 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 29, 220r-v.

had really meant.⁴⁹ The clear sense was that Falaiseau's strong personal desire to champion Calvinist minorities had clouded the information he was providing the elector. From this point forward the Swedish authorities mistrusted Falaiseau's excessive zeal in religious issues throughout the rest of his stay. Their fears came to the fore in 1688 when Falaiseau became involved in the final two religious controversies of his embassy, one regarding the acceptance of Huguenot refugees into Sweden, and the other yet another new church ordinance.

Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685 sent a tidal wave of Huguenots flooding out of France in search of asylum elsewhere in Europe. Finding new homes for those driven from France was a financial and logistical challenge of international proportions. It was also a diplomatic flash-point that created tensions not only between Catholics and Protestants, but also between Protestants of different stripes who felt varying levels of commitment to alleviating Huguenot suffering and held varying opinions on the best way to go about doing so. Protestant diplomats across Europe reacted to the revocation in different ways, sometimes acting on orders from their governments and other times taking matters into their own hands. This led not infrequently to diplomatic incidents in which activist diplomats raised the ire of the French authorities, of their host governments, or even of their own princely masters through their actions on the Huguenots' behalf.⁵⁰ Falaiseau can be counted squarely amongst these diplomatic activists.

Brandenburg, to Falaiseau's delight, had been one of the most aggressive countries in welcoming the refugees into its borders from the moment the Edict was revoked. He wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm from Stockholm in the highest praise of this action:

I take the liberty to offer a thousand most humble thanks for the protection that you have granted to my poor and unfortunate brothers. Nothing is so

⁴⁹ "...weiln aber von dem *Concipienten* sothanen schreibens, welcher den *tenor* der alten Vorigen also genandten *Religions Placaten* hierin gefolget, auch die Calvinisten zugleich mit hineingesetzt undt darin benennet und von solchem Schreiben, wieder Unsere *intention* einige Copeyen auß *practiciret* und *divulgiret* worden, hatt der alhiesige Chur brandenburgische *Minister Falaiseau* sich daran sonderlich *scandalisiret*, undt es also auffnehmen undt deuten wollen, alß ob hiemit die Calvinische lehre alhie im Reich vor Ketzerisch wäre *declariret* worden... insonderheit würde sich der Herr Churfürst zu Brandenburg sich dieses gar tieff zu gemühte ziehen..." Karl XI to Grafenthal, Stockholm, 28 May 1687. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 30. Grafenthal was instructed to make sure that Friedrich Wilhelm received an accurate impression of the ordinance.

⁵⁰ On the revocation as a diplomatic crisis that bred extreme diplomatic action, see Frey and Frey, 214.

worthy, Your Majesty, of the greatness of [your] soul, of your piety, courage and valor . . . [The elector's actions] may render Your Majesty great in history and before men. But that which at the present renders Your Majesty great before God, that will be in the book of the Lamb . . . , and Your Majesty will receive in Heaven the reward that You deserve.⁵¹

Falaiseau believed that this religious duty to welcome Huguenot refugees was shared by all Protestant states, including Sweden, and he recognized as early as September 1685 that the biggest obstacle to Sweden fulfilling its duty would be posed by the Swedish clergy.⁵² In December 1685 the clergy, showing what Falaiseau characterized as an inhuman cruelty, urged the king to deny the Huguenots all refuge whatsoever in his lands. The king in turn came up with a compromise solution in which Huguenot refugees were allowed to settle in Pomerania, Bremen, Livonia, and other lands under Swedish control, but not in Sweden itself.⁵³ By 1688 the acceptance of Huguenot refugees in Sweden proper had become a clearly politicized issue between Brandenburg and Sweden, and Falaiseau was exerting what pressure he could to convince the Swedes to admit the refugees. It became clear to Karl that allowing the refugees to settle in Sweden would be an important step in forwarding positive relations with Brandenburg, and when the decision was made to admit some refugees in May 1688 Falaiseau attributed this largely to Brandenburg's diplomatic pressure.⁵⁴ Elector Friedrich III immediately expressed his pleasure over

⁵¹ "Je supplie treshumblement Vost: Alt: Elect. Monseigneur de trouver bon que Comme François et comme Reformé je prende la liberté de luy rendre mille graces treshumbles de la Protection qu'elle donne à mes pauvres et malheureux Freres, Rien n'est si digne Monseigneur de la grandeur d'ame, et de la pieté de Vost: Alt: Elect: Le Courage et la Valeur de Vost: Alt: Elect: Les atailles qu'elle a gaignées, les Places qu'elle a prises tout cela Monseigneur peut rendre V:A:E: grand, dans l'Histoire et devant les Hommes. Mais ce que fait presentement V:A:E: le rendra Grand devant Dieu, Cela Sera dans le Livre de l'agneau sans sasche, Et V:A:E. en recevra un jour dans le Ciel la recompense qu'elle merite." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 12 December 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28. Friedrich Wilhelm issued his Edict of Potsdam on 9 November 1685, welcoming the Huguenots into Brandenburg under very favorable conditions.

⁵² Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 19/29 September 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

⁵³ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 23 December 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

⁵⁴ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 5/15 May 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 3, 2r–3v; Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 12/22 May 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 3, 4r–6r.

Sweden's decision, and he ordered Falaiseau to give his special thanks to Oxenstierna for the support he had given to the refugees throughout.⁵⁵

Falaiseau was not the only Brandenburg diplomat to take action on behalf of the Huguenots. Ezechiel Spanheim was stationed in Paris itself at the time of the revocation, and he transformed his residence into a clearinghouse to transport refugees and what property they could bring with them out of the country. Spanheim came from a family of reformed theologians and had been educated at Leiden. He combined a distinguished diplomatic career, first in service to the Elector of the Palatinate and later to Brandenburg, with an active scholarly program, publishing widely in history, religion, literature, and above all numismatics. While resident in Paris his intellectual accomplishments, and in particular his studies of ancient coins, gained him entrée into the cultural circle that formed around Le Tellier. Spanheim's mastery of this group's elite and cosmopolitan cultural code opened up avenues of access to important officials and smoothed his dealings under the highly sensitive circumstances he was operating in. Indeed, Spanheim was fully fluent in the universal, francophone diplomatic culture that was coming to dominate the upper echelons of European political society, and this was a tangible asset in his ability to function diplomatically at the French court, including providing assistance to the Huguenots. Saint-Simon in fact noted Spanheim's participation in the height of Enlightenment universality, the Republic of Letters.⁵⁶

Falaiseau's parents were amongst the Huguenot refugees Spanheim assisted, and he had been instrumental in facilitating Falaiseau's own entry into Brandenburg service several years earlier.⁵⁷ The two remained in correspondence into the 1700s. However, whereas Spanheim moved in the rarified air of universal high-elite culture, Falaiseau operated within

⁵⁵ Friedrich III to Falaiseau, Colln/Spree, 31 May/10 June 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 3.

⁵⁶ Sven Externbrink, "Diplomatie und République des Lettres: Ezechiel Spanheim (1629–1710)," *Francia* 34, nr. 2 (2007), 25–59; idem, "Humanismus, Gelehrtenrepublik, und Diplomatie: Überlegungen zu ihren Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit," in Thiessen and Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen*, 133–49, here 143–46; Walther, 369–70, 381–83; Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, 331; Victor Loewe, *Ein Diplomat and Gelehrter: Ezechiel Spanheim (1629–1710)* (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1924); Ch. Schefer's Introduction to Spanheim's *Relation de la Cour de France en 1690* (Paris: Renouard, 1882), i–lvii.

⁵⁷ On Spanheim's assistance to Falaiseau's parents, see Spanheim, *Relation de la Cour de France*, 228. On Spanheim's role in Falaiseau's own appointment, see GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 72–75 England, Konv. 9F; Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Madrid, 30 December 1700. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 240e Spanien, fasc. 8.

the more restricted mode of Protestant cosmopolitanism. His diplomatic agitation was grounded in individual initiative and personal relationships; the language in which he spoke to his Swedish counterparts was that of confessional solidarity. His methods lie within the purview of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture, while his passion stretched that culture to its limits. Real problems arose when it became apparent that the limits themselves were becoming more susceptible to the kinds of challenges Falaiseau was posing to them.

To this point, however, Falaiseau had been able to procure positive results regarding the proposed 1686 church ordinance and settlement of Huguenot refugees without damaging the rapprochement with the Swedish government that was the larger goal of his mission. This is less easy to say in regards to another new church ordinance that was not simply proposed, but also enacted. The controversy surrounding the church ordinance of 1688 was the most serious religious issue of Falaiseau's embassy and the one that elicited the most passion. The central provision of the 1688 ordinance was that all children born in Sweden had to be baptized by a Lutheran minister. Since the baptismal ceremony included an oath administered by the presiding (Lutheran) clergyman that the child be educated in the precepts of true religion, the ordinance in effect demanded a pledge from the parents and baptismal witnesses that the child be raised Lutheran. Perceptive Swedes feared that the ordinance could produce protests from Reformed diplomats, and not surprisingly Falaiseau was at the heart of the commotion that did arise.⁵⁸

When the ordinance was enacted, a Calvinist and naturalized Swedish subject by the name of Olivet turned to Falaiseau for assistance in preventing his child from being baptized in the fashion demanded by the ordinance.⁵⁹ Falaiseau adopted Olivet's cause and agreed to serve as the child's baptismal witness himself, setting off a heated conflict with the Swedish authorities in which Falaiseau made use of all arguments available to him in a no-holds-barred attempt to drum up resistance to the ordinance.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See Friedrich Christoph von Dohna to Gabriel Turesson Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 25 January 1688. RA, Enskilda arkiv, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E1108.

⁵⁹ For information on Olivet see Olivet to de la Paroisse, Stockholm, 28 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4; Falaiseau to [Friedrich Wilhelm], Stockholm, 3/13 March 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33.

⁶⁰ Olivet was not the first Calvinist Swedish subject to seek out Falaiseau's assistance and protection on a religious issue. As early as July 1685 a delegation of Bremen Calvinists had come to Falaiseau in Stockholm to ask for his support for their struggles against the

Falaiseau complained to Oxenstierna that the ordinance was an open assault on the basic rights granted to all parents by divine and natural law to control the religious upbringing of their children.⁶¹ In a later report to the elector he accused the ordinance “of coercing the consciences of infants in the cradle and of stealing them away from the arms of their fathers.”⁶² Falaiseau also raised the now familiar specter that the ordinance would bring about the total destruction of Calvinism in Sweden and a deterioration of the necessary political cooperation between Europe’s Protestant states.⁶³ Falaiseau’s sense of the dual religious and political dangers posed by the ordinance was strengthened by his belief that the ordinance had been brought about by an alliance of his two arch enemies in Sweden, the orthodox Lutheran clergy and the (largely noble) pro-French party. His reports back to Brandenburg contain an all-out attack against this cabal of his opponents, and an intricate theory of why they were working together. Falaiseau was unrestrained in his characterization of the leading clergymen whom he saw standing behind the ordinance: the king’s personal minister Samuel Wirænius was “won over by money”; the Archbishop of Uppsala was “an ignoramus” and perhaps also corrupt; and the powerful clergyman Iser was “a drunkard who leads a scandalous life.”⁶⁴ His words for those he saw leading the pro-French party were equally strong: he described Wallenstedt as “extremely ignorant and capricious” and “one of the most brutish men in the world,” while Count Erik Lindschöld, the marshal of the Swedish nobility and a trusted advisor of the king, was “the mortal and declared enemy of the Calvinists.”⁶⁵ Falaiseau viewed

Swedish Lutheran authorities. See Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 25 July 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 28.

⁶¹ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4; Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 24 March/3 April 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁶² “Car il ne s’agit plus simplement de la Ceremonie des Parains... du Droit que Dieu et la Nature donnera un Pere de choisir a ses Enfants de Parains de sa Religion Ainsi, Monseigneur, Il s’agit presentement de forcer les Consciences des Enfants au Berceau et de les enlever d’entre les Bras de leurs Peres.” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 10/20 March 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁶³ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 25 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33; Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁶⁴ “...l’Archevesque d’Upsal est un ignorant, Werrenius, est Gaigne par argent, est peut estre aussi, l’Archevesque qui est Grand amy Werrenius, Et Iser, est un Yvrogne et qui mene une Vie Scandaleuse...” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 10/20 March 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁶⁵ “Wallenstedt...l’un de plus brutaux hommes du monde...”; “Wallenstedt est un Brutal, fort ignorant et fort capricieux...” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm,

Lindschöld as the chief of the alliance between the clergy and the pro-French party, and the true mastermind behind the new ordinance. He wrote to Paul von Fuchs in January 1688 that "it is certain, my lord, that the new church ordinance is not the work of the clergy alone, but is properly the work of Lindschöld, who took up the quill and wrote it" along with "some priests of his cabal," and then with the assistance of Wirænius convinced the king to approve it.⁶⁶

Lindschöld was the key connection between the clergy and the pro-French party. Falaiseau had written to the elector as early as March 1686 that Lindschöld was receiving a pension from France and was entirely dedicated to French interests, and that he also had a very close relationship with the clergy. Falaiseau added that he had "reason to believe that that which the clergy does against the Calvinists is done at the instigation of Lindschöld" and for the sake of French money.⁶⁷ In a report of July of that same year Falaiseau stressed again the connections between French money and the Swedish clergy, this time stating that the clergy was susceptible to French bribes aimed at the destruction of the Lutheran religion in Sweden since many of them "are ignorant dishonest men without any religion" who would do anything for money.⁶⁸ This theory of segments of the Swedish clergy acting in the interests of France due to Lindschöld's influence and French bribes appeared only sporadically in the early years of Falaiseau's embassy, but in his writings regarding the 1688 ordinance it became a recurrent theme. As the controversy surrounding the 1688 ordinance progressed, Falaiseau came to almost totally conflate his two groups of enemies, with the politically pro-French faction becoming

24 March/3 April 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4; "Lindenschild qui est ennemy mortel et déclaré des Reformez..." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 5/15 May 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 3, 3v.

⁶⁶ "Il est certain Monseigneur que la nouvelle ordonnance Ecclesiastique n'est pas l'ouvrage du Clergé seul, c'est proprement l'ouvrage de Lindenschild, qui a tenu la plume et qui l'a écrite et de quelques prestres de Sa Cabale... Et, c'est Lindenschild et Werenius, Predicateur du Roy, qui affirment Le Roy dans ce que cette ordonnance contient contre les Reformés en Suede." Falaiseau to von Fuchs, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33.

⁶⁷ [Lindschöld was] "entièrement dans les interests, et Pensionnaires de la France... il est ennemy mortel des Reformés entièrement bien avec le Clerge, et j'ay mesme des raisons de croire que ce que le Clergé fait contre les Reformez il le fait à l'instigation de Lindenschild et qu'en cela c'est la Piquetiere [the French representative in Stockholm] et l'argent de la France qui font agir ainsi." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 31 March 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 31.

⁶⁸ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 21/31 July 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 31.

increasingly identified with anti-Calvinism, and the anti-Calvinist orthodox clergy increasingly associated with pro-French sentiment.⁶⁹

The anti-Calvinism of the pro-French party could be explained by their desire to drive a wedge between Sweden and the Calvinist states of Europe, thus serving the interests of France by destroying Protestant unity and increasing the likelihood of a Swedish-French alliance. But Falaiseau went further than this by declaring many of the members of this group, and particularly Lindschöld, to be personally papist.⁷⁰ He was even more adamant in insisting, without any apparent sense of irony, that the orthodox Lutheran clerical members of the cabal supporting the church ordinance (an ordinance which, mind you, insisted that all children in Sweden be raised Lutheran) were not only pro-French, but also secretly papist. He called the cabal "powerful and entirely devoted to papism," and estimated that three-quarters of the Swedish clergy were either Catholic or would gladly become so if allowed to keep their wives.⁷¹ The ultimate goal of the pro-French/clerical cabal, Falaiseau feared, was to convert Sweden to Catholicism. He had written to von Fuchs in December 1687 that "Lindschöld does not receive a large pension from France only to work to dispose Sweden in France's favor, but also to aid in the establishment of papism. And for this design he has already won not only the principal clergymen of Stockholm, and of some provinces, but also the clergy of the court, especially Wirænius."⁷² Falaiseau took this danger very seriously, and in August 1688 he wrote to the elector that, due largely to Lindschöld and his support in the clergy, "Sweden is one of the lands in the world

⁶⁹ Wirænius in particular was said to be an intimate friend of la Piquetiere. Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 11/21 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 1/11 August 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 35, 51v.

⁷¹ "Mais il s'agissait Monseigneur de s'opposer à une Cabale Puissante et entièrement devoüée au Papisme de faire connoistre au Roy les pernitieux desseins de quelques Gens dont le but est tres asseurement de ruiner la Religion Protestante, et de luy ouvrir les yeux sur le sujet des Prestres, dont l'ignorance est si grossiere en ce pays cy, que la plus part aymeraient mieux estre Papistes que Reformez, dont je pris dire hardiment, que les trois quarts servient Papistes des demain, si en les devenant, ils pouvaient conserver leurs femmes." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 April 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁷² "Lindenschöld Non seulement a une bonne pension de la France pour travailler à disposer la Suede en sa faveur, Mais, pour aider à établir le Papisme Et que dans ce dessein il a desja gagné non seulement les Prestres principaux de Stockholme, et de quelques Provinces, Mais aussi les Prestres de la Cour, et principalement un, nommé Werenius..." Falaiseau to von Fuchs, Stockholm, 14/24 December 1687. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 30.

where it would be easiest to reestablish Papism.”⁷³ The church ordinance of 1688, so Falaiseau thought, was a definite step in this direction.

The Swedish authorities had been aware of the potential for conflict with Brandenburg over the new church ordinance even before any response from Brandenburg had been registered. In late January 1688 Karl XI wrote to Peter Macklier, the Swedish ambassador at the Brandenburg court, with instructions on how to counteract the potential fallout that a report from Falaiseau would likely cause.⁷⁴ Karl expressed the fear that Falaiseau's zeal for his religion would lead him to give the elector false impressions regarding the true nature of the Swedish ordinance, which in turn would challenge Brandenburg-Swedish friendship at a time when Protestant unity and cooperation was needed to counter Catholic aggression. He ordered Macklier to work carefully to correct these impressions.⁷⁵ The king had also anticipated that broader diplomatic damage could arise when word of the controversy surrounding Falaiseau and the Swedish church ordinance spread to other Calvinist states. He therefore wrote to Maurits Vellingk, the Swedish representative in Hamburg, and Johan Leijonberg in England with instructions to control any negativity that Falaiseau's reports may give rise to where they were stationed.⁷⁶ Swedish representatives in Brandenburg also recognized that this issue had the potential to cause considerable strain in Swedish-Brandenburg relations, which in turn could damage important Swedish foreign policy interests.

⁷³ “Lindenschild est plus Papiste que Lutherien, Il a beaucoup de pouvoir aupres des Prestres, Et, si Dieu n'a pitie de la Religion Je puis repondre a VAE: qui un des Pais du monde, ou il serait plus ayse de retablir le Papisme, c'est la Suede.” Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 1/11 August 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 35, 51v.

⁷⁴ Karl XI to Peter Macklier, Stockholm, 25 January 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 26v–27r.

⁷⁵ “Såsom nu är at förmoda, at han [Falaiseau] af en allt för stoor yfwer och *passion* för sin *Religions* deruti torde gåå för widt, och således gifua Churförsten den *impression*, som brukade man emoth deß *Religions* förwanter här en sådan *vigueur*. Hwaraf hos Churförsten kunde forutsakes någon Anstöteligheet och den mißtancka, som här man flyte wydriggeeter i sinnet som annorstedes bankas emot dhe *Reformerade*, huilken irringh myket skulle skade det gemehna Wasendet och komma Mißförståndh åstadh emellan dhe Evangeliske, där dod deras sammanhåldh och Eenigheet nu som mäst behofwes, till at bemötha dhe Påpwiske höghmodh och Öfuerwåldh, som dhe fast alle Orther sýnes förehafua emoth begge Evangeliske *Religions* förwanter; Altså är hoognödigt at J hoos Churförsten sökien medh all flytat betagha och förkomma flyte wydrige *impressioner* och mystanckar...” Karl XI to Peter Macklier, Stockholm, 25 January 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 25v–26r.

⁷⁶ Karl XI to Maurits Vellingk, Stockholm, 25 January 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 22v–23r; Karl XI to Johan Leijonberg, Stockholm, 14 March 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 80r–81v.

Secretary Justus Heinrich Storren wrote to Karl from Berlin and urged the king to act with caution in implementing the new provision concerning baptism because he feared that the elector's anger could threaten the outcome of the Holstein restitution issue, perhaps Sweden's largest foreign policy objective at the time.⁷⁷ Storren went so far as to suggest that, in order to preserve the trust of the elector at this critical juncture, the king, at least for the time being, tacitly allow Calvinist baptisms to continue.⁷⁸

Swedish fears proved to be well founded when Falaiseau's passionate reports from Stockholm elicited a prompt, sharp response from his government. An official protest was registered with Macklier in the beginning of February 1688, and at the end of that month Friedrich Wilhelm wrote directly to Karl XI to protest against the ordinance.⁷⁹ Many of the arguments used by the elector are the same as those advanced by Falaiseau in his reports. The ordinance would "deprive [the Calvinists] of the right over their children given to them by God and nature [as] the foremost part of their fatherly authority." It would also give great pleasure to Catholics by creating "new diffidence and animosity" between the Protestant confessions rather than the unity that was so badly needed.⁸⁰ Perhaps most interestingly, the elector warned the king that the church ordinance would likely have damaging economic consequences for Sweden since so much of Sweden's Baltic trade was carried out by and with Calvinists who would be angered by the persecution of their coreligionists.⁸¹

⁷⁷ For a discussion of the drawn-out struggle between the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the Danish crown, and the important role that this conflict occupied in Sweden's foreign policy, see Landberg, 165–261.

⁷⁸ Justus Heinrich Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 11 March 1688. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 32.

⁷⁹ Memo of meeting, Rhetz and Meinders with Macklier, 4 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸⁰ "... denselben das Von Gott und der Natur Ihre gegebene Recht über seine Kinder gleichsam in dem Vornehmsten stück der Väterlichen *potestät* entzogen werden will"; "... also auch auf den widrigen fall andre ebenfals gar bald damute *remittin* und folg. das Junge was bishehr mit so großer Mühe wegen eine Nähren Zusammensetzung beyder *Religionen* gebauet worden zu der Papisten großen frohlock und der Evangelischen nach fernern Verderben einen nicht geringen anstos leiden und allerhand Newe *diffidentz* und *animosität* veruhrsachen dörrfte ..." Friedrich Wilhelm to Karl XI, Potsdam, 28 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸¹ This argument appears to have originated with von Fuchs, who also appears to have written the draft of the elector's letter to the Swedish King. See von Fuchs to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 14 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33. The elector urged Falaiseau to press this point in his negotiations. Friedrich Wilhelm to Falaiseau, Potsdam, 18/28 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4. Falaiseau himself also recognized the vital importance of trade to the Swedish state, and in September 1689 suggested that the allies should work to strengthen commercial

In addition to these measures, the Brandenburg government also sought to mobilize European-wide Calvinist pressure in protest of the ordinance. Falaiseau suggested in January 1688 that Friedrich Wilhelm write to other Protestant states to inform them of the Swedish ordinance and encourage them to resist it.⁸² Letters were sent to the Dutch States General, England, Hessen-Kassel, and the Calvinist Swiss cantons and received a positive response.⁸³ The States General wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm that they “took much pleasure in [his] laudable concern . . . for the conservation of the true Reformed religion,” and informed him that they had instructed their representative at the Swedish court to cooperate with Falaiseau on behalf of Sweden’s Calvinists.⁸⁴ The Swiss sent Friedrich Wilhelm a copy of the letter of protest they had written to Karl following their receipt of the elector’s letter, and Brandenburg and Hessen-Kassel became involved in an extended correspondence regarding the Swedish ordinance and the steps they were taking against it.⁸⁵

Karl’s own response to the minor diplomatic storm Falaiseau had provoked was essentially similar to his reaction to the much smaller controversy surrounding the ordinance of 1686. The new ordinance, Karl insisted, was directed primarily against Catholics, and Sweden’s Calvinists had no reason to fear for their religious liberties as long as they “kept themselves within their bounds.”⁸⁶ Once again, Karl accused Falaiseau of having sensationalized a harmless development and of having given the elector an

ties with Sweden and to rehabilitate Swedish trade in general as perhaps the best way to keep Sweden firmly within the allied camp and away from French subsidies. Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 18/28 September 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 42.

⁸² Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4. He wrote to von Fuchs on the same day with a similar suggestion, proposing that it would be particularly fruitful to involve the Dutch States General and the Count of Hessen. Falaiseau to von Fuchs, Stockholm, 28 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33.

⁸³ See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸⁴ “hebben Wy . . . met veel vreugd vernomen de Loffelyke Zorge die Uwe Chur Furstelyke Doorlugtigheyt allerwegens draagt voor de conservatie van de ware Gereformeerde Religie . . . en hebben Wy daarom aanstonts Onsen Resident aan’t Hof van Zweden aangeschreven . . . concertéren met en Heer Falaiseau Uwe Cur Furstelyke Doorlugtigheys Extraordinaris Envoyé aan’t gemelte Hof aldaar, omten besten van gemelte Gereformeerden inhet voorschreve Koningkryk, alle mogelyke bevordering te doen . . .” States General to Friedrich Wilhelm, den Haag, 16 March 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸⁵ Swiss cantons to Friedrich Wilhelm, Zürich, 2 April 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸⁶ Karl XI to [Macklier], Stockholm, 23 January 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

inaccurate impression due to his “excessive zeal for his religion.”⁸⁷ Karl wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm that “never before” had he seen an ambassador “explain [an issue] so adversely, and also meddle [in it] with such eagerness.”⁸⁸ Macklier similarly complained to the authorities in Berlin that Falaiseau’s extreme passion for his religion was distorting his judgment on this issue.⁸⁹ It is interesting to note that in the internal Swedish correspondence the controversy surrounding the church ordinance came almost immediately to be referred to as the “Falaiseau issue,” equating the entire complex matter with the agitations of one bothersome and over-zealous troublemaker. Concerns about Falaiseau’s zealousness, however, were not limited to Sweden. The more confessionally cautious Paul von Fuchs went so far as to suggest that it might be best to recall Falaiseau and replace him with a Lutheran ambassador lest his reputation as a biased and personally interested actor compromise the success of his negotiations.⁹⁰ Falaiseau’s personal passion for defending the rights of Calvinist religious minorities had become a recognized impediment to his ability to function as Brandenburg’s ambassador in Sweden.

Relations between Brandenburg and Sweden concerning the church ordinance remained tense until the death of Friedrich Wilhelm in early May 1688. In Macklier’s last audience with Friedrich Wilhelm the elector threatened to recall Falaiseau from Stockholm and leave his position at the Swedish court unfilled due to the religion issue—a diplomatic threat of considerable weight.⁹¹ Karl in turn advised Macklier to let the issue lie for the time being in hopes that it would cool down and eventually wither away, and he cited encouraging statements from von Fuchs that made

⁸⁷ “hat derselbige [Falaiseau] sich sehr darüber *allarmiret* und von Nachricht zugeben keinen umgang haben könnte. weiln nun bey so gestalten Sachen zubefahren, daß Er aus übermäßigen Eiffer vor seine *Religion* etwan Zuweit gehen, und dem Churf. die *impression* machen dörfte, ob solte man deßen Glaubens Genoßen nicht Alleine hart alhie halten, sondern auch hinführo noch mehr zudrücken gesinnet sein.” Ibid.

⁸⁸ “dahero den Mich so viell mehr befrembdet, daß E: Churfürstl. Durchlt: allhier befindtlicher *Minister* diese Sache nicht allein so gantz wiedrig gedeutet, sondern auch mit solchem *empressement* sich darin gemischet, daß dergleichen nie vorhin von einigen *Ministro* dieses ohrtes geschehen.” Karl XI to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 17 March 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 245b Schweden, fasc. 4.

⁸⁹ Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 22 February 1688. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 30.

⁹⁰ von Fuchs to Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg, 14 February 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 33.

⁹¹ Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 11 April 1688. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 30.

him believe this could happen.⁹² This strategy seems to have worked, and following the elector's death Brandenburg's uproar over the church ordinance subsided.

When Falaiseau was finally recalled from Sweden at Karl's request in 1690 it was as the result of a controversy that had nothing to do with religion. While the great majority of the Brandenburg army was deployed in the Rhineland to fight the French, Falaiseau remarked in Stockholm that the Brandenburgers had been careful to keep a significant body of troops back in case the Swedish-Danish conflict over Holstein boiled over into hostilities—a lightly veiled statement that Brandenburg did not trust Swedish intentions and would be prepared to intervene if necessary on the Danes' behalf. This infuriated Karl. The Brandenburg government rushed to assure the king of their trust in Sweden, and stressed that they had not actually held such a force back. But Karl had finally had enough, and he called openly for Falaiseau's removal, which the Brandenburgers reluctantly granted.⁹³ Although the immediate cause of Falaiseau's recall was purely diplomatic, the cumulative effects of Falaiseau's years of religious contentiousness and (perceived) excessive religious zeal contributed to the king's desire to have Falaiseau removed. As early as March 1688 Karl instructed Macklier to insinuate to the elector that Falaiseau's conduct in the church ordinance issue rendered him no longer "a convenient and useful instrument to maintain friendship and good trust between Us and the Elector,"⁹⁴ a clear hint that the king would have welcomed Falaiseau's recall and replacement. Karl ordered Macklier to quietly raise the prospect of Falaiseau's removal with the Brandenburg councilor Eberhard von Danckelman in October of that same year—several months after the tension surrounding the church ordinance had died down—yet in the king's list of reasons why Falaiseau was no longer able to successfully fill his role

⁹² Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 2 May 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 125v–126r.

⁹³ For documents relating to this issue see RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 31.

⁹⁴ "... så at Wÿwele förmoda, det Churförsten sådant hans *Conduite* icke warder *apperberkudes*, effter som ock Wÿ nu så många prof hafue af hans wÿdrighet, at Wÿ honom ej mehra anser för dhen, som wore at bequemt och tänligit *instrument*, at underhålla mellan Oß och Churförsten Wänskapen och et godt förtrooende; det J Churförsten skole gifua fogeligen och *bonis modis* tillkenna, medh betÿgande, at Wÿ elliest ganska redebogne äre, at o[?][r][?]ÿggeligen bestå medh Churförsten uti en god och förtrolig *Intelligence* till ytterligare befrämjande af det gemehna bästa." Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 17 March 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 84r.

his contentiousness in the baptismal issue was the first item cited.⁹⁵ When the king made a more forceful demand for Falaiseau's recall the following year he once again listed Falaiseau's agitation over the church ordinance as the first reason.⁹⁶ Falaiseau had clearly come to be a religious thorn in Sweden's side, and this was partially responsible for Karl's decision that he finally needed to be removed.⁹⁷

Von Dohna in Sweden

What is more telling, however, is what happened after Falaiseau was withdrawn. His replacement as ambassador in Sweden was Alexander von Dohna, a man held in high regard at the Swedish court and extremely well connected in Sweden through a network of familial, marriage and other personal connections.⁹⁸ Alexander was the nephew of Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, the husband of Bengt Oxenstierna's sister Anna and

⁹⁵ "Och hafwer hans *Conduite* nu på en tyd nogsampt uthwyst, at han söker at komma mißförståd till väga, och at han alt uthtyder till det värsta, såsom man det ock wid åthskillige tillfällen för detta sodt hafwer med hans fadderskap, med den *pretenderade* Tullfreyheten, med fremmande *Ministrerars* rång och *competence* emoot Wår Råd och *Senatorer*. Det är fördenskull nödigt, att J sökien at betaga så hoos Churförsten som deß *accrediterade Ministrer* alle wýdrige *impressioner*, som han giordt hafwer och än wýdare lærer sökia at giöra. Wan hafwer så mycket minder orsaak at *scandalisera* sig häröfwer, som detta är icke något nyt, utan reda således *practiserat* i Wår högSehl: Herrfaders tyd . . . Men Wy komma fast mehra på de tanckar, at med alt detta sökas något annat af bemte: *Falaiseau*, som sine *passioner* reda så offta uti annat yttrat hafwer och den Oß mächta *suspect* förkommer . . . så at han ingalunda *meriterar* det loford, som Sehl: *Grafendahl* gafz af Churförstens Sahl: Herr Fader, at han wore ett ratt bequam och *propre Instrument* at underholla Wänskapen emillan Oß och det Churförstl: Huuset, det lykwähl det förnåmbste Ögenmärcke böör wara hoos en wähl *intentionerad Minister*; hwilket senare J dock hoos *Danckelman* allena *discoursewys* kunnen omröra." The king also mentioned Falaiseau's friendship with the Danish ambassador in Stockholm as another reason he was held in suspicion. Karl XI to Macklier, Stockholm, 17 October 1688. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1688, 395r–399r.

⁹⁶ Karl XI to [Friedrich Wilhelm Horn], Stockholm, 31 July 1689. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1689, 712r–722v.

⁹⁷ Years later Falaiseau claimed that the root of Swedish animosity towards him lie in his actions to have Friedrich Wilhelm secure his cousin Christina's inheritance. Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Madrid, 30 December 1700. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 240e Spanien, fasc. 8. On these activities, see GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 249b Schweden. A selection of documents is printed in *UA*, XXII, 481–505. See also Ferdinand Hirsch, "Die Beziehungen des Großen Kurfürsten und seines Nachfolgers zu der Königin Christine von Schweden in den Jahren 1687–1689," *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 23 (1910), 377–402.

⁹⁸ For biographical information on Alexander von Dohna, see *NDB*, IV, 52f. (by Lothar Graf zu Dohna); Press, 399–400.

the founder of the Swedish branch of the von Dohna family that became an engaged participant in Swedish politics.⁹⁹ Alexander himself married his cousin Emilie von Dohna, the daughter of Christoph Delphicus and Anna Oxenstierna and thus Bengt Oxenstierna's niece. Emilie's brother (and therefore Alexander's brother-in-law and first cousin) Friedrich Christoph von Dohna was an active Swedish diplomat who served as Swedish ambassador at the Imperial Court in Vienna and, for a short time right before Alexander was sent to Sweden, as Swedish representative at the Brandenburg court in Berlin. Alexander's connections via blood and marriage to the Swedish von Dohna line, and through them to the Oxenstierna family, gave him a firmer base in leading Swedish circles than Falaiseau had ever enjoyed.

In the years before his embassy von Dohna had built up a series of personal relationships with influential Swedes to complement his familial and marriage ties. He visited Sweden on private business from October 1685 to June 1686, and Falaiseau reported in glowing terms on the warm reception von Dohna received. Within weeks of von Dohna's arrival, Falaiseau wrote, he had been able to gain "universal esteem," not only with the king, but also with "all people of quality." He went on to say that von Dohna enjoyed free entry into Sweden's highest social and political circles, and was allowed to converse with an openness and candor that Falaiseau himself was denied.¹⁰⁰ Before von Dohna departed Falaiseau stressed to Friedrich Wilhelm once more the great good he would be able to accomplish if he were to remain in Sweden, due largely to his close personal relationships with Bengt Oxenstierna and other leading figures at the Swedish court.¹⁰¹ The full acceptance that von Dohna enjoyed at the highest levels of the Swedish state was still evident when he arrived in Stockholm as Brandenburg ambassador in 1690, accompanied by his Swedish-born wife. Queen-Mother Hedvig Eleonora, for instance, personally sent the von Dohnas medicine when one of their children fell ill.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ On Christoph Delphicus von Dohna, see above, 209–11.

¹⁰⁰ "Il y a desja pres de trois semaines qu'il est icy, et en ce peu de tems on ne peut acquerir une estime plus universelle qu'il a fait, et aupres du Roy, et aupres de tout ce qu'il y a de gens de qualité.... Comme il est icy au milieu de ses parens et de sa Famille et qu'il est mesme neveu du Chance: Oxenstirn on est beaucoup moins en garde contre luy que contre moy. Et il a les entrees plus libres que je ne les peus avoir..." Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 22 October 1685. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 28.

¹⁰¹ Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 10 March 1686. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29, 35v–36r.

¹⁰² Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 25 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 46.

At the time of his embassy, then, Alexander von Dohna was a well-known and highly regarded commodity in Sweden who possessed advantages that Falaiseau never had. Although an active Calvinist, he was more religiously moderate than Falaiseau. He had been educated as a youth under Pierre Bayle, the great scholar and enemy of narrow orthodoxy who was employed by Alexander's father Friedrich von Dohna as tutor for his children. In Alexander's later career he himself served as a protector of the scholar Jean Barbeyrac against Berlin's hard-line Huguenot consistory.¹⁰³ He also directed the education of the future King Friedrich Wilhelm I in a manner that was strictly Reformed but also sought to downplay the differences between Calvinists and Lutherans.¹⁰⁴ Von Dohna's more restrained Calvinism should have served him well in Sweden, as his instructions made clear that he was intended to be a compromise figure who could soothe over any wounds left by Falaiseau while continuing to work toward the two main goals of retaining Sweden within the anti-French coalition and improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations in general.¹⁰⁵ By all appearances von Dohna was ideal for such a mission, and Falaiseau wrote from Stockholm that "there could not be a better or more agreeable choice to this court."¹⁰⁶ However, rather than bringing calm to Brandenburg-Swedish relations, von Dohna's embassy burst almost immediately into a controversy far more intense than any that had occurred under Falaiseau, and with graver consequences. Religion once again stood at the root of the problem.

Emilie von Dohna, although raised Lutheran, had quietly converted to Calvinism after her marriage to Alexander. Emilie's mother learned of her daughter's conversion not long after the von Dohnas arrived in Stockholm, and she reacted with horror. News spread to the king as well, and as

¹⁰³ Sieglinde C. Othmer, *Berlin und die Verbreitung des Naturrechts in Europa: Kultur- und sozialgeschichtliche Studien zu Jean Barbeyracs Pufendorf-Übersetzungen und eine Analyse seiner Leserschaft* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970), 60.

¹⁰⁴ Hintze, "Kalvinismus," 273–74.

¹⁰⁵ Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Königsberg, 30 March/9 April 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 46.

¹⁰⁶ "A l'égard de Monsieur le Comte Alexandre de Dona, que V.A.E. à nommé pour remplir ma place, Je prendrai la Liberté de dire, que V.A.E. ne pouvait pas faire un Choise ni meilleur ensay ni plus agréable à cette Cour: aussi en est on extremement content . . . Mais ce ne sont que es compliments, et ie le repeterai encore à V.A.E. quelle a fait en ce Comte un choix le plus prudent et le plus sage, qu'elle pût faire." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 4/14 December 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 42, 190r–v. On the importance of pre-existing ties, and of a diplomat's wife, for the success of a diplomat's mission, see Klaus Müller, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1740)* (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1976), 249–50.

Emilie had been born and raised in Sweden the king considered her a Swedish subject and her conversion a violation of Swedish religious law. He subsequently banned her from appearing at the Swedish court unless she renounced her conversion.¹⁰⁷ Von Dohna was incensed by this, and drew upon his network of high-placed connections for redress. He went at once to Bengt Oxenstierna and asked for help. Oxenstierna pledged his support to have Emilie's ban lifted, claiming that it was the result of clerical pressure on the king, seconded by ill-intentioned senators.¹⁰⁸ Von Dohna also spoke with Nils Gyldenstolpe, who similarly promised his assistance.¹⁰⁹ Queen Ulrike Eleonora was another source of support. During the period of the ban she wrote personal letters to Emilie on a daily basis with expressions of friendship and promises of mildness, and on one occasion even sent an expensive gift.¹¹⁰

For his part, Karl attempted to reassure von Dohna that he had no desire to risk his friendship with Brandenburg over this issue, and that in fact he held Alexander himself in the highest regard.¹¹¹ Drawing upon the paternalistic language of absolutism, Karl said that he was merely acting as any father would toward his wayward child by looking after Emilie's best interests and reprimanding her for going astray.¹¹² In an audience with Alexander in November 1690 the king went so far as to say that despite

¹⁰⁷ See Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹⁰⁸ "[Oxenstierna] beklagten daß Werck in sich undt Verischerte er währe nicht im Raht gewehsen, Ihr Konigl. Maytt. währen von der *Clerisey* überlauffen worden, undt hatten umb den Lärm zu stillen etwaß thun müßen." Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹⁰⁹ Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 19 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹⁰ Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47; Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 15/25 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47; Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 5 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 46.

¹¹¹ Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 11/21 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹² This argument was most clearly expressed by Ulrike Eleonora in a letter to Electress Sophie Charlotte: "Ich haben aber nachdem vom Könige selber erfahren, daß Sr. Mtt. nichts geschehen laßen alß was der Gräfin E. Ihm fraw Mutter selber gethan, umb Ihre *indignation* zu *marquiren* und daß der König, weill die Gräfin E. hier in Lande gebohren, sich als Vater und Vormundt in einer sachen worin die Gräfin sich selbst an schädlichen wehre vorstellen müsten, wo Ihre Mt. nicht von einer *blasmablen indifférence soupçonniret* seyn wolten. der König hat dabey Versicherten daß I. Mayt. die Gräfin E. nicht anders, als dero eigene Kinder in gleichen fall wolten begegnen laßen, und weill alles zu Ihren besten angesehen . . ." Ulrike Eleonora to Sophie Charlotte, 8 October 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

his great personal affection for the von Dohnas and his pleasure at having a well-intentioned Brandenburg minister at his court (a not-so-subtle slap at Falaiseau), his hands were tied by the Swedish Constitution's provisions against Swedish subjects converting from Lutheranism to Calvinism. He saw no reason why this issue should give the elector displeasure, or get in the way of von Dohna's ability to carry out the elector's business in Sweden.¹¹³

Von Dohna, although deeply insulted by his wife's banishment from court, attempted to hold his emotions in check and to work through the diplomatic culture's established channels of informal personal contacts to see the issue through. Emilie, for her part, sought to explain her conversion to the Swedes in language of Protestant common-ground that also resonated with the diplomatic culture, claiming that differences between Lutherans and Calvinists "existed more in name and ceremonies than in belief."¹¹⁴ The cautious tone of von Dohna's reports indirectly suggested that the elector should act with restraint to protect his relationship with Sweden.¹¹⁵ The official Brandenburg reaction, however, was anything but restrained. Friedrich III declared Emilie's ban from court an open attack against all of Calvinism and a particular affront to his own dignity to have his ambassador's family treated in such a fashion. He made it plain that he was prepared to recall von Dohna from Sweden if the ban was not lifted.¹¹⁶ As time went by and the ban remained in place the elector's anger grew. He ordered von Dohna to confront the Swedes with a *de facto* ultimatum: unless Emilie's ban was removed von Dohna would be forced to leave. Von Dohna hesitated, particularly after consultation with Bengt Oxenstierna convinced him that a threat like this would only insult the king, strengthen the hand of those supporting the ban, and push Karl to take an even harder line.¹¹⁷ Friedrich responded that the offense given

¹¹³ Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 26 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹⁴ Emilie expressed these sentiments in a letter directed towards her mother (though not addressed directly to her), and added that the Reformed teachings she had been exposed to in Prussia were essentially the same as the core Lutheran teachings she had been raised with in Sweden. RA, *Acta Ecclesiastica*, Nr. 139.

¹¹⁵ On von Dohna's self-consciously cautious approach to dealing with the situation, see his reports to Friedrich III out of Stockholm dated 11/21 October 1690, 18 October 1690, and 19 November 1690 in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹⁶ Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Cleve, 28 October/8 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹⁷ Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 19 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

by Emilie's ban was "so enormous, and Our subsequent resentment held by the entire reasonable world as so justified" that there was "no reason at all" for von Dohna to show restraint in holding back the threat of his potential recall.¹¹⁸ Upon Friedrich's insistence von Dohna finally submitted a written memorial to the king, stating his case explicitly. But Karl refused to bend.¹¹⁹ As a result von Dohna, hand-picked to improve relations between Brandenburg and Sweden and welcomed to Stockholm with open arms, was angrily withdrawn after only eight months at the Swedish court. Friedrich even ordered Alexander to disrupt the exchange of objects between the courts, an important metric in the symbolic code of friendship between early modern princes, by refusing the customary farewell gifts offered by the king, an action that the shocked Swedish Master of Ceremonies Grüneberg declared as unprecedented and led some in Sweden to call for von Dohna's arrest.¹²⁰ The intensity of Swedish

¹¹⁸ "...so finden Wir doch auch gantz keine Ursach, warumb Ihr die wegen Eures Abschieds Euch *eventualiter* ertheilte *ordre disimulis* solte...daß man Uns in d[er] Sache thue so *enorm*, und unser desfalls tragendes *resentiment* von der gantzn *raisonnable* Welt vor so gerecht gehelt und; daß Wir beständig...bestehen, man Ewre Gemalin der Zutritt bey Hofe eben so frey wie Sie ihn Vorhin gehabt nicht wider Verstatte werden solte, als dan Ihr so fort Euch Von dort wieder zuruck...sollt." Friedrich III to Alexander von Dohna, Cöln/Spree, 12/22 December 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹¹⁹ For von Dohna's memorial, Karl XI's response, and von Dohna's reports to Friedrich III about this, see GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

¹²⁰ "So ist...der erste *Ceremonien* Meister Grüneberg zu Mir gekommen...undt weilen Ihr Maytt mir eine *marque* von dero Gnade geben wolten, welche ich zu dero gedächtniß behalten könnte, so hätten Sie Ihme befohlen, mir dieses Ihr *Portrait* zu übergeben. Er *presentirte* mir also des Königs *Portrait* mit *diamanten* besetzt, da ich Ihme aber zur Andtwordt gegeben daß was meine Reyse betreffe, Ihr Maytt wohl wissen würden wie gerne ich hier geblieben wäre wann es Ihr Maytt gefallen, undt daß ich im übrigen nicht vermuthet nachdem ich so unglücklich gewehsen in meiner *negotiation* nicht zu *reussiren* daß Ihr Maytt mich dennoch solten *regaliren* wollen, undt wie ich diese gnade nicht annehmen könnte. Wie ich mich dann alles deßen waß Ew: Churfürstl. Durchl. in dem fall vorgeschrieben, gebrauchet, worauff der *Ceremonien*-Meister nicht wenig bestürzt worden, undt gesaget, das der gleichen *refus* alhier nie geschehen wären, Er dürrtte daß *present* unmöglich zurück bringen dan Er nicht wüste wie es Ihr Maytt aufnehmen würden...hierauff zog Er ein *Diamanten bracelet* herfor, undt sagte daß Er *ordre* hätte dieses meiner Ehegattin nebst einem *Compliment* zu übergeben, ich *replicirte* wiederumb, daß Sie eben so wenig alß ich sich könnte *regaliren* laßen: Wie nun diese Andtwordt dem Könige gebracht worden, habe Ich sicher nachricht, daß Ihre Kön. Maytt. sich entsetzet haben, und sehr *inquiet* worden, undt da dieses zu vieler verständigen leute ohren kommen, so seind die rosten gedanken gewesen, daß Ich müste hier *arrestiret* werden, umb so gleich jemanden an Ew: Chf. Dhl. zu schicken, der über diesen *affront* klagen, undt *satisfaction* begehren solte." Alexander von Dohna to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 7 February 1691. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47. The best study of the symbolics of diplomatic gift exchange is Falcke. See also M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*,

reaction to this move should come as no surprise, as departing gifts for diplomats were laden with layers of meaning, and even declarations of war rarely prevented their offering and acceptance.¹²¹ The refusal to accept a departing gift was always a sharp-edged political statement that cut to the heart of the gravest threat to the economy of symbolic exchange: a gift ill-received.¹²² The Imperial ambassador in Stockholm, Count von Starenberg, reported to Vienna that although both Karl and von Dohna had tried to put a polite face on things, the continuation of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship was in doubt.¹²³ Friedrich took the additional step of drawing up a report to inform other allied governments of Sweden's unsavory conduct in the von Dohna affair.¹²⁴ Most significantly, after von Dohna's recall high-level diplomatic relations between Brandenburg and Sweden were broken-off for the following three and a half years. The religious controversy surrounding Emilie von Dohna had exploded into a significant diplomatic rupture, and Alexander von Dohna's promising

49–52. On the attentions of masters of ceremony to violations of gift-exchange etiquette, see Carriò-Invernizzi, 893.

¹²¹ See Duchhardt, "Das diplomatische Abschiedsgeschenk," esp. 355–57, 362. See also Jansson, 364–67.

¹²² Godbout writes that "le principal danger du don, c'est, pour le donneur, que le don soit mal reçu." *Ce qui circule*, 373.

¹²³ "Demnach der, eine Zeitlang allhier geweste ChurBrandenburgshe *Envoyé* Graff von *Donau*, wegen seiner Ehe=*Consortin* beschehenen Verbiethung hiesigen Hoff's bißanhero auff einige *satisfaction* umbsonst gewartet, hat er auß befelch seines Gdstn. Churfürstens entlich bey Ihro Könige Mayt: umb seine abschieds=*Audientz* anhalten laßen; Worauff dieselbe ihme durch den *Ceremonimaister* ein schön= Vndt Costbares *Præsent* zuebeschickt, undt darbey eine stund zur *audienz* benennen laßen: Indeme derselbe aber (:vnter höfflichem Vorwandt, daß er nicht so glücklich gewesen in seiner *negotiation* wohl zu reüssiren, also einfolglich so hohe Gnade nicht verdeinet hette:) sothanes Königliche *Præsent* anzunehmen *recusirt*, vnd daßelbige dem *Ceremonimaister* wieder zurückgegeben, hat man bey Hoff darüber allerhandt seltsame gedancken geschöpffet, und ist anfanglich fast angestanden, ob man ihme Graffen von *Donau* annoch zur Abschieds *audienz* *admittiren* solle oder nicht? man hat ihme aber entlich selbige verwichenen Sontag ertheilet, mit höfflichster *Protestation*, daß diese seine genomene beurlaubung der Zwischen Ihro Königl. Mayt: undt seinem Gdstn Churfürsten bißhero gepflogenen aufrichtigen guten freundschaft undt Verstandtnuß (:welche man fort und fort bestendig zu erhalten sich befließen werde:) den allergeringsten abbruch nicht thun solle (etc.) Woran doch männiglich starkh zweiffeln thueth." Franz Graf von Starenberg to Leopold I, Stockholm, 11/21 February 1691. HHStA, Gruppe VIII Staatenabteilungen, Schweden, Karton 8, 1691, 28r–v.

¹²⁴ See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 47. Friedrich kept Falaiseau, now stationed at the Danish court, informed of his actions, and was careful to order him to act with moderation and care should he need to justify Brandenburg's conduct in the matter. See Friedrich III to Falaiseau, Cölln an der Spree, 2/12 April 1691. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 66–70 Dänemark, Konv. 20B, 1r–v.

embassy to Sweden, aimed at improving Brandenburg-Swedish relations, had ended in a complete and disastrous failure.

Confessional Tension as a Marker of Fundamental Change

Religion—or more specifically, Lutheran-Calvinist confessional conflict—thus led repeatedly to stress, and on occasion to serious diplomatic tension, between Brandenburg and Sweden in the later 1680s and the early 1690s—precisely the time when the existing historiography would lead us to believe that intra-Protestant confessional conflict would be least expected—and this despite the fact that Brandenburg and Sweden agreed entirely on the importance of Protestant political unity at this point. Why did this happen? Several potential explanations come to mind. The first turns on the conduct of Falaiseau. His personal religious passion shines clearly through in his correspondence, and there can be little doubt that his fervor in championing the Calvinist cause in Sweden was counter-productive to furthering Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. Moreover, Falaiseau's propensity for scandal was not entirely coincidental. He wrote to Friedrich Wilhelm in April 1688 that “sometimes it is good when scandal arrives,” under which circumstances one can achieve more dramatic results than under normal conditions.¹²⁵ Falaiseau began to earn a reputation as an intriguer from the time of his first diplomatic appointment for Brandenburg in Great Britain in 1682, when Charles II had refused to receive him at court because of his suspicion that Falaiseau was conspiring with the king's domestic opponents.¹²⁶ Brandenburg's choice of a zealous,

¹²⁵ “Je prendray la liberté de dire encore une fois à V:A:E: ce que je me suis desja donné l'honneur de luy ecrire, Que quelque fois il est bon que scandale arrive...” Falaiseau to Friedrich Wilhelm, Stockholm, 20 April 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 249b Schweden, fasc. 2, 71r.

¹²⁶ GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 72–75 England, Konv. 9F. See also Ferdinand Hirsch's discussion in *UA*, XXI, 336–39. Correspondence between Falaiseau, von Fuchs and the Duke of Monmouth was indeed discovered in the papers seized from a man arrested for complicity in the Rye House Plot in summer 1684. See Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, II:257. The Imperial court in Vienna, hoping for Brandenburg-Swedish cordiality at this time of war against France (and the Turks), followed Falaiseau's appointment as ambassador to Sweden with interest, noting that he had “earlier done good intrigues for the public good in England”: “Worauf man ein Abschickung nacher Schweden *resoluiert*, und darzu zwar einen Frantzosen, nahmens *Valiseau*, so seine *religion* *mutirt*, und sonsten Vorhero in Engellandt *pro bono publico* guete *intriguen* gemacht haben solle, benennet.” Summary of reports submitted by Franz Heinrich von Fridag, Imperial ambassador in Berlin, compiled for Emperor Leopold I in June 1685. HHStA, Gruppe VIII Staatenabteilungen, Brandenburgica, Karton 21, 1685, 61r–70v, here 67v. For further examples of Falaiseau's

scandal-loving Calvinist as ambassador to Lutheran Sweden must surely be included among the causes of the eruption of confessional tension in Brandenburg-Swedish relations at this time.

The focus on Falaiseau, however, has its limitations. Following his recall from Sweden he went on to have a successful and extended mission to Lutheran Denmark, and was later even made envoy to Catholic Spain. Furthermore, in the years after he was forced out of Sweden he continued to be a respected voice in mainstream northern European Protestant intellectual and diplomatic circles. He corresponded with Pufendorf and Leibniz (amongst others), and in 1698 Samuel Chappuzeau wrote to Leibniz that “the illustrious M. de Falaiseau” was one of the “savants in Berlin” with whom he had shared manuscript copies of his writings.¹²⁷ A letter to the Dutch statesman Anthonie Heinsius in 1706 described Falaiseau as “highly esteemed and considered one of the great men of the good [allied] party.”¹²⁸ Falaiseau himself bragged of the active political life he enjoyed in England following his retirement from Brandenburg service, including (if we are to believe him) a warm personal relationship with William III.¹²⁹ Falaiseau therefore cannot simply be written off as a figure from the radical fringe who created tension wherever he went.

continued use of inflammatory and bombastic language to characterize his political enemies during his time as ambassador to Denmark, see Richard Schück, *Brandenburg-Preußens Kolonial=Politik unter dem Großen Kurfürsten und seinen Nachfolgern (1647–1721)*, 2 vol. (Leipzig: Fr. Wilh. Grunow, 1889), 1:246.

¹²⁷ “Tous nos Pasteurs et autres Scavans de Berlin, et entre autres l’illustre Mr. Faleseau, à qui j’ay fait voir tous mes manuscrits, et qui ont ouï la lecture de plusieurs articles qu’ils ont trouvé fort exactement touchés[,] m’ont tous fortement exhorté de poursuivre mon travail, jugeant qu’il ne pourra être que tres utile et agreable au public, et sur tout aux Protestans, n’y ayant point en encore en ce genre de Dictionaire si universel et si curieux, ni qui pût mieux tenir lieu d’une ample Bibliotheque.” Samuel Chappuzeau to Leibniz, Celle, 13 [23] November 1698. Printed in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, 1st series, vol. XVI (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), Nr. 182, 289–90, here 289. See also Varrentrapp, “Briefe Pufendorf’s”; Klopp (ed.), *Correspondenz von Leibniz*.

¹²⁸ R. Saunière de l’Hermitage to Anthonie Heinsius, London, 9/20 April 1706. *De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720*, vol. 5, ed. A.J. Veenendaal Jr. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 205–06.

¹²⁹ Falaiseau to Alexander von Dohna, 30 July 1711. GStA PK, VI. HA, Fürstliches Hausarchiv Dohna-Schlobitten, Karton 25a (Alexander), Nr. 277. As early as 1692 William Blathwayt had written to H. Greg that “I have acquainted his Majesty with Monsr. Falaiseau’s and your endeavours to interrupt the irregular trade of the Danes. For Monsr. Falaiseau, whose acquaintance I had formerly in England, I desire you to present my most humble service to him, and to assure him his Majesty does very much value his zeal for the common cause.” Blathwayt to Greg, Grammen, 23 September 1692. Kemble (ed.), *State Papers and Correspondence*, Nr. 20, 96–97.

Furthermore, since Falaiseau's replacement by the conciliatory, religiously-moderate, and well-connected von Dohna led to a religious scandal even more damaging than Falaiseau's, Brandenburg-Swedish confessional conflict can scarcely be explained as the inevitable result of Falaiseau's personal characteristics.

Another possible explanation turns on Swedish domestic politics. Anti-Calvinist sentiment had always run high among the Swedish clergy, yet this sentiment had not yet been a significant detriment to Sweden's diplomatic relations with Brandenburg or other Calvinist states. Sweden had in fact enjoyed something of a reputation as a (relatively) tolerant state domestically and a friend of Calvinists' rights internationally dating back to Gustav Adolf (a warrior/martyr for *all* of Protestantism) and Swedish assistance in securing *paria jura* for Calvinists in the Empire at the Westphalia negotiations.¹³⁰ Why, then, were Swedish religious policies now fomenting intra-Protestant confessional tensions and presenting diplomatic problems? Certainly the *reduktion* and its attendant increase in the power and influence of the orthodox Swedish clergy may have played a role, but the *reduktion* had begun several years before Falaiseau's embassy, and in itself appears to be an insufficient explanation of the change. Karl's ardent defense of the prerogatives of his sovereignty also contributed to his bristling at what he saw as Falaiseau's meddling in internal Swedish affairs, and to the king's unwillingness to compromise in the von Dohna incident, even when serious diplomatic consequences were looming. This was tied closely to the development of Swedish absolutism.¹³¹

Recent studies of Karl's reign have pointed to the central position that religion and the Swedish Church occupied in his worldview and in

¹³⁰ The records of Falaiseau's embassy reveal a fascinating struggle over Sweden's historical legacy. Brandenburg officials repeatedly attempted to paint any Swedish anti-Calvinist actions as dangerous innovations that flew in the face of the time-honored Swedish tradition of toleration that included not only Gustav Adolf and the Swedish actions at Westphalia but also the well-known pan-Protestant leanings of Queen Christina and Karl X Gustaf. The Brandenburg documents are often filled with long and glowing descriptions of past Swedish actions that the most patriotic Swede would have been hard-pressed to top. The Swedes, in turn, were forced to argue that their current actions were in fact in keeping with the real and original spirit of the Swedish Reformation, which was that Sweden was an officially Lutheran state and that laws designed to protect its Lutheran nature (like the church ordinance of 1688) were fully (and historically) justified.

¹³¹ For a discussion of the von Dohna incident in the context of theories of absolutism, see Daniel Riches, "Conversion and Diplomacy in Absolutist Northern Europe," in David M. Luebke, Jared Poley, Daniel C. Ryan, and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *Conversion and the Politics of Religion in Early Modern Germany* (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 87–100.

the rise of a style of rule that did away with many of the constitutional constraints that had bound earlier Swedish monarchs.¹³² The king was a man of deep and extremely traditional piety with an intellectual outlook wholly dominated by Swedish Lutheran orthodoxy. He, like most of his subjects, believed that Swedish social order and wellbeing depended upon national religious unity, which implied adopting a firm stance towards those who may have wished to stray from the faith.¹³³ The responsibility for preserving such unity was a divine mandate Karl believed to have been placed firmly on his shoulders alone, and as such was a central plank in justifying his absolutist policies. Scholars of Swedish Church history have in fact long noted that the wave of Church reforms in the late-1680s and 1690s that included the production of the new Church Law, Church handbook, catechism, psalm book, and Bible translation was an integral part of the ordering and standardizing process involved in the consolidation of the absolutist system.¹³⁴ The king's ability to carry through these reforms and enforce religious uniformity in his kingdom was not only the fulfillment of a God-given duty, but was also a direct reflection of the sovereign majesty of the crown. Any public expression of religious dissent therefore meant not only open disobedience, but also a denigration of the crown's glory that could not be tolerated, even at the risk of incurring significant diplomatic difficulties. Karl's dogged insistence that Emilie conform to the mandates of Swedish religious law was thus based in the king's highly developed sensitivity to any challenge to the prerogatives of rule that formed the cornerstone of the Swedish absolutist system. His chosen form

¹³² Rystad, *Karl XI*; Upton, *Charles XI*; idem, "Sweden," in John Miller (ed.), *Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 99–121.

¹³³ A document written after Karl's death praised him for his intolerance of (especially Calvinist) religious dissent, declaring "Who knows how things might now be with our religion and freedom, if the most blessed King Karl XI had allowed the free exercise of religion here in the kingdom!" Undated and unsigned document with title "Någre swärigheter som wil den *Reformerte religions* öfningen kunna upkomma ifall den på utskilliche orther, hur i riket skula tillåtas." RA, Acta Ecclesiastica, Nr. 139. The Swedish emphasis on domestic religious harmony, including a desire to limit intra-Lutheran polemic, could attract the attention of foreign Lutherans as well. See pp. 174ff. of Johan Frost's "Staat des Königsreichs Schweden, de anno 1686," presented to the Elector of Saxony in 1693. KA, Manuskriftsamlingen, XXXII. Diverse, vol. 4.

¹³⁴ See, for example, Hilding Pleijel, *Karolinsk Kyrkofromhet, Pietism och Herrnhutism 1680–1772*, Svenska Kyrkans Historia, vol. 5 (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1935), 7–61. Lars Anton Anjou has also noted Karl XI's ceaseless striving for order and uniformity in Swedish religious practice during his reign. See part 3 of his *Svenska Kyrkans Historia*.

of admonishment for Emilie—that she be barred from physically appearing at the performative center of absolutist power projection, the royal court—is perfectly in keeping with this understanding. This does nothing, though, to detract from Karl's sincerity in his desire to cultivate friendship with Brandenburg, and it is clear that he had no intention of turning his religious policies into a diplomatic provocation.

So the questions remain: why did Brandenburg make the questionable decision to send hotheaded Falaiseau on a delicate and sensitive mission aimed at conciliation?; why was Sweden suddenly unable to prevent long-established clerical anti-Calvinism from tainting its diplomacy with Brandenburg? In short, why did both governments make important miscalculations, each with religious undertones, which interfered with their mutually-recognized goal of improving relations with one another? An answer to these questions needs to start from the recognition that the rise of confessional tension in Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy in the late-seventeenth century was not an isolated occurrence, but rather symptomatic of a larger shift in Brandenburg-Swedish relations that left each country searching for a new understanding of their relationship.

Falaiseau himself had a notion that a deep change was taking place. "The maxims of the government have indeed changed," he wrote to Friedrich III in September 1689, "and it is nearly impossible that one does not see very quickly the effects of this change."¹³⁵ In terms of Brandenburg's relations with Sweden this change had two main components: first, a generational shift in which a cadre of Swedish officials well-versed in the diplomatic culture and often sharing anti-French sentiments and an openness to cooperating with Brandenburg, were dying out; and second, a general hardening of the Lutheran-Calvinist confessional boundary between the countries that made it more difficult for Protestant cosmopolitans to operate. Falaiseau repeatedly noted that Chancery President Oxenstierna had been his one consistent ally during his years in Sweden, and he once wrote that Oxenstierna was "the only man in Sweden" with the exception of the king who did not have pro-French inclinations.¹³⁶ Falaiseau

¹³⁵ "les maximes du gouvernement sont bien changées, et il est presque impossible que l'on ne voye pas bien tost des effets de ce changement." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 7/17 September 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 42, 56v.

¹³⁶ "[Oxenstierna] est encore le seul home du Suede, hormis le Roy qui n'ayt pas eu des inclinations Francaises." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 9/19 March 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 41, 120r. Falaiseau became more suspicious of Oxenstierna following his withdrawal from Sweden, but not to the point of denying his anti-French credentials.

saw Oxenstierna as isolated and surrounded by enemies. "Chancellor Oxenstierna," he wrote, "does not have a single friend in all of Sweden."¹³⁷ Oxenstierna was an old man, and Falaiseau feared the prospect of his death and its inevitable consequences: "the Chancellor is 68 years old, which is a great age, and after his death, My Lord, one may say heartily that there is scarcely a Swedish minister on whom the allies can rely, and who is not of entirely of pro-French disposition, and willing to do that which France desires for money."¹³⁸ Other Swedish figures who were friendly towards Brandenburg such as Eberhard von Grafenthal, Gustav Sparre, and Knut Kurck did indeed die during this time. Falaiseau took pains to relate the sorrow felt by Oxenstierna over the death of Sparre, "who was the same age as he, and with whom he had been reared and educated."¹³⁹ The dwindling numbers and isolation of this anti-French group around Oxenstierna—those possessing the common diplomatic culture that had connected Sweden and Brandenburg for much of the preceding century—left the Brandenburgers with few men in the Swedish government whom they felt they could trust. It also weakened the ability of this same group to contain the confessional controversies arising during Falaiseau's and von Dohna's embassies and to prevent them from affecting the larger course of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy.

This situation both contributed to, and was exacerbated by, a broader development in which the Calvinist-Lutheran confessional divide between Brandenburg and Sweden was thrown into sharper relief. The appointment of someone like Falaiseau as Brandenburg ambassador to Sweden may point toward a larger radicalization of the northern European diplomatic and religious climate accompanying Louis XIV's religious persecutions when angry and determined activist Huguenots entered the diplomatic and military service of the northern European states in

¹³⁷ "le Chancelier Oxenstirn n'a pas un seul amy dans toute la Suede." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 8/18 March 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 44, 85r.

¹³⁸ "ce Chancelier a 68. ans, qui est un grand age, et, apres sa mort, Monseigneur, on peut dire hardiment qu'il n'y a presque pas un seul Ministre de Suede, sur qui les Allies puissent compter, et qui ne sait pas dans des dispositions entierement Francaises, et prest à faire ce que la France voudra pour de l'argent." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 31 July/9 August 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 42, 17r.

¹³⁹ "Le Comte d'Oxenstiern a été malade cinq au six jours... qu'il eut d'apprendre la mort... d'un senateur nommé Gustave Sparr, qui estait de même âge que lui, et avec qui il avait été nourri et élevé." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 23 November/3 December 1689. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 42, 183v.

significant numbers.¹⁴⁰ The religiously-charged atmosphere of the period did not lead exclusively to a closing of ranks against France, which was facing a trans-confessional alliance of opponents. Rather, rising religious tension could challenge the ability of Louis' Protestant and Catholic enemies to get along with one another and complicate their diplomatic interactions. Brandenburg, for example, responded to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by overturning the long-standing practice of tacitly allowing Catholic subjects to attend mass at the *Imperial* embassy in Berlin, creating diplomatic friction with one of the most important allies.¹⁴¹ Amongst Protestants themselves, Louis' policies heightened sensitivity to any perceived threat to their faith, and although this often led to cooperation between Lutherans and Calvinists (including, at times, between Brandenburg and Sweden, as in the case of the alliance of 1686,) it also carried with it the potential for intra-Protestant confessional conflict as soon as one Protestant prince felt that the actions of another ran counter to the welfare of his confession. Brandenburg therefore was especially prone to a robust defense of Calvinists' rights against either Catholic or Lutheran persecution at the time of Falaiseau's and von Dohna's embassies, whereas Sweden was equally determined to ward off any challenge to its established Lutheran Church.¹⁴² Neither side would have viewed its own actions as inconsistent with the larger goal of Protestant cooperation against French aggression. Geoffrey Symcox has insightfully noted that "the net result of the revocation [of the Edict of Nantes] was to add religious tension to the political factors already polarizing Europe."¹⁴³ The example of Brandenburg and Sweden shows that the religious tension Symcox alluded to was not necessarily confined to the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy. Rather, the French offensive placed pressure on all northern European political arrangements and religious borders, and this pressure could lead just as easily to the disappearance of boundaries between Protestants deciding to join in an alliance as to the creation of boundaries

¹⁴⁰ The military aspect of Huguenot service has been investigated ably by Matthew Glozier. See his *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688: the Lions of Judah* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002); and his co-edited volume with David Onnekink, *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot soldiering, 1685–1713* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

¹⁴¹ Klaus Müller, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, 153.

¹⁴² It is not coincidental that in the same time frame that the von Dohna incident was playing out the Brandenburg government increased efforts to censor anti-Reformed Lutheran texts and protest their publication in Lutheran states. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 19d, fasc. 15; *ibid.*, fasc. 17; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 66–70 Dänemark, Konv. 20B.

¹⁴³ Symcox, 184.

between the same Protestants if they had any reason to be suspicious of one another.

The tense confessional atmosphere in northern Europe in the late-1680s and early-1690s was an active factor in the redefinition of the relationship between Brandenburg and Sweden that took place at this time. Religious issues could lend the two states a sense of common purpose at one moment, a feeling of disorientation, alienation, or anger at another. Each of these extremes exerted tangible influence on the conduct of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy, from the alliance of 1686 to the diplomatic rupture of 1691. David Parrott has correctly described this period as “an epoch when it is widely and erroneously asserted that confessional issues had ceased to be a factor in international politics.”¹⁴⁴ A glance at Brandenburg-Swedish relations reveals that religion did indeed remain an important factor in northern European diplomacy and international relations as the seventeenth century drew to a close, although it did so under changing circumstances and with unexpected results that shook the foundations of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture.

The increasingly confessional nature of the northern European political landscape was felt by many at the time. During Falaiseau's years in Sweden he was approached by a number of Swedish officials seeking to leave Swedish service and enter that of Brandenburg. These were often Protestant cosmopolitans who were open to cooperation with Calvinists (or were even Calvinists themselves) and felt Swedish confessional culture constricting around them. Many expressed to Falaiseau their general displeasure at how things were going in Sweden and their belief that the environment in Brandenburg would be more to their liking.¹⁴⁵ Around the same time there may have been a parallel but opposite movement coming out of the lands of the Brandenburg Elector, with dissatisfied orthodox Lutheran elements emigrating to the more favorable (for their taste) religious climate of Swedish Pomerania.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Parrott, 133.

¹⁴⁵ The most prominent of these was Samuel Pufendorf, who contacted Falaiseau as early as March 1686 regarding his desire to leave Sweden and enter the elector's service. Others include senator Knut Kurck, chancery secretary Thomas Polus, and military figures such as Count Steinberg, Lieutenant Colonel Ridderhielm, and Captain Mardefelt. Olivet, not surprisingly, sought to leave Sweden and obtain an appointment in Brandenburg as well. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 29 [for Pufendorf]; fasc. 33 [for Olivet]; fasc. 42 [for Kurck and Steinberg]; fasc. 44 [for Polus, Ridderhielm, and Mardefelt].

¹⁴⁶ I am grateful to Dr. Jürgen Splett and Dr. Lothar Noack of the University of Potsdam for this information.

The decline of the older generation of Swedish officials and the increasingly confessionalized diplomatic climate in northern Europe created a new set of circumstances that forced Brandenburg and Sweden to interact with one-another differently. Earlier low-points in their relations had been caused by dynastic/feudal concerns (Poland), open warfare (1635–1641, 1658–1660, 1674–1679), or major territorial disputes (Pomerania), but the scandals of the later 1680s and early 1690s were marked by the inability of individual diplomats to function at a time when geopolitical circumstances should have favored concord. By the time that Falaiseau arrived in Sweden, the diplomatic culture that had existed between the countries was already dissolving. The number of Swedish and Brandenburg students enrolling at Dutch universities declined dramatically in the last decades of the century, and cultural relations between Sweden and the Netherlands in general came to an almost complete stop in the later 1690s, never again to recover their earlier vigor.¹⁴⁷ The effects of this change were sensed intuitively by Falaiseau, and also by those Swedish officials who decided that Sweden was no longer to their liking and sought to move to Brandenburg. The disastrous failure of the supremely-connected von Dohna's mission over a confessional issue showed that even a course of action that would once have been entirely safe now led in utterly unexpected directions.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Rietbergen, 341.

¹⁴⁸ Falaiseau's and von Dohna's religious controversies have attracted almost no scholarly attention. Two longstanding and unfortunate features of Prusso-German historiography bear partial responsibility. The first is the editorial decision-making of the compilers of the seminal *Urkunden und Actenstücke* series, who viewed the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm through the teleological lens of Prussian state formation and therefore removed virtually all signs of intra-Protestant confessional tension from the documents in their volumes, especially those from the post-Westphalia period. The edited version of the documents regarding Falaiseau's embassy in volumes XXII and XXIII.2 contain no mention of the church ordinance issues. The second and more deeply problematic factor for the study of early modern Brandenburg is the tendency to focus disproportionately on Friedrich Wilhelm, and to view his death as a fundamental break in Brandenburg-Prussian history. This historiographical dividing-line drawn at May 1688 slices through the middle of Falaiseau's embassy and unnaturally divorces the climax of the embassy (Falaiseau's forced recall in 1690) from the basis of this outcome laid by the religious controversies of the preceding years. It also prevents the formation of any linkage between Falaiseau's and von Dohna's respective religious controversies, a linkage that the archival documents make unmistakably clear and that the Brandenburgers themselves made at the time. The Swedish historical profession's sharp turn away from diplomatic history in general in recent decades only adds to the historiographical obscurity of these events.

EPILOGUE

It took several years following the Falaiseau and von Dohna incidents before full diplomatic relations between Brandenburg and Sweden were restored. The need to cooperate or at least communicate about a variety of issues remained, and the task fell to Justus Heinrich Storren, a voice of moderation during the flare-up over Falaiseau who remained in Berlin as Karl XI's resident, to try to pick up the pieces and craft a working relationship at a time when no Brandenburg representative was present in Stockholm. This wasn't an easy charge. From the spring of 1691—shortly after von Dohna was recalled—the tone and frequency of Storren's dispatches reflected the cold state of relations. Whereas in normal times a representative would send reports back home about twice a week, and even more frequently when matters of great importance were being worked out, Storren's production slipped to once a week and then twice a month as the chill between the two governments stretched on. Most of his writings did little more than convey general information, with scant mention of his having any contact with Brandenburg authorities, receiving orders to negotiate from the king, or indeed of doing much of anything at all.¹ On those occasions when Storren did approach the Brandenburgers with a matter of some weight, such as Karl's offer to mediate a settlement between the allies and Louis XIV, his proposals were pushed aside in a manner to which even the conciliatory Storren took some offense.²

There can be no doubt that the tensions over Falaiseau and especially von Dohna played the major role in this rift, and that both sides were acutely aware of this. As soon as von Dohna's recall became inevitable the Swedish government went into damage control mode, writing to its representatives across Europe to inform them of what had transpired and order them to quell any rumors at their respective posts and stress Sweden's

¹ See RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 32; RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1691; RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1692; RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1693–1694.

² Justus Heinrich Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 5 May 1691. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 32. On Swedish desires to mediate, see RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1691.

unswerving commitment to preserving good relations with Brandenburg.³ Storren immediately sought out Eberhard von Danckelman—a man Storren praised for his moderation in attempting to avert a showdown over the von Dohna issue⁴—who told him of the elector's anger over the matter and made plain that Brandenburg would not appoint a new ambassador to Stockholm until the ban against Emilie was lifted. Danckelman even hinted at the prospects of escalation in stating that Brandenburg had shown great restraint *to this point* by not informing its own ambassadors stationed at foreign courts about the incident nor mentioning it to the English or Dutch at the recently completed talks in The Hague.⁵ Anger

³ “Wir haben Euch hiebevör gnädigst *Communiciret* und eröffnet, waß deises Ohrtes mit der Gräfin *Amelia* von *Dohna*, des Churbrandenburgischen *Ministri* und Abgesandten, Graf *Alexander* von *Dohna*, Ehegattin wegen Ihres genommenen abtritts von Unser *Religion* der ungeenderten Augßburgischen *Confession* Vorgegangen, und waß wir auff sein deßfals eingegebenes *Memorial* vor eine *Declaration* gegeben. Ob wir nun wohl Verhoffet, es werde der Churfürst bey solcher Erklärung und darin enthaltenen wohlgewendeten *raisons acquissiren*, und es da beÿ wollen bewenden laßen. So hat doch Unß erwehnter *Minister* zu kennen gegeben, wie Er beordert were seinen abscheidt bey Unß zu nehmen, und sich von hinnen zugeben; welches wir dan demselben nicht verwegern können, wie wohl wir sonsten gerne gesehen, daß er alhier noch lenger würde geblieben, als welchen wir sonsten *judiciret* haben, daß er ein wohl *intentionirter Minister* were und nicht undienlich seyn werde, daß beiderseitige gute Vornehmen zu unterhalten, als welches Wir mit dem Churfürsten zu *cultiviren* unserseits allerdings geneiget seyn; weilen Er aber auff seine *dimission* gedrungen, auch die ihm und seine Ehegattin zugesandten *présentz* nicht annehmen wolten, so haben wir guthgefunden Euch davon hiemit in gnaden nachricht zu ertheilen, damit ihr allen wiedrigen *Spargementen* moget zu begenen wißen, und darthun können daß unserseits nichts geschehen, in der *intention* und meynung gegen dem Churfürsten etwas wiedriges und unangenehmes zu veranlaßen, wie wir dem annoch beharren in Voriger wohlmeinung, alle gute *intelligence* mit demselben alle wege zu hegen und fort zu pflanzen, welches ihr gebührender Ohrtes zu *contestiren* und zu Versichern habet.” Karl XI to Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, Dörfler, Rothlieb, and Storren, Stockholm, 6 February 1691. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1691, 109v–110v. A Swedish language version of essentially the same document was sent from the same place and day to Gabriel Oxenstierna, Leyonberg, Leyonclo, and Snoilsky. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1691, 111r–112r.

⁴ “...sondern auch der *von Danckelman* von deme nunhehr alles *dependiret*, bißhero in allem seinem thuen große *moderation* gebrauchet, undt selbig auch in diesem Stück zuverüben auß Ew. Königl. May. gnädigen Antwort auf deß H. Grafens *von Dohna Memorial* billig anlaß nehmen sollen.” Justus Heinrich Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 15 February 1691. RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 32.

⁵ “Zwar mueste Er [*Danckelman*] gestehen, daß eß Sr. Churfürstl. Dhl. sehr zu hertzen ginge, daß Ewr. Königl. Maytt. daß wieder die Fr: Gräfin *von Dohna* ergangene Verboth daß Königl. Hofes deroselben zu liebe aufzuheben sich nicht entschließen können, undt Sei dadurch unumbganglich genötigt worden, ihren *Ministrum* zu *avociren*. Sie hetten aber nicht desto weniger annoch die hoffnung zu Ew: Königl. Maytt., daß Sie der abermahligen ans(.)ehn hirin statt geben würden, wolten auch damit zufrieden seyn, wan Ewr. Königl. Maytt. nur geruhn möchten, auch noch schon erfolgter abreise deß Grafn *von Dohna* abgedachteß verboth aufzuheben, nicht daß S. Churfürstl. Dhl. meinung wehre denselben an

over the von Dohna incident continued to resurface in Brandenburg's dealings with Sweden in the years that followed, despite Swedish insistence that the matter lay in the past and bore no connection to the issues at hand.⁶

Despite the tension, a number of pressing issues demanded that short-term and normally low-level diplomatic contact continued off and on between the two governments, usually in multi-lateral negotiations involving the implementation of treaty terms or the regulation of trade.⁷ The Brandenburgers also knew that remaining without a man on the ground in Stockholm for too long would cripple their ability to remain informed of the goings-on at the Swedish court, so Christian Gottfried Winckler was stationed in the Swedish capital and charged with sniffing out Swedish state secrets and reporting them back to Brandenburg.⁸ This meant that Brandenburg's top man in Sweden was working in the shadows of Stockholm as little more than a spy, while Storren in Berlin was in effect a correspondent with only limited dealings with his hosts. The force of events—not the least of which being the ongoing wars of

Ew. Konigl. Maytt. wieder abzuschicken, sondern damit Sie nicht gehindert werden mochten, jemandt anderß der ihrigen abzufertigen, nach Ursach haben, sich eben Ew. Konigl. Maytt. einiger maßen zubeschwehren. Sie hetten solches bißhero nicht gethan, sich auch solcher *moderation* gebrauchet, daß weder ihr eigene an außwertigen Höfen habende *Ministri* von der Sach *informiret*, noch mit denen Englischen und Hollandischen *Ministries* im *Haag* bey neulicher versambling gemahlen darauß geredet worden." Justus Heinrich Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 25 March 1691. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 32.

⁶ See, for example, Karl's palpable frustration over Brandenburg raising the von Dohna affair in the context of the negotiations over Gollnow in May 1693 and the king's insistence that the two matters had "not the slightest to do with one another": "Hwad J uti Edert *post scripto* förmähle 1. Angående brandeburg, at et ingen synnerlig lust skall hafwa, at låta den uthsatte *Gollnouse* Strydigheetern komma under någon *compromiss*, märckiandes, at man där intet med synnerlige skiähl i det måhlet är understödd och at det dem på en fäfang omkostnad komma skulle; Men lykwähl på det de under något skeenbahrt namn den *desputen termineras* måtte, skulle Churförsten wara sinnad, deme Saken moot något nöye uti det, som hans Afgesandt Gref *Dohna* för någre åhr sedan här wederfahret är, willia slåtta och byläggia. Så är deme swar en langesedan afgjord Saak och öfwer hwilken Churförsten slätt ingen Orsak hafwer at mißnöyd wara. Därtill med har densamma icke den ringaste Gemehnsakap med den *Gollnouse*." Karl XI to Nils Bielke, Stockholm, 27 May 1693. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1693–1694, 249r–251v, here 250v.

⁷ These issues included the status of Gollnow, the occupation of Güstrow, coinage and customs regulation, negotiations at the Reichstag, etc.

⁸ In 1696 Winckler wrote of his first years in Stockholm that "werden Ew.C.Dhl: sich genädigst zu erinnern wissen, daß dieselbe mir damahls wenig oder gar keine *secreta* anvertrauet... Mein *devoir* aber wahr damahls die *Secreta publici* hier auszusuchen, und Ew.C.Dhl: *Minister* ins geheim zu berichten." Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 15 April 1696. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 53.

Louis XIV—made it clear that such a situation would not be tenable in the long-run, and in 1694 each side took steps to restore their relations to solid footing. Karl XI sent Count Nils Bielke, a field marshal and governor general of Swedish Pomerania, to Berlin on a mission that was clearly recognized as an opportunity to put problems behind them and work towards reestablishing friendly relations.⁹ While in Berlin Bielke held a special meeting with the elector's highest officials (Danckelman, Meinders, and von Fuchs) in which they spoke directly of the von Dohna affair and agreed to put it behind them.¹⁰ Friedrich III responded to Bielke's mission by sending Count (and Field Marshall) Johann Albrecht von Barfuss to

⁹ The immediate matter at hand was negotiations over Gollnow, although the king was well aware of the broader potential of the mission to put Brandenburg-Swedish relations back on track if the elector would be receptive: "Skulle och en sådan god *disposition* hoos ChurBrandenburg förspöras, som man eder försäkrar om, att befästa wänskap med Oß, och att rädia utur wägen alla stridigheeter, som kunde entstå, af dhe öfriga ännu oafgiorde *differentier*, hwaröfwer för detta wid dhe anställte *conferentier* i Damm och Collbatz är *Disputerat*, och hwilka till en lägligar tyd är utsatte blefue, särdehles angående Oderbrucherne med andre ärender flere, som Eder icke obekante är; Så hafwen J att *sondera* och uthleta, hwad *success* man deruti nu kunde hafwe att förwänta, och huru man sig wid ChurBrandenburgiske hoffwet deröfwer torde wehla uthlåta, samt huru dhe förmehehna, att sådane ärender på det fryligaste och utan widlöfftighet stodo att afgiöra, betygandes Wår redebogenhet och wälmente upsåt, att stå med Churförsten uti en god *intelligence* och uprichtig wänskap, der Wj blifua på lyka sätt bemötte." Karl XI to Nils Bielke, Stockholm, 10 March 1694. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1693–1694, 177r–180v, here 179r–180r. Bielke was able to negotiate an agreement over Gollnow. See RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1693–1694; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 37; von Moerner, Nr. 377, 594–95.

¹⁰ This meeting took place on 25 June 1694 and is summarized in a protocol of that same date in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv: "Ob zwar Sr. Curfürstl. Dhlt. bißhero in den Gedanken gestanden, alß wann Ihrem *Envoyé extraordinaire*, welchen sie zuletzt in Schweden geschicket, dem Grafen Von Dohna, in denjenigen, was wegen seiner Eheliubsten *passiret*, zu wehe geschehen, weshalb Sie auch denselben zu *avociren* veranlaßet worden: jedennoch nach dehm dieselbe vernommen, daß bey der Sachen einige Umstände forgekomen, welcher Ihro vorhin nicht bekant gewesen, insonderheit zu Ihro Königl. Maytt: auch zu unterschiedenen mahlen hochlich *contestiret*, daß Sie nicht die geringste *intention* gehabt, Sr. Churfürstl. Dhlt. *Minstro* einigen *tort* zuzufügen der demselben desjenige entziehen zu laßen, was dem *character*, so Er von Sr. Churfürstl. Dhlt. getragen, gebühret hatte, Allenmaßen dan auch Ihr Königl. Maytt. zur bezeügung der *consideration*, so Sie vor Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. hätten, der Gräffin anzeigen laßen, daß Ihr frey stunde nach hoffe zukommen und Abschied zu nehmen, so haben Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. beschloßen, dieser sachen halber keine Regung mehr zu thun, sondern selbige gäntzlich vor abgethan zuachten und also auch dieses, wie woll geringe *obstacle* mit Ihr Königl. Mayt: eine vollkommene Nachbahrliche Freundtschafft zu *cultiviren*, auß dem wege zureümen zu welchem ende Sr. Churfürstl. Durchl. so bald Sie vernehmen werden, daß Ihr Königl. Maytt: in Schweden angelegt, dero *General* den von barfus an dieselbe zuschicken entschloßen seynd.

Herr Graff *Bielke* p. Nahm diese Erklärung mitt bezeugung sonderbahrer Vergnugung auf und *contestirete* hoch, daß die Abschickung des *General Barfussen* Ihrer Königl. Mayt: sonderlich lieb und angenehm seyn würde." GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47.

Sweden, remarking plainly that he wanted to match Bielke's mission by sending a man of comparable rank to the king as a demonstration of his friendship and satisfaction that the von Dohna incident had been cleared out of the way.¹¹ Barfuss was treated with dignity and returned from his brief mission with a present from Karl in hand, mending the breach in the economy of symbolic exchange between the two courts that had been so scandalously disrupted by von Dohna's refusal of his parting gift.¹²

At this same time Winckler was raised to a respectable position and took up public duties as Friedrich's secretary in Stockholm.¹³ He was now a fully-functional diplomatic representative and engaged in extensive dealings on a broad range of issues until his death in 1697.¹⁴ Winckler was well aware of the religious scandals his two predecessors had become embroiled in, and throughout his years in Stockholm he showed acute concern over the potential for confessional tension to disrupt Brandenburg-Swedish relations once more. When a vigorous debate arose in 1695 regarding the extent of religious freedom to be granted to foreign Calvinists resident in Sweden, English and Dutch diplomats quickly became enmeshed in the affair on behalf of their sizeable expatriate merchant communities. The Reformed Winckler held himself aloof from the fray despite his clear

¹¹ The elector wrote to Falaiseau in Copenhagen of this decision: "...nachdem der König. Schwedische FeldMarschall und *General Gouverneur* des hertzogthums Vor Pommern der *Graff Bielke* ohnlangst mit nur gnossen Vollmacht von seinen Könige anhero kommen, und...derselb wenige, wegen der Gollvanischen *reluitions*-sache annoch unror-tete *puncta* mit Ihn Verglichen danebst auch wegen dessen was mit...lezthin in Schaden gehalten *Ministri* der Grafen Von Dona Ehegattin *in po religionis* bekante wessen zu Stockholm *passiret*, solche erlauterung und *contestationes* von Ihn gethan worden, dß Wir alle Vorhin deshalb gefassete ungliche *opinion* billig fahren lassen, so hülten Wir wenige nicht zu thuen verwegt als hinwiederumb Jemand der Unsrigen... ohngefehr von eben der *profession* u. *Character* wie der *Graff Bielken* an den König abzuschicken und deroselben das Vergnügen, so Wir wegen dieser *retablirung* des, mit Ihre Kon Mt. hebevor gepflegten guten Vernehmes held, zu bezeigen, dieses weher auch das gantze und einige *salet* von des *General Barfus in Commission*..." Friedrich III to Falaiseau, Köln an der Spree, 14/24 August 1694. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 48. Similar letters were sent on the same date to Brandenburg's representatives in Vienna, London, and The Hague. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 48. Barfuss' own instructions are dated Oranienburg, 7 August 1694. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 48.

¹² Documents relating to Barfuss' mission are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 48 and RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1693–1694. On the importance of mutual participation in the exchange of objects between courts as a marker of the health of relations between those courts, see Falcke.

¹³ Winckler's letter of credentials to Bengt Oxenstierna was dated Grimnatz, 31 July/10 August 1694, and his first official report was sent out of Stockholm on 20 October 1694. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 49.

¹⁴ Documents from Winckler's years in Stockholm are in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 49–65.

personal sympathies, and in stark contrast to Falaiseau his reports back to Berlin were level-headed and detached.¹⁵ He urged the elector to leave the matter to the English and Dutch to deal with and suggested that if things escalated Friedrich could offer to mediate between them precisely as a demonstration of his disinterested neutrality that would earn him political points with the Swedes and protect their re-established friendship.¹⁶ Equally importantly, Winckler was circumspect about his own religious activities. He wrote to Friedrich that he was “sacrificing the pleasure of my soul” for the elector’s “service and true interests” by staying away from Calvinist services at a time when debates over foreign ambassadors’ rights of religious exercise would “give the King fresh memories of Falaiseau’s quarrels with the Swedish clergy and the Dohna affair.”¹⁷ Winckler even

¹⁵ Winckler’s correspondence on the matter is in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 50–53. For a taste of Sweden’s diplomatic dealings over this issue, see RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1695–1696.

¹⁶ “Ew. C. Dhl., als welche mit Schweden anjetzo wol stehen, gehet diese *brouillerie* zwar nicht an, ich stelle aber dero höchsterleuchtetem *sentiment* anheim, Ob dieselbe, wan Schweden sich mit England und dem *Staat* mehr *brouilliren* solten, dero *Officia offeriren*, und zu beylegung der Sachen *mine* machen wollen. An hiesigem Hoff würde solches nicht unangenehm seyn, und die *impression* machen, daß Ew. C. Dhl. an dieser *mesintelligence* weder *directe* noch *indirecte* theil nehmen, sondern, als ein *Neutraler Potentat*, zur ruhe beyder *Interessirten Puissancen* zu arbeiten sich ein *plaisir* machen.” Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 27 November 1695. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 51. Already in January 1695 Bengt Oxenstierna had praised to Winckler Brandenburg’s staying out of this issue since doing otherwise would have been interpreted as meddling in Sweden’s internal affairs and would have strained their newly re-established friendship: “Ew. C. Dhl. höchst vernunftfuge *conduite* bey diesen *Religions troublen*, hat H. Graff *Oxenstirn* noch vor einigen tagen sehr gerühmet, in dem... dero mißverständnis mit dieser Cron *declariret* sich in diese *affaire* einzumischen, und nach her gestelter guten *intelligence* mit Ihro May:t die Neüe Freundschaft zu *troublieren* keinen anlaß geben wollen, zu mahlen da Engelland und Holland zu letzt bloß dero eigene Unterthanen zu *appuyiren* sich unterstanden, Ew. C. Dhl. aber deren alhier keine haben, und also nothwendig vor die Einheimischen allein sich hätten *interponieren* müssen, welches man bey Ihro May:t übel außdeüten, und als wen Man sich in *domestica* dieses Königreichs einmischen wolte, hätte *interpretiren* können.” Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 16 January 1695. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 50. Oxenstierna’s choice of language suggests that the implicit contrast between this behavior and Falaiseau’s was likely intentional.

¹⁷ “So besorgte ich es möchte dergleichen *Religions querelle* so bald Sie aufs *Tapis* kähme, dem Könige des von *Falaiseau* ehemahlige mit der Schwedischen Geistlichkeit gehabte Streigitkeit, wie ingleichen die *Donaische affaire* in frisches Andencken bringen, auch Ew. C. Dhl. villeicht sehr ungenädig aufnehmen, daß Sie allezeit dero *Ministrorum* und Bedienten *Religions-exercitii* wegen mit diesem Hoff *demelé* haben, auch mit bey jetzigen *conjuncturen* dero *protection* wiederfahren laßen solten.

habe ich also das sonst an allen orthen übliche *privilegium Juris Gentium respectu* meines öffentlichen Gottes dienstes, wie ingleichen die Vergnügung meiner Seelen bey öffentlichen versamlungen, Ew. C. Dhl. dienste und wahrscheinlichem *interesse*, als ein

went so far as to invite malicious slander upon his character by keeping his marriage to a Swedish woman secret so that her refusal to follow Swedish law and raise her children Lutheran would remain out of the public eye.¹⁸ On more than one occasion Oxenstierna expressed his approval of Winckler's "wise behavior" in religious matters.¹⁹ Brandenburg diplomats also opened up efforts to involve the Swedish government in broader Protestant cooperation on behalf of religious issues in the peace talks with France.²⁰

From 1694, then, things appeared to be returning to the *status quo ante* in Brandenburg-Swedish relations. The efforts of two major figures—Danckelman and Bielke—to rebuild the relationship in the mode of the old diplomatic culture, however, show how incorrect that assumption was. These men worked hard (and in cooperation with each other) to bring Brandenburg and Sweden together through their personal actions, and both fell from grace with disastrous personal consequences. The causes of their respective downfalls had complicated domestic roots, and their efforts on behalf of Brandenburg-Swedish friendship were only singular pieces in much larger and more complex puzzles: it would severely overstate the case to say that they ran into trouble *because of* their role in Brandenburg-Swedish relations. Rather, what Bielke's and Danckelman's respective demises do show is that their way of operating—the diplomatic culture that had characterized Brandenburg-Swedish relations for a number of decades—was now out of step with the times, and those

devoter treüer Knecht, sacrificiren, und deroselben beÿ diesen conjoncturen keinen embarras durch mein particulier Wesen veruhrsachen wollen, sondern mich vielmehr begnüget privatim vor Ew. C. Dhl. langes leben und glorieuse Regierung zu bitten, auch ins geheim zu comuniciren." Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 30 October 1695. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 51.

¹⁸ "Daß ich aber, weil mein Weib der Reformirten Religion zugethan, und damit . . . nicht als eine Schwedische Unterthanin die Gewöhnliche Acte, daß ihre Erben Lutherisch erzogen werden sollen, unterzeichnen möge, in der Ersten mit behutsamkeit und verschwiegenhiet die Heÿrath vollzogen solte ja eher zu meinen ruhm als Schimpf dienen." Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 4 April 1696. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 53. Winckler's marriage did lead to a series of wild accusations against both his and his wife's honor (amongst them being that they were leaking allied secrets to the French) against which he vigorously defended himself.

¹⁹ "So viel weiß ich, daß Graff von Oxenstirn von mir *in hoc puncto* dieser Tage gesprochen, und, ohne ruhm zu melden, gesaget, ich hätte mich *sagement* in dieser Sache *comportiret*." Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 30 October 1695. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 51.

²⁰ See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 714; *ibid.*, Nr. 726; *ibid.*, Nr. 754.

drawn to support the old way were no longer able to navigate comfortably through the system.

Danckelman (1643–1722) possessed the background and values that made him a prime exemplar of Protestant cosmopolitanism. The son of a councilor of the House of Orange, he displayed intellectual gifts at a young age and as a teen studied in the Netherlands and traveled extensively through England, France and Italy.²¹ He entered Brandenburg service at the age of twenty as a tutor to the future Elector Friedrich III. One of Friedrich's first acts upon coming to power was to name Danckelman to the privy council, and despite Danckelman's young age he became the *de facto* chief minister in the electoral government and perhaps the single most influential figure in crafting Brandenburg's policies in the struggles against Louis XIV. He also remained active culturally and intellectually as a patron of the arts and an important figure in the work that led to the establishment of the Prussian *Akademie der Wissenschaften*.²² Etienne Chauvin wrote in the introduction to the first volume of his *Nouveau Journal des Savants dressé à Berlin* that "the first minister of His Electoral Serenity has always well distinguished himself on the part of learning, by his singular erudition and his great ability; and one may rightly call him Maecenas of the *savants*."²³

Danckelman enjoyed a uniformly high reputation and good working relationship with Sweden's representatives at the Brandenburg court. Peter Macklier described him as a "man of probity"²⁴ with whom he had built a "good friendship."²⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm Horn worked closely with

²¹ See entries for Danckelman in *ADB*, IV, 720–25 (by Bernhard Erdmannsdörffer); *NDB*, III, 503–04 (by Hans Saring); and *BBL*, 85 (by Meta Kohnke.) For Danckelman as Friedrich III's favorite who was ill-situated to thrive in the atmosphere of court politics, see Michael Kaiser, "Der unhöfische Favorit: Eberhard von Danckelman (1643–1722), Oberpräsident in Brandenburg unter Kurfürst Friedrich III.," in Michael Kaiser and Andreas Pečar (eds.), *Der zweite Mann im Staat: oberste Amtsträger und Favoriten im Umkreis der Reichsfürsten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Beiheft 32 to the *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 271–94.

²² See Conrad Grau, *Die Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin: eine deutsche Gelehrten-gesellschaft in drei Jahrhunderten* (Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 1993), 57–60.

²³ "Le premier Ministre de Sa Serenité Electorale s'est toujours bien distingué du côté du savoir, par sa singulière érudition et sa grande capacité; et on peut l'appeller justement de Mécène des savants." Cited in *ibid.*, 58.

²⁴ "Geheime Rådth Danckelman . . . hwilcken *passerar* för een Man af *probite* . . ." Peter Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 3 March 1688. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 30.

²⁵ "Ich habe . . . Auch mit dero Geheimbten Raht Hrn. Danckelmann . . . gute Freüntschafft gemacht." Peter Macklier to Karl XI, Berlin, 18 April 1688. RA, Diplomata, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 30.

Danckelman during his time in Berlin and consistently praised his honesty, sincerity, and good intentions.²⁶ Friedrich Christoph von Dohna approved of him as well-intentioned, frank and polite.²⁷ All of them (and Storren as well) noted Danckelman's desire to work for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship. Given this, it is not surprising that he became Bielke's primary partner in 1696 in a movement to cement Brandenburg and Sweden's recovering friendship by renewing the defensive alliance of 1686.²⁸

Bielke's participation in such an effort was less expected. He hailed from one of the leading families in Sweden, was amongst the kingdom's richest and most powerful men, and had an illustrious military record and close personal connections to Karl XI.²⁹ He also, however, had a well-known reputation, amongst Swedes, Brandenburgers, and even the French themselves, of being what Falaiseau described with characteristic understatement as "entirely French to the core," and he had indeed received a French pension for several years, making him an unlikely candidate to partner with Danckelman to champion Brandenburg-Swedish rapprochement.³⁰ On the other hand, Bielke enjoyed ample personal connections to

²⁶ See Horn's correspondence in RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 31.

²⁷ "han [Danckelman] är en Man af ett öppet sinne, gladhCöut ock höflig... Denne Minister har altyd syntes mycket *porterat* för dät att Hanß Herre kunde komma att stå wähl med Eders Kongl: Maytt:, ock har han på alt sätt sökt migh om sådant att försäkra hälst nu medan jag i förledan wår war i Königsberg." Friedrich Christoph von Dohna to Karl XI, Stockholm, 4 May 1691. RA, *Diplomatica, Germanica*, vol. 311, 111–18, here 115–16.

²⁸ Georg Wittrock writes that the plan originated with Danckelman, who found in Bielke "en statsman, som var villig att gå hans stäfanden till mötes." Wittrock, "Nils Bielkes Underhandling i Brandenburg 1696," *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* 1918 (Lund: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1918), 2–3.

²⁹ See the entry for Bielke in *SBL*, IV, 241–57 (by Georg Wittrock). See also Ragnhild Hatton, "Presents and pensions: a methodological search and the case study of Count Nils Bielke's prosecution for treason in connection with gratifications from France," in Phyllis Mack and Margaret C. Jacob (eds.), *Politics and Culture in Early Modern Europe: essays in honor of H.G. Koenigsberger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 101–17, esp. 110–17; and Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 380 (entry B8).

³⁰ "Il [Bielke] est d'une avarice si grande, que ce la gaste tout le reste, et, qu'elle Est capable de luy faire faire[sic] toutes les bassesses imaginables autre cela il es entierement Francois dans le Coeur quoy quil le dissimule de puis queleques moix. Mais pour peu qu'il vist depenchant dans l'esprit du Roy en faveur de la France Ce Comte severait bientot le Masque et se ferait connaistre tel qu'il est." Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 1/11 August 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 35, 47r–54v, here 52r–v. Bielke's connections to France stretched back to his youth when he had been educated at a noble academy in Paris while accompanying his cousin Claes Tott's embassy to the French court. He himself later served as Swedish ambassador to Louis XIV from 1679–1682. For French ambassador Feuquiere's assessment of Bielke as one of the principal supporters of France in Sweden, see his intercepted letter dated Jönköping, 12 September 1677, in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 63, Nr. 571, 331r–334r. French payments to Bielke appear to have stopped in 1696, the year the alliance renewal talks began. See Hatton, 116–17.

circles that had partaken in the Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture (he was, for example, married to a daughter of Gustav Horn), and he himself had facility with the style of semi-autonomous personal diplomacy that had led to so many of the moments of improvement in Brandenburg-Swedish relations in previous decades. More importantly still, Bielke faced an array of domestic political enemies and believed that carrying through an important and ambitious enterprise such as advancing Brandenburg-Swedish friendship would strengthen his own hand back home. There was in fact some overlap between Bielke's enemies and those Swedes whom the Brandenburgers labeled as opposed to their interests, leading to a form of negative integration between Bielke and Brandenburg. Bielke and Winckler in particular shared a hatred of Balthasar Ehrenstolpe, to whom they referred in their extensive correspondence as "the animal" and "the mortal enemy of good relations between Sweden and Brandenburg."³¹ The two got along so well that the normally cautious Winckler could write in April 1696 that Bielke—so recently affiliated with France—was "amongst [the elector's] true friends at this court."³²

With this in mind it is less surprising that Danckelman reached out to Bielke in his plan to renew the alliance of 1686, and that Bielke responded with enthusiasm.³³ They proceeded in the spirit of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture: through personal correspondence, encouraging words to their own governments, official meetings in which they stretched (and in the case of Bielke exceeded) the latitude given them by their sovereigns, and in language reminiscent of the decades before (the need for Protestant cooperation, the natural connection between Brandenburg and Sweden and their near invulnerability if they stood together, etc.) Bielke traveled to Brandenburg in June for negotiations, was received with pomp and circumstance, and worked out a series of agreements with Danckelman

³¹ "Le dt. animal... C'est l'ennemy mortel de la bonne intelligence entre la S: et le Brandebourg..." Winckler to Bielke, Stockholm, 1 August 1696. Cited in Wittrock, "Nils Bielkes Underhandling," 24 n. 3. Wittrock writes at length on the correspondence between Winckler and Bielke and provides considerable direct citations in his notes. Hatred for Ehrenstolpe permeated not only Winckler's letters to Bielke but also his reports back to Berlin as well.

³² "Herr Feldmarschall Graffen von Bielke können Ew. C. Dhl. gleichfals unter dero treüe Freunde an diesem Hoffe zehlen, und muß selbst der Groß-Cantzler Graff von Oxenstirn, der sonst mit ged.n Feldmarschall nicht in alen Stücken von gleichem *sentiment* ist, ihm hierunter *justitz* thun." Christian Gottfried Winckler to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 4 April 1696. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 2471 Schweden, fasc. 53.

³³ Wittrock, "Nils Bielkes Underhandling," provides by far the most detailed treatment of their efforts.

and Fuchs to renew the alliance and deal with other outstanding issues between the two lands.³⁴ Further correspondence and additional meetings between Bielke, Danckelman, Fuchs, and Friedrich III in the fall and between Bielke and Danckelman alone in January followed.³⁵

That Bielke took liberty to step beyond his instructions from the king to pursue a course of action that simultaneously served his heartfelt assessment of Sweden's best interests *and* his own personal agenda fit the pattern for how so much of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy had been driven forward for the better part of the century. Danckelman's vision of Brandenburg-Swedish harmony as a centerpiece of lasting Protestant cooperation in the North was equally consonant with the Protestant cosmopolitan values that had motivated a number of earlier Brandenburg and Swedish diplomats.³⁶ The agreements put together by Bielke and Danckelman met with resistance from their domestic opponents and from those in each state who were suspicious of the true intentions of the other, but by 1698 the terms had been by and large confirmed by both governments. By this time, however, both Danckelman and Bielke had been driven from the public stage, and each was fighting for his very survival against accusations of treason.

Danckelman's and Bielke's respective falls are enormously complex matters that will only be touched upon here.³⁷ Both were politically-motivated proceedings based in charges that were trumped-up by political rivals who were jealous of their adversary's privileged position and distrusting of the policy directions he was taking. Danckelman began to lose his place as Friedrich III's favorite in 1697 when Electress Sophie Charlotte lent her weight to the complaints of his longtime rivals that he was abusing his

³⁴ See von Moerner, Nr. 396, 618–20.

³⁵ Documents from these events are strewn throughout the archives. In addition to Bielke's correspondence cited in Wittrock, "Nils Bielkes Underhandling," see RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1695–1696 and 1697; RA, Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica, vol. 189; GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 250 Schweden, fasc. 5.

³⁶ See Wittrock's ("Nils Bielkes Underhandling," 58–9) description of Danckelman: "Sverige i honom funnit en uppriktig vän, som främst fäste blicken vid gemensamma protestantiska och nord-europeiska intressen..."

³⁷ For Danckelman's fall, see Curt Breysig, *Der Prozess gegen Eberhard Danckelman: ein Beitrag zur brandenburgischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, ed. Gustav Schmoller, vol. 8, nr. 4 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889); Johann Gustav Droysen, *Friedrich I. König in Preußen*, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 123–33; Werner Schmidt, *Friedrich I.: Kurfürst von Brandenburg, König in Preußen* (München: Diederichs, 1996), 142–63. For more on Bielke's trial, see Georg Wittrock, "För-räderipunkten i Nils Bielkes Process 1704–5," *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok 1917* (Lund: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1917).

disproportionate power and, amongst other things, leading Brandenburg to financial ruin. As the chorus of voices against him rose Danckelman sensed the writing on the wall and resigned his governmental positions in November, only to be arrested and imprisoned the following month. Bielke's arrest followed four months later in a similar fashion. The death of Karl XI opened the door for Bielke's foes to act upon their old animosity against him, and in April 1698 they succeeded in having him arrested on charges ranging from self aggrandizement to treasonous contact with foreign princes. Bielke's dealings with Brandenburg played a role in the proceedings, as one of the nine main points raised against him involved accusations of having negotiated with Brandenburg and other states in a manner that ran counter to governmental policy. An intercepted letter from Bielke to Fuchs added further fuel to the claims that he stood in illicit commerce with foreign powers.³⁸

Legal proceedings against Bielke stretched on until April 1705, during which time Brandenburg made moderate efforts to intercede on his behalf.³⁹ He was eventually found guilty on a number of accounts and sentenced to the loss of life and property. The death sentence was never carried out and likely never seriously intended, but Bielke was banned for life from residing in Stockholm or in the vicinity of Court, stripped of whatever property he had not disposed of in the meantime (it helped that he had a rich wife who owned much in her own name), and permanently removed from participation in public affairs. Danckelman's fate was no kinder. Although the trial against him was inconclusive, his property was confiscated and he was imprisoned in the fortress Peitz until 1707, when he was granted a limited amnesty and allowed to reside in Cottbus with certain liberties and a small income from his confiscated estates. He returned to princely grace (although not to public office) when Friedrich Wilhelm I came to the throne in 1713.

Interestingly, Bielke's and Danckelman's opponents held a range of opinions regarding Brandenburg-Swedish relations and included a number of men who had worked in favor of Brandenburg-Swedish cooperation and shared in the traits that had defined the diplomatic culture (including Bengt Oxenstierna and Alexander von Dohna amongst others). Their falls also occurred at a time when, according to Ragnhild Hatton, "the division between pro-French and pro-Allied Swedes had to a large extent

³⁸ *SBL*, IV, 252.

³⁹ See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 249a Schweden, fasc. 2.

lost its meaning.”⁴⁰ Indeed, the trials of Danckelman and Bielke began in the immediate wake of the Treaty of Rijswijk that brought to an end the current round of hostilities between Louis XIV and the allies.⁴¹ From the point of view of Brandenburg-Swedish relations, therefore, the defeat of Bielke and Danckelman (the ‘good party’ in favor of friendship) cannot be described as the triumph of an opposing camp defined in traditional terms. Rather, it was a signal that a new political constellation was in ascendance, and a new mode of operation between the two lands was coming into place.

This transformation took place within the broader context of the decline of the common culture that was evidenced in the scandals surrounding Falaiseau and von Dohna.⁴² Each of them had written in the highest praise of Queen Ulrike Eleonora as a consistent voice for Brandenburg-Swedish friendship and, in Falaiseau’s words, “one of the most wise and enlightened and virtuous princesses in the world.”⁴³ The queen was a great lover of books and patron of the arts who was affiliated with Rumpf’s circle and hoped to build ties between Dutch scholars and the University of Uppsala.⁴⁴ Her death in 1693 was not only a political blow for the friends of northern Protestant cooperation, but also a strike against the Protestant cosmopolitan cultural community held together by transnational

⁴⁰ Hatton, 113.

⁴¹ Disappointment over the outcome of the war added to the momentum against Danckelman. See Hintze, *Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, 258–59.

⁴² It is worth noting that in May 1694 Karl XI issued orders to have copies of Sweden’s religious statutes delivered to all non-Lutheran foreign diplomats immediately upon their arrival in the country so that they could not claim ignorance of the law as a defense for their transgressions: “Emedan det torde hända, at en och annan af de hÿtkommande uthländske *Ministrer* af främmande *Religion*, enår af honom eller hans *domestiquer* något blefwe begått emoot de här i Wårt Rÿke giorde *Religions*-Stadgarne och Förordningar, sig därmed skulle wela ursächta, at han därom icke warit kunig och underrättad; Så är Wår nådigste Willie och befallning, at så ofta en uthlänsk *Minister* af främmande *Religion* här ankommer, J då honom straxt låter *communicera copier* och *Extractor* af de här *publicerade Religions* Stadgar och Förordningar, så wÿda de kunna sådane uthländske *Ministrer concernera* och angå, till at därmed betaga dem den *prætext* och förwändring, at därom icke hafwa warit *informerad* och underrättad; hwarmed J förrättendet Oß länder till nådigt behag,” Karl XI to Christoffer Gyllenstierna, Stockholm, 16 May 1694. RA, Utrikesexpeditionens registratur, 1693–1694.

⁴³ “Le Reine Regente est une de plus Sages de plus éclairées et de plus vertueuses Princesses du monde.” Falaiseau to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 24 August 1688. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 35, 82r–85v, here 84v. Von Dohna (to Friedrich III, Stockholm, 26 November 1690. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 47) similarly said the queen “could justly be held as an exemplar of virtue” (“die Königin, die wohl recht vor ein *exempel* der tugend *passiren* kan.”).

⁴⁴ Rietbergen, 323.

erudition. It is highly symbolic that in 1695 Johannes Leyendecker, the Calvinist minister of the Dutch embassy in Stockholm, published a Dutch-language panegyric to the late Queen Mary and Ulrike Eleonora.⁴⁵ No less symbolic is the fact that news of the queen's death arrived in Berlin just as the mourning ceremonies for another great figure of the old style of interaction—the Prince of Anhalt—were concluding.⁴⁶ The dying out of these figures and the fall from grace of others such as Danckelman placed increasing distance between the political-religious worldview of Protestant cosmopolitanism and the actual conduct of international affairs in the north.

The cultural drifting apart was furthered by the continuing grip of Lutheran orthodoxy in absolutist Sweden and additional restrictions that were placed on Swedish participation in international higher education. In October 1691 Karl XI had written to Bengt Oxenstierna, who served as Chancellor of the University of Uppsala, of the need to guard against “innovations” that threatened the “purity and unity” of teaching at the university, whose mission was to provide Sweden's youth with “instruction in the fear of God, virtue, honor, and all kinds of useful knowledge.”⁴⁷ In coming years one of the main goals of Swedish religious policy became the defense against unorthodox foreign influences, and this was reflected in a new round of restrictions on the foreign travel of Swedish students.⁴⁸ Pietism in particular came to be viewed as a seductive threat to

⁴⁵ Ibid., 329.

⁴⁶ Storren wrote of the receipt of Karl's letter notifying Friedrich III of Ulrike Eleonora's death that “Ihre Churfurstl. Dhl. so wol alß der gantze Hof sindt durch selbiges zum empfindligsten *touchiret* worden, undt kan Ewer. Konigl. Maytt. ich mit grundt der warheit versichern, daß aber dergleichen Trauerfälle nicht leicht ein so algemeines undt warhafftes Leidtweesen hiesiegeß ohrtß verspühret worden, gestalt dan auch zu mehrer bezeugung deßen Hochstgedachte Sr. Churfl. Dhl. nicht alleine die Trauer, welche der hof schon vor einigen tagen wegen Sr. Furstl. Dhl. von *Anhalt Dessau* (welche am 17 dieses des nachtsß umb 11. Uhren nach außgestandener dreytägigen kranckheit am Roth=lauff alhir gestorben) angeleget, zu umdoppaln[?] gnadigst Verordnet, sondern auch mit dem ersten vor die Ehre geschenehe *Notification* durch eine besondere antwort Ewr. Konigl. Maytt. danken, und deroselben Ihr besonderß mitlieden mit mehrem bezeugen werden.” Storren to Karl XI, Berlin, 23 August 1693. RA, *Diplomatica, Brandenburgico-Borussica*, vol. 32. Friedrich III's letter of condolence to Karl XI is dated the following day. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 249a Schweden, fasc. 2.

⁴⁷ Karl XI to Bengt Oxenstierna, Stockholm, 26 October 1691. RA, *Utrikesexpeditionens registratur*, 1691, 613r–616v.

⁴⁸ Göransson, *Svenska studieresorna*, 110ff.

Swedish orthodoxy to be kept out of the kingdom at all costs.⁴⁹ Karl XI's appointment of the ultra-orthodox and bitterly anti-pietistic Johann Friedrich Mayer in 1691 as a high church official in Sweden's German possessions is emblematic of his commitment to nip the Pietist threat in the bud (Ulrike Eleonora, on the other hand, had invited Spener's friend Scriver to be her court chaplain, although he had declined the invitation).⁵⁰ This anti-Pietistic Lutheran orthodoxy was a further wedge that pulled Sweden and Brandenburg in different cultural directions, as Brandenburg became the leading center of German Pietism in the 1690s, particularly at its newly founded University of Halle (1694). Under Friedrich Wilhelm I Pietism developed into something of a Prussian state ethos.⁵¹

Mayer was named Vice Chancellor of the Swedish-Pomeranian University of Greifswald in 1701 and built it into an orthodox Lutheran anti-Halle. Already in 1696 he had visited Sweden with the intention of gaining Karl's official sanction to write in opposition to Halle's Thomasius on political-religious issues, a move that aroused Winckler's fears of confessional tensions straining Sweden's relationship with Brandenburg.⁵² With the urging of Mayer and his allies, Karl XII issued the Edict of Ravitz in 1705, mandating that any Swedish student planning to study in a foreign country had to first spend at least one year at Greifswald as a kind of orthodox inoculation against the damaging influences he was in danger of picking up at Halle or elsewhere.⁵³ The educational paths and

⁴⁹ See Herman Levin, *Religionstvang och Religionsfrihet i Sverige 1686–1782: bidrag till den svenska religionslagstiftningens historia* (Stockholm: Andréens, 1896), 155–228; Pleijel, section II.

⁵⁰ Anjou, 564–65. On Mayer, see *SBL*, XXV, 291–92 (by Helmut Backhaus.) Mayer quickly raised the ire of Brandenburg officials with his attacks on Spener. See *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 13, Nr. 24, fasc. 5.

⁵¹ See Carl Hinrichs, *Preußentum und Pietismus: der Pietismus in Brandenburg-Preußen als religiös-soziale Reformbewegung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1971); Klaus Deppermann, *Der hallesche Pietismus und der preußische Staat unter Friedrich III. (I.)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961); Richard L. Gawthrop, *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Benjamin Marschke, *Absolutely Pietist: patronage, fictionalism, and state-building in the early eighteenth-century Prussian army chaplaincy* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2005).

⁵² See the correspondence in *GStA PK*, I. HA, Rep. 11, Nr. 247I Schweden, fasc. 53. The specific tract that Mayer wanted to refute was Thomasius' *Das Recht Evangelischer Fürsten in Theologischen Streitigkeiten* (Halle, 1696).

⁵³ Göransson, *Studieresorna*, 130ff. On Swedish students at Halle, see Thomas Otto Achelis, "Schwedische und Finnische Studenten auf der Universität Halle 1692–1774," *Historisk Tidskrift* 51 (1931), 443–46.

religious-cultural worlds of Sweden's and Brandenburg's future generations of diplomatic elites were diverging.

The foreign policies of the Swedish and Brandenburg governments were also embarking upon increasingly separate paths. The renewal of the alliance of 1686 led to short-term cooperation but not the long-term bond that Bielke and especially Danckelman had hoped for.⁵⁴ Substantial diplomatic contact between the states did continue for years to come—from this there could be no turning back.⁵⁵ The centers of their attention, however, were drawn in different directions: Brandenburg-Prussia's towards a desired coronation and yet another round of fighting with Louis XIV, Sweden's more definitively towards the East and the looming wars of Karl XII. That Prussia was more or less able to keep itself on the peripheries of Karl's Northern Wars, and Sweden in turn played not much more than a perfunctory role in the wars of Friedrich the Great some decades later, shows just how much things had changed.

Concluding Remarks: Squeezed From Both Ends

The style of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy that was coming to its end as the seventeenth century expired was characterized above all else by personal relationships. The personal diplomacy of networks of individuals could accomplish much when the formal institutions of state power were insufficiently developed, ill-positioned, or unwilling due to external circumstances or internal divisions to do the work of crafting and maintaining an early modern diplomatic relationship. In the face of immature (or even illicit) bilateral ties, these networks could maneuver state entities towards major actions, as we have seen in the case of the marriage negotiations discussed in Chapter Three. On other hand, the events of Chapter Five demonstrate that a reliance on networks of individual actors within a structure of diplomatic contact that accorded them sufficient power could seriously complicate or even completely undermine the sincere efforts to state institutions to get along if the individual diplomats had independent or divergent agendas. The diplomatic culture rendered Brandenburg-Swedish relations vulnerable if individuals such as Falaiseau pulled in a particularly sensitive direction, regardless of how convinced these individ-

⁵⁴ Landberg, 255–57; Wittrock, “Nils Bielkes Underhandling,” 55–60.

⁵⁵ See Ernst Carlson, *Sverige och Preussen 1701–1709* (Hist. Bibliotek, 1880); Bengt Lundberg, *De Diplomatiska Förbindelserna Mellan Sverige och Preussen från Poltavslaget 1709 till Fredsbrottet 1715* (Lund: Gleerupska Universitets-Bokhandeln, 1893); idem, *Sverige och Preussen från Krigsutbrottet 1715 till Freden 1720. I. 1715–1718* (Örebro: Lindhska, 1913).

uals may have been that their actions were serving the interests of their prince as well as a broader common good. As Bielke and Danckelman learned, unspoken shifts in diplomatic paradigm brought about by the changing culture could alter the effectiveness of the familiar tools at hand and force a recalibration of the instruments of statecraft.

The fall of figures such as Danckelman coincided with advances in the centralized administration of diplomatic activity as the apparatus of the early modern state continued to evolve. Though still far removed from the full bureaucratic management of foreign policy to which modern states aspire, Danckelman's demise marked a stage of transition away from the dominant role of individual personalities and towards the increased power of institutional structures governed by written regulations and less-flexible modes of conduct.⁵⁶ Whereas the increasing prominence of transnational networks and non-state actors in the post-Cold War international arena is often attributed to a 'thinning' of the state, the transition into the eighteenth century was a time of thickening of state structures that restricted the motion of such networks and actors.⁵⁷ The developing state shouldered elements of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture such as friendship ties off of their perch between public and private and firmly into the private sphere.⁵⁸ Diplomatic gift-giving came under more centralized bureaucratic control as well.⁵⁹ Daniela Frigo cites the transition from seventeenth to eighteenth century as the time in which advances in state sovereignty and international law "profoundly altered the ambassador's functions and conduct" within a new, systematic understanding of diplomacy as a distinct abstract concept.⁶⁰ In short, the grinding, halting march of European state formation applied pressure to the old diplomatic culture in a manner it was ill-suited to withstand.

At the same time adherents of Protestant cosmopolitanism found less space for themselves within a Swedish service increasingly attentive to

⁵⁶ Ulrike Müller-Weil places Danckelman's fall in precisely this context. See her *Absolutismus und Aussenpolitik in Preussen: ein Beitrag zur Strukturgeschichte des preussischen Absolutismus*, Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen, vol. 34 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), 162–63.

⁵⁷ On the 'thinning' of the state, see Rudolph, 12. On the growing state monopoly over diplomatic activity at the cost of non-state actors and networks as the eighteenth century progressed, see Externbrink, "Humanismus, Gelehrtenrepublik, und Diplomatie," 146–47. From a modern perspective, the diplomatic actions of non-state actors are intrinsically questions of power and the limits of state sovereignty. See Heintzen, 83–84.

⁵⁸ See Österberg, *Vänskap—en lång historia*, 285–86.

⁵⁹ Jansson, 353.

⁶⁰ Frigo, "Prudence and Experience," 15–16. Thiessen's model of the *type ancien* diplomat came to an end at the same time.

more narrowly-focused understandings of Swedish national identity and Lutheran orthodoxy. The numbers of foreigners receiving diplomatic and other appointments fell, as did the numbers of Swedish elites studying abroad.⁶¹ Sweden's political structure was becoming mono-lingual and mono-cultural—a world of “shrinking horizons” as the eighteenth century began that left little room for fluid cosmopolitanism and a protean, transnational diplomatic culture.⁶²

The particularizing forces of state formation and nascent political-cultural nationalism imposed upon the world of diplomacy—and equally importantly on the identity and allegiance of diplomatic actors—borders that were both more sharply delimited and more jealously guarded than had existed before. Modern states may demand the complete and exclusive loyalty of their diplomats, who in turn construct their sense of self around being servants of that state.⁶³ Some recent historians of early modern diplomacy have rightly challenged the transposing of these modern concepts of the state as abstract, autonomous, confident entity onto an early modern context where such forms of political organization were not yet ascendant, either in theory or practice.⁶⁴ In place of an anachronistic vision of an impersonal state, a number of scholars stress the continuing centrality of the prince as individual in early modern foreign policy decision making, and argue that early modern diplomats defined their activity in terms of personal relationships of loyalty and service to the prince.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 322.

⁶² Sten Carlsson used the label “krympande horisonter” for eighteenth-century Sweden, in particular in reference to the role of foreigners and international influences. Carlsson, “Tyska invandrare i Sverige,” *Fataburen* (1981), 9–31, here 23. See also Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*, 322 n. 55.

⁶³ This is a cornerstone of Garrett Mattingly's understanding of Western diplomacy since the Renaissance. Mattingly paraphrases the fifteenth-century Venetian scholar and diplomat Emolao Barbaro to declare that, according to the new diplomatic theory accompanying the rise of the sovereign state, “[t]he ambassador can have no private views. He exists to serve the state.” While granting that the triumph of such views took time, Mattingly adds that “[t]he new omniscient, egotistic states were beginning to demand the external signs, at least, of this total allegiance, and in making the expected gestures men were coming to feel the appropriate emotions.” The result was that modern “diplomats, by the conditions of their service, could think only each of his own state, and the state, by the law of its being, could think only of itself.” Mattingly, 102.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, esp. 13–25.

⁶⁵ Black, *History of Diplomacy*, esp. 43–58. Thiessen discusses the bond between prince and diplomat as a form of patron-client relations. *Diplomatie und Patronage*, 34–36, 224–26. See also idem, “Diplomatie vom *type ancien*,” 487–88. Droste describes early modern Swedish diplomats as servants of the crown rather than of the prince *per se* who sought through their service to gain participation in the exercise of power. Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone*.

These studies fit closely with the image of the diplomat as courtier, functioning through connections with his prince at home as well as with the court to which he was posted. This understanding finds support in the burgeoning early modern theoretical literature on the 'perfect ambassador' that stresses the necessity of courtly skills and the diplomat's status as the prince's direct personal representative. This book, however, has suggested that important parts of early modern diplomatic activity were conducted outside of the context of the court, and by individuals who could have the most tenuous of connections to princes. Personal loyalty to a prince, like that to an impersonal state, formed but part of a Protestant cosmopolitan's sense of allegiance that remained fundamentally plural rather than singular in orientation. As the eighteenth century approached, however, the growing weight of demands from the developing states became increasingly difficult to resist, and the plurality of allegiance increasingly difficult to maintain. The shape of diplomatic activity itself was forced to adjust accordingly.⁶⁶

This was not, however, the only direction from which Protestant cosmopolitanism and Brandenburg-Swedish diplomatic culture were put under duress. Whereas this first set of factors erected new barriers that divided those within the group from each other in novel ways, the universalizing forces of Enlightenment and an increasingly ascendant pan-European elite diplomatic culture eroded the older lines that had set the same group apart from the world around them as something unique. Scholars of eighteenth-century diplomatic culture consistently note its aristocratic universality. Europe's diplomatic corps became more socially uniform from the later years of the seventeenth century, with nobles dominating diplomatic appointments that had previously been open to talented and well-connected commoners.⁶⁷ Participation in diplomatic affairs became ever more confined to a continent-wide yet socially-closed set of actors with a strong sense of group solidarity undergirded by a consistency of values,

⁶⁶ My sincere thanks to the anonymous reviewer at Brill for helping clarify the thoughts in this paragraph.

⁶⁷ See Scott, 72–73; Klaus Müller, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen*, 235–36; Lindemann, "Discreet Charm," 289; Black, *History of Diplomacy*, 102–03; Klaus Kjølse, *Det diplomatiske Fag: den danske Udenrigstjenestes Forvaltning 1700–1770* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1991). On the persistence of aristocratic preponderance in European diplomacy into the twentieth century, see T.G. Otte, "'Outdoor Relief for the Aristocracy'? European Nobility and Diplomacy, 1850–1914," in Mösslang and Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World*, 23–57.

outlook, taste, manners, and patterns of action that had little patience for regional or confessional variation.⁶⁸ As Hamish Scott describes:

Diplomats from every country came to behave in similar and even identical ways; to speak the same language—French—and even to correspond with their superiors in it, rather than their own native tongues; to be drawn overwhelmingly from the same social group, the nobility and especially its higher echelons; to spend a larger proportion of their time attending the royal court of the country to which they had been sent; and to identify with fellow-diplomats with whom they shared the same lifestyle, mores and set of socio-cultural values. In this way they became a distinct ‘independent society’ ...⁶⁹

An ‘independent society’ of all (officially-credentialed) diplomats posed a fundamental challenge to the transnational and malleable yet quite definitely exclusive diplomatic culture shared by many Brandenburgers and Swedes (and by no means only those with formal diplomatic appointments) in the preceding century. The same can be said of the forms of universalizing cosmopolitanism favored by the Enlightenment. As was true of diplomatic culture, eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism was often elite in composition and courtly in style but grounded in pretensions of universal humanity and “standards assumed to transcend any locale.”⁷⁰ Passionate religious attachments, especially when manifested as prejudice towards those religiously different, were seen as particularly antithetical to a worldview that honored reason and aimed to accentuate that which all people held in common. The world of diplomacy was not left untouched by such thinking. Indeed, the eighteenth-century diplomat, as a man of travel and refinement, was expected to be the paragon of this

⁶⁸ Frey and Frey (212) write that “The international character of European aristocratic society also reinforced ambassadorial privilege. Shared patterns of conduct, family ties, and common cultural values of a privileged elite fostered diplomatic privilege. The similarity of manners, style, and even language of an aristocracy that crisscrossed Europe facilitated contact between the various courts. In the eighteenth century a member of the European nobility would have more in common with members of his own class in another country than with those of a different class in his own.” See also Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, 374.

⁶⁹ Scott, 60. The reference to eighteenth-century diplomats as an “independent society” is taken from Antoine Pecquet, *De l'art de négocier avec les souverains* (The Hague, 1738), 104.

⁷⁰ A. Anderson, “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity,” 267–69; Calhoun, 89; Schlereth, xi–xiii.

form of cosmopolitanism, and to serve as a bridge figure providing access to cosmopolitan currents for broader swaths of elite society.⁷¹

Taken together, these shifts in European diplomatic culture and cosmopolitanism worked to dissolve the distinctively northern Protestant features of Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy into the broadly universal at the same time that the progress of state formation and the stirrings of political-cultural nationalism divided the northern Protestant world from within. The forms of interaction examined in this book and the worldview that underlay them were under assault from two distinctly different directions. Though by no means an instantaneous, uncontested, or completely successful process, Brandenburg-Swedish diplomacy in the future would evolve in the face of these forces towards the state-centered world of stable boundaries, secular interests, and the preponderance of credentialed diplomatic actors taken for granted in most works of modern diplomatic history.

Historians who project this modern image of diplomacy backwards onto the early modern period do so at their own peril. This book has used the example of Brandenburg-Swedish interaction to argue that early modern diplomacy had an importantly different form than the modern model often ascribed to it. The Brandenburg-Swedish relationship was grounded in a diplomatic culture that defied the structured polarities of modern understandings of bilateral relations. The creation and maintenance of this diplomatic culture was a fundamentally social and cultural act, where values, beliefs, and personal connections held an important and sometimes higher place than formal political allegiance or the high affairs of state. Awareness of this allows us to recapture the dynamism of an early modern diplomatic world that consisted not of lumbering impersonal instruments but rather of continually forming and reforming relationships between multifaceted individuals who were immersed in the intellectual, cultural, and religious—as much as the political—currents of their day.

⁷¹ Lucien Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe (XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 585. Mori (149–66) investigates diplomatic assistance to elite travelers on grand tour as an example of diplomats' mediation of cosmopolitan culture.

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